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This research project originally contributes to the analysis of Antonio Tabucchi’s oeuvre 
by proposing an interpretation of his poetics through the perspective of the uncanny. 
Existing literature, despite having detected a presence of the Freudian unheimliche in the 
writer, has not developed this observation into a wider reading and problematisation of 
Tabucchi’s poetics. It has been my aim in this thesis to fill this gap, through a 
comprehensive analysis of Tabucchi’s works and a descriptive interpretation of his poetics. 
The present research takes its cue from the observation of two undisputable, interrelated 
facts. First, there is a threefold presence by the uncanny in the works of Tabucchi: diegetic 
(the uncanny in Tabucchi), narrative (the uncanny through Tabucchi) and theoretical 
(Tabucchi and the uncanny). Second, this uncanny is not necessarily and solely equivalent 
to Freud’s unheimliche – and this is where/why Agamben comes in. Using Agamben in 
reading Tabucchi lets surface a philosophical enquiry within his works that would remain 
otherwise overlooked. Tabucchi’s philosophical enquiry is precisely the uncanny 
emergence of signification itself in literature (the uncanny as poetics), in relation to the 
ontological (or metaphysical) view of men as creators of sense. Thus, drawing on 
Agamben’s theorisation of the concept, the uncanny is defined, throughout this study, as a 
signifying function and a process of semiosis, which, far from being reducible to a 
catalogue of themes and motifs, occurs as the structuring of sense in and through the 
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La vita è l’esitazione fra un’esclamazione e un’interrogazione.  
Nel dubbio c’è un punto finale. 








… Then another abyss opens 
between this body and the body 
that was inside it: the abyss that 
separates mother and child. What 
relationship is there between me 
or, more modestly, between my 
body and this internal graft, this 
crease inside, which with the 
cutting of the umbilical cord 
becomes another person, inaccessible? 
My body and … him. 
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Quest(ion) of Sense. Antonio Tabucchi’s Poetics of the Uncanny 
 
This research project questions what it means to talk about a poetics of the uncanny within 
the oeuvre of Antonio Tabucchi, and to what extent, on what conditions and in what ways 
it is possible to do so. Answering such questions entails an analysis of the main theoretical 
and conceptual premises that underpin the critical perspective embraced in the study: What 
is the uncanny? In particular, how does Tabucchi define and understand it? And how can it 
be made intelligible in terms of poetics? This will also require a close examination and 
interpretation of the styles and strategies the writer adopts in his writings. How and on 
what levels does the uncanny function? And what do Tabucchi’s texts reveal about his 
poetics?   
 
This study is intended as a work of literary criticism, understood as ‘the pursuit of signs 
[…] incited by the prospect of grasping, comprehending, capturing […] evasive signifying 
structures’.1 It is aimed at describing the manner in which specific ‘meanings or effects 
[…] are achieved’2 in a literary text, not solely by examining what it signifies, what 
meanings it advances to the reader, but also by considering how it signifies, how 
Tabucchi’s opus composes a signifying structure articulated and performed within and by 
his works (poetics). Accordingly, the term poetics is used to define how Tabucchi creates 
his literary discourse, how he understands the role of literature and his personal literary 
experience in relation to the cultural and historical context he inhabits. As Benedetti 
affirms, ‘[l]a poetica, nel senso tutto particolare che la parola ha acquisito nel Novecento, è 
il programma che guida il fare artistico individuale’, which is to say ‘quel complesso di 
ragioni che spingono un autore a scegliere una certa forma d’espressione [… e] che 
toccano spesso i massimi problemi: il rapporto tra linguaggio e realtà, tra arte e società, tra 
arte e istituzioni artistiche’.3 Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny is socially and historically 
                                                        
1 Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction, revised edition (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. vii.  
2 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 
61.  
3 Carla Benedetti, L’ombra lunga dell’autore: indagine su una figura cancellata (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1999), p. 
35. As Benedetti specifies, ‘la nozione di poetica […] fu riportata in auge da Walter Binni’ (ibid.), according 
to whom ‘con la parola “poetica” si vogliono essenzialmente indicare la consapevolezza critica che il poeta 
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situated. This implies that his oeuvre should be understood as an individual, aesthetic 
reflection of and reaction to the actual social and historical forces that condition it and 
from which it arises. In this regard, the challenge to the possibility of a discourse of truth 
and the crisis of sense making inaugurated by modernity and radicalized by postmodernity 
can be understood as the historical and cultural roots from which the uncanny within 
Tabucchi’s opus originates and develops as a kind of poetics. 
 
Significantly, in his main theoretical discussion of the concept,4 Tabucchi adopts the term 
‘inquietudine’ (often capitalised), rather than the properly Freudian ‘perturbante’. 5 
Choosing a noun instead of the adjective immediately suggests that the writer intends to 
engage with and conceptualise the uncanny on an ontological: Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ is 
a condition, before and beyond being an affective property.6 In effect, a crucial motif of 
Tabucchi’s literary output is the idea of man’s openness to meaning as uncannily 
articulated: what distinguishes a human being is a need for significance and an incessant 
creation of structures of meaning through which to make sense of one’s being in the world 
(ontological or metaphysical uncanny). Man is unique in his potential to endow every 
experience he undergoes with sense, including that of his own existence. In Tabucchi, this 
task is uncanny for two main reasons: first because it calls into question and exposes the 
gaps existing inside any pre-given, meaningful totality and familiar practice of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
ha della propria natura artistica, il suo ideale estetico, il suo programma, i modi secondo i quali si propone di 
costruire. Si distinguono di solito una poetica programmatica e una poetica in atto, ma la parola ha il suo vero 
valore nella fusione dei due significati, come intenzione che si fa modo di costruzione’. As Binni remarks, an 
author’s poetics needs to be historicised, that is analysed in relation to the historical context within which it 
originates, since it expresses ‘il gusto di un’epoca, le tendenze di un periodo letterario’. See: Walter Binni, 
‘La poetica del decadentismo’, in Opere complete di Walter Binni (Florence: Il Ponte Editore, 2014), pp. 25-
26. 
4 See: ‘Dal desassossego di Fernando Pessoa fino all’assurdo beckettiano’, in Parole per Antonio Tabucchi. 
Con quattro inediti, ed. by Roberto Francavilla (Rome: Artemide, 2012), pp. 65-75. 
5 All the occurrences of the term unheimliche in Freud’s writings have usually been translated with the 
adjective ‘perturbante’ since Silvano Daniele’s first translation in: Opere di Sigmund Freud (Turin: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 1966-80). As Tabucchi acknowledges, ‘[i]l termine  freudiano è das Unheimliche, che in italiano 
è stato tradotto da Cesare Musatti con il termine “perturbante” ed è il termine con il quale poi è entrato nel 
commune linguaggio psicanalitico italiano’. See: ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 67.  
6 As Tabucchi explains, this linguistic choice comes from the fact that ‘inquietudine’ is the term he and his 
wife Maria José de Lancastre have used in their first Italian translation (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1986) of Pessoa’s 
Livro do Desassossego. For Tabucchi, desassosseggo and unheimliche belong to the same ‘blocco 
semiologico’ (‘Dal desassossego’, p. 67). However, in chapter 2 I will outline the differences between the 
two. 
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signification; second because it constitutes an interrogation of sense that cannot – and does 
not want to – be exhausted or utterly answered, which is capable of sustaining and 
inhabiting semantic limits and voids. Disturbing and collapsing familiar processes of sense 
making, the unheimliche reveals how human beings are inherently producers of sense and 
how this takes place in a discontinuous, interrogative and unsaturated manner.  
This impression of a search for meaning underlying Tabucchi’s oeuvre is cognate with my 
decision to read his texts through and alongside Agamben’s account of the uncanny. 
Indeed, for both authors the unheimliche provides a privileged vantage point from which to 
meditate upon the essence of human being as creators of sense,7 questioning the way in 
which it is possible to dwell within a meaningful existence.  
At present, it is not possible to document a direct influence of Agamben’s texts on 
Tabucchi, nor the fact that the writer knew or directly read the philosopher. However, 
referring to Agamben’s treatment of the uncanny in reading Tabucchi allows one to 
identify and examine a type of philosophical enquiry within the latter’s works that would 
otherwise remain (and has indeed remained thus far) overlooked. Tabucchi’s philosophical 
enquiry addresses and at the same time embodies precisely the uncanny emergence of 
signification itself in literature (the uncanny as poetics), in relation to the ontological (or 
metaphysical) view of men as creators of sense. In other words, it is an investigation of the 
different ways in which literature (and his own literary practice) can be a discontinuous, 
interrogative, unsaturated experience of sense making – an exploration of how literature 
addresses what Tabucchi calls ‘desiderio metafisico’8 or ‘interrogazione metafisica’,9 
namely the idea that ‘[l]a letteratura è una forma laica […] di risposta alle necessità 
religiose dell’uomo’.10 Indeed, Tabucchi observes,  
 
Da quando abbiamo perso la convinzione che qualcuno ci osservi, la nostra vita manca di finalità. 
[…] Adesso che non c’è più nessuno che ci osserva, la nostra vita si è convertita in un qualcosa 
privo di senso […].11  
 
On this point he then adds how 
                                                        
7 Agamben defines it as ‘lo statuto poetico dell’uomo’. Giorgio Agamben, L’uomo senza contenuto (Milan: 
Rizzoli, 1970), p. 89. 
8 Carlos Gumpert, ‘La letteratura come enigma e inquietudine. Una conversazione con Antonio Tabucchi’, in 
Dedica a Antonio Tabucchi, ed. by Claudio Cattaruzza (Pordenone: Associazione Provinciale per la Prosa, 
2001), pp. 17-105 (p. 92). 
9 Tabucchi, ‘L'irreversibile e la nostalgia’, L'indice dei libri del mese, 5 June 1985. 
10 Gumpert, p. 74. 
11 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
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[N]ella letteratura, come forse anche nella vita, la cosa fondamentale non è trovare ma cercare. I 
ritrovamenti mi sembrano secondari, l’essenziale è l’ansia della ricerca, è questo che deve animare 
l’uomo […]. La letteratura è una specie di sfinge […] perché, data la sua ambizione di rispondere ai 
grandi interrogativi dell’esistenza e dell’uomo, ci attrae irresistibilmente dandoci l’illusione che 
interrogandola troveremmo le risposte che cerchiamo.12 
 
If human beings inevitably find themselves facing the uncanny in their search for meaning, 
literature is uncanny insofar as it offers means, modes and spaces for this interrogation by 
virtue of its problematisation of how sense is constructed, experienced and shared. 
Drawing on Agamben’s philosophy of language and more specifically on his theorisation 
of the notion of uncanny – which, as will be shown, is fundamentally consistent with the 
one offered by Tabucchi – the uncanny will be defined throughout this study as a 
signifying function and a process of semiosis. Far from being reducible to a catalogue of 
themes and motifs, this is rather understood as a meaning-making process that occurs in 
and through the literary text.13 Like literature, the uncanny takes place within language or, 
rather, it problematises the experience we undergo (with)in language.14 Accordingly, 
speaking of a ‘poetics of the uncanny’ ultimately implies analysing the ways in which 
Tabucchi explores the conditions of possibility and the limits of literature as a process of 
sense making, and thus addresses the question of how it is possible – for and through 
literature – to make sense of our being in the world (Tabucchi’s ‘necessità religiose 
dell’uomo’). For, Tabucchi observes, there is a strong nexus between the uncanny and the 
very idea of poetics, namely of a ‘letteratura [che], riflettendosi su se stessa, possiede la 
coscienza di farsi’: this comes from the fact that ‘una scrittura che si interroga non è una 
                                                        
12 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
13 ‘Even if the uncanny is not conceived as an irreducibly subjective sentiment its objective structure cannot 
be determined solely in thematic terms, independent of their completely structured context. If, as Freud’s 
conclusion suggests, das Unheimliche has a privileged relation to literary ‘fiction’, it is surely not to the 
merely contexts represented ‘in’ or ‘by’ texts, but to their ‘formal’, textual structure itself’. Samuel Weber, 
The Legend of Freud, 2nd edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 218. 
14 ‘Above all, the uncanny is intimately entwined in language, with how we conceive and represent what is 
happening within ourselves, to ourselves, to the world, when uncanny strangeness is at issue’. Nicholas 
Royle, The Uncanny, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) p. 2. Similarly, Bernstein comments 
that ‘[t]he uncanny calls not for a definition, a collection of thematic terms, but rather, as a formal, textual 
structure, demands reading. […] It has tended to become a fixed psychoanalytic concept whose descriptive 
potential overshadows the fact that the uncanny puts in question the possibility of definition itself’. Susan 
Bernstein, ‘It Walks: The Ambulatory Uncanny’, Experimenting: Essays With Samuel Weber, ed. by Simon 
Morgan Wortham and Gary Hall (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), pp. 183-208 (p. 184). 
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letteratura che si ripiega su se stessa, bensì una letteratura che presenta più interrogativi, 
che inquisisce [e perciò inquieta] con maggior profondità’ (my italics).15 
 
The title of this study aims to simultaneously describe and perform Tabucchi’s uncanny 
exploration. The conceptual oscillation between and intermingling of ‘quest’ and 
‘questioning’ alludes to the fact that Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny is grounded in a 
search for sense, constituting a problematisation of literary signification itself. 
Incorporating a parenthesis to suggest this twofold value, the title offers a sort of disjointed 
and estranging linguistic and reading experience that visualises the uncanny. A similar 
process takes place with Tabucchi’s works, where the uncanny is both thematised and 
performed. The question(ing) and the quest for sense, at once a re-grounding and a pursuit 
of ‘metaphysical’ significance,16 is what defines and legitimates, for Tabucchi, the role of 
literature, and which also constitutes the pivotal principle underpinning his own poetics: 
 
Un romanzo non è grande se non ha in sé almeno un’interrogazione metafisica. Interrogazione che 
non è incompatibile col realismo, come a volte si tende a credere, perché realismo e metafisica 
possono andare perfettamente d’accordo; anzi, più che il fantastico, che è la negazione della 
metafisica, è spesso il reale che postula interrogativi metafisici, o che fa scattare quella metafisica 




15 Gumpert, p. 93. 
16 The use of the adjective ‘metaphysical’ is consistent with Tabucchi’s idiosyncratic employment of the 
same term. However, it defines a sort of post-metaphysics, an approach that undoes and transcends the 
Western metaphysics of presence, what Derrida calls ‘the historical determination of the meaning of being as 
presence’, as well as the negativity that, as it will be seen in chapter 1, Agamben identifies at its core. 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), p. 12. Metaphysical is the writer’s ‘intention’ to explore and describe man’s mode of 
being: nonetheless, this exploration and description is post-metaphysical in its form – a literary questioning – 
and in its content – the uncanny.  This in fact entails a topological understanding of being, of reality as a 
‘folding together of multiple dimensions of meaningfulness’, which is no longer founded upon (the search 
for) a unifying principle or origin. Jussi Backman, Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the 
Postmetaphysical Unity of Being (Albany: SUNY Press, 2015), p. 8. For Tabucchi, any attempt – including 
his own – to understand and make sense of man’s ultimate essence, and the fact that individuals exist in the 
form of creators of meaning is metaphysical in nature. But man’s mode of being is uncanny and the uncanny 
is (post)metaphysical because it occurs as a production of sense rather than as the grounding of a unique 
signified. This means rejecting any pre-given plenitude of sense as what detaches men from their true being. 
17 ‘L'irreversibile e la nostalgia’, italicised.  
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What is the meaning of and in what ways is it possible to articulate a metaphysical 
investigation of the real? While Tabucchi posits a typically modern question – what forms 
the basis of (human) being? Who are we? Is there a purpose in our being alive? Where do 
we come from? Where are we going? –, the answer he advances is inherently postmodern: 
facing an apparently meaningless universe ruled by randomness and chaos and that 
deactivates any foundational justification and claim, he nonetheless tries to circumscribe 
and inhabit potential enclaves of sense. As Surdich affirms: 
 
In un reale deprivato della fermezza logica e della legittimità consequenziale dei nessi, il narratore si 
muove tra le cicatrici dei nessi che sono saltati e cerca non di riordinare l’universo, ma di sondarne i 
vuoti, di abitarne le inadeguatezze, di rasentare quanto è assente.18  
 
In the end, Tabucchi offers no proper answer but only a place and an effort to keep those 
interrogatives open. Tabucchi’s uncanny is a process of negotiation, interrupting reassuring 
readings and opening up to ambiguity, which seeks the reader’s participation. It is the 
othering of language that makes it possible to dwell within an unsaturated symbolic.19 In 
particular, I will pursue the idea that Tabucchi’s work constitutes an attempt to signify 
otherwise what is other and for the other. Signifying otherwise defines the writer’s effort 
to problematise, question and re-negotiate familiar spaces and modalities of signification. 
Signifying the other focuses on the potentiality to articulate, in terms of narrative 
structures, that which reverses accustomed meanings and eschews rational mastery, and 
that will be understood both as the individual and the collective (sociocultural) 
unconscious. By collective unconscious I mean Tabucchi’s representation of what has been 
excluded from the dominant narratives of the past – as well as of the present –, what might 
have taken place differently and what actually occurred but was then silenced.20 Signifying 
                                                        
18 Luigi Surdich, ‘Il principio della letteratura, raccontare il sogno di un altro. Forma e sostanza dei sogni 
nella narrativa di Tabucchi’, in I ‘notturni’ di Antonio Tabucchi. Atti di seminario. Firenze, 12-13 maggio 
2008, ed. by Anna Dolfi (Rome: Bulzoni, 2008), pp. 25-63 (p. 44). 
19 The distinction between saturated and unsaturated elements is derived from the works of the psychoanalyst 
Wilfred R. Bion. The former define ‘situations or states that remain completely impregnated with 
something’, whereas the latter are ‘entirely free or empty’ of rigidly assigned meaning. Rafael E. Lopez-
Corvo, Wild Thoughts Searching for a Thinker: A Clinical Application of W.R. Bion's Theories (London: 
Karnac Books, 2006), p. 98. 
20 Indeed, the two dimensions of individual and collective unconscious are strictly intertwined for, as 
Francese contends, ‘[w]hen writers [like Tabucchi] examine and express their own internal reality, they 
restore to our present the forgotten and/or repressed past so that it might serve as a model for collective 
analysis of the disquietude of contemporary society.’ Joseph Francese, ‘Tabucchi’s Fragments of Lovers 
Discourses’, Italica, 80.3 (Autumn 2003), 389-402 (p. 394). 
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for the other describes the author’s practice of literary discourse as a modality of ethical 
commitment that tries to make sense in the place of and on behalf of he who has been 
denied the possibility to formulate his own narrative of sense. 
 
 
Critical Approaches to the Uncanny: Modes and Problems    
 
This study aims to offer a contribution to the conceptualisation of the uncanny in relation 
to literature and to use this as a basis to achieve a deeper understanding of Tabucchi’s 
oeuvre and its critical reception.  
Concerning the former, I will try to formulate an original interpretation of the uncanny that 
has its roots in the overlapping areas of Agamben’s philosophical and Tabucchi’s literary 
discourse, and will gradually emerge in my argument as a potential modality of literary 
criticism. 21  As a matter of fact, the demand to scrutinise the intermingling of the 
unheimliche and literature has constituted a recurrent and pivotal argument throughout the 
theoretical development of this concept: for instance, Weber argues that ‘the problem of 
the narrative context of the uncanny […] emerges as crucial for further investigation’;22 
and Prawer claims that ‘the uncanny in literature does speak of something true and 
important […] its investigation, therefore, is worth our while’.23 This is due to the fact that, 
as Lacoue-Labarthe points out, ‘[t]he Unheimliche, as estrangement, is the estrangement of 
the human […]. It follows that the Unheimliche is essentially a matter of language, or that 
language is the site of the Unheimliche – if the latter can be said to have a site’.24   
It is significant that already in Freud’s 1919 essay ‘The Uncanny’, the text that inaugurates 
the discourse about the concept, the analysis takes its cue from a linguistic investigation 
                                                        
21 Despite the fact that Agamben lacks a consistent theory of the uncanny, since only a limited number of 
passages in his texts explicitly address the concept, this does not affect the validity and usefulness of 
approaching it from and through his theory of language. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to observe that, 
although non-systematic and under-researched, Agamben’s theorisation has already been recognised as an 
important contribution to the debate on the concept: significantly, Berto includes Agamben’s work Stanze in 
her suggested bibliography on the unheimliche. Graziella Berto, Freud, Heidegger, lo spaesamento (Milan: 
Bompiani, 1999), p. 12. 
22 Weber, p. 234, italicised. 
23 Siegbert S. Prawer, The Uncanny in Literature. An Apology for its investigation (London: Westfield 
College, 1965), p. 25. 
24 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Catastrophe: A Reading of Celan’s The Meridian’, trans. by Timothy Clark 
and Sylvia Gautheron, Oxford Literary Review, vol. 15 (1993), 3-41 (12). 
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into the etymology of the word unheimliche and a survey of its literary manifestations.25 
The importance of the uncanny, however, remains equally crucial and incontrovertible for 
contemporary literary theory too. This can be seen, specifically, in the most important 
contributions that engage with this concept, published during what Masschelein defines as 
its most prominent ‘period of conceptualization’:  
 
It was Freud who raised the phenomenon and the word ‘unheimlich’ to the status of a concept […]. 
Freud remains the founder of the discourse in the Foucaldian sense of the term because subsequent 
theorists have not superseded his centrality in the debate. […] The concept of the uncanny has only 
really been picked up in the last three decades of the twentieth century, when Freud’s 1919 essay 
was widely discovered primarily in French and in Anglo-Saxon literary theory and criticism. […] 
The Freudian uncanny is a late-twentieth century theoretical concept.26 
 
During the 1970s, the analyses formulated by Todorov, Derrida, Cixous and Weber were 
key in positioning the uncanny at ‘the heart of poetics and of a theory of literature itself’.27 
For, to them, the unheimliche ‘incorporates and reveals the essence of literature’,28 namely 
that narratives are based upon an endless deferral of meaning. Although I agree with the 
idea that ‘the uncanny is literature, literature in itself, the literary in its essence’,29 since 
they both expose the fact that language is not transparent or neutral, I would dispute the 
deconstructionist foundation of such statement, and the identification of a shared 
‘uncontrollable semantic proliferation’30 at the linguistic level. The literary uncanny is not 
(necessarily) semantic undecidability or deferral. On the contrary, what my intertwined 
study of Agamben’s and Tabucchi’s oeuvre tries to clarify is that literature is inherently 
                                                        
25 ‘Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides 
with its opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of heimlich’. Sigmund 
Freud, ‘The Uncanny’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. 
by James Strachey, vol. XVII (London: Hogarth, 1955), pp. 219-52 (p. 226). In the essay, Freud scrutinises 
the uncanny elements in Hoffman’s short story ‘The Sandman’ (1817). 
26 Annaleen Masschelein, The Unconcept. The Freudian Uncanny in the Late-Twentieth-Century Theory 
(Albany: State University of New York, 2011), pp. 3-4, italics in the text. 
27 Ibid., p. 94. Specifically, one may consider: Tzvetan Todorov, Introduction à la littérature 
fantastique (Paris: Seuil, 1970); Jacques Derrida, La Dissémination (Paris: Seuil, 1972); Hélène Cixous, 
‘Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's Das Unheimliche (The ‘Uncanny’)’, trans. by Robert 
Dennome, New Literary History, 7.3 (1976), 525-48; Samuel Weber, ‘The Sideshow, or: Remarks on a 
Canny Moment’, MLN, 88 (1973), 1102–33. 
28 Masschelein, p. 123. 
29 David Ellison, Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Literature. From the Sublime to the Uncanny 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 53. 
30 Ibid. 
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uncanny to the extent to which it produces a non-conceptual experience of truth and sense 
making, owing to the fact that the unheimliche allows for a particular linguistic experience. 
The uncanny is a crisis of the Saussurean model of the sign and a modification thereof.31 
The uncanny, in fact, reveals the functioning of language as non-propositional semiosis 
that challenges the conditions of possibility and the limits of signification itself:  
 
The concept of the uncanny arises throughout the various attempts to reconcile symbol and 
symbolised, i.e. signifier and signified. The tension between the two makes symbolization a highly 
ambivalent endeavour, for the symbol can never fully coincide with the content of what should be 
symbolised. The meaning of the concept of the uncanny is a process, an infinite semiosis.32  
 
Consequently, as chapter 1 intends to demonstrate, this differentiation opens a gap between 
Agamben and the deconstructionist position, for which the uncanny is tantamount to 
negative undecidability.  
On the contrary, far from being a locus of negativity, the unheimliche constitutes an 
enabling mechanism of signification. This is also implicated in Freud’s linguistic 
assessment of the term: what the prefix un- of the German word marks is a counter-turning 





The critical discourse about the uncanny begins with Freud’s 1919 seminal essay ‘Das 
Unheimliche’.33 This text is divided into three parts, as Freud develops his arguments: 
from a linguistic perspective, examining the etymology of the German term and the 
difficulties of its translation into other languages; by collecting and analysing a repertoire 
of themes and experiences that provoke an uncanny feeling of anxiety, such as those of the 
double or involuntary repetitions or those associated with seemingly animate objects like 
automatons; finally, by reading and interpreting the uncanny in E.T.A. Hoffman’s 1817 
short story The Sandman. 
                                                        
31 In his Cours de linguistique générale (Lausanne: Libraire Payot, 1916) Ferdinand de Saussure develops a 
dyadic model of the linguistic sign, as composed of the signifier (its form) and the signified (its conceptual 
content), which are arbitrarily linked (as graphically represented by the bar). 
32 Masschelein, p. 116. 
33 As Freud explicitely admits, the subject of the uncanny had been discussed by Ernst Jentsch in his 1906 
essay ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’, where it is equated with a condition of uncertainty provoked by 
what is novel and unfamiliar.   
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Likewise, Freud’s enquiry into and definition of the uncanny follows three main 
conceptual steps. First, he argues that: ‘this uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign, 
but something familiar and old-established in the mind’.34 This means that something 
unfamiliar is uncanny not by virtue of being new, uncertain or unknown, but because it is 
tied up with a previous familiarity. This initial element, which is also the most complete 
definition of the Freudian unheimliche, is framed through the interplay of two (apparent) 
conceptual polarities: the familiar and the unfamiliar, and the concealed and the 
unconcealed. Freud discovers the first of these oppositions by investigating the etymology 
of the term unheimliche and observing how, although ‘the German word unheimliche is 
obviously the opposite of heimlich, heimisch, meaning “familiar,” […] and we are tempted 
to conclude that what is “uncanny” is frightening precisely because it is not known and 
familiar’, ultimately ‘heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops towards an 
ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite’.35 The subsequent conceptual pair 
is grounded in the fact that heimlich, alongside notions of the familiar and the homely, also 
retains the meaning of something hidden, and comes from Schelling’s suggestion that 
‘everything is uncanny that ought to have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to 
light’.36 Therefore, if heimlich signifies ‘familiar’, unheimliche takes on the meaning of 
‘unfamiliar’. But, when heimlich means ‘hidden’, then unheimliche indicates 
‘unconcealment, uncovering’. Tellingly, these two sets of meanings are mutually inclusive: 
what is uncovered and thus seems unfamiliar is something that was once familiar and then, 
at a later point in time, was covered up.  
In the Freudian uncanny: 
 
i. There is something familiar.  
ii. This is then concealed and estranged. 
iii. And it is finally unconcealed as being both unfamiliar and familiar. 
 
But what is it that was once familiar? And how does it undergo the dual process of 
defamiliarisation and unconcealment? 
Freud answers these interrogatives formulating the second conceptual step in his 
reasoning. In effect, Freud observes how what is originally familiar and then hidden might 
take two forms: allegedly overcome childhood complexes or ancient, yet surmounted 
                                                        
34 Freud, ‘The Uncanny’, p. 240. 
35 Ibid., pp. 220-26.   
36 Ibid., p. 241. 
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beliefs.37 Freud finds a paradigmatic example of each form in Hoffman’s short story The 
Sandman.  
On the one hand, Freud identifies the real uncanny motif of the story in the recurring 
element of the eyes and the fear of blindness. The Sandman, who threatens loss of the 
children’s eyes, symbolises the castration complex. As Freud comments, there is 
 
[N]o doubt that the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand-Man, 
that is, to the idea of being robbed of one’s eyes […].We know from psychoanalytic experience, 
however, that this fear of damaging or losing one’s eyes is a terrible fear of childhood. Many adults 
still retain their apprehensiveness in this respect, and no bodily injury is so much dreaded by them as 
an injury to the eye. We are accustomed to say, too, that we will treasure a thing as the apple of our 
eye. A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that a morbid anxiety connected with the 
eyes and with going blind is often enough a substitute for the dread of castration.38 
  
On the other hand, the figure of the doll Olympia, regarding which the protagonist and the 
reader cannot tell whether she is animate or inanimate, is uncanny because the possibility 
of her being alive seems to reactivate and actualise an old, primitive or childhood belief in 
animism. As Freud affirms, although we now hold non-animistic beliefs, 
 
[W]e do not feel quite sure of our new set of beliefs, and the old ones still exist within us ready to 
seize upon any confirmation. As soon as something actually happens in our lives which seems to 
support the old, discarded beliefs, we get a feeling of the uncanny […].39 
 
Thus, answering the second question, Freud explains how the dual process of estrangement 
and unconcealment, regardless of what actually undergoes it, is structured in the form of 
the return of the repressed: ‘the uncanny is nothing else than a hidden, familiar thing that 
has undergone repression and then emerged from it’. 40 
 
In the final part of his essay, which marks the third conceptual point in Freud’s arguments, 
he states that it is possible to distinguish the uncanny experienced in life from the one 
encountered in fictional works, since ‘there are many more means of creating uncanny 
                                                        
37 ‘An uncanny experience occurs either when repressed infantile complexes have been revived by some 
impression, or when the primitive beliefs we have surmounted seem once more to be confirmed’ (ibid., p. 
249). 
38 Ibid., pp. 231-34. 
39 Ibid., pp. 247-48.  
40 Ibid., p. 244. 
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effects in fiction than there are in real life’.41 What does this imply for a literary uncanny? 
And for Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny?  
On the one hand, it might seem that Freud recognises the strict nexus existing between 
literature and the uncanny, understood as a reading (or formal) effect: 
 
[T]he story-teller has a peculiarly directive influence over us; by means of the states of mind into 
which he can put us and the expectations he can rouse in us, he is able to guide the current of our 
emotions, dam it up in one direction and make it flow in another, and he often obtains a great variety 
of effects from the same material.42 
 
Meaningfully, this affects also Freud’s own writing. As Farrell Krell suggests, ‘all 
[Freud’s] sources for the uncanny are literary’ since ‘even what he claims to be 
autobiographical lived experiences are of course marvellously narrated and beautifully 
crafted pieces of writing’.43 
On the other hand, however, as his analysis of Hoffman’s story evidences, Freud 
admittedly confines the literary uncanny solely to a thematic reading. Consequently, he 
overlooks the fact that ‘it is really the form of the narrative and not the theme in itself 
which plays the decisive role in the production of [uncanny] effects’.44  
 
Nonetheless, Freud’s understanding of the uncanny and of the literary uncanny is 
consistent with his wider view on art. Regarding the latter, ‘[a] full and complete 
presentation of his psychoanalytic observations on art and artists is not to be found as such 
in Freud’s works’.45 Still, as Sterba contends, the central assumption underlying Freud’s 
investigation of the aesthetic field is that: 
 
The work of art is […] the product of psychic forces which are in opposition to each other, such as 
desire and inner prohibition. It represents a reconciliation between these conflicting forces and has 
therefore the character of a compromise, as have also those psychopathological formations - errors, 
dreams and neurotic symptoms - which are well known. The fundamental dynamic force at the root 
                                                        
41 Ibid., p. 249. 
42 Ibid., p. 251 
43 David Farrell Krell, ‘Das Unheimliche: Architectural Sections of Heidegger and Freud’, Research in 
Phenomenology, vol. 22 (1992), 43-61 (60). 
44 Sarah Kofman, Freud and Fiction, trans. by Sarah Wykes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 137. 
45 Richard Sterba, ‘The Problem of Art in Freud’s Writings’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly (1940), 9: 256-268 
(256). 
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of a work of art is an unfulfilled wish of the artist; just as in dreams and fantasies, the work of art 
represents this wish as fulfilled.46 
 
Thus, for Freud, the artist ‘is able through the creation of a work of art to obtain sufficient 
gratification of his intense childhood wishes which he represents as fulfilled in his 
creation’.47 Specifically, art is a ‘social act of wish fulfilment’ which collapses the binary 
opposition between individual and society.48 The social relevance of art as an act of wish 
fulfilment needs to be understood in a dual sense. On the one hand, by creating a work of 
art, the artist dialogues with an external audience that identifies with those same wishes 
captured in cultural products: as a matter of fact, ‘[t]he practice of art is an activity whose 
aim is to assuage unappeased wishes’ and ‘[t]his aim is achieved not only from the 
standpoint of the creator but also from that of the person enjoying the creation’.49 
Additionally, however, the view of art as a social phenomenon pertains to the fact that it 
allows for an imaginary satisfaction of unconscious wishes in a socially acceptable way. 
For not only are these wishes expressed by artists ‘the same wishes which mankind 
combats by means of its great institutions, the most important of which are religion and the 
moral laws’ and which are therefore ‘banned by culture, suppressed and repudiated by 
education’.50 But, also, conversely, through artistic production such wishes are satisfied 
within socially valuable products. 
 
This view of art links to the Freudian uncanny, to the extent to which the latter, as seen, 
designates the return of the repressed. Indeed, adopting the Freudian perspective, the 
artistic artefact can occasionally make room precisely for the emergence and representation 
of unconscious, repressed content. Yet, on a deeper level, the strongest nexus between 
Freud’s understanding of art and the Freudian unheimliche lies in the fact that  
 
The magic creation of a pseudo reality [namely the creation of a work of art], in which not the laws 
of the outside world but conscious and unconscious wishes are the determining factors, signifies a 
regression to this phase of the omnipotence of thought. The early childhood tendencies of this period 
                                                        
46 Ibid., 257. For a more contemporary psychoanalytic view on Freud’s approach to art and the implicit 
significance of its formal and performative elements, see Gaburri’s and Ambrosiano’s (2003) remarks on his 
work on Michelangelo’s Moses. 
47 Ibid., 259. 
48 Ibid., 262, italicised. 
49 Ibid, 257. 
50 Ibid., 262. 
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of omnipotence of thought are preserved in all of us and the pseudo reality of the work of art brings 
them a profound satisfaction.51 
  
And, as indicated, surmounted beliefs such as the one in the omnipotence of thought are 
one of the two main sources of the unheimliche, the other being overcome childhood 
complexes. 
 
However, Freud’s conceptualisation of artistic practice, though necessary in relation to 
Freudian uncanny, is not relevant, if not partially – namely, solely as far as the idea of art 
as social phenomemon is concerned –, to my analysis of Tabucchi’s poetics. To begin 
with, methodologically speaking, I do not believe that 
 
[W]orks of literature can or should be read as manifenstations of the return of the repressed of the 
empirical author. Readers may not apply the psychoanalytic method to writers about whom there is 
always much we cannot know with certainty, and who are refractory to the crucial element of 
psychoanalytic process, transference.52 
 
Moreover, as anticipated, Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny designates a need for sense 
and a problematisation of sense making experiences that: first, originates within and can 
only be made intelligible as a reflection of and response to a precise historical period; 
second, dialogues with and partakes in a collective and social dimension. As for the first 
point, already in this introduction I will interrogate the ways in which Tabucchi’s works 
have been and might be historically contextualised, particularly assessing the modern and 
postmodern facet of his poetics. Regarding the second element, the social relevance of the 
uncanny will be both theoretically addressed in chapter 1 – specifically in relation to 
Orlando and Agamben – as well as scrutinised throughout the study.  
As a matter of fact, Tabucchi’s three main narrative modes and motifs of the uncanny 
(those of play, reversal and testimony) have a clear social dimension: play is how the 
author exposes, estranges and questions familiar and socially accepted practices and 
mechanisms of sense making (such as law or mass media); through reversal, Tabucchi 
gives voice to what I call collective unconscious, namely to alternative and unofficial 
representations of historical events; finally, testimony is how the writer tries to dialogue 
with the external, individual and collective, other, illuminating social tensions and political 
conflicts. Clearly, however, on this point Tabucchi’s opus reverses the Freudian idea of art 
                                                        
51 Ibid., 264-65. 
52 Joseph Francese, Socially Symbolic Acts: The Historicizing Fictions of Umberto Eco, Vincenzo Consolo, 
and Antonio Tabucchi (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson Press, 2006), p. 106. 
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as a social act of wish fulfillment. This follows from the fact that, while for Freud works of 
art are socially acceptable and valuable insofar as and to the point to which they conform 
to social values, Tabucchi’s commitment precisely occurs as a questioning and critique of 
familiar and shared truths.  
  
In this section I have argued that Freud formulates a sort of temporal understanding of the 
uncanny, as an experience of temporal disruption that originates from, is structured around 
and occurs as the return of the repressed. Yet, concluding that ‘un- is the token of 
repression’,53 Freud conflates the two different operations and levels on which the uncanny 
works: negation and uncovering.54 
 
When ‘heimlich’ means the familiar, the un- negates it by producing its lack. When ‘heimlich’ 
means the secret, the un- removes, undoes or reverses it. […] So there are two kinds of negation that 
might be attributed to the un- of ‘uncanniness’. One is privative and produces a lack, absence or 
imperfection (negating un-). The other is a reversal or turn which is often a return (reversing-
releasing un-). […] Basically, the story of the return of the repressed links the two ways of 
producing the unheimliche in a chain of psychic events: something familiar becomes unfamiliar and 
hidden, only to return to the familiar as unfamiliar.55 
 
This is a crucial point insofar as, also for Agamben, the uncanny, although articulated in 
topological rather than temporal terms, designates a way to produce the positive out of the 
negative. Similarly, Weber maintains that the uncanny occurs as ‘a certain indecidability 
which affects and infects representations, motifs, themes and situation’. 56 However, he 
adds that ‘the uncanny is not merely identical with this indecidability: it involves and 
implies a second moment or movement, namely the defence against this crisis of 
perception’.57 And this gesturing beyond undecidability ‘implies a denial (Verneinung is 
the Freudian term) […] that in turn involves a certain structure of narration, in which this 
denial repeats and articulates itself’.58  
 
                                                        
53 ‘The Uncanny’, p. 245. 
54 Masschelein explains this by commenting that ‘the uncanny is marked by the unconscious’ where ‘denying 
something at the same time conjures it up’ (p. 8). 
55 Katherine Withy, Heidegger on Being Uncanny (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 215-18. 
56 Weber, p. 233. 
57 Ibid., p. 234. 
58 Ibid. 
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As is already evident in Freud’s essay, any attempt to theorise the uncanny faces one main 
problem. Indeed, since the unheimliche elicits and moves critical responses towards 
metalinguistic thinking, this (un)concept cannot effectively be pinned down to nor 
contained by any rigorous, steady definition, since, in a sense, it always overflows its own 
reception. The uncanny at once belongs to language while seemingly trying to observe it as 
from an external viewpoint.59 This follows from the fact that: first, the uncanny is 
inherently linguistic since the word unheimliche is uncannily constructed in a sort of 
abysmal ‘conceptual mimesis’60 of the phenomenon to which it refers; and second, the 
uncanny problematises and seeks to modify our familiar experience with language. 
However, it is precisely with the role and impossibility of this ‘meta’ that the speculation 
about the uncanny reaches a seeming dead-end or looping deferral, for no linguistic 
meditation outside of language appears to be feasible. Approaching this concept through 
Agamben means changing the perspective from which we look at the problem, since, with 
the Italian philosopher, it becomes clear that metalinguistic thinking does not occur from 
an impossible standpoint outside language. On the contrary: meta-language is nothing but 
the topological experience of the taking place of language itself, of its signifying function, 
before and beyond any semantic content: 
 
Il pensiero contemporaneo ha preso risolutamente coscienza del fatto che un metalinguaggio ultimo 
e assoluto non esiste e che ogni costruzione di un metalinguaggio resta presa in un regresso 
all’infinito. Il paradosso della pura intenzione filosofica è, tuttavia, proprio quello di un discorso che 
deve parlare del linguaggio ed esporne i limiti senza disporre di un metalinguaggio. In questo modo 
essa si urta proprio a ciò che costituiva il contenuto essenziale della rivelazione: logos en arché, la 
parola è assolutamente nel principio […].61 
 
Interpreting the metalinguistic nature of the uncanny through Agamben also involves 
reading this impossible ‘metalanguage’-outside-language as being informed by and 
replicating another pre-suppositional structure: that of (nihilist) meta-physics, which 
                                                        
59 ‘Every allegedly uncanny text is always a text about the uncanny. The uncanny is always ‘meta-uncanny’. 
And at the same time there can be no ‘meta-uncanny’, since we can never fix the place or borders of where 
the alleged discourse of the uncanny ends and the putatively ‘meta’ discourse begins’ (Royle, pp. 18-19). 
60 ‘For Freud, the metalanguage of etymology is a neat tool for the psychoanalysis of a word […] as though 
the synchronic lexicon had a (diachronic) unconscious. But when Freud’s method of defamiliarization is 
brought to bear on the topic of defamiliarization, the metalanguage and the so-called object language fold 
back into each other’. Davis Schur, ‘Jocasta’s Eye and Freud’s Uncanny’, in Bound by the City: Greek 
Tragedy, Sexual Difference, and the Formation of the Polis, ed. by Denise McCoskey and Emily Zakin 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), pp. 103-118 (p. 106). 
61 Giorgio Agamben, La potenza del pensiero. Saggi e conferenze (Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2005), p. 30. 
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locates the foundation of man’s being outside of him. This is why, for him, ‘[a]ny 
overcoming of nihilism […] will therefore entail an entirely new model of signification’.62 
In the end, Agamben’s philosophical speculation occasions an innovative reconfiguration 
of the relationship between the uncanny and language, as well as a reformulation of 
language itself, as an excess over metaphysical constraints. This constitutes one of the 
main findings of chapter 1. 
 
 
Reading Tabucchi: Difficulties, Misappropriations and New Directions 
 
Addressing the second purpose of this research project, reading Tabucchi’s works through 
Agamben’s uncanny appears to be not only possible, but also legitimate and necessary. It 
is legitimate in relation to the writer’s texts, since my interpretation stems from and builds 
upon the fact that, as chapters 2 to 5 will demonstrate, there is a presence of the uncanny in 
Tabucchi, both as narrative theme and form and as critical concept, that is transversal to his 
fictional and theoretical writings, and which does not solely and necessarily overlap with 
the Freudian unheimliche.  
Additionally, this critical approach seems necessary in relation to his understanding, 
insofar as it produces an innovative and in-depth reading of the author and of his entire 
literary output. Pointing towards a general reassessment of Tabucchi’s oeuvre, the main 
effort of this study is, in fact, to shed light upon hitherto unexplored or overlooked 
potentialities of his work. On the one hand, the study engages with and draws upon some 
readings already advanced by Tabucchi’s scholars, but which have not thus far been 
understood in the broader terms of a poetics, that is to say as a discursive strategy, a 
modality of signification that underpins the writer’s approach to literature and reality. On 
the other hand, this thesis endeavours to disentangle the author from those critical 
categorisations that have proven inaccurate or not adequately problematised. For example, 
in this introduction I will address, question and/or confute what I consider to be the two 
main weaknesses in the author’s reception. The first is the idea of a chronological fracture 
dividing Tabucchi’s texts into metafictional and political works – which, despite having 
already been contested, is still hold valuable in any discussion concerning the writer. The 
second, and more radical, of such weaknesses is his classification as a postmodern writer: 
in this regard, I will make the case for an original interpretation of Tabucchi that is no 
                                                        
62  Shane Weller, Literature, Philosophy, Nihilism. The Uncanniest of Guests (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008), pp. 138-40. 
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longer based on the historical labels of ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’, but on the topological63 
one of ‘contemporary’.64 
 
Antonio Tabucchi died on 25 March 2012. Since then, critical literature relating to his 
oeuvre has rapidly increased, leading to a number of retrospective publications that could 
be gathered into three groups: those paying posthumous homage to the individual, those 
praising the committed intellectual, and lastly those celebrating the significance of the 
writer’s literary legacy. 65  Nonetheless, leaving aside the risk of an ‘inevitabile 
mitizzazione, seguendo quel noto adagio secondo cui lo scrittore, lo scrittore bravo, inizia 
a vivere soltanto dopo che è morto’,66 despite the increased attention to the author and the 
substantial publication, along critical contributions, of Tabucchi’s own unpublished 
writings, including both commentaries and fictions – such as the novel Per Isabel. Un 
Mandala –67 his literary experience still creates ‘un problema di poetica’.68 In effect, 
                                                        
63 In this study, ‘topological’ designates both the place and the taking place itself of a mutual relationship, a 
sort of negotiation of sense between two entangled elements. 
64 I borrow the concept of ‘contemporaneo’ from Agamben for whom, as I will argue, it defines a certain 
temporal disjointedness, a spatial distance from one’s own historical time. 
65 Among the most substantial publications dedicated to the private Tabucchi one should mention: Sosteneva 
Tabucchi, ed. by Luca Ricci (Pisa: Felici Editore, 2013); and Parole per Antonio Tabucchi. Con quattro 
inediti, ed. by Roberto Francavilla (Rome: Artemide, 2012), specifically in relation to the commemorative 
essays collected in the first half of the book, while the second part offers unpublished notes by Tabucchi on 
the subject of literature and his own poetics. The same hybrid structure, divided between personal memories 
and a critical reading of his oeuvre, also characterises Una giornata con Tabucchi, ed. by Paolo Di Paolo, 
Carlos Gumpert and others (Rome: Cavallo di ferro, 2012) and Adamastor e dintorni. In ricordo di Antonio 
Tabucchi, con un frammento inedito, ed. by Valeria Tocco (Pisa: ETS, 2013). Posthumous homages to the 
committed, civic dimension of Tabucchi appeared mostly in journals and newspapers in the aftermath of his 
death. See, for instance: Paolo Di Stefano, ‘Tabucchi tra romanzi e passione civile. Furori e fantasmi di uno 
scrittore civile’, Il Corriere della Sera, 26 March 2012; Carlo Grande, ‘Addio Tabucchi. Passione e rabbia 
contro la dittatura dell’ignoranza’, La Stampa, 26 March 2012; Osvaldo Guerrieri, ‘Tabucchi, la letteratura 
come inquietudine’, La Stampa, 22 March 2013; Fulvio Paloscia, ‘Se Tabucchi si indignava’, La Repubblica, 
26 March 2012; ‘Antonio Tabucchi, la scrittura e l’impegno’, Micromega, vol. 5 (January 2012). The most 
significant recent publications dealing with the literary profile of Tabucchi include: Antonio Tabucchi and 
Luca Cherici, Dietro l’arazzo. Conversazione sulla scrittura (Rome: Giulio Perrone Editore, 2013); Tempo, 
spazio e memoria nella letteratura italiana. Omaggio a Antonio Tabucchi, ed. by Zosi Zografidou (Rome: 
Aracne editrice, 2013); ‘La scrittura è la mia voce. Ad Antonio Tabucchi’, Narrazioni. Rivista semestrale di 
libri, autori ed eterotopie, 3 (Winter-Spring 2013); and Gioia Pace, La ricerca di una logica del 
postmoderno. Tabucchi e la categoria della memoria (Siracusa: Morrone Editore, 2012).  
66 ‘Nota Introduttiva’, in Sosteneva Tabucchi, p. 9, italics in the text. 
67 Per Isabel. Un Mandala (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2013). 
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Tabucchi has always constituted a problematic and challenging figure for critics. When 
mapping the literature about Tabucchi, a gap can be detected between the abundance of 
contributions coming from several countries and following the author since the early ‘80s, 
and an Italian critique that became truly significant only after the publication of the novel 
Sostiene Pereira in 1994.69 Tabucchi’s reception has engendered a puzzling situation that 
Schwarz Lausten delineates thus: 
 
Tabucchi è uno degli autori italiani viventi [2005] più conosciuti e rispettati anche all’estero. Viene 
tradotto e studiato in molti paesi, ha ricevuto premi letterari (nel 2004 è stato anche fra i candidati al 
premio Nobel per la letteratura), e si organizzano convegni sulla sua opera in quanto rappresentante 
della narrativa italiana più interessante e innovativa di oggi. In un primo momento, la sua opera 
sembra aver fatto appello soprattutto al pubblico internazionale. La prima grande raccolta di articoli 
sulla sua opera uscì infatti in Australia […] mentre la prima monografia è stata pubblicata in Italia 
(anche se scritta da un’italiana residente all’estero).70 
  
In a sense, it is as though, in the critical responses he inspired, an opposition might be 
drawn between Tabucchi the bestselling author, contender for the Nobel prize, and subject 
of early collected reviews and profiles by foreign scholars or Italian professors living 
abroad, and the other Tabucchi, the one discovered belatedly by Italian academia. When, in 
2007, Conti tried to recapitulate the critical works which had been produced about the 
author by that point, she began her analysis by stressing the correspondence between the 
international success of his fictional writings – she defines Tabucchi as ‘uno scrittore 
internazionale’ – and ‘un precoce successo critico all’estero’, whereas ‘alla metà degli anni 
Novanta, per lo studioso che si accingesse a scrivere un articolo su Antonio Tabucchi, la 
bibliografia critica disponibile in Italia era ridottissima’.71 It is worth following Conti’s 
review closely since she pinpoints a specific year, 1994, and an event, the publication of 
Sostiene Pereira, as the turning point for Tabucchi’s Italian critique: 
                                                                                                                                                                       
68 Serena Di Lecce, ‘Un “problema di poetica” al quadrato’, in Narrazioni, 49-54.  
69 Sostiene Pereira. Una testimonianza (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).  
70 Pia Schwarz Lausten, L’uomo inquieto. Identità e alterità nell’opera di Antonio Tabucchi (Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), pp. 9-10. 
47 Actually, as Conti declares, when she had already performed a similar task in 1995: ‘[n]on esistevano in 
Italia molti saggi in volume sull'autore […] la critica su Tabucchi era per lo più limitata alle interviste o alle 
recensioni su quotidiani e periodici, in occasione di nuove pubblicazioni’. Eleonora Conti, ‘Il punto su 
Antonio Tabucchi’, Bollettino 900, n. 1-2 (2007) <http://www3.unibo.it/boll900/numeri/2007-i/Conti1.html> 
[accessed 17 November 2013]. See also: Eleonora Conti, ‘Alcuni elementi costitutivi dell’opera di 
Tabucchi’, Bolettino 900, n. 0 (1995) <http://www.comune.bologna.it/iperbole/boll900/tabucchi.htm> 
[accessed 17 november 2013].   
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La prima impressione che si ricava, intraprendendo una rapida ricerca fra le risorse di rete, è che di 
Antonio Tabucchi si siano occupati, in passato, più sistematicamente gli italianisti che lavorano 
all'estero, piuttosto che non gli studiosi in Italia. […] La seconda impressione è che le monografie 
italiane sull'autore siano molto recenti e si infittiscano indicativamente a partire dal 2000. Eppure 
Tabucchi è autore che ha riscosso molto successo già alla fine degli anni Ottanta e che è stato 
lanciato definitivamente nel firmamento letterario con un romanzo che ha messo d'accordo pubblico 
e critica, Sostiene Pereira […]. Proprio nel 1994, il successo di Sostiene Pereira – romanzo letto da 
molti come allusione al presente politico italiano – aveva scatenato un nugolo di polemiche circa 
‘l'impegno’ degli scrittori e dunque una serie di articoli contrapposti sui quotidiani di destra e di 
sinistra sull'opportunità o meno che uno scrittore si pronunciasse circa la politica del proprio paese. 
[…] Al di là di questa impennata d'interesse per il romanzo e per l'indimenticabile figura del suo 
protagonista, mancava ancora una sistemazione critica della narrativa tabucchiana del decennio 
precedente, quella dei racconti e dei romanzi brevi, insomma quella del Tabucchi per lo più 
fantastico e postmoderno.72 
 
The increase in critical contributions resulting from the publication of Sostiene Pereira 
seems to follow a shift that had already occurred in Tabucchi’s own poetics, which would 
move from the postmodern texts of the 1980s to those characterised by the emergence of 
political concerns, published in the following decade. Not only did the publication of 
Sostiene Pereira represent for the Italian critique the birth of Tabucchi as the committed 
intellectual, but it also retrospectively denied his previous writings any ethical 
involvement. This marks the starting point, in my view, of a pervasive misreading of 
Tabucchi’s oeuvre, whereby critics establish a rift in his work between the pre- and post-
1994 books, nourishing the myth of two irreconcilable figures: from that moment and 
henceforth Tabucchi the engaged writer was born, ready to replace the postmodern one. 
 
In actual fact, the difficulties surrounding Tabucchi’s reception may be rendered more 
intelligible if looked at from three points of view: historical, stylistic and biographical.  
First, Tabucchi has never been affiliated with any literary school or cultural movement and 
consequently cannot be attributed any collective literary agenda or manifesto. In The New 
Italian Novel Lepschy stresses how Tabucchi ‘like most writers of the 1980s belongs to no 
group or movement, but in his individualistic approach gives pre-eminence to the art of 
narration’.73 Individualism characterised the Italian novelists of the 1980s, the period 
during which Tabucchi came to the fore. Analogously, in La narrativa italiana degli anni 
                                                        
72 Ibid. 
73 Anna Laura Lepschy, ‘Antonio Tabucchi: Splinters of Existence’, in The New Italian Novel, ed. by 
Zygmunt G. Barański and Lino Pertile (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), pp. 200-18 (p. 200). 
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Novanta, Mondello distinguishes between the ’90s, which were ‘caratterizzati dalle 
presenze se non di gruppi certamente di tendenze’ and the preceding decade, which was 
marked by ‘esperienze isolate, scritture regolari o irregolari, che restavano entro il confine 
di percorsi individuali’.74  
Second, not only did Tabucchi never make his own statements of poetics explicit, but he 
also mocked and questioned the very possibility and value of configuring an interpretation 
of his – and of any writer’s – work in such terms. Notwithstanding his peculiar exploitation 
of and strategic dwelling in the liminality of the peritext, Tabucchi never, except perhaps 
once, and obliquely, in Autobiografie altrui (2003),75 reflected on his own poetics in a 
straightforward way. According to Genette’s definition, the peritext is a ‘spatial category’ 
and represents the space of a book occupied by ‘such elements as the title or the preface 
[…] chapter titles or certain notes’.76 As Brizio-Skov acknowledges, Tabucchi uses the 
peritext to establish an unconventional novelistic pact and to advance a metafictional 
problematisation of his own narratives.77 By dwelling in the peritext, Tabucchi achieves 
four major goals: he declares the sources of his texts, traces their genesis, introduces and 
explicates the role of the author and of the reader within the narration, and provides critical 
readings of his own writing.78 On the other hand, even when dedicating an entire book to a 
speculation concerning what he designates as his own ‘poetiche a posteriori’,79 Tabucchi 
                                                        
74 Elisabetta Mondello, ‘La giovane narrativa degli anni Novanta. Cannibali e dintorni’, in La narrativa 
italiana degli anni Novanta, ed. by (Rome: Meltemi, 2004), pp. 11-37 (p. 12).  
75 Autobiografie altrui. Poetiche a posteriori (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2003). In this volume Tabucchi comments, 
in story form, on some of his fictions, discussing their (possible) genesis and interpretation. However the 
epigraph taken from Joseph Conrad – ‘Prima si crea l’opera, e solo dopo si riflette su essa’ (ibid., p. 9) – 
immediately warns the reader not to passively trust the pages that follow. 
76 Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. by Iane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp. 4-5. 
77 Flavia Brizio-Skov, Antonio Tabucchi. Navigazioni in un arcipelago narrativo (Cosenza: Pellegrini, 2002), 
p. 36. 
78 Giovanni Palmieri, ‘Per una volatile leggerezza: il “lato manco” di Antonio Tabucchi’, in Piccole finzioni 
con importanza. Valori della narrativa italiana contemporanea, ed. by Nathalie Roelens and Inge Lanslots 
(Ravenna: Longo, 1993), pp. 125-36 (125). 
79 In Autobiografie altrui, Tabucchi defines his own ‘poetiche a posteriori’ as: ‘[t]endenzialmente illogiche, 
carenti di deontologia, cariche di false memorie e di false volontà, messaggere di un senso che ci sforziamo 
pateticamente di dare poi a qualcosa che avvenne prima. […] Ipotesi vagabonde, nomadi e arbitrarie  […]’ 
(p. 12). As for the paradoxical title ‘autobiografie altrui’, it is revealing of two important aspects of 
Tabucchi’s poetics: his tendency to problematise the borders between factual, biographical experience and 
fiction – which I will discuss in chapters 3 and 5; and his exploration of plural, disarticulated subjectivities, 
of the other(ness) inhabiting the (individual and collective) self – which I will examine in chapter 4. This 
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ambiguously breaks down the distinction between theoretical and fictional writing, 
meaning that it is not entirely clear to which genre this text belongs. When asked to talk 
about his own poetics, Tabucchi operates a dual gesture: he frames it in plural terms, 
speaking of ‘poetiche’ instead of a more conventional ‘poetica’, and adopts a backward-
looking perspective, according to which no theoretical speculation ever precedes the 
genesis of a text. These two aspects should be linked to the fact that Tabucchi regards 
literature and his own literary experience as a peculiar modality of signification and 
discourse of truth, which proceeds non-methodically, i.e. not following a pre-existing road 
but excursively producing it. For Tabucchi, poetics acts as a sort of late comprehension of 
the sense, that is, the meaning and direction, of his quest: this is what he calls ‘previsione 
del passato che si realizza postumamente’.80  
These first two motives – his lack of affiliation with any literary movement and his refusal 
to make any statements of his poetics explicit –, which explain a somewhat critical 
uneasiness surrounding Tabucchi’s critique, are interrelated, inasmuch as his lack of 
affiliation with any group attests to a characteristic he shared with the vast majority of 
Italian writers of his time, as well as to an idiosyncratic dwelling within the history of 
literature,81 which signals a precise, personal choice of poetics.  
As for the third and final reason explaining the difficulties surrounding Tabucchi’s 
reception, any attempt at demarcating Tabucchi’s literary production, isolating it inside and 
from his wider, public engagement, is to my mind problematic – and, to some extent, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
latter aspect is strongly influenced by ‘Pessoa’s literary lesson, which is based on the rejection of the 
equation between identity and singularity in favour of the relation between identity and multiplicity, a 
relation famously exemplified by Pessoa’s creation of a number of fictional heteronyms’, namely 
independent poetic personalities (alter egos), each with his biography, poetics, worldview and writing style. 
Luca Pocci, ‘Tabucchi in the 1980s: The Phantasms of the Past in Il gioco del rovescio, Notturno indiano and 
Piccoli equivoci senza importanza’, Italian Studies, 71:3 (September 2016), 403-418 (409). Indeed, Pessoa is 
a central presence in Tabucchi’s life and works: having bought a volume of Pessoa’s poetry from a 
bookseller in Paris by chance, Tabucchi was so fascinated by the reading that he decided to study Portuguese 
at University and then became one of the most important scholars on Pessoa. See: Alberto Scarponi, ed. by, 
Alberto Arbasino, Italo Calvino, Andrea Camilleri, Umberto Eco, Mario Luzi, Claudio Magris, Dacia 
Maraini, Antonio Tabucchi raccontano se stessi (Rome: Gangemi, 2002). 
80 Ibid., p. 103. 
81 The centrality ascribed to literature is something Tabucchi shared with the Italian authors who came to the 
fore in the 1980s; in this sense, Pedullà writes: ‘Per cominciare, sia maiuscola l’iniziale: Letteratura. E la 
letteratura torna ad essere un mito per una generazione che si è trovata svuotata di ogni mitologia 
novecentesca, compresi gli antimiti delle varie avanguardie’. Walter Pedullà, foreword to Maria Pia 
Ammirati, Il vizio di scrivere. Letture su Busi, De Carlo, Del Giudice, Pazzi, Tabucchi e Tondelli (Soveria 
Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 1991), pp. 7-11 (p. 9). 
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disputable.82 It is true to say that the combination of his avowedly elusive literary profile 
with a sharp, civic personality could also lead to a reading of his texts that is prejudicially 
filtered through the lens of his ‘public’ position.83 In this respect, although it is correct to 
say that ‘[t]entare delle ipotesi sull’opera dello scrittore Tabucchi significa quindi non 
perdere mai di vista la produzione dell’uomo Tabucchi’ since ‘[a] ben vedere, esiste una 
corrispondenza tra la sua narrativa e la sua produzione non narrativa’,84 I will examine the 
author’s articles published in Italian journals and newspapers solely when they appear 
influential or central in addressing his literary oeuvre. Accordingly, this study takes into 
account three types of texts: fictional works; initially non-fiction writings which were only 
later published as coherent, self-conclusive books, such as La gastrite di Platone, Gli 
Zingari e il Rinascimento and L’oca al passo;85  and theoretical pieces dealing with 
literature and the uncanny, such as the transcript of the speech given at the University of 
Siena in 1997, entitled ‘Dal desassossego di Fernando Pessoa fino all’assurdo beckettiano’, 
now contained in the anthology Parole per Antonio Tabucchi. 
 
Despite the difficulties in dealing with Tabucchi’s work, the thesis advanced in this study 
is geared at formulating an in-depth and comprehensive reading of his poetics. This entails 
a preliminary complication and/or confutation of two frailties, if not faults, in the critical 
reception of the writer: that the novel Sostiene Pereira opens up a hiatus86 in Tabucchi’s 
works; and that he can be plainly defined as postmodernist tout court. These 
misappropriations are strictly intertwined, since, as Wren-Owens observes, ‘notions of 
intertextuality and dialogue with the literary heritage suggest a focus on self-reflexivity 
and interiority [Tabucchi’s postmodernism] at the expense of the dialogue with social 
                                                        
82 Exemplarily, Jeannet affirms that is not her intention ‘to explore the interweaving of the ethical dimension 
and the creative imagination in Antonio Tabucchi’, namely ‘to address what the man/citizen Tabucchi may 
say or write, as for instance in his La gastrite di Platone, or Gli Zingari e il Rinascimento, or what he asserts 
in his interviews as one of the most prominent intellectuals in today's Italy, because those are in part public 
relations phenomena’. Angela M. Jeannet, ‘A Matter of Injustice: Violence and Death in Antonio Tabucchi’, 
Annali d’Italianistica, 19 (2001), 153-69 (154), my emphasis. 
83 For example, the right-wing journalist Luca Doninelli defined Sostiene Pereira as an electoral pamphlet. 
Luca Doninelli, ‘Macché letteratura, è propaganda’, Il Giornale, 9 March 1994. 
84 Brizio-Skov, p. 15 
85 La gastrite di Platone (Palermo: Sellerio, 1998); Gli Zingari e il Rinascimento. Vivere da Rom a Firenze 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1999); L’oca al passo. Notizie dal buio che stiamo attraversando (Milan: Feltrinelli, 
2006).  
86 ‘La fortuna critica di Tabucchi mette in evidenza la divisione tra coloro che vedono la letteratura come 
fenomeno di sperimentazione raffinata e coloro che invece prediligono temi di un certo impegno politico ed 
esistenziale’ (Brizio-Skov, p. 11). 
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issues [which seemingly comes to the fore only after 1994]’.87 As preliminary clarification, 
in this study I distinguish between postmodernity as a historical period or ‘condition’ 
(Harvey) defined by the development and affirmation of information technology, 
globalised, post-industrial economy and a pervasive ‘media culture that generates sanitized 
collective memories and nurtures uncritical aesthetic sensibilities’ (Francese), and which 
have caused, in the postmodern subject, the emergence of a feeling of spatial disorientation 
and the loss of a ‘unitary sense of history’ (Francese); and postmodernism, as the set of 
philosophical, cultural and aesthetic experiences, characterised by the so-called 
‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ (Lyotard), that represent, refract and respond to the 
structural transformations of the age. The adjectives ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ 
indistinctly apply to the historical periods and the related cultural experiences.88 
The first point (the idea of a fracture within Tabucchi’s opus) is the easiest to disprove. For 
not only, to adopt the chronological parameter, does it emerge that Piazza d’Italia, 
Tabucchi’s 1975 debut, was already deeply concerned with ethical and political questions 
like history, memory and witnessing, but, additionally, the writer himself ascribed the 
same type of commitment to his most metafictional texts, such as Il gioco del rovescio 
(1981) or Piccoli equivoci senza importanza (1985). 89  Hence he declared that, 
‘identificarmi nel punto di vista altrui, forse è questa la mia maniera di impegnarmi.[...] Il 
                                                        
87 Elizabeth Wren-Owens, Postmodern Ethics. The Re-appropriation of Committed Writing in the Work of 
Antonio Tabucchi and Leonardo Sciascia: 1975-2005 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2007), p. 157. 
88 See: David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blacwell, 1989), p. viii; Joseph Francese, Socially Symbolic Acts: The Historicizing 
Fictions of Umberto Eco, Vincenzo Consolo, and Antonio Tabucchi (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson Press, 
2006), p. 12; Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxiv. Recently, a 
number of Italian literary scholars (Donnarumma, Luperini) has started to differentiate between 
postmodernity and the so-called ‘ipermodernità’, a period roughly beginning around 2000, which, although 
still characterised by the same, abovementioned political and socio-economical features of late, globalised 
capitalism, differs – specifically in its literary manifestations – from postmodernism in paying attention to 
and ethically engaging with reality. However, despite the latter elements being central in Tabucchi’s poetics, 
Donnarumma fails to acknowledge them, as he deems realist commitment to be incompatible with 
(Tabucchi’s) postmodernism; exemplarily, Donnarumma argues that ‘[a]nche quando prende di petto il 
presente, [Tabucchi] sente poi il bisogno di distanziarsene e di inserirlo in un gioco letterario’. Raffaele 
Donnarumma, Ipermodernità: Dove va la narrativa contemporanea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), Amazon 
Kindle e-book (Chapter 2, para. 4, location 1180). 
89 Piazza d’Italia [Bompiani, 1975], 2nd edition (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1996); Il gioco del rovescio e altri 
racconti, [1981] 2nd edition (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1988); Piccoli equivoci senza importanza (Milan: Feltrinelli, 
1985). 
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mio impegno consiste [...] nell’indagare la realtà con gli occhi altrui’.90 The centrality of 
the ethical dimension throughout the entirety of Tabucchi’s production has been correctly 
pointed out by, among others, Lazzarin, Burns and Wren-Owens. Significantly, Lazzarin 
claims that the fracture within Tabucchi’s oeuvre is a reflex of the diplopia or double 
vision of the criticism, which nonetheless demands a resolution: 
 
Sostiene Pereira, che alcuni considerarono, al momento della sua pubblicazione, come il sintomo di 
un nuovo interesse per il ‘reale’ da parte dello scrittore, non segna, in verità, alcuna svolta nell’opera 
di Tabucchi (una svolta si compie indubbiamente nella storia della sua ricezione: a partire dal 
fortunato romanzo del 1994, Tabucchi va sempre più acquisendo una notorietà mondiale; ma questa, 
naturalmente, è un’altra faccenda). […] Non soltanto, dunque, il fingitore e il polemista si alternano 
in tutto il corso della carriera di Tabucchi, ma collaborano alla redazione di tutte le sue opere, che 
solo impropriamente possiamo suddividere in ‘testi di finzione’ e ‘testi impegnati’.91 
 
On the other hand, both Burns and Wren-Owens interpret Tabucchi’s ethical commitment 
in the light of a reformulation of the notion of ‘impegno’ itself, taking into account its 
postmodern configuration as the ‘break-up of the commitment to a single, overarching 
social agenda into a fragmentary attention to specific issues’.92 Consequently, against those 
readings that divide Tabucchi’s works into dissimilar strands, such as that of Guglielmi, 
who reads Tabucchi’s short stories from the 1980s as ‘non-storie’,93 they note that ‘the 
themes pinpointed by other critics as divorced from engagement in fact represent a 
different yet powerful form of committed writing’.94 Accordingly, as will be discussed in 
chapter 2, I intend to argue that an uncanny estrangement (the questioning of sense), which 
underpins Tabucchi’s most self-reflective texts, makes room for the re-articulation of one’s 
individual and collective being in the world, creating a potential enclave of meaning 
wherein it becomes possible to understand in what ways and forms we do and should make 
ourselves intelligible to ourselves and dwell in the world we inhabit. 
  
                                                        
90 L’oca al passo, p. 131.  
91 Stefano Lazzarin, ‘Antonio Tabucchi Fingitore e Polemista’, Narrazioni, 46-58 (49).   
92 Jennifer Burns, Fragments of impegno: Interpretations of Commitment in Contemporary Italian Narrative 
1980-2000 (Leeds: Northern Universities Press, 2001), p. 1. Speaking of ‘postmodern impegno’, Antonello 
affirms that ‘si può adottare una definizione minima della nozione di impegno nei termini di una posizione di 
carattere etico e politico, veicolata da particolari modalità di espressione […] che scavalcano irrigidimenti di 
carattere ideologico o strettoie di carattere storico’. Pierpaolo Antonello, Dimenticare Pasolini. Intellettuali e 
impegno nell’Italia contemporanea (Milan-Udine: Mimesis, 2012), p. 142. 
93 Angelo Guglielmi, Trent’anni di intolleranza (mia) (Milan: Rizzoli, 1995), p. 198. 
94 Wren-Owens, p. 3. 
  26 
In addressing the second weakness in Tabucchi’s reception, namely his classification as a 
postmodern author, I intend to propose the following argument. There is, on the part of 
Tabucchi and his scholars, a certain uneasiness at defining the writer as postmodern. This 
critical discomfort is revealing of and should lead to a rethinking of (his) postmodernism 
as an appropriation and development of the modern need for and question of sense. 
Tellingly, this postmodern recuperation of modernity is made possible by and builds on the 
presence of the uncanny in both modernity and postmodernity. Consequently, the 
idenitification of such an historical continuity between the modern and the postmodern 
could (and demands to) be read through a different temporal model, which I identify in 
Tabucchi’s view of literary fetishism. 
 
First, Tabucchi himself rejects being defined as postmodernist – ‘Sono stato classificato 
alcune volte, cosa che mi ha molto stupito, come un postmoderno. È una definizione che 
trovo orribile e inaccettabile’.95 Next, this resistance emerges, albeit obliquely, in the fact 
that scholars have advanced very dissimilar interpretations of his postmodernism. For 
instance, Ceserani praises Tabucchi for being  
 
[A]mong the most successful, talented, and sophisticated Italian postmodernist writers […] although 
sometimes he might prefer to remain in the company of his high modernist model Fernando Pessoa. 
[…] Together with Cortázar, Tabucchi is one of the few contemporary writers capable of 
revitalizing, within our culture and our system of communication, the nineteenth-century genre of 
the fantastic short story, especially in its psychological version. […] It is not difficult to find many 
of the typical features of postmodern literature in Tabucchi's fiction.96  
 
Luperini, on the other hand, recognises in Tabucchi the presence of a tension between a 
‘postmodernismo retorico, volto a prediligere la riscrittura e a riciclare non senza 
raffinatezza stilemi e situazioni letterarie e artistiche del passato’ and a ‘postmodernismo 
mimetico, inteso a registrar un mondo vuoto, caotico e privo di direzione’.97 However, as 
Dolfi warns, Tabucchi’s opus moves ‘da un minimo a un massimo di distanza dalle 
                                                        
95 Andrea Borsari, ‘Che cos’è una vita se non viene raccontata? Conversazione con Antonio Tabucchi’, 
Italienisch, 13.2 (November 1991), 2-23 (9). 
96 Remo Ceserani, ‘Modernity and Postmodernity: A Cultural Change Seen From the Italian Perspective’, 
Italica, 71.3 (Autumn 1994), 369-84 (380). 
97 Romano Luperini, Tramonto e resistenza della critica (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2013), pp. 236-37. 
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modalità narrative caratterizzanti […] gli ultimi decenni […] senza per altro appartenere 
propriamente a nessuna’.98 
Lastly, it is important to highlight that the concept of the uncanny enables us to rethink 
Tabucchi’s position fully acknowledging the proximity he sees between modernity and 
(his) postmodernism. For Tabucchi, the uncanny is inherently modern and, reciprocally, 
modernity is essentially uncanny; thus he concedes his belonging to postmodernism only if 
this is understood as ‘a new consciousness about the uncanny as a fundamental dimension 
of modernity’,99 which the writer describes as the ability to ‘vivere pienamente la nostra 
modernità e al contempo temerla, guardarla negli occhi per indagarne gli aspetti più 
feroci’.100 From this point of view, Tabucchi’s postmodernism constitutes an attempt to 
come to terms with the main questions of and about modernity, the possibility of sense and 
the seeming lack thereof. But why is modernity uncanny? Tabucchi’s answer is twofold. 
On the one hand, in his ‘Elogio della letteratura’ (2013) Tabucchi recognises the presence 
of an obscure side to modernity: 
 
Negli ultimi anni, dopo che coloro che si prendono cura di noi ci avevano ricoverato in svariati 
reparti, strutturalizzandoci, formalizzandoci, destrutturalizzandoci, psicanalizzandoci, 
semiologizzandoci, e finalmente […] erano giunti alla rassicurante conclusione che siamo 
semplicemente moderni, quando non postmoderni […] ecco che all’improvviso dottissimi eruditi 
stanno arrivando alla conclusione che i migliori scrittori moderni (e anche post) in realtà sarebbero 
antimoderni. […] Temo che a questi illustri pensatori sfugga il conquibus della questione: e cioè che 
essere moderni è vivere pienamente la nostra modernità e al contempo temerla, guardarla negli 
occhi per indagarne gli aspetti più feroci.101  
 
On the other hand, as the following section will make clear, for Tabucchi modernity is 
uncanny to the extent to which it is driven by a search for sense, which, however, unlike 
Tabucchi’s (postmodern) one is entirely concerned with questions of perception and 
knowing rather than with questions of being and signification.  
   
                                                        
98 Anna Dolfi, Gli oggetti e il tempo della saudade. Le storie inafferrabili di Antonio Tabucchi (Florence: Le 
Lettere, 2010), pp. 9-10. 
99 Mladen Dolar, ‘I Shall Be with You on Your Wedding-night: Lacan and the Uncanny’, October, 58 
(Autumn 1991), 5-23 (23). 
100 Di tutto resta un poco. Letteratura e cinema, ed. by Anna Dolfi (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2013), p. 19. 
101 Ibid., p. 13, my emphasis. 
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That modernity is in itself uncanny eventually also finds corroboration in the critical 
discourse concerning the concept. Hence, in their introduction to Uncanny Modernity, 
Collins and Jervis claim that: 
 
The way these experiences [of the uncanny] emerge and are articulated implies an intimacy between 
these dimensions that is both very modern and central to the possibility of the uncanny itself. In 
particular, we can refer here to the way the conjunction of eighteen-century rationalism, the 
disintegration of the early modern category of the marvellous, and the simultaneous internalisation, 
production and cultivation of ‘affect’ results in a self of insecure boundaries. […] Explored 
extensively in the arts […] the uncanny is also a presence in modernism itself, a reflexive 
‘defamiliarisation’ being central to its programmes for artistic reinvention and renewal.102 
 
 
Reconsidering Tabucchi’s Postmodernism 
 
In the previous section I contended that there is, on the part of Tabucchi and his scholars, a 
certain uneasiness at defining the writer as postmodern. Accordingly, I suggested that this 
critical discomfort is revealing of and should lead to a rethinking of (his) postmodernism 
as an appropriation and development of the modern need for and question of sense. By the 
same token, this differentiates Tabucchi from the mainstream postmodern approach. 
Tellingly, his postmodern recuperation of modernity is made possible by and builds on the 
presence of the uncanny in both modernity and postmodernity. In this section I will explore 
how the idenitification of such an historical continuity between the modern and the 
postmodern could (and demands to) be read through a different temporal model, which I 
identify in Tabucchi’s view of literary fetishism. In particular, I intend to argue that in the 
novel Requiem Tabucchi hints at his view of literary fetishism by producing a narration in 
which the latter appears in the form of melancholia. My argument premises on the 
theoretical proximity that Agamben identifies between fetishism and melancholia and that 
helps illuminating Tabucchi’s own appropriation of the two concepts. 
 
                                                        
102 Jo Collins and John Jervis, ‘Introduction’, Uncanny Modernity: Cultural Theories, Modern Anxieties, eds. 
by (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 1-9. Similarly, Gunning argues: ‘While I would never 
claim that the uncanny is exclusively a modern phenomenon, I would certainly claim there is a modern 
uncanny. Much of what we think of as uncanny entails the emergence of a modern world: the struggle that an 
enlightened scientific worldview undertook with what it understood as superstition and illusion’. Tom 
Gunning, ‘Uncanny Reflections, Modern Illusions: Sighting the Modern Optical Uncanny’, in Uncanny 
Modernity, pp. 68-90 (p. 68). 
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Since a concern with modernity is inherent to the (writer’s) uncanny, it follows that his 
own categorisation as postmodern needs to be rethought. On the one hand, the quest for the 
possibilities and limits of sense differentiates Tabucchi from the mainstream postmodern 
approach. The latter, in effect, is characterised by a challenge to the possibility of a 
discourse of truth, and the collapse of the world and the self, a fall not reciprocated by the 
intention to seek answers, at the moment when grand narratives are no longer able to 
provide a reassuring totality. Tabucchi, on the other hand, problematises and transcends 
any definition of postmodernism, calling into question the sense of every act of 
classification based on chronological sequence. To his classification as a postmodern 
writer, Tabucchi counters a view of (his own) literature as a practice of fetishism: 
 
Sono stato classificato alcune volte, cosa che mi ha molto stupito, come un postmoderno. È una 
definizione che trovo orribile e inaccettabile. Credo invece, per semplificare molto, di essere un 
feticista. Ho bisogno di dichiarare e toccare, toccare citandoli, i miei feticci. Il feticcio, come spiega 
Freud, è una creatura molto complicata perché presuppone la mania, ma anche la liberazione, la 
paura, ma anche lo scongiuro.103 
 
Fetishism provides a possible clue to Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny as a somewhat 
topological articulation of modernism and postmodernism. According to Freud, fetishism 
arises out of the discovery of the lack of a penis in the female body, primarily that of the 
mother. This discovery engenders what Freud calls Verleugnung, a disavowal. Confronted 
with the absence of the phallus, the child does not accept the reality of his perception. He 
at once admits and dismisses it. The reason for the child’s partial negation is ascribable to 
the necessity to exorcise and defend himself from the threat of castration, which produces 
‘uncanny and traumatic’104 impressions. This is the same process Tabucchi is referring to 
when, in his own definition of fetishism, he juxtaposes terms such as ‘mania’ and 
‘liberazione’, ‘paura’ and ‘scongiuro’. Fetishism therefore becomes a metaphor that 
Tabucchi uses to describe his relationship with the literary tradition as a sort of interplay or 
negotiation between influence and originality. 105  Tabucchi needs and seeks for the 
(nonfactual) presence of his literary models, but only if this is not passively accepted. In 
what ways and to what extent is it possible to consider Tabucchi as a fetishist writer? And 
                                                        
103 Borsari, 9, italicised. 
104 Sigmund Freud, ‘Fetishism’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, ed. by James Strachey, vol xxi (London: Hogarth, 1966), pp. 149-57 (p. 155). 
105 Significantly, Bloom observes how ‘the special case of anxiety of influence’ is ‘a variety of the uncanny’. 
Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), pp.77-78. 
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how does this give rise to his postmodernism? A potential answer to such questions might 
come from a somewhat allegorical (in this respect) reading of the novel Requiem, for not 
only is it a postmodern book by virtue of its questioning of ontological problems such as 
the intermingling of reality and fiction,106 but it also engages with theoretical reflections 
about the postmodern and the correlation of the latter with the modern. In particular I 
intend to argue that in Requiem Tabucchi hints at his view of literary fetishism by 
producing a narration in which the latter appears in the form of melancholia. My argument 
premises on the theoretical proximity that Agamben identifies between fetishism and 
melancholia and that helps illuminating Tabucchi’s own appropriation of the two concepts. 
 
Significantly, in Chapter 8, the protagonist meets his ‘Convitato’ – recognisably Pessoa – 
in a restaurant, which another character, the ‘Venditore di Storie’, depicts as postmodern:  
 
Proprio di fronte al molo c’è un ristorante che prima era una stazione […] adesso l’hanno 
trasformato in un luogo d’incontro polivalente […] credo che sia un locale post-moderno. Post-
moderno?, dissi io, in che senso post-moderno? Non glielo saprei spiegare neanch’io, disse il 
Venditore di Storie, voglio dire che è un posto con molti stili, guardi, è un ristorante con molti 
specchi e una cucina che non si sa bene cos’è, insomma, è un posto che ha rotto con la tradizione 
recuperando la tradizione, diciamo che sembra il riassunto di varie forme diverse, secondo me è in 
questo che consiste il postmoderno.107 
 
During his dinner with the ‘Convitato’, the protagonist – to some extent a projection of 
Tabucchi himself – explains postmodernism by reproaching his guest – ‘può anche darsi 
che lei abbia una certa responsabilità […] nel post-moderno’ – adding that, ‘a ben guardare 
sono state le avanguardie a rompere l’equilibrio, queste cose lasciano un segno’.108  
                                                        
106 As Brizio-Skov states, ‘non è solo la posizione di uomo di fine secolo che rende questo protagonista 
postmoderno, bensì la scoperta che non è possibile arrivare alla verità. Tuttavia il romanzo è postmoderno 
anche ad un altro livello, giacché presenta una polifonia di discorsi e un peritesto che problematizzano il 
rapporto tra reale e fittizio e quindi costringono il lettore a interrogarsi continuamente sulla categoria del 
vero’ (p. 126). 
107 Réquiem. Uma allucinação (Lisbon: Quetzal, 1991), Requiem. Un’allucinazione, trans. by Sergio Vecchio 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1992), pp. 112-13. Set in a scorching Lisbon, the story is structured as a succession of 
ghostly meetings. Falling asleep while reading Pessoa’s Livro dos desassossego, the protagonist dreams 
about encountering a wide range of figures, ranging from Pessoa’s fictional characters – such as ‘Lo Zoppo 
della Lotteria’ – to Tabucchi’s own, recurring literary creatures – Tadeus and Isabel – or pseudo-biographical 
projections – exemplarily ‘Il Padre Giovane’. 
108 Ibid., p. 118. 
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This episode has received a lot of critical attention, since it has been regarded as an 
essential hint left by Tabucchi to interpret his postmodernism. While for Brizio-Skov it 
marks the writer’s ultimate acceptance of postmodernism, Bertone, on the contrary, 
interprets it as a distancing from postmodern nihilism in favour of modern commitment.109 
Botta addresses the issue in a contribution evocatively entitled ‘Mourning Modernism’, 
wherein she reads the entire novel as a turning point in Tabucchi’s postmodern poetics 
insofar as she detects in it a mourning for modernism. The mournful gesture takes place at 
the levels of content and form alike. The narrator’s encounters with figures from his 
memory, specifically his father, represent a summoning of the dead triggered by a sense of 
guilt. 110  In addition, that the entire novel is structured as both a viaticum and a 
hallucination, as indicated by Tabucchi in the preface and subtitle, alludes, respectively, to 
‘a process of re-integrating the ego’ and to the fact that the protagonist is experiencing ‘the 
first phase of mourning, [with] the subject’s clinging to the lost object’.111 To substantiate 
her view of the author’s narrative as a grieving process, Botta relies on Vattimo’s idea that:  
 
Postmoderno […] è ciò che ha con il moderno un rapporto verwindend, che lo accetta e lo riprende 
[…] e che lo prosegue, ma distorcendolo. […] [N]on si può lasciare semplicemente vuoto il posto 
prima occupato dai ‘metaracconti’’ […] sarebbe come non-elaborare un lutto.112  
                                                        
109 Manuela Bertone, ‘Frammenti per Requiem, allucinazione portoghese di Tabucchi’, Narrativa, 8 (July 
1995), 139-55.  
110 Anna Botta, ‘Antonio Tabucchi’s Requiem: Mourning Modernism’, in ‘Antonio Tabucchi. A Collection 
of Essays’, ed. by Bruno Ferraro and Nicole Prunster, Spunti e Ricerche, 12 (1997), 143-57 (147). 
111 Ibid.,146-48. 
112 Gianni Vattimo, Moderno postmoderno. Soggetto, tempo, sapere nella società attuale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 
1987), pp. 102-07. The philosophical concept of the pensiero debole was first advanced by Vattimo and 
Rovatti with the publication of Il pensiero debole (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1983): ‘it defines a ‘typically 
postmodern mode of reflection’ as opposed to the ‘strong’ metaphysical thought of modernity. It 
optimistically salutes the end of modernity precisely as the liberation from a thinking founded upon the 
enlightened predominance of reason, from the Cartesian idea of a rational and integral subjectivity, from the 
conception of history qua unilinear progress’. Matei Cãlinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-
garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 272. Reading 
Tabucchi’s postmodernism through Vattimo’s thought inserts the writer into the wider passage ‘da un 
postmoderno di opposizione al moderno, a un postmoderno che concepisce la sua relazione con il moderno 
piuttosto in termini di ‘oscillazione’’. Monica Jansen, Il dibattito sul postmoderno in Italia. In bilico tra 
dialettica e ambiguità (Florence: Franco Cesati Editore, 2002), p. 84. Adopting a similar expression, 
Tabucchi acknowledges how, at the core of literature, ‘l’effetto pendolo agisce, riconducendo le modalità del 
narrare là dove erano state un tempo’, while still ascribing an individualistic approach to it rather than 
accepting the influence of ‘una vera o presunta predilezione generazionale’ for the narrative forms he himself 
practiced (Gli oggetti, pp. 9-10). 
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While Wren-Owens reaches a similar conclusion, citing ‘Tabucchi’s view that modernist 
writers and thinkers […] hold valuable truths but must be considered partial’113 as that 
which makes him a postmodernist writer, Schwarz Lausten, too, reiterates in her analysis 
the correspondence between Tabucchi’s postmodernism and Vattimo’s position: 
 
Forse la sua narrativa si colloca in un campo di tensione tra moderno e postmoderno, e il suo legame 
con la tradizione della letteratura moderna può essere descritto con […] il concetto di ‘Verwindung’ 
e di rimemorazione del moderno. Tabucchi ripensa il moderno attraverso l’uso di figure e motivi 
postmoderni.114 
 
Finally, Jansen comments on Requiem arguing that ‘con l’aiuto di un interlocutore 
moderno il protagonista tenta qui di decifrare la sua condizione postmoderna’.115 And, 
following Botta’s reading, she regards the episode only as a lamentation of modernism, 
once again equating it with Vattimo’s idea of Verwindung.  
Requiem undeniably performs a mournful process. Yet, it is my contention that this 
argument is not sufficient to describe the writer’s postmodernism, which, I believe, refuses 
Vattimo’s idea of filling up voids through mourning, and which also entails and enables a 
melancholic mechanism. 116  My interpretation requires and is premised upon a non-
Freudian conceptualisation of melancholia: following Agamben’s reading, which moves 
away from a pathological interpretation, melancholia is here defined as a positive 
possibility and ability to experience and encounter what would otherwise remain 
unattainable, that is, the taking place of signification itself. For Freud, on the contrary, 
melancholia defines a negative incapacity to articulate and express grieving. As he 
explains in his 1915 essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, the two processes differ in two 
ways. First, with mourning, the libido, or psychic energy, is positively transferred from the 
lost object onto a new one, while with melancholia the loss is narcissistically internalised 
by the mourner’s ego. And second, in the case of mourning, ‘reality-testing has shown that 
the loved object no longer exists’ whereas with melancholia ‘one cannot see clearly what it 
                                                        
113 Wren-Owens, p. 171. 
114 Schwarz Lausten, p. 150. 
115 Jansen, pp. 301-05. 
116 Bahun defines this interlocking of mourning and melancholia as ‘countermourning’, a mode of writing 
that suspends interpretative closure and sustains gaps within signification, wherein against ‘the premise that 
everything can be semantically pinned down’ the melancholic element insists ‘upon the vacancy that cannot 
be contextualized or filled in’. Sanja Bahun, Modernism and Melancholia: Writing 
as Countermourning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 39. 
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is that has been lost’ and ‘the object-loss […] is withdrawn from consciousness’.117 
According to Agamben, the fact that ‘mentre il lutto consegue a una perdita realmente 
avvenuta, nella malinconia […] non è nemmeno certo che di perdita si possa parlare’ leads 
to a situation in which ‘la malinconia offre il paradosso di un’intenzione luttuosa che 
precede e anticipa la perdita dell’oggetto’.118 How can this be seen in positive terms? The 
answer lies in the fact that, ‘se la malinconia riesce ad appropriarsi del proprio oggetto solo 
nella misura in cui ne afferma la perdita’,119 it comes to designate the capacity to make 
sense of and sustain a symbolic – rather than actual – void. How and why might this apply 
to Tabucchi’s postmodernism? Responding to this question means, on the one hand, 
recognising how, for him, modernity is not lost. This is why Tabucchi’s hallucinatory 
requiem cannot be regarded solely as a grieving process. On the contrary, his Requiem also 
includes a process driven by melancholia.  
For (Tabucchi’s) postmodernism: first, mourns something that was already – though 
mostly unconsciously – mournful in itself (that is, lacking any sense of totality); and 
second, it processes grieving without saturating this lack but keeping it open. Tabucchi 
finds questions instead of answers in modernity and modern literature (that which makes 
them uncanny). And he keeps these same questions – and the need for sense underlying 
them – open.   
On the other hand, reading Tabucchi’s postmodernism as a melancholic process makes 
utterly intelligible the reasons why he describes his own approach to literary modernity as 
fetishist. For there is a similarity between the fetishist and the melancholic rationale, 
which, Agamben observes, consists in the fact that: 
 
Come, nella Verleugnung feticista, nel conflitto fra la percezione della realtà, che lo spinge a 
rinunciare al suo fantasma, e il suo desiderio […] il bambino non fa né una cosa né l’altra, o, 
piuttosto, fa simultaneamente le due cose […] così, nella malinconia, l’oggetto non è né appropriato 
né perduto, ma l’una e l’altra cosa nello stesso tempo.120 
 
Although I will engage, in chapter 1, with Agamben’s intertwining of fetishism and the 
uncanny, insomuch as they both propose a similar, spatial configuration of temporal 
experience, it should already be indicated that the melancholic disavowal might help 
                                                        
117 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. xiv (London: Hogarth, 1968), pp. 243-58 (pp. 244-45). 
118 Giorgio Agamben, Stanze. La parola e il fantasma nella cultura occidentale (Turin: Einaudi, 1977), p. 25. 
119 Ibid., p. 26. 
120 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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capture the true meaning of the final dialogue between the protagonist of the novel and the 
‘Convitato’: 
 
Non è stato bene in mia compagnia?, chiese lui. No, risposi, è stata molto importante, ma mi ha 
inquietato, ecco, diciamo che mi ha inquietato. […] Non crede che sia proprio questo che la 
letteratura deve fare, inquietare?, da parte mia non ho fiducia nella letteratura che tranquillizza le 
coscienze. Nemmeno io, approvai, ma vede, […] la sua inquietudine si aggiunge alla mia e produce 
angoscia. Preferisco l’angoscia ad una pace marcia, affermò lui […].121  
 
Arguably, Tabucchi moves from seeking answers in modernism to trying to answer the 
questions of modernity. What is lost – hence mourned –122 is the possibility of finding a 
response in modernity, and what is interiorised – hence triggering melancholia and 
fetishism – is something that was not there in the first place, namely a founding meaning. 
For Tabucchi, modernity becomes a vacuum that he attempts to symbolise and narrate: his 
‘liberazione’ is not reaching a plenitude of sense but sustaining a lack thereof. 
Postmodernism is the struggle to make sense of a loss which was however, already, a lack 
in itself (modernity as uncanny). This ultimately explains the commingling of mourning 
and melancholia in Tabucchi’s postmodernism. 
 
To summarise, my reading of Requiem has shown how the continuity between modern 
literature and Tabucch’s postmodernism is based on a fundamental similarity: they both 
uncannily engage in a quest for sense. However, this proximity is reciprocated by an 
essential difference. Modernity is incapable to sustain the void of a plenitude of sense and 
aims to saturate it through unearthing a bedrock of certainties – that which makes it 
‘mournful’. On the contrary, Tabucchi’s postmodernism is able to keep this same void, to 







121 Requiem, p. 119, my emphasis. 
122 ‘Ed è soddisfato della giornata che ha avuto?, chiese lui. Non saprei spiegarle, risposi, mi sento più 
tranquillo, più leggero’ (Requiem, p. 125). Tellingly, as Vidler maintains, when ‘historicized, the uncanny 
might be understood as a significant psychoanalytical and aesthetic response to the real shock of the modern’. 
Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny. Essays in the Modern Unhomely (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1992), p. 9. 
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Clearing the Ground: Methodology and Thesis Summary  
 
The aim of this introduction has been to clear the ground for a new, possible pathway to 
reading Tabucchi’s uncanny by removing the obstacles and debris standing in the way. 
What follows is a brief outline of the place and of the taking place of my journey through 
and alongside the writer’s poetics. 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the speculative basis for 
the working hypothesis of the research project, looking at Agamben’s and Tabucchi’s 
theorisations and understandings of the uncanny against the backdrop of the critical debate 
about the concept. In effect, my investigation of the writer’s uncanny was actually begun 
by collecting Tabucchi’s theoretical meditations on the topic and comparing and 
contrasting it with the latter’s main formulations. A methodological approach that revealed 
the lack, within the constellation of critical discourses about the uncanny, of a proper 
examination of its nexus with the problem of signification within a wider metaphysical 
perspective. Accordingly, scrutinising the uncanny within Agamben’s thought appeared 
necessary insofar as the philosopher originally and most prominently addresses it as a 
matter of post-metaphysical (linguistic) signification. This enquiry, as already stated, lies 
also at the core of Tabucchi’s use of the uncanny as poetics.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present a close reading of Tabucchi’s texts with the purpose of 
describing and explaining the strategies employed by the writer to structure and give form 
to his poetics of the uncanny.  
 
Chapter 1 surveys the main strands within the critical discourse about the uncanny, 
discussing its formulation in psychoanalysis, philosophy, aesthetics and literary criticism. 
Subsequently, it maps the use and understanding of the unheimliche within the context of 
Italian Studies. Finally, it makes the case for an interpretation of the uncanny inside and 
through Agamben’s philosophy, analysing how the philosopher’s meditation on language 
and on its potentiality to escape metaphysical nihilism leads Agamben to a reflection on 
the unheimliche as a different experience of sense making.  
Chapter 2 begins with a recapitulation of the main issues concerning the interaction 
between the uncanny and postmodernism, as discussed in the introduction and in chapter 1, 
in order to examine the ways and extent to which they might apply to Tabucchi’s poetics. 
It then offers a survey of Tabucchi’s reflection on the uncanny, observing its relationship 
with the cognate phenomena of the nocturnal and the absurd, as well as with Freud’s and 
Agamben’s unheimliche. Combining theoretical reasoning with close reading, Tabucchi’s 
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‘Inquietudine’ comes to be defined as a temporal non-coincidence with one’s own time, an 
ontological homelessness and a linguistic estrangement; key to his understanding of the 
uncanny appears the mode in which the latter might be practised and made intelligible in 
terms of a poetics, that is, as a disquieting, interrogative process of sense making.      
Chapter 3 argues that Tabucchi combines diegetic and textual games in his uncanny 
attempt to signify otherwise, to estrange language from its familiar uses, which brings him 
close to the concepts of postmodern irony and Agamben’s profanation. This chapter 
demonstrates how Tabucchi’s characters play games through which they experience the 
two uncanny moments of sense-withdrawal and meaning production, while the author 
finds their discursive counterparts in the practice of illusion – based on the trope of 
metalepsis – and allusion, which form the principal narrative structures of his ludic 
signification. 
Chapter 4 advances the idea that Tabucchi’s ‘rovescio’ designates the mode in which the 
writer tries to produce the unconscious mechanisms of meaning creation. Accordingly, the 
chapter problematises Tabucchi’s understanding of the unconscious as a semiotic 
potentiality, namely as way of looking differently at a reality which is ambiguous and 
ambivalent. Next, it scrutinises: how Tabucchi deploys a vast array of visual motifs and 
textual structures to produce and signify the uncanny other, a possibility of sense that is 
neither graspable nor propositional; and how Tabucchi’s other combines the individual and 
the collective dimension, drawing a parallelism between the functioning of consciousness 
and that of official historiographical accounts, and between the psychic unconscious and 
potential, untextualised historical narratives.  
Chapter 5 employs Agamben’s and Felman’s reflections on testimony and its literary 
manifestations to examine the testimonial facet of Tabucchi’s uncanny, the act of 
signifying for the other. In particular, it contends that the writer’s theoretical move from 
feeling guilty by virtue of a supposed dichotomy between literature and life to the uncanny 
as a unique mode of literary engagement is mirrored in his characters’ gradual shift from 
passivity to activity, that is, from being mere observers to becoming the agents and shapers 











1.1 Mapping the Critical Debate  
 
Referring to Agamben’s treatment of the uncanny in reading Tabucchi allows one to 
identify and examine a type of philosophical enquiry within the latter’s works that would 
otherwise remain (and has indeed remained thus far) overlooked. Tabucchi’s philosophical 
enquiry addresses and at the same time embodies precisely the uncanny emergence of 
signification itself in literature (the uncanny as poetics), in relation to the ontological (or 
metaphysical) view of men as creators of sense. To this purpose, chapter 1 preliminarily 
interrogates Agamben’s theorisation of the uncanny against the backdrop of the critical 
debate about the concept. 
 
That the uncanny has nowadays become ‘a master trope available for appropriation in a 
wide variety of contexts’ together with the fact that ‘by common consent, the theoretical 
explanation for the current fascination with the concept is Freud’s 1919 essay’,123 is 
revealing of two things: first, the unheimliche has expanded beyond its original Freudian 
formulation and the psychoanalytic framework; and second, Freud still constitutes an 
essential interlocutor and point of reference in the critical debate on the concept. 
Accordingly, this chapter intends to map the principal formulations and developments of 
the Freudian uncanny within the three main fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy and 
aesthetics (with a focus on literary criticism): as Masschelein argues, the entire historical 
process of conceptualisation of the unheimliche is characterised by ‘discursive shifts’ that 
‘also lead to semantic exchanges of the Freudian uncanny with related aesthetic and 
philosophic notions such as the sublime, the fantastic, and alienation’.124  
Following from this, I then consider how Italian scholars have interpreted the unheimliche. 
Finally, I formulate an original understanding of the uncanny in Agamben’s philosophy of 
language, which, as stated in the introduction, is essential to understand the emergence of 




123  Martin Jay, ‘The Uncanny Nineties’, in Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time Critical Perspectives 
On Modern Culture (Minneapolis: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), pp. 157-164 (p. 157) 
124 Masschelein, p. 5. 
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1.1.1 Psychoanalytic Uncanny  
 
As Masschelein affirms, since its ‘stage of “preconceptualization” between 1919 and 
roughly the mid-1960s’, 125  psychoanalytic explorations of the Freudian unheimliche 
mostly focus on the latter’s relationship with anxiety.  
In this context, the most important (re)formulation of the Freudian uncanny comes from 
Lacan’s 1962-63 Seminar X, precisely devoted to the theme of anxiety. For Lacan, Freud’s 
1919 essay constitutes ‘the indispensable pivot to address the question of anxiety’.126 
Tellingly, if Freud explains the feeling of angst associated with the unheimliche by virtue 
of castration anxiety,  
 
‘The Uncanny’ offers Lacan a key to the fundamental new insight in anxiety, namely that ‘anxiety 
may be without cause, but not without object’. Specifically, the object of anxiety is a special kind of 
object that has not yet attained the status of an object, namely the ‘object a’, which is also the ek-
centric cause of desire. […] Whereas Freud took castration anxiety as the model for anxiety […] 
Lacan translates the threat of the absence of the phallus as the negative perception of the missing 
phallus [… namely] an imaginary castration that is not confirmed by perception. The phallus, which 
should be missing, is still perceived as present.127 
 
This can be best illustrated by making reference to the uncanny motif of the double. As 
Dolar explains: 
 
The double is the same as me plus the object a, that invisible part of being added to my image. […] 
Lacan uses the gaze as the best presentation of that missing object; in the mirror, one can see one’s 
eyes, but not the gaze which is the part that is lost. But imagine that one could see one’s mirror 
image close its eyes: that would make the object as gaze appear in the mirror. This is what happens 
with the double, and the anxiety that the double produces is the surest sign of the appearance of the 
object. […] Here the Lacanian account of anxiety differs sharply from other theories [including 
Freud’s]: it is not produced by a lack or a loss or an incertitude; it is not the anxiety of losing 
something (the firm support, one’s bearings, etc.). On the contrary, it is the anxiety of gaining 
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something too much, of a too-close presence of the object. What one loses with anxiety is precisely 
the loss – the loss that made it possible to deal with a coherent reality.128 
 
Lacanian psychoanalysis classifies three different, though intermingled, registers of 
experience: the imaginary, which is made of those images perceived or imaged in both 
conscious and unconscious thought (e.g. who one ‘imagines’ to be); the symbolic, i.e. the 
order of trans-subjective signification (e.g. language, institutions, laws, customs, rituals, 
etc.); and the real, that is what at once resists and invades any attempt at symbolising or 
representing it (e.g. nightmares or traumas). In his study of the Lacanian uncanny, Dolar 
argues that Lacan’s equivalent for Freud’s unheimliche might be found in the concept of 
extimité (i.ie. extimacy), which describes the intermingling of Lacan’s three registers, and, 
most prominently, of the real and the symbolic: 
 
The dimension of extimité [that] points neither to the interior nor to the exterior, but is located there 
where the most intimate interiority coincides with the exterior and becomes threatening, provoking 
horror and anxiety. The extimate is simultaneously the intimate kernel and the foreign body; in a 
word, it is unheimlich. […] And it is this very dimension beyond the division into ‘psychic’ and 
‘real’ that deserves to be called the real in the Lacanian sense.129  
 
It follows, with Dolar, that the ‘simple Lacanian common denominator’ to Freud’s 
catalogue of uncanny phenomena ‘is the irruption of the real into homely, commonly 
accepted reality […] the emergence of something that shatters well-known divisions and 
which cannot be situated within them’.130 In order to understand Lacan’s account of the 
uncanny as the emergence of the real, and to recognise the way in which it parallels 
Freud’s discourse, it is fundamental to recall that the French psychoanalyst distinguishes 
between reality and the real: while reality defines ‘the product of our representations […] a 
symbolic or imaginary construction’, the real could be grasped as ‘a void that arises 
through the symbolic order, as an effect of the symbolic order, which is nevertheless 
irreducible to the imaginary or symbolic’.131 Reality, understood through the prism of the 
Freudian unheimliche, is the familiar that negates and represses the real, whose emergence 
constitutes, in turn, the return of the unfamiliar repressed. Lacan’s real is not necessarily 
traumatic in itself, but solely because and to the degree to which it is unfamiliar in relation 
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to the familiar reality: ‘[t]he real is traumatic because there has been no sufficient symbolic 
or imaginary network in place for representing it’.132 
 
 
1.1.2 Philosophical Uncanny  
 
As Masschelein observes, one of the main axes along which the uncanny develops is the 
‘“existential/post-Marxist” semantic line of alienation, strangeness, and angst [which] will 
emphasize the uncanny’s relation to society, politics, and ethics’.133 Similarly Royle 
remarks that ‘[e]verything in Marx that speaks of a spectre that is haunting Europe, 
everything that has to do with notions of alienation, revolution and repetition comes down 
to a thinking of the uncanny’.134 A central place, in this regard, is occupied by Heidegger’s 
formulation of the uncanny. In the latter there is, however, a crucial distance from the 
Freudian uncanny that is revealed by language itself: while Freud uses the term 
unheimliche, that is a substantivised adjective linguistically expressing openness and 
indeterminacy, Heidegger employs the substantive unheimlichkeit, which fittingly denotes 
an essence or condition. For the German philosopher, in effect, the uncanny is no longer 
(solely) a subjective feeling, but an ontological condition, insofar as ‘the experience of 
angst is not just a breakdown of familiarity but a breakdown that reveals something […] 
not a pathological way of relating to the world […] because it is a genuine way of latching 
onto how things are – a special mode of access to the ontological’.135 This implies that, for 
Heidegger, the unheimliche ‘is not a negative revelation of what everyday life has been 
like but a positive revelation of what the human essence is like’.136  
There are three main elements in Heidegger’s account of the unheimliche. First, Heidegger 
distinguishes the phenomenon of feeling uncanny, which takes place in an exemplary 
manner with anxiety. That is, the fact that the ‘particulars of our lives withdraw into the 
background or slip away and in this withdrawal is revealed something about me, about 
human life, or about the world as such’137 is differentiated from the ontological grasping of 
being uncanny. Namely from the fact that the ‘human being is the entity that is essentially 
exposed or open to meaning’ through a ‘self-constituting reciprocity between openness and 
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finitude’, and whose ‘[i]ntelligibility is essentially finite’. 138  Second, for Heidegger 
uncanniness coincides, therefore, with human beings’ essence or being and defines them as 
sense-makers, for they ‘are distinguished from other entities by the fact that they 
understand being or make sense of the world’.139 Therefore, ‘uncanniness would belong to 
the human essence as part of the human project of making familiar or making sense of 
things’140 and ‘the essence is the seeking of the essence’.141 Third, feeling and being 
uncanny are not opposite or mutually exclusive; rather, they co-enable each other, for ‘in 
anxiety one feels uncanny […] enters into the existential mode of the not-at-home’.142 As 
Withy explains, the relationship between these two moments or movements (derealisation 
and revelation) ‘is less a forking than a folding’.143 An idea that, I will argue, lays at the 
core also of Agamben’s uncanny.  
 
 
1.1.3 Aesthetic and Literary Uncanny 
 
In aesthetics, the uncanny is often considered as a sort of ‘negative Sublime’. Exemplarily, 
in Agon. Towards a Theory of Revisionism, Bloom states that:  
 
The Uncanny [is] the only major contribution that the twentieth century made to the aesthetics of the 
Sublime. [. . .] The Sublime, as I read Freud, is one of his major repressed concerns, and this literary 
repression on his part is a clue to what I take to be a gap in his theory of repression.144  
 
This formulation premises on the belief that the sublime is based on repression. Therefore, 
the uncanny comes to be defined as ‘that mode in which the poet, while expressing 
previously repressed thought, desires or emotions, is able to continue to defend himself 
against his own created image by disowning it’.145  
More recently, Kohon has argued that the Freudian uncanny is ‘a necessary condition for 
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the experience of the aesthetic’,146 as the latter forms an encounter with the negative, i.e. 
what defies familiar meaning and representation. This is due to a certain commonality 
between psychoanalysis and aesthetics, which ‘share the task of making a representation of 
the unrepresentable’ although ‘[a]rt and literature have the capacity to create something 
unfamiliar within the familiar reality’ while ‘psychoanalysis reveals and identifies the 
unfamiliar already present in that apparent reality’.147 According to Kohon, the uncanny 
inheres every aesthetic experience in two ways: first, because it makes room, on the part of 
the artist, for an ‘encounter with the negative, something secret or repressed in the subject, 
which the artistic or literary object has brough to light’;148 and second, since it demands 
from the audience the ability to ‘withstand […] feelings of depersonalisation (or 
derealisation)’.149  The Freudian unheimliche becomes, therefore, a form of aesthetic 
anxiety. 
 
On the other hand, as Masschelein notices, ‘Freud’s essay also serves to construct a post-
Freudian theory of fiction, of writing and reading in terms of effect’.150 This is evident 
when considering the conceptualisations advanced by decostructionist thinkers, especially 
by Derrida. The latter understands the Freudian unheimliche as undecidability and 
dissemination, i.e. as an endless deferral and destabilisation of meaning. If ‘dissemination 
represents […] the remarkable empty locus of a hundred blanks no meaning can be 
ascribed to, in which supplements and substitution games are multiplied ad infinitum’, 
Derrida writes that a similar textual play lays at the core of the uncanny (and of Freud’s 
1919 essay), which is characterised by ‘undecidable ambivalence, the play of the double, 
the endless exchange between the fantastic and the real, the “symbolized” and the 
“symbolizer,” the process of interminable substitution’. 151  The Freudian unheimliche 
becomes a sort of synonym for literature’s capacity to problematise and question our 
familiar experience with language and signification. However, differently from what will 
be the case in Agamben and Tabucchi, this does not result in a positive experience of sense 
making. In effect, with Derrida and deconstruction,  
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The uncanny becomes an insidious, all-pervasive ‘passe-partout’ word to address virtually any topic: 
politics, history, humanity, technology, psychoanalysis, religion, alongside more familiar aesthetic 
questions, related to genres, specific literary texts and motifs commonly associated with the 
uncanny. Because the uncanny affects and haunts everything, it is in constant transformation and 
cannot be pinned down.152 
 
From this perspective, it is remarkable how the central place occupied by Derrida in the 
conceptualisation of the uncanny and the convergence of the latter with deconstruction, 
inherent in his formulation of the unheimliche, lead to the idea that ‘the Freudian uncanny 
[eventually] is a late-twentieth century theoretical concept’.153 
 
Finally, within literary criticism, the uncanny is mostly discussed in relation to the 
fantastic. The centrality of Todorov for the theory of the uncanny depends partially on a 
misunderstanding. As Masschelein indicates, the English translation of the French term 
étrange, used by Todorov, with ‘uncanny’ is far from accurate and legitimate. Besides, 
such mistranslation appears to compromise, from the outset, the effectiveness and the 
truthfulness of the debate about the two concepts of the uncanny and of the fantastic. 
Masschelein suggests how it somewhat explains both an usual ‘conflation of the Freudian 
uncanny and the Todorovian uncanny’154 as well as a more radical identification of the 
Freudian uncanny with Todorov’s fantastic. A conflation mainly due to the notion of 
‘hesitation’ that occupies a central place in Todorov’s definition of the fantastic: 
 
The fantastic requires the fulfilment of three conditions. First, the text must oblige the reader to 
consider the world of the characters as a world of living persons and to hesitate between a natural 
and a supernatural explanation of the events described. Second, this hesitation may also be 
experienced by a character […]. Third, the reader must […] reject allegorical as well as ‘poetic’ 
interpretations. The first and the third constitute the genre.155  
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According to Masschelein, it is such idea, in actual fact, what ‘allows for a shift of the 
uncanny towards the fantastic, through the link with lexical ambivalence in Freud’s 
definition’.156 However, what makes the unheimliche irreducible to Todorov’s literary 
genre of the étrange is the latter’s qualification as ‘supernatural explained’157 and its being 
bound up solely with a psychological reaction of fear. Tellingly the literary critic oscillates 
between the acceptance and the dismissal of Freud’s theorization of the concept of the 
uncanny. Thus, after having recalled that ‘according to Freud, the sense of the uncanny is 
linked to the appearance of an image which originates in the childhood’, he counters that 
this is ‘a hypothesis still to be verified’.158 Accordingly, he concludes that ‘there is not an 
entire coincidence between Freud’s use of the term and our own’.159 Moreover Todorov 
tries to comprehend the uncanny (the Freudian unheimliche and his étrange) in the limited 
field of a genre, only to admit at a later point that it is a genre that ‘dissolves into the 
general field of literature’.160 This fact, together with his reducing the unheimliche to a 
mere emotive aftereffect of the moment of hesitation, marks the distance from the uncanny 
traditionally understood.  
 
With the explicit intent to resolve those blind spots found in Todorov’s work, Rosemary 
Jackson inaugurates a fundamental shift in the critical debate about the fantastic and its 
relation with the Freudian uncanny: 
 
For to see the fantastic as a literary form, it needs to be made distinct in literary terms, and the 
uncanny, or l’étrange, is not one of these – it is not a literary category, while the marvellous is. It is 
perhaps more helpful to define the fantastic as a literary mode rather than a genre, and to place it 
between the opposite modes of the marvellous and of the mimetic.161 
 
Two points should be highlighted in Jackson’s proposal.  
First, she dismisses Todorov’s definition of the fantastic as a literary genre, opposing that 
of a literary mode. Tellingly such term designates ‘structural features underlying various 
works in different periods of time’.162 The scholar describes her attempt to expand the 
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poetics of the fantastic into a politics of fantasy, namely into a hermeneutical approach that 
conjugates psychoanalytic reading with cultural and historical contextualization. From this 
point of view, the poetics of the fantastic develops into and is to be understood as the 
narrative articulation of unconscious drives, precisely insofar as ‘it is in the unconscious 
that social structures are reproduced and sustained within us’.163  
Second, moving the uncanny out of Todorov’s oppositional scheme, Jackson formulates it 
as a sort of historical configuration or embodiment of the fantastic mode, which follows 
the period of the marvellous and takes place in a scientific and rationalistic reality. Indeed 
this assumption is coherent with the recognition of a peculiar modern dimension of the 
uncanny and, conversely, of the defamiliarizing value of modernity itself. 
 
 
1.2 The Italian Unheimliche 
 
Speaking of an Italian unheimliche, namely of how Freud’s uncanny has been interpreted 
within the framework of Italian Studies, means, first of all, recognising a struggle in 
linguistic conceptualisation. In his 1919 essay Freud explicitly affirms that no equivalent 
for the German term exists in Italian language, where only a periphrasis might convey the 
concept’s whole significance. An observation later confirmed by the fact that the word 
unheimliche has been translated into Italian in different, often conflicting, ways. For 
instance, while Orlando defines Freud’s essay ‘il saggio sul mal traducibile Das 
Unheimliche (più “il sinistro” che il perturbante dei traduttori)’164, Rella maintains that 
‘[l]a traduzione giusta sarebbe “spaesante”, “desituante”, “atopico”: l’ingresso in una sorta 
di extraterritorialità che ci appartiene come qualcosa costitutivo del nostro essere 
umani’. 165  This situation is complicated further from the fact that unheimliche is 
understood and, accordingly, translated differently in the texts of Freud and Heidegger. As 
a matter of fact, 
 
Le traduzioni italiane del termine unheimlich, con le sue varianti, negli scritti di Freud e Heidegger, 
sono molteplici. Se, per quanto riguarda Freud, prevale il termine ‘perturbante’ […], per quanto 
riguarda Heidegger la versione più frequente e accreditata è ‘spaesante’, ‘spaesamento’, introdotta 
da Chiodi nella traduzione di Sein und Zeit, e ripresa di recente, per altri testi, da Volpi; a essa si 
affiancano però la traduzione di Masi, con ‘inquietante’, e quella di Marini, con ‘inospitalità’. 
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‘Spaesamento’ è forse la traduzione che più si avvicina al termine Tedesco, per la prossimità tra 
‘paese’ e ‘Heim’, pur non potendo renderne la pregnanza di sfumature.166 
 
Yet, despite this linguistic difficulty, the (Freudian) unheimliche constitutes an important 
point of reference and topic of discussion for several Italian scholars. In her survey of the 
most significant Italian contributions to the critical debate on the uncanny, Berto observes 
how ‘[i]l motivo dell’Unheimliche emerge comunque con una certa frequenza, benché in 
modo generalmente frammentario e indiretto […] a indicare l’incontro con una dimensione 
di inappropriabilità, diversamente interpretata’.167 Within the geographical and cultural 
perimeter of ‘un dibattito italiano particolarmente ricco’,168 the uncanny is still addressed 
from a psychoanalytic, philosophical and aesthetic-literary perspective.  
 
Ciaramelli, who combines Freudian psychoanalysis and Heideggerian philosophy, 
develops the most innovative reading of the psychoanalytic uncanny. For Ciaramelli, 
 
Ciò che concerne l’uomo ineludibilmente e che tuttavia non gli è accessibile immediatamente 
costituisce il nucleo e il fondo della Unheimlichkeit dell’uomo, la latenza verso cui si dirigono 
psicoanalisi e fenomenologia, e dalla quale siamo ambiguamente attratti e restinti.169 
 
This understanding of the uncanny as a sort of ‘original latency’, i.e. as a primal dimension 
of plenitude of sense and gratification never actually experienced by men, directly affects 
his conceptualisation of (unconscious) desire as inherently based on a relationship between 
the subject and the other: 
 
Il mito infantile e primitivo dell’onnipotenza magica dei pensieri, considerato come caratteristica 
della vita psichica originaria, è un’espressione dell’onnipotenza immaginaria del desiderio, in 
quanto automatismo d’un appagamento immediato e totale, vale a dire allucinatorio. In questa 
fantasia retrospettiva si manifesta il carattere antinomico, insostenibile e perturbante del desiderio 
umano. Ciò che qui al tempo stesso attrae e respinge è l’estraneità stessa del proprio. Il 
vagheggiamento di questa totalità originaria, il richiamo avvincente ma paralizzante di questa 
inclusione inglobante nel proprio, nasce dalla tensione del desiderio verso l’impossibile 
riappropriazione del suo presunto oggetto originario. […] La deriva del desiderio – il suo 
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movimento indiretto verso sempre parziali forme di appagamento e soddisfacimento differito – è 
originaria proprio perché il desiderio non è mai immediato e diretto ma fin dall’inizio coinvolto 
nella mediazione istituita. Il desiderio emerge nel rimando del senso all’altro da sé, all’estraneo: 
perciò, il desiderio è originario proprio in quanto incapace d’autogenerarsi.170 
 
Thus, Freud’s unheimliche reveals how unconscious desire can never be fully satisfied 
because it originates from and is inhabited by an irreducible, unfamiliar, radical alterity. 
 
 
Meaningfully, the major contributions to the philosophical uncanny come from the 
members of the so-called ‘pensiero debole’. In particular, while Vattimo reads the uncanny 
as a structural condition of postmodernity, for Rovatti it aptly designates the postmodern 
approach to philosophical thinking. Vattimo praises the postmodern condition of instability 
and ambivalence, of being-not-at-home as a possibility for authentic freedom: 
 
Vivere in questo mondo molteplice significa fare esperienza della libertà come oscillazione continua 
tra appartenenza e spaesamento [..] ma anche perché noi stessi non sappiamo troppo bene quale 
fisionomia abbia, facciamo fatica a concepire questa oscillazione come libertà [... a] cogliere questa 
esperienza di oscillazione nel mondo postmoderno come chance di un nuovo modo di essere (forse 
finalmente) umani.171 
 
As Jansen explains, Vattimo derives the two concepts of ‘spaesamento’ and ‘oscillazione’ 
from Heidegger. Therefore, his postmodern uncanny constitutes more an historicisation of 
Heidegger’s unheimlichkeit rather than of Freud’s unheimliche. 
Rovatti shares Vattimo’s identification of postmodernity with a condition of unfamiliarity 
or ‘estraneità’, claiming that ‘per stare in una situazione come questa bisogna allentare il 
troppo, aprire interstizi [...] produrre in noi zone di vuoto, di silenzio, di estraneità’.172 
Accordingly, he uses the term ‘spaesamento’ to describe the hermeneutical and linguistic 
approach that distinguishes the postmodern ‘weak thought’ as the philosophical attempt to 
produce ‘il disincanto, un effetto di disillusione rispetto alla pretesa totalizzante’ of 
philosophy itself by integrating ‘una sospensione poetica all’interno del linguaggio della 
filosofia’.173 In effect, as Schwarz Lausten comments, Vattimo and Rovatti adopt 
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[L]a metafora dell’abitare per descrivere la nuova condizione del soggetto [nella postmodernità]: 
l’io non abita più un luogo nel senso che ne è il padrone. Esso è spaesato e disorientato dopo il 
crollo dei sogni della metafisica, e il pensiero debole è un tentativo di rendere abitabile, cioè 
pensabile, questa nuova condizione.174  
 
 
Furthermore, similarly to Kohon, Italian scholars frame the aesthetic uncanny in terms of 
an experience of the negative. Tellingly, Carboni declares that ‘senza dubbio, il perturbante 
è una figura del Sublime moderno, una delle forme in cui esso riemerge’.175 For this reason 
he defines as ‘abbaglio’ if not ‘rimozione’176 Freud’s affirmation, at the beginning of his 
1919 essay, that ‘nothing is to be found upon this subject [the uncanny] in elaborate 
treatises on aesthetics, which in general prefer to concern themselves with what is 
beautiful’.177 
In a similar fashion, Rella argues that the aesthetic uncanny produces a crisis of 
representational logic, in particular by collapsing our familiar experience of time as linear 
continuity:  
 
La logica iterativa, la ripetizione, che vediamo emergere […] con una specificità, nelle opere d’arte, 
mette radicalmente in discussione la logica lineare a cui siamo abituati. L’evento o la forma, quando 
sono ripetuti, sono in questa ripetizione ribaditi […] ma d’altro canto questo ‘più’ insinua in noi ciò 
che prima non era comprensibile […]. Questo qualcosa è perturbante, strano, unheimlich, in quanto 
incrina la logica della rappresentazione. La perfetta corrispondenza tra significante e significato si 
spezza nell’emergere dell’Unheimlich.178 
 
For Rella, this implies the fact that the uncanny reveals how every work of art makes room 
for the return of something previously repressed, i.e. a different modality of signification. 
Meaningfully, this reaches a climax in literature, where  
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Il materiale rimosso che ritorna è già stato lavorato dalla rimozione e porta le tracce sia del lavoro 
che l’ha ‘sommerso’, sia del lavoro e del materiale che l’hanno fatto riaffiorare, si esprime cioè in 
una differenza, in altro modo, con altre forme.179 
 
As for the relationship between Freud’s unheimliche and literature, the Freudian literary 
critic Orlando advances a distinctive formulation.  
First, Orlando stresses the importance of shifting the Italian translation of the definition of 
the uncanny as ‘return of the repressed, from ‘ritorno del rimosso’ to ‘ritorno del represso’. 
On the one hand, this comes from the fact that, as stated in the introduction, Freud 
identifies two sources of the unheimliche: overcome childhood complexes and surmounted 
beliefs. In the latter case, however, one cannot properly speak of repression. Here, in 
effect, Freud ‘estende […] l’uso del termine rimozione al di là dei suoi confini legittimi, 
poiché tali credenze primitive non sono mai state […] rimosse […] sono state piuttosto 
sorpassate’.180 Therefore, Orlando comments, ‘[a]nche se non la conia di fatto, dunque, 
concettualmente e virtualmente, Freud autorizza qui un’espressione analogica come 
“ritorno del sorpassato” [o] “ritorno del represso”’.181  
On the other hand, Orlando’s linguistic change leads to a major modification in the critical 
conceptualisation of the uncanny since, unlike ‘rimosso’, ‘represso’ includes a socio-
collective dimension: 
 
[I]nfatti ‘represso’, in ‘ritorno del represso’, è parzialmente sinonimo di ‘rimosso’, dato che può 
indicare qualcosa di inconscio. La sostituzione di ‘represso’ a ‘rimosso’ [è] una scelta terminologica 
esplicita, motivata dalla volontà di includere nell’espressione non solo contenuti individuali e 
inconsci, ma anche sociali e consci.182 
 
Second, Orlando articulates a theory of literature as ‘ritorno del represso socialmente 
istituzionalizzato’, wherein what uncannily returns is: 
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1. Ritorno del represso come presenza di qualità formali assimilabili a quelle proprie del 
linguaggio dell’inconscio secondo la descrizione di Freud [what Orlando calls ‘figure’]; 
2. Ritorno del represso come presenza di contenuti censurati dalla repressione sociale che 
grava sul sesso; 
3. Ritorno del represso come presenza di contenuti censurati da una repressione ideologico-
politica.183 
 
Clearly the first point (‘represso formale’) is also the most significant as it addresses the 
formal and linguistic dimension of literature. From this it follows, for Orlando, that 
literature is a ‘formazione di compromesso’184 between two different logics or models: the 
conscious and the unconscious one. And this is ascribable to the fact that literature ‘altera 
quella trasparenza nel rapporto tra significato e significato che dovrebbe essere prevalente 
o almeno normale nell’uso conscio-adulto del linguaggio’ making room, although 
indirectly, for unconscious sense making.185 Also within the context of Italian Studies, 
therefore, the nexus between literature and the uncanny, which I discussed in the 
introduction, is overtly acknowledged and thematised.  
 
Eventually, mapping the Italian debate on the uncanny, Berto briefly alludes to Agamben, 
and to the presence, in the latter’s writings, of a reflection on the relationship between the 
uncanny and ‘[la] dimensione della logica e del linguaggio’.186 However she does not 
develop further this critical insight. Therefore, it is to the overlooked formulation of the 







183 Ibid., [Chapter 2, location 377]. 
184 By the concept ‘compromise formation’ Freud defines ‘the form taken by the repressed material […] 
in order for it to be admitted into consciousness. Thus the compromise formation is the formation of a 
symptom’. Jacki Watts and others, Developmental Psychology, 2nd edition (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2009), 
p. 62. 
185 Although focusing exclusively on literature and moving within a Freudian framework, Orlando develops 
arguments similar to those suggested by Agamben in the same years (Orlando’s Per una teoria freudiana 
della letteratura was first published in 1973, Agamben’s Stanze in 1977). Indeed, already with Orlando the 
uncanny is addressed as a matter of semiosis, but not in relation to its ontological (post-metaphysical) 
dimension, as with Agamben and Tabucchi. 
186 Berto, p. 12. 
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1.3 Agamben and the (Freudian) Uncanny  
 
 If it is true of Agamben that it is ‘the pure factum loquendi (the fact speaking beings 
exist), that he everywhere tries to think through’,187 it is precisely his search for a different 
understanding of the signifying function of language that leads him, in Stanze. La parola e 
il fantasma nella cultura occidentale (1977), to a direct engagement with the Freudian 
uncanny. The title of this volume188 alludes to the metric division and measure of the 
troubadours’ poetry as well as, more broadly and metaphorically, to an im-possible place 
(in the case of the medieval poem, the space or taking place of erotic desire) that produces 
unsaturated meaning. In Stanze Agamben pursues a new conceptualisation of experience 
through which individuals may gain access to and abide by their ‘proper’ place:  
 
Nelle pagine che seguono, il modello della conoscenza è così cercato in quelle operazioni, come la 
disperazione del malinconico o la Verleugnung del feticista, in cui il desiderio nega, e, insieme, 
afferma il suo oggetto, e in questo modo riesce a entrare in rapporto con qualcosa che non avrebbe 
potuto altrimenti essere né appropriato né goduto […] un modello del significare che sfuggisse alla 
posizione primordiale del significante e del significato che domina ogni riflessione occidentale sul 
segno. […] [S]olo se si è capaci di entrare in rapporto con l’irrealtà e con l’inappropriabile in quanto 
tali, è possibile appropriarsi della realtà e del positivo.189  
 
Accordingly, the uncanny comes to ground and designate, for Agamben, a model of 
signification that is capable of exposing and undoing the metaphysical bearings inherent in 
the traditional understanding of the linguistic sign as the union of the signifier and the 
signified. For, while this apparent unification superficially conceals a linguistic fracture – 
the bar that at once joins and divides the two planes –, on a metaphysical level it hides and 
disregards the original (positive) fracture and estrangement inherent to the essence of 
                                                        
187 Justin Clemens, ‘The Role of the Shifter and the Problem of Reference in Giorgio Agamben’, in Giorgio 
Agamben: Law, Literature and Life, ed. by Justin Clemens, Nicholas Heron and Alex Murray (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press), pp. 43-65 (p. 44). 
188 ‘I poeti del ‘200 chiamavano «stanza», cioè «dimora capace e ricettacolo», il nucleo essenziale della loro 
poesia, perché esso custodiva […] quel joi d’amor che essi affidavano come unico oggetto della poesia’ 
(Stanze, p. xiii). The latter opens ‘uno spazio in cui il segno poetico appare come l’unico asilo offerto al 
compimento dell’amore e il desiderio amoroso come il fondamento e il senso della poesia’ (Ibid., pp. 151-
52). 
189 Ibid., pp. xiv-xvi.  
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human beings, i.e. the fact that the latter have to acquire language and signification and, in 
infancy,190 experience themselves precisely as a potential intention to signify.  
 
For Agamben, the adjective ‘uncanny’ describes the modality in which a peculiar 
experience takes place as well as the content of that experience: the uncanny is how one 
encounters (through language, understood as a sense-making process available only to 
man) what is uncanny (man’s being). Or rather, an uncanny experience is always an 
experience of uncanniness. This reciprocity is due to the fact that formulating an 
understanding of the concept from and through Agamben’s theory of language entails 
considering the uncanny as a signifying potentiality, revealing of man’s proper essence, 
and hence as a possible way out of what he calls metaphysical nihilism.191 It is, in fact, the 
oblivion of the possibility of experiencing language as such – what Agamben calls 
                                                        
190 ‘Infanzia’ is the term through which Agamben designates a radically new experience of language, ‘a new 
concept of experience that is based on a transcendental consciousness stripped of all psychological attributes 
and existing in language alone’. Catherine Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill/Queen’s University Press, 2008), p. 34. It is the experience of the taking place of language itself; and, 
despite the name, it is a somewhat transcendental potentiality not confined solely to childhood. 
191 Reaching its climax with modernity, for Agamben, nihilism might and should be understood not in the 
most traditional sense of a devaluation or absence of unifying and transcendental values, but, rather, as the 
presence of a foundation that is, nonetheless, unattainable, in a way always already lost to men. However, it 
is a negative grounding that can, in turn, be negated, for, as Molad points out, ‘Agamben believes that rather 
than maintaining a reactionary or merely critical attitude towards nihilism, our task is to put it to a new use 
by realising its redemptive potentiality’ (Yoni Molad, ‘Nihilism’, in The Agamben Dictionary, pp. 138-39 (p. 
138)). Significantly, it is on this point that language, and literature, appear qua (negating) modalities of sense 
making: for Agamben ‘art’s privilege is located […] in its power to disclose the nihilism of Western culture 
as such. […] Art […] is also that in which the surpassing of nihilism may be accomplished’ (Weller, p. 156). 
This is also why Hillyer assigns Agamben to what he defines as the ‘literature of the no’, namely to a 
conceptualization of literature that, far from reducing it to a mere acceptation and representation of 
metaphysical nihilism, is able to perceive a potential way out. Accordingly, the scholar finds in Agamben ‘[a] 
particular understanding of literature, its claim to verisimilitude, and therefore also a particular understanding 
of language, its signifying function […] in which the communicative and informative functions of language 
are deactivated in order to open it up to a new potential use’ (Aaron Hillyer, The Disappearance of 
Literature: Blanchot, Agamben, and the Writers of the No (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 9). According to 
Hillyer, Agamben is one of those authors who ‘having lost all hope of an expressible, totality of words, that 
signifies wholly, eternally and unequivocally, and of an accessible tradition, decide instead to build their 
work from a standpoint of extreme negativity, while still chancing that the literary word’s potential is not yet 
consumed’ (ibid., p. 1). From the perspective of Agamben’s uncanny, if nihilism defines a sort of ineffable 
‘semantic saturation’, overcoming, or twisting free of nihilism means being able to sustain a state of void and 
doubt, being able to stay in an interrogative mode that seeks no ultimate answer. 
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experimentum linguae –, of the linguistic function and functioning regardless of any actual 
content to be communicated, that, for the philosopher, has estranged man from himself.  
Therefore, the two dimensions (the uncanny as mode and content of an experience) as well 
as the relationship existing between them both need to be examined. Indeed, I will argue 
that, ultimately, the uncanny takes place exactly through and in the form of this 
relationship, as the articulation between the estranging feeling of the uncanny and its 
occurring as ontological insight.  
 
 
In Stanze Agamben develops his conceptualisation of and confrontation with Freud’s 
unheimliche through a threefold process: he begins by picking upon what might be 
regarded as an archetypical manifestation and occurrence of an uncanny experience, 
namely the modern subject’s alienation within and from a world that is seemingly in the 
process of losing its significance, thus focusing on the uncanny as an unsettling form of 
experience. Subsequently, examining the metaphysical presuppositions that underpin the 
familiar functioning of the linguistic sign and how they are questioned and estranged by 
the logic inherent in symbols or by the presence of the bar between the signifier and the 
signified, Agamben moves from an understanding of the uncanny qua subjective feeling of 
derealisation and depersonalisation to an understanding of uncanniness as a mode of being. 
Finally – and this is where the figures of Lacan and Derrida will come into play – 
Agamben formulates a potential, tentative description of this shift(ing) between the 
phenomenological and the ontological unheimliche, between the uncanny as the mode and 
content of such an experience, suggesting that, in the end, the uncanny resides neither in 
the formal disquiet nor in the ontological fracture, but precisely in the sense-making 
relationship, in the articulation between the two. The uncanny is the place and the 
structuring, the taking place of this articulation.   
 
 
1.3.1 On Feeling and Being Uncanny  
 
In Stanze Agamben first alludes to the Freudian unheimliche while trying to identify the 
properties that characterise and distinguish an uncanny experience, and thus engaging with 
the question: what is uncanny about an uncanny experience? This occurs in the second part 
of the volume, where Agamben is analysing the concept of fetishism.  
A dual thrust structures the triadic relationship he develops between the uncanny, fetishism 
and the third element of modernity: on the one hand, the uncanny witnesses and enhances a 
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crisis of experience, the loss of any stable relationship with objects and of any firm 
meaning, a horror vacui characterising, at its climax, the trauma of modernity, the 
experience of modernity as traumatic, acknowledging that ‘trauma signifies the collapse of 
signification’.192  
 
For Agamben, modernity is the highest example of what it takes to undergo an uncanny 
experience, since it is characterised by alienation, ‘il disagio dell’uomo di fronte 
all’inquietante metamorfosi degli oggetti più familiari’. 193  Thus, Agamben finds a 
somewhat primeval instance of Freud’s uncanny in Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism.194 
The chapter entitled ‘Beau Brummel o l’appropriazione dell’irrealtà’ opens with 
Agamben’s description of Grandville’s vignettes and disquieting illustrations of daily 
objects. What these drawings reveal is man’s discomfort when faced with mass-produced 
commodities,195 since they display the parallelism that occurs between the alienation of the 
object through its commodification and the alienation of individuals no longer capable of 
experiencing them. According to Agamben, in fact, ‘Grandville scorge […] la cifra di un 
nuovo rapporto fra gli uomini e le cose […] il disagio dell’uomo di fronte all’inquietante 
metamorfosi degli oggetti più familiari’.196  
A sense of alienation and disquiet might illuminate, therefore, the way in which the feeling 
of the uncanny arises and is experienced:  
                                                        
192 James Berger, The Disarticulate: Language, Disability, and the Narratives of Modernity (New York: New 
York University Press, 2014), p. 566. 
193  Stanze, p. 55. As he states in Infanzia, ‘[o]gni discorso sull’esperienza deve oggi partire dalla 
constatazione che essa non è più qualcosa che ci sia ancora dato di fare. […] l’incapacità di fare e trasmettere 
esperienze è, forse, uno dei pochi dati certi di cui egli [l’uomo contemporaneo] disponga su se stesso’ (p. 5). 
The crisis of experience is, with modernity, also an experience of the crisis, of a fracture that, significantly, 
takes place in the form of a temporal disjointedness. Indeed, modernity is a time-centred idea. It presupposes, 
in effect, a linear concept of time bound up with the notion of progress. Or, rather, it assumes a twofold 
temporality, a caesura between ‘the objectified, socially measurable time of capitalist civilization […] and 
the personal, subjective, imaginative durée, the private time created by the unfolding of the self’ (Cãlinescu, 
p. 5). 
194 ‘In quanto si presenta sotto questa doppia forma di oggetto d’uso e di porta-valore, la merce è un bene 
essenzialmente immateriale ed astratto, il cui godimento materiale è impossibile se non attraverso 
l’accumulazione e lo scambio […]. Alla sovrapposizione del valore di scambio al valore d’uso corrisponde, 
nel feticismo, la sovrapposizione di un particolare valore simbolico all’uso normale dell’oggetto’ (Stanze, p. 
45). 
195 ‘La degenerazione implicita nella trasformazione dell’oggetto artigianale in articolo di massa si manifesta 
quotidianamente per l’uomo moderno nella perdita della disinvoltura rispetto alle cose’ (ibid., pp. 55-56). 
196 Ibid., p. 55. 
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Proprio all’inquietante (Das Unheimliche, di cui scorge esempi insigni proprio in due temi cari a 
Grandville: l’occhio enucleato e il pupazzo animato, che egli trova nei romanzi di Hoffmann), Freud 
dedica un ampio studio, comparso nel quinto volume di Imago, le cui conclusioni sono molto 
significative. Egli vede nell’inquietante (Unheimliche) il familiare (Heimliche) rimosso. ‘Questo 
inquietante non è in realtà nulla di nuovo, nulla di estraneo, ma piuttosto qualcosa che è da sempre 
familiare alla psiche e che solo il processo di rimozione ha reso altro’. Il rifiuto di prendere 
coscienza dei facticia mercificati si esprime crittograficamente nell’aura minacciosa che avvolge le 
cose più familiari, con le quali non è più possibile sentirsi al sicuro.197  
 
Agamben links the Freudian uncanny to Marx’s idea of alienation, since, to him, they are 
both exemplary instances of that receding of meaning and of signification that, despite 
underpinning the entire metaphysical tradition for Agamben, reaches its highest point with 
modernity.  
 
This is a much shared position in the critical reception of the uncanny, as: 
 
The basic Freudian definition of ‘the familiar that has become strange’ cannot be disconnected from 
one of the most important concepts in many discourses of the twentieth century: alienation as an 
economic, political, psychological and existential condition. […] The infusion of the Marxist 
tradition of alienation in the concept of the uncanny provides it with a more critical potential.198   
  
On the other hand, however, the unheimliche is also a way to signify such loss, to try to 
cope with it. In this sense – and on this point the texts partly anticipate the subsequent 
investigation into the experience of the uncanny qua ontological category – it functions 
similarly to fetishism, which has, according to Agamben, a profanating logic,199 being 
based at once upon presence and absence.  
                                                        
197 Ibid., p. 61. 
198 Masschelein, pp. 136-46. 
199 Agamben derives the idea of profanation from Roman law, where it was opposed to the act of consacrare, 
defining the action of ‘restituire [le cose consacrate agli dei] al libero uso degli uomini’. Giorgio Agamben, 
Profanazioni (Rome: Nottetempo, 2005), p. 83. The Italian philosopher establishes, in particular, a 
parallelism between consecration, as that which presupposes the separation of something from the ordinary 
sphere of men, and all those pre-determined, pre-regulated actions and practices that punctuate an 
individual’s daily life, but which, at the same time, separate him from his own awareness and free will. Thus 
Agamben employs the term profanazione, specifically addressing the creation of ‘un mezzo puro […] un 
nuovo uso […] possibile per l’uomo solo disattivando un vecchio uso, rendendolo inoperoso’ (ibid., p. 99). 
As Salzani argues, with profanation ‘what is rendered inoperative, is an activity directed towards a goal, in 
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Disavowal, the gesture performed in fetishism, neither posits (or longs for) a full presence, 
nor does it dissolve into the vortex of the absence of meaning.200 Rather, it tries to rethink 
and re-arrange semiosis and language in order to allow for the symbolisation of the trauma 
– which is exemplary of modernity – itself. Within Agamben’s thinking of a new modality 
of experience, which constitutes the fundamental issue in Stanze, ‘fetishism plays a central 
role here because of how it isolates its object in a curious space never clearly locatable in 
either the subject or the object.’201 Fetishism, in its Freudian codification, allows for what 
Agamben defines as ‘l’appropriazione stessa dell’irrealtà’,202 the appropriation of that 
which can never be properly possessed or mastered, because it exists as potentiality203: 
 
Le cose non sono fuori di noi, nello spazio esterno misurabile, come oggetti neutrali (ob-jecta) di 
uso e di scambio, ma sono invece esse stesse che ci aprono il luogo originale […] sono cioè esse 
stesse comprese fin dall’inizio nel topos outopos in cui si situa la nostra esperienza di essere-al-
mondo. La domanda dove è la cosa? È inseparabile dalla domanda dove è l’uomo? Come il feticcio 
[…] le cose non sono propriamente in nessun posto, perché il loro luogo si situa al di qua degli 
oggetti e al di là dell’uomo […].204 
 
That fetishes are properly no-where alludes to the fact that they unceasingly advance and 
remove meaning, articulating a topological, almost paradoxical, space of sense making, 
which is never at hand and yet always already at the core of man’s existence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
order to open it to a new use’. Carlo Salzani, ‘Inoperative/Deactivation’, in The Agamben Dictionary, pp. 
106-08 (p. 107). 
200 Significantly, on this point Agamben differs from Derrida, for whom fetishism is structured around an 
‘economy of the undecidable’. Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. by John P. Leavey Jr. and Richard Rand 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 210. 
201 Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2009) p. 64. 
202 Stanze, p. 52. 
203 Interestingly Bodei defines as fetishist that dimension of virtual possibility that belongs to Tabucchi’s 
writings: ‘Tabucchi esprime il paradosso di ogni vera creazione poetica: i suoi prodotti appaiono infatti 
essere, nello stesso tempo, modi di potenziamento del senso di realtà e mezzi che sembrano indebolirla. In 
questa prospettiva ogni opera letteraria appartiene alla realtà e alla possibilità. […] Si direbbe pertanto che la 
pienezza e il senso della vita siano in un altrove virtuale […]. A tale ipotesi si accompagna peraltro l’oscura 
consapevolezza che l’altrove è già qui, incastonato nella pagina di un romanzo o nelle cadenze di una poesia. 
Nella letteratura il fittizio (o il fattizio, da cui viene anche, attraverso la mediazione del portoghese, il termine 
‘feticcio’) assume più realtà dell’immediatamente reale […]’. Remo Bodei, ‘Giochi proibiti. Le “vite 
parallele” di Antonio Tabucchi’, in Dedica, pp. 117-39 (pp. 123-25), italicised. 
204 Stanze, p. 69. 
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To summarise, it could be argued that, addressing the uncanny feeling reaching its climax 
with modernity, Agamben somehow advances the following proportion: 
 
Freud’s uncanny: Marx’s fetishism = Agamben’s uncanny: Freud’s fetishism. 
 
This implies that: Freud’s unheimliche exemplarily takes place as the modern form of 
Marx’s alienation; and Agamben’s uncanny both incorporates this estranging experience of 
disorientation while indicating possible ways to cope with it or dwell within it – that which 
relates to men’s uncanniness, i.e. the fact that men exist as creators of sense. 
 
 
Indeed, the conceptual passage from the uncanny as affective property to the uncanny as 
mode of being, partly suggested with fetishism, is fully explored and accomplished in the 
second reference Agamben makes to the uncanny – and to Freud’s essay – and which 
appears in the last part of Stanze, evocatively entitled ‘L’immagine perversa. La 
semiologia dalla parte della Sfinge’,205 which I now set out to investigate.  
Agamben’s critique of Freud’s account reveals the extent to which he leans on Heidegger’s 
and Lacan’s conceptualisations. In particular, from Heidegger – to whom Stanze is 
dedicated – Agamben derives his dual (phenomenological and ontological) understanding 
of the uncanny, the fact that, as anticipated, the uncanny is both a feeling as well as a 
feature of the human essence. In Lacan Agamben finds a psychoanalytic interpretation of 
the unheimliche that stands as an alternative to Freud’s, from which he borrows a 
topological description of the uncanny as the interplay between the two moments of 
derealisation and engagement with the real, between the anxiety of feeling uncanny and the 
revealing understanding of being uncanny.  
 
Addressing the ontological dimension of language, more specifically, the philosopher 
works through the following question: what is experienced within and through an uncanny 
experience? To answer this question, Agamben follows the same rationale that he adopted 
                                                        
205 Agamben’s critique of the familiar, post-Saussurean understanding of the sign as the union of the signifier 
and the signified is however not a critique of Saussure himself, but of his legacy and misappropriation, for 
Agamben finds, in Saussure, a crisis of semiology, as well as an attempt to ‘far segno verso quella differenza 
[…] che è stata coperta e rimossa, nella semiologia moderna, con la «barriera resistente alla significazione»’. 
As he further comments, ‘[i]solare la nozione di segno, inteso come unità positiva di signans e signatum, 
dall’originale e problematica posizione saussuriana del fatto linguistico come «plesso di differenze 
eternamente negative», equivale a far ricadere la scienza dei segni nella metafisica’ (Stanze, p. 186). 
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in his previous discussion of the uncanny feeling, although he now takes into account more 
exclusively man’s uncanny experience with language. In this case, uneasiness on the part 
of the subject and a sense of threatening estrangement on that of the object arise and are 
experienced with and before the symbolic, which, unlike the most familiar linguistic sign, 
forms an immediate union between the signifier and the signified, as well as before the bar, 
which, on the contrary, lies at the core of every sign, at once grounding and separating the 
signifier and the signified:  
 
Il ‘disagio’ che la forma simbolica porta scandalosamente alla luce è quello stesso che accompagna 
fin dall’inizio la riflessione occidentale sul significare, il cui lascito metafisico è stato raccolto senza 
beneficio d’inventario dalla semiologia moderna.206 
 
What is, therefore, this metaphysical discomfort implicit in the symbolic – and the bar207 – 
and which is revealed by the uncanny? What is this meaninglessness, this resistance to 
signification that man encounters within signification itself? The answer lies in the fact that 
the traditional understanding of the linguistic sign as double is founded upon ontological 
nihilism: 
 
In quanto nel segno è implicita la dualità del manifestante e della cosa manifestata, esso è infatti 
qualcosa di spezzato e di doppio, ma in quanto questa dualità si manifesta nell’unico segno, esso è 
invece qualcosa di ricongiunto e unito. Il simbolico, l’atto di riconoscimento che riunisce ciò che è 
diviso, è anche il diabolico che continuamente trasgredisce e denuncia la verità di questa 
conoscenza. Il fondamento di questa ambiguità del significare è in quella frattura originale della 
presenza che è inseparabile dall’esperienza occidentale dell’essere e per la quale tutto ciò che viene 
alla presenza, viene alla presenza come luogo di un differimento e di un’esclusione […].208 
 
For Agamben, that the uncanny can and does enable a way out of metaphysical nihilism is 
predicated upon the fact that ontology is essentially bound up with language:  
 
Nella riflessione sul linguaggio, che è da sempre per eccellenza il piano in cui si proietta 
l’esperienza della frattura originale, questa interpretazione si cristallizza nella nozione di segno 
come unità espressiva del significante e del significato: la frattura della presenza prende così 
l’aspetto di un processo di significazione […]. Nella semiologia moderna, l’oblio della frattura 
originale della presenza si manifesta proprio in ciò che dovrebbe denunciarla, e cioè nella barriera – 
                                                        
206 Ibid., p. 160. 
207 For Agamben ‘the bar is language as pure, insignificant, and ultimately indifferent mediality’. William 
Watkin, The Literary Agamben (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 19. 
208 Stanze, p. 160. 
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del grafo S/s. […] Dal punto di vista del significare, la metafisica non è che l’oblio della differenza 
originaria tra significante e significato.209 
 
Thus the symbolic and, similarly, the bar disturb the more familiar functioning of the 
process of signification, insofar they occur as a caesura – almost an alienation of and inside 
language, to recall Agamben’s observation on Marx’s fetishism – pointing towards 
metaphysical oblivion. Interrupting the flow of signification that underpins our most 
familiar experience with the linguistic object, the symbolic210 and the bar uncover its 
opacity. Consequently, Agamben delineates the modality in which, with modernity, this 
disruptive element intersects with and is absorbed by the Freudian uncanny: 
 
Non è perciò sorprendente che, con l’eclisse dell’allegoresi barocca, la forma emblematica, che 
estrania ogni significante dal proprio significato, cominci ad apparire inquietante. […] Il mondo 
delle raffigurazioni emblematiche […] diventa ora il magazzino di rottami in cui l’Inquietante pesca 
i suoi spauracchi. […] Nella forma dell’Inquietante, che invade ora sempre più prepotentemente la 
vita quotidiana, il simbolo si presenta come la nuova Sfinge che minaccia la cittadella della ragione. 
Freud è l’Edipo che propone la chiave che dovrebbe dissipare l’enigma e liberare la ragione dai suoi 
mostri. Per questo le conclusioni del suo studio sull’Inquietante sono per noi particolarmente 
interessanti.211   
 
The uncanny is able to reveal this crisis of the more familiar modus significandi because, 
on a deeper level, it disturbs the traditional, metaphysical logic of the sign.212 At the same 
time, however, it performs and enhances a new model of signification. This is a crucial 
point, inasmuch as it marks the conceptual passage from the feeling of the uncanny to (the 
feeling of) being uncanny. For Agamben, the unheimliche forms the paradoxical root of the 
apotropaic enigma of the Sphinx, as that which can be faced only obliquely, sideways.213 It 
                                                        
209 Ibid., pp. 161-62. 
210 Moreover, Freud found in the symbolic an example of the unheimliche: ‘This is that an uncanny effect is 
often and easily produced by effacing the distinction between imagination and reality, such as when 
something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes 
over the full functions and significance of the thing it symbolizes, and so on’ (‘The Uncanny’, p. 232). 
211 Stanze, pp. 171-72. 
212 ‘Agamben’s object is a critique of the dominant metaphysics of language as presence, encapsulated in a 
theory of the linguistic sign where the signifier expresses and mirrors the signified: the signified is present in 
the signifier, and meaning is the consequence of that presence’. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, ‘Alice and the Spinx’, 
in Literature and Philosophy, ed. by Herbert Grabes (Tübingeng: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1997), pp.  25-35 (p. 
30). 
213 ‘‘Unheimlich’ – lo si è detto fin dall’inizio – è una parola unheimlich. […] Essa nomina qualcosa che 
normalmente in ogni dire rimane nascosto, che si ritrae nella pretesa all’univocità e all’esattezza. 
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comes to identify, as a synonym, the taking place of human language as such and not as a 
signification to be rationally deciphered: 
 
Ciò che la Sfinge proponeva non era semplicemente qualcosa il cui significato è nascosto e velato 
dietro il significante ‘enigmatico’, ma un dire in cui la frattura originale della presenza era allusa nel 
paradosso di una parola che si avvicina al suo oggetto tenendolo indefinitamente a distanza. L’αἶνος 
dell’αἴνιγµα non è solo oscurità, ma un modo più originale del dire. Come il labirinto, come la 
Gorgone e come la Sfinge che lo proferisce, l’enigma appartiene infatti alla sfera dell’apotropaico, 
cioè di una potenza protettrice che respinge l’inquietante attirandolo e assumendolo dentro di sé. Il 
sentiero di danza del labirinto, che conduce nel cuore di ciò da cui tiene a distanza, è il modello di 
questo rapporto con l’inquietante che si esprime nell’enigma.214 
 
Thus, Oedipus’ most radical guilt lies in failing to recognise that the Sphinx was 
articulating a different model of sense making (the symbolic), which is not predicated upon 
and does not seek a meaning that closes down the chain of signifiers.215 Tellingly, for the 
philosopher, Freud himself might be regarded as a sort of modern Oedipus precisely 
because, like the tragic character, he has imposed a psychoanalytical model of signification 
that postulates a hierarchical distinction between obscure (unconscious) meaning and 
proper (conscious) sense, and eventually represses the symbolic: 
 
Freud è l’Edipo che propone la chiave che dovrebbe dissipare l’enigma e liberare la ragione dai suoi 
mostri. […] Egli vede nell’Inquietante (Unheimliche) il familiare (Heimliche) rimosso […]. Questa 
formula, che riassume anche l’atteggiamento di Freud rispetto ai simboli, che egli costantemente 
riconduce al meccanismo della rimozione, ci autorizza a domandarci perché la cultura moderna 
abbia così ostinatamente identificato il simbolico con l’Inquietante. […] L’interpretazione edipica 
della parola della Sfinge come ‘parola cifrata’ governa segretamente la concezione freudiana del 
simbolo. La psicanalisi presuppone infatti la scissione del discorso in una parola oscura e per termini 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Nell’Unheimliche viene nominato ciò che sporge da ogni significato, ciò che rimane non detto in ogni dire 
che pretenda di afferrare qualcosa. Parola eccedente, essa nomina un’eccedenza della parola, una residualità 
del significante che non viene assorbita nella coerenza del discorso, ma che piuttosto interferisce con esso, ne 
disturba l’ordine e la compiutezza’ (Berto, p. 143). ‘The problem with Oedipus is that he translates the riddle 
posed by the Sphinx, thus making the signified (the meaning of the riddle) coincide with the signifier (its 
formulation). […] We are indeed in the realm of the Sphinx, with this disjunction between signifier and 
signified, this excess of signified over signifier, and their paradoxical co-existence’ (Lecercle, pp. 31-33).  
214 Stanze, p. 164. 
215 ‘L’insegnamento liberatore di Edipo è che ciò che vi è di inquietante e di tremendo nell’enigma scompare 
immediatamente se si riconduce il suo dire alla trasparenza del rapporto fra il significato e la sua forma al 
quale solo in apparenza esso riesce a sfuggire. […] [L]a colpa di Edipo non è tanto l’incesto quanto una ὕβρις 
verso la potenza del simbolico in generale’ (ibid., pp. 163-64).  
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impropri, che è quella dell’inconscio fondata sulla rimozione, e in una parola chiara e per termini 
propri, che è quella della coscienza.216 
 
Agamben’s reception of Freud’s uncanny is undoubtedly not entirely accurate, since he 
misses the fact that, as indicated in the introduction, the Freudian unheimliche is both a 
repression – comparable to Oedipus’ repression of the symbolic – and the return of that 
which has been repressed, thus forming the base of a potential presencing of the Sphinx 
inside Oedipal semiosis.217 Agamben overlooks how, also for Freud, the uncanny is the 
(positive) negation (through the articulation of a new linguistic experience for Agamben, 
and through the return of what was repressed in Freud’s account) of negativity (nihilism 
for Agamben, psychological repression itself for Freud).  
 
 
1.3.2 Beyond Freud: Agamben, Lacan, Derrida  
 
Nonetheless, this distance from Freud’s grasping of the uncanny is noteworthy as it leads 
Agamben to search for a different grounding of the same concept within the 
                                                        
216 Ibid., pp. 172-75. 
217 Goux similarly reproaches Freud’s Oedipal blind hubris, which derives from a misinterpretation of the 
Greek myth and results in a repression of the figure and the function of the Sphinx: ‘The Sphinx is the 
unthought element of Freudian psychoanalysis, a riddle unresolved by the Freudian movement. And one that 
for structural reasons cannot be resolved, for its solution would threaten the entire Freudian edifice, based as 
it is on a certain fundamentally erroneous interpretation of the Oedipus myth and, more seriously still, of the 
Oedipus complex. The riddle of the Sphinx? An expression to be taken in two senses: the riddle that the 
Sphinx proposes, and the one that the Sphinx herself constitutes. Oedipus thought he had resolved the first 
and Freud the second. But what if neither had found the answer?’ Jean-Joseph Goux, Oedipus, Philosopher, 
trans. by Catherine Porter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 23-24. 
However, this criticism is not entirely accurate, as the Sphinx eventually haunts Freud’s essay on the 
uncanny, emerging in his observation that: ‘It often happens that male patients declare that they feel there is 
something uncanny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to the 
former heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where everyone dwelt once upon a time and in the 
beginning. There is a humorous saying: “Love is home-sickness”; and whenever a man dreams of a place or a 
country and says to himself, still in the dream, “this place is familiar to me, I have been there before,” we 
may interpret the place as being his mother’s genitals or her body. In this case, too, the unheimlich is what 
was once heimisch, homelike, familiar’ (p. 245). Accordingly, although ‘Freud starts his discourse on the 
uncanny in a typical frame of  the Oedipus complex […] he ends elsewhere, with a return of the repressed, in 
the womb-fantasy, exposing the repressed (m)other […] the spectral Sphinx’. Wu Yuan Yuan, The Riddling 
Between Oedipus and the Sphinx: Ontology, Hauntology, and Heterologies of the Grotesque (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2016), p. 99. 
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psychoanalytical field. In particular, alongside the abovementioned appropriation of the 
fetishist disavowal to describe the functioning of the unheimliche,218 it pushes Agamben’s 
reflection from a temporal explanation to a spatial and topological account of the 
psychoanalytical uncanny. The title Stanze foreshadows and accentuates the demand to 
conceive of a new topology of experience, while already in the preface Agamben alludes to 
the need to ‘configurare un nodo borromeo’.219 What kind of space is this? Agamben’s 
answer accentuates the necessity to ‘pensare il “luogo” non come qualcosa di spaziale, ma 
come qualcosa di più originario dello spazio’,220 not as an actual, static place, but as the 
force structuring it, as the taking place of the place itself. Hence, adopting a topological 
vocabulary points to the fact that, for Agamben, the unheimliche describes a shaping 
tension between two moments or movements – feeling uncanny and being uncanny – that 
are not opposite or intelligible in terms of chronological causality, since they enable each 
other and take place reciprocally, the one through the other. This spatial articulation of 
mutual inclusiveness is most clearly manifested by and located in the bar that, inside every 
sign, joins and separates the signifier and the signified, for: 
 
The division within every speech-act between what is said and that it is said, is aimed at exposing 
humanity’s irrevocable subjection to something enigmatic in communication, that is, to the 
indestructible barrier that founds the possibility of speech. The Sphinx, in this conception, is itself 
the half-body that bespeaks the half-said [mi-dire] of the enigma, which cannot ever be fully spoken. 
                                                        
218 ‘La teoria […] che vede in ogni simbolo il ritorno del rimosso in un significante improprio, non esaurisce 
tuttavia la concezione freudiana del simbolo. Freud descrive infatti a più riprese processi simbolici che non si 
lasciano in alcun modo ridurre a questo schema. Uno di questi è la Verleugnung del feticista. […] La 
Verleugnung ci confronta, infatti, a un procedimento in cui, grazie a un simbolo, l’uomo riesce ad 
appropriarsi di un contenuto inconscio senza portarlo alla coscienza’ (Stanze, p. 173). Lacan is cited also for 
his description of the bar as the foundation of ‘quella posizione primordiale del significante e del significato, 
come due ordini distinti e separati da una barriera resistente alla significazione’ (ibid., p. 162) and for his 
explanation of the metaphor (ibid., p. 176). However, the most relevant passage is the one in which Agamben 
compares Lacan’s understanding of the unconscious (ibid., p. 173) to Benveniste’s attempt to rethink 
semiology, whose ‘distinzione di una doppia significanza del linguaggio […] in cui la nozione semiotica di 
segno (come unità positiva di significante e di significato) non è più valida’ gestures towards ‘la stessa zona 
del significato che si è qui cercato di configurare opponendo la nozione edipica del significare a quella 
sfingea’ (ibid., p. 186). 
219 Ibid., p. xvi. The Borromean knot is also, strikingly, one of the most famous images through which Lacan, 
in the years 1972-77 (Agamben wrote Stanze during the same period, and published it in 1977), describes the 
intertwining of what for him constitute the three registers of human experience: the imaginary, the symbolic 
and the real. See: Ellie Ragland-Sullivan and Dragan Milovanovic, ed. by, Lacan: Topologically Speaking 
(New York: Other Press, 2004). 
220 Stanze, p. xvi. 
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The enigma is therefore not a riddle to be decoded; indeed, Oedipus’ folly is that he treats the 
enigma as if it were a riddle, an utterance as if it were a statement. […] Rather, the enigma is 
nothing other than the emergence of the pure being of language itself, its negative foundation 
without content.221 
 
Significantly, it is on this point that Agamben’s uncanny comes closest to Lacan. 
Observing how ‘[i]l territorio dell’inconscio, nei suoi meccanismi come nelle sue strutture, 
coincide integralmente con quello del simbolico e dell’improprio’, Agamben clarifies in a 
footnote that ‘è a questa concezione ortodossa del simbolismo [Freud’s Oedipal uncanny], 
e non all’interpretazione lacaniana del freudismo che si rivolge la nostra critica’.222 Also 
for Lacan, in effect, the bar between the signifier and the signified is uncanny, since and to 
the extent to which it shows how the real is extimate to language: 
 
Esercita essenzialmente una funzione di cesura, di separazione, di divisione. La barra nell’algoritmo 
lacaniano non articola ma disarticola, non unisce ma divide. Essa, infatti, mette in evidenza non 
tanto la produzione di senso quanto la resistenza al senso.223 
 
Indeed, for the French psychoanalyst the Real at once propels and marks the limit of 
symbolisation. However, this does not mean that Lacan’s Real corresponds to Agamben’s 
uncanny. Uncanny is the relationship (extimacy) between the Real and the Symbolic, the 
fact that language seeks to understand and make sense of that which is both at its core and 
outside of it.  
Thus, Agamben draws upon the French psychoanalyst to strengthen and specify an 
interpretation of the uncanny as a topological process and counter-turning relationship, as a 
form of relationality as such. Arguably, the image of the fold stands for, within his 
philosophy of language, Lacan’s psychoanalytical concept of extimacy. Making the case 
for a new model of signification, Agamben states that: 
   
Il nucleo originario del significare non è né nel significante né nel significato […] ma nella piega 
della presenza su cui essi si fondano: il logos, che caratterizza l’uomo in quanto zoon logon echon, è 
questa piega che raccoglie e divide ogni cosa nella «commessura» della presenza. E l’umano è 
precisamente questa frattura della presenza, che apre un mondo e su cui si tiene il linguaggio. […] 
Solo quando saremo giunti in prossimità di questa “articolazione invisibile”, potremo dire di essere 
                                                        
221 Clemens, p. 9, italicised. 
222 Stanze, p. 173. 
223 Massimo Recalcati, Il vuoto e il resto (Milan: Cuem, 2001), p. 68. 
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entrati in una zona a partire dalla quale il passo – indietro – al di là della metafisica, che governa 
l’interpretazione del segno nel pensiero occidentale, diventa veramente possibile.224 
 
Agamben’s uncanny defines a topological process of sense making as folding, in which 
‘[l]’ algoritmo S/s deve perciò ridursi alla sola barriera […] ma in questa barriera non 
dobbiamo vedere soltanto la traccia di una differenza, ma il gioco topologico delle 
commessure e delle articolazioni’. 225  Agamben’s ‘barriera’ illuminates how the 
functioning of uncanny semiosis takes the form of Lacan’s extimacy, of an outside that is 
also, already, an inside. Language is not (solely) difference but topological interplay: it 
signifies complicating or literally folding together plural dimensions of sense. 
 
What semiotic model is, therefore, Agamben’s uncanny? Briefly, it determines a shift from 
propositional to performative language, from language ‘as a system of signs for something, 
e.g. for the object of thought’ to a word that ‘brings forth, is enactive’.226 This view of 
language as manifold(ing) distinguishes Agamben from that which constitutes his final 
polemical target in Stanze, Derrida’s conflation of signification – and, tellingly, of the 
unheimliche – with the trace, with an endless deferral of meaning. Although both 
deconstruction and Agamben uncover how the dual structure of the Saussurean sign 
epitomises ‘l’illusione di una presenza piena e originaria’ that circumscribes, precisely, 
‘l’illusione della metafisica’,227 on closer examination their distance becomes patent: 
 
La solidarietà dell’interpretazione del significare come unità di un significante e di un significato 
con la storia della metafisica occidentale è esplicitamente affermata da un’intenzione critica il cui 
progetto si enuncia come la sostituzione di una scienza della scrittura (grammatologia) alla scienza 
dei segni (semiologia). […] Il carattere specifico del progetto grammatologico si esprime perciò 
nell’affermazione secondo cui l’esperienza originaria è sempre già traccia e scrittura, il significato 
sempre già in posizione di significante. […] Porre all’inizio una scrittura e una traccia, significa 
mettere l’accento su questa esperienza originale, ma non certo superarla. […] La metafisica della 
scrittura e del significante non è che l’altra faccia della metafisica del significato e della voce, il 
venire in luce del suo fondamento negativo e non certo il suo superamento.228 
 
                                                        
224 Stanze, pp. 188-89. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Kenneth Maly, Heidegger’s Possibility: Language, Emergence-Sayng, Being (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008), p. xxii. 
227 Stanze, p. 186. 
228 Ibid., pp. 186-87. 
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The fact that Agamben, concluding his conceptualisation of the unheimliche, alludes to 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1967) is noteworthy, since, as stated, the French philosopher 
is among the most important theorists of the Freudian uncanny, which he considers as a 
quasi-synonym for the trace.229  
However, Agamben fiercely criticises the latter, defining it as ‘una pratica interpretativa 
che sospende e [… non da] mai accesso ad un evento compiuto di significato’.230  
If Derrida correctly identifies a problem of signification, a frailty in the Saussurean sign, 
his attempts to solve it are ill-founded, since they merely seem to reverse the hierarchy of 
the signifier and the signified, without taking into account the bar that articulates their 
reciprocal enabling. In a way, adopting Agamben’s perspective, Derrida’s uncanny does 
not constitute a new, post-nihilist model of signification, but solely an unfamiliar reversal 
of the familiar semiotic process. For Agamben, deconstruction is nihilist in that it is based 
upon the unattainability of a stable sense, and, more radically, because it is still entirely 
committed to searching for an ultimate signified. For the endless deferral of meaning, 
Agamben substitutes the ‘condition of suspension in potentiality’.231 While in Derrida’s 
account the uncanny is the impossibility of reaching a final closure in the chain of 
signification and an unceasingly openness to a future always to come, for the Italian 
philosopher unheimliche is the experience in which a proper meaning is no longer sought-
after.232 Agamben’s uncanny is an interrogation which only in being posed and not in 
being answered answers itself. It is a modality of signification which does not pursue a 
final meaning but which comes to form the grounding of meaningfulness itself. 233  
                                                        
229 ‘The trace calls to be thought in terms of the non-signifying difference that is originarily at play in all 
signification’. Simon Morgan Wortham, The Derrida Dictionary (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), 
p. 129. 
230 Giorgio Agamben, Signatura rerum. Sul metodo (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2008), pp. 44 and 79. 
231 Mills, p. 123. 
232 This also distinguishes Agamben’s uncanny from Todorov’s fantastic, and from the traditional conflation 
of the literary uncanny with the fantastic genre. For Todorov, as seen, a fantastic text ‘must oblige the reader 
to consider the world of the characters as a world of living persons and to hesitate between a natural and a 
supernatural explanation of the events described’ (The Fantastic, p. 33). However, when Agamben defines 
the final verse of a poem as the ‘sublime esitazione tra il senso e il suono’ (Idea della prosa, p. 21), he is 
referring to an entirely different kind of hesitation. Whereas for Todorov hesitation occurs within language, 
as a matter of referentiality to be explained, and is consequently solvable, for Agamben it is instead a 
hesitation of language, i.e. that through which language comes forth and reveals itself as such. To a hesitation 
within representation, Agamben opposes a hesitation of representation itself. 
233 ‘The deepest paradox of language resides not, for Agamben, in the mutual attraction and repulsion of the 
signifier and the signified (or sign and sign) across the space or spacing of their difference (or of différance); 
that is to say, not in the irreducible play of the terms in the structure that semiology writes as ‘S/s,’ but rather 
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In the end, Agamben’s topological articulation sheds light upon why, in the case of the 
uncanny, the quest is a questioning and vice versa. To say that a quest takes the form of a 
questioning means, with Agamben, that it occurs as the experience of language as such, 
before and beyond any actualised signified. To say that the act of questioning forms a 
quest implies that its answerability somewhat paradoxically and unsettlingly coincides 
with its questionability: it cannot be answered because it does not aim for it, remaining 
suspended in the condition of a potentiality to signify. While this further illuminates the 
theoretical underpinnings of the title of this study, I will now investigate why and how this 









in what is pointed to, what is presupposed, in that bar or barrier between ‘S’ and ‘s’ itself. What does this 
diagonal line separating the signifier from the signified signify? What does it mean? Because that bar resists 
signification, the answer to this question is difficult to formulate, since it can pertain neither to the sphere of 
the signifier nor to that of the signified. The sphere to which one must have recourse in order to investigate 
the meaning of this bar is one that exceeds or precedes those that represent either side of the fracture inherent 
to the linguistic sign. How, then, can one conceive of this sphere? What might precede significance and the 
mechanics of linguistic meaning? What is presupposed by the logic of the sign, which has at its centre, but is 
unable to see, this abyssal void or bar? While Derrida might answer ‘différance’ (or one of its near- 
synonyms, ‘trace,’ ‘reserve,’ ‘writing’ [G, 93]), Agamben’s answer is: the signifying event itself, ‘the pure 
fact that one speaks, that language exists’’. Kevin Attell, Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the Threshold of 
Deconstruction (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), p. 33. 
234 In the first chapter of L’uomo senza contenuto, entitled ‘La cosa più inquietante’, Agamben describes ‘la 
capacità di pro-durre, di portare una cosa dal non-essere all’essere come ciò che vi è di più inquietante’ (p. 
13). Meaningfully, this is precisely what distinguishes poetics itself, for, Agamben states, ‘il carattere 
essenziale della poiesis non era […] nel suo aspetto pratico, volontario, ma nel suo essere un modo della 
verità, intesa come disvelamento’ (ibid., pp. 21-22). For Agamben, speaking of an author’s poetics means, 
therefore, examining the mode in which his/her work unveils, is an experience of sense making: unlike 
praxis, that aims for the creation of an object, the term poetics designates, in fact, a production and coming-
forth of sense. In a way, it is as if, to him, every poetics were inherently uncanny and, reciprocally, the 




• The principal formulations and developments of the Freudian unheimliche occur 
within the three main fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy and aesthetics (with a 
focus on literary criticism). 
• This applies also to the Italian reception of the uncanny, as the latter is mostly 
discussed as a psychoanalytic, philosophical and aesthetic (literary) concept. 
• Mapping Agamben’s thinking of the uncanny against this twofold theoretical 
background uncovers the philosopher’s proximity to Heidegger, Lacan and 
Orlando, as well as his distance from Freud and Derrida. 
• For Agamben, in effect, every uncanny experience is also one of uncanniness. 
Feeling and being uncanny cannot be separated (topological uncanny). 
• Accordingly, Agamben’s uncanny defines a modality of signification that, 
collapsing Saussurean semiosis, reveals: the fact that men exist as creators of sense 
(ontological, post-metaphysical uncanny); how this has been covered up by the 
familiar, nihilistic use of the linguistic sign (linguistic uncanny); and that 
modernity, with its traumatic experiences of alienation and estrangement, coupled 
by an incessant need for sense, constitutes a unique possibility to experience the 



















2.1 Towards Tabucchi’s Uncanny 
 
Both the introduction and chapter 1 proposed a specific interpretation of the uncanny that, 
rooted in Agamben’s philosophy of language, constitutes a unique theoretical basis for 
analysing Tabucchi’s opus and poetics: accordingly, in this study the uncanny is defined as 
a question of sense, a potentiality of signification that always maintains itself as such. By 
the same token, the present chapter sets to interrogate Tabucchi’s theoretical reflection on 
the uncanny as ‘Inquietudine’, comparing and contrasting it with Freud’s and Agamben’s 
understandings of the unheimliche. The main findings of the chapter – namely my 
conceptualisation of Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny as a disquieting and interrogative 
process of semiosis – will guide and lead up to the textual readings of Tabucchi’s works in 
chapter 3 through 5. 
 
The discussion so far, in relation to the unheimliche as well as, formerly, with regard to the 
critical reception and historical positioning of the Italian writer, clearly indicates that, in 
Tabucchi, the uncanny originates at the intersection of manifold areas of signification. Not 
only does the uncanny constitute a key notion in the process of rearticulating the dialectic 
between the modern and the postmodern, but it also provides useful conceptual tools to 
examine and make sense of the tension between the modality in which a certain 
postmodernism235 – mostly inspired by Derrida’s idea of the trace – has read this Freudian 
category and other ways in which it can be understood (once postmodernism itself has 
been resemanticised). 
The uncanny solicits a rethinking of the relationship between modernity and 
postmodernism: it is an inherently modern concept in that it inhabits the territory of the 
need for signification. The fact that ‘discontinuity and the consciousness of discontinuity 
have effectively entered into modernity’236 is what causes, in reaction, the modern, 
obsessive demand for established values. Yet the unheimliche adopts a postmodern 
                                                        
235 ‘Si potrebbe avanzare l’ipotesi che mentre negli Stati Uniti il postmodernismo letterario nasce come 
“l’anything goes” […] il postmoderno italiano nasce come “rifiuto della letteratura” e quindi come crisi della 
sua funzione sociale. […] A partire da questo momento la letteratura è diventata un gioco “post-realistico”, 
consapevole dell’inutilità e dell’autoreferenzialità della scrittura letteraria’ (Jansen, p. 239). 
236 Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes, September 1959-May 1961, trans. by John 
Moore (London: Verso, 1995)  p. 180. 
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approach that discards any monolithic, nostalgic or utopic narrative of sense – which is 
what Agamben negatively labelled as metaphysical. Significantly, Tabucchi was himself 
very aware of this reciprocity between the uncanny and the modern-postmodern interplay. 
Indeed, the way in which he defines postmodernism is key to understanding his view of the 
uncanny and, mutually, through the category of the uncanny, the author’s historical 
positioning becomes entirely intelligible. Explicitly embracing McHale’s differentiation 
between the modern epistemological paradigm and the postmodern ontological one,237 
Tabucchi recognises the centrality of the latter to his writings; this is strictly connected to 
the fact that, for him, literature, as an expression of the uncanny, has to provide disquieting 
questions rather than answers: 
 
Uno scrittore postmoderno non si domanda mai come può interpretare il mondo del quale fa parte, 
bensì si chiede in che tipo di mondo vive e cosa egli faccia in quel mondo. Da questo punto di vista 
probabilmente la mia opera contribuisce ad offrire un’idea del mondo estremamente problematica, a 
disegnare un’immagine della nostra vita con un punto di domanda, per cui forse si può considerare 
in effetti postmoderna.238  
   
In the passage to the ontological dominant of postmodernism, Tabucchi retrieves the 
importance of what he calls ‘un desiderio metafisico’, which leads him to question reality, 
rejecting a literature that ‘pretende di interpretare il mondo’ to which he opposes ‘le opere 
che si interrogano sul senso che questo ha’.239 As indicated in the introduction, it could be 
argued that, in relation to the crisis bound up with the modern,240 the writer’s peculiar use 
of postmodernism marks his attempt to reflect and respond to it. 
On the other hand, this interaction between the urgency of sense and the rejection of any 
univocal, predetermined meaning also triggers – as discussed in chapter 1 – the 
comparison between Derrida and Agamben, which is to say between a reading of the 
uncanny that depends on a traditional definition of postmodernism and a new interpretation 
of the unheimliche that implies a reformulation of the postmodern. With deconstruction, 
                                                        
237 For the scholar, postmodern fiction moves from ‘problems of knowing to problems of modes of being’. 
Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 10. 
238 Gumpert, p. 90. 
239 Ibid., p. 92. 
240 The modern crisis originates, from this point of view, from the simultaneous surfacing of what, with 
Agamben, I have identified as the impossibility of a stable, metaphysical modus significandi (nihilism) and 
the need for a new experience of signification. In this regard, the (postmodern) uncanny occurs as a potential 
symbolisation of the trauma that begins with(in) modernity and that postmodernity deepens, exposes and 
sustains.  
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the necessity to free language from pre-existing metaphysical grids turns into a negative, 
differential play of signifiers and an endless deferral of meaning. Deconstruction keeps on 
looking for a final sense that, however, cannot be reached, as it is ceaselessly delayed. On 
the contrary, as I have shown, Agamben suggests an understanding of the taking place of 
language and of the uncanny in terms of topological fulfilment. Unlike deconstruction, he 
does not aim for an answer to fill the void inherent in any interrogation, but posits the 
capacity to sustain and engage with this sort of interrogative vacuum. The unheimliche 
neither conveys a unique signified nor dissolves into undecidability at the level of the 
signifier. Rather, it keeps asking, occurring as a process of sense making, a modality to 
investigate the conditions of possibility and the limits of signification itself. This is 
precisely the assumption that lies at the core of Tabucchi’s characterisation of the uncanny 
and of his poetics qua negotiation of meaning. While recognising his own proximity to the 
postmodern problematisation of ontology, the writer discards that postmodernism that is 
based on the so-called theory of ‘anything goes’, which would find in deconstruction a 
possible basis if not a legitimisation.241  The uncanny is a process of interrogation, 
interrupting reassuring readings and opening up to ambiguity, which calls for the reader’s 
participation. Uncanny literature asks questions, its only answer being, in a sense, to offer 
the reader the possibility of adopting an interrogative approach. As Tabucchi claims, ‘ho 
preferito non fornire alla mia opera un eccessivo interesse per le risposte, ho scelto 
piuttosto una letteratura che decidesse di porsi delle domande da sola’.242  
To summarise: 
• Modernity is uncanny because it is characterised by men’s traumatic experience of 
disorientation and alienation, which is, nonetheless, reciprocated by a search for 
sense.  
• Tabucchi’s postmodernism is uncanny because, in a historical and cultural context 
of radicalised and occasionally even avowed disorientation (postmodernity) it tries 
to cope with the trauma of modernity, at the same time integrating the modern need 
for signification. 
                                                        
241 As D’Agostini argues, this is ‘postmodernismo nella sua versione deteriore, quella che non è mai stata 
antirealismo, ma piuttosto trivialismo metodologico, ossia pratica sistematica dell’anything goes […] se si 
ritiene (seguendo disciplinatamente Derrida) che quel che conta è la lettera e non lo spirito. Che in pratica 
vuol dire: quel che conta è l’apparenza, dunque mentite pure, purché non vi scoprano’. Franca D’Agostini, 
Realismo? Una questione non controversa (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2013), p. 67. Significantly, Tabucchi 
accepts his definition as postmodern only on the condition that this term no longer define ‘una certa corrente 
di letteratura light, caratterizzata dal manierismo o da una ricercata vacuità’ (Gumpert, p. 89).   
242 Ibid., p. 83. 
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2.1.1 Uncanny Dwellings: the Labyrinth and the Mandala  
 
Similarly to Agamben, Tabucchi understands the uncanny as a spatial relationship, a 
topological articulation of sense. Although his reflection on the concept originates from 
and tries to address a problematic experience of time, the temporal uneasiness Tabucchi 
perceives throughout modernity and postmodernity calls for a proper explanation and 
potential resolution in spatial terms. He compares temporal disquiet to the condition of 
homelessness, questioning how it might be possible to dwell within this state of disjointed 
time: ‘[q]uella malattia, cioè un rapporto sfasato con il Tempo quale dimensione in cui non 
riusciamo più ad abitare, un rapporto guasto con la storia […], quella malattia mi pare 
appartenere in pieno al Novecento’.243 However, the uncanny uncovers and sustains 
disjointedness, the not-being-at-home as the authentic essence of human being, since not-
being-at-home designates the need for significance and the incessant creation of structures 
of meaning through which man makes sense of his being in the world. Modernity 
inaugurates and postmodernity deepens the gap separating individuals’ existence from a 
(presupposed, unreachable and ineffable) foundation of meaning, mirrored in the hiatus – 
the bar – that opens up between the signifier and the signified. In what ways, then, 
Tabucchi asks, could man recover a sense of belonging, of being at home in the time he 
inhabits? How can one live as an agent of signification when the fallacy – metaphysical 
and linguistic – behind the Saussurean sign is exposed? The answer lies in what Tabucchi 
identifies as the task of literature: ‘porre domande, inquietare, essere co-scienza critica’.244 
For, being uncanny means that human beings dwell ‘not at home’ in two ways: they 
produce sense solely when pre-existing familiar meaning withdraws; and they produce 
sense in the form of an interrogation, which does not seek closure at the level of the 
signified, but demands to be recognised as a different experience of semiotisation. Being 
able to inhabit an ontological homelessness metaphorically alludes to humanity’s 
possibility and capacity to articulate sense, to create a meaningful, yet not totalising (hence 
nihilistic) practice of signification.  
 
Tabucchi’s view of the unheimliche as disclosing an unsaturated potentiality of sense 
informs his idiosyncratic use of multiple spatial structures and paradigms of signification, 
such as the labyrinth and mandala, which function as symbolic dwellings for man’s 
                                                        
243 Di tutto, p. 20. 
244 Ibid., p. 36. 
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ontological homelessness. Not only are these semiotic models thematised within his 
stories, but the writer even adopts them to design the overall configuration of the narratives 
in which they appear, thus establishing a close correspondence between content and form.  
The labyrinth qua semiotic paradigm parallels and patterns the labyrinthine structure of the 
real. In his Postille to the novel Il nome della rosa, Eco distinguishes between the classical 
labyrinth, which ‘non consente a nessuno di perdersi’, the one he names ‘manieristico’, 
which develops along progressive bifurcations and is based upon a ‘trial-and-error 
process’, and, finally, the rhizomatic one, which ‘non ha centro, non ha periferia, non ha 
uscita, perché è potenzialmente infinito’, and which, as in Tabucchi’s opus, is linked to a 
view of the real as ‘strutturabile, ma mai definitivamente strutturato’.245 Accordingly, 
Tabucchi writes: 
 
Non conosco l’uscita precisa dal labirinto. Come tutti, procedo tentoni, quasi camminassi al buio. 
Sono cosciente del fatto che ci sono diverse direzioni possibili e preferisco lasciarle tutte 
plausibilmente aperte. La letteratura, forse, non è altro che questo, il tentativo di condurre a termine 
un discorso in cui finiamo per perderci. […] Qualsiasi scelta significa addentrarsi in una strada unica 
e davanti a una tale costrizione proviamo la tentazione di procedere a zig-zag, saltando da una via 
all’altra, e ciò asseconda o forse disegna e crea, il labirinto. In questo si cela, dunque, sia il desiderio 
di soluzione di un enigma che il pericolo di rimanere catturato, come in una tela.246 
 
Tabucchi identifies the possibility of approaching the labyrinth, the uncanny,247 in three 
different ways. Firstly, one might fall prisoner to the desire to solve the enigma, thus 
making the same mistake Agamben attributes to Oedipus, namely that of trying to decipher 
through a familiar, metaphysical modus significandi that which, instead, disturbs and 
collapses it (the uncanny renders the unfamiliar familiar). Or, in the second and antithetical 
case, one might get caught up in the net of endless signifiers, which is the effect of 
deconstruction (where the uncanny serves to render the familiar unfamiliar). Finally, one 
might follow a third, oblique path, designing and creating the labyrinth, which is what 
Tabucchi’s uncanny poetics performs (the uncanny simultaneously renders the unfamiliar 
familiar and the familiar unfamiliar). This option implies that, for literature, to be uncanny 
means exploring the conditions of possibility as well as the limits of sense and of sense 
making: Tabucchi does not solve the enigma, and nor does he exit the labyrinth. Rather, he 
inhabits them both. But only as places where one is at home by being not-at-home.  
                                                        
245 Umberto Eco, Postille a Il nome della rosa (Milan: Bompiani, 1985), pp. 524-25. I 
246 Gumpert, p. 97. 
247 The motif of the labyrinth metaphorically stands for the uncanny since they are both characterised by an 
experience of disorientation and the subsequent need to find one’s bearings within an unfamiliar context.  
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A fitting representation of this kind of labyrinth is offered in ‘Sogno di Dedalo, architetto e 
aviatore’.248 The story recounts Daedalus’ dream, in which, after having got lost in the 
maze he himself designed and having met, at its centre, the Minotaur sadly longing to 
escape and to contemplate the moon, Daedalus succeeds in finding the way out by solving 
the enigma of the two guardians – of which one always tells the truth, while the other 
provides only lies: ‘In questa stanza ci sono due porte […] e a guardia di ciascuna porta ci 
sono due guardiani. Una porta conduce alla libertà e una porta conduce alla morte. Uno dei 
guardiani dice solo la verità, e l’altro dice solo la menzogna’.249 However, this is not an 
‘Oedipal’ solution: Daedalus cannot interpret the guardians’ words as if they were hiding a 
proper meaning, nor can he remain paradoxically paralysed by endlessly oscillating 
between the two sentinels’ responses. Like the protagonist of Pessoa’s drama O 
Marinheiro, whence the topos of the two guardians is derived, Tabucchi’s Daedalus ‘per 
arrivare alla verità […] deve riuscire a percorrere in senso inverso il processo attraverso il 
quale gli arriva la risposta’,250 namely he has to make the unfamiliar familiar and the 
familiar unfamiliar, reversing the answer he receives.251 In effect, not only does the 
guardians’ enigma defy classical logic, according to which the negation of a negation is an 
affirmation: on the contrary, what their words open is a place of topological difference 
between affirmation and negation. But also, solving their enigma implies moving from the 
content-level (what they actually say) to the semiotic one (how they say it), thus 
recognising how a different modality of saying is at work. 
But the story is uncannily labyrinthine also in another dual sense: because it is a sort of 
vicarious dream, as the heterodiegetic narration hypothesises another person’s dream 
(‘sogno di sogno’), which, however, unlike the other stories in the book, does not end on 
the protagonist’s awakening – as to signify that the oneiric labyrinth is not and should not 
be escaped; and since Dedalus’ struggles to find a way out of his maze, involving all his 
false steps, are linguistically mirrored and embodied in the text. In particular, if, on the 
diegetic level, Daedalus ‘si mise a cantare una nenia antica’ and ‘[l]e arcate del lungo 
                                                        
248 The text is included in Sogni di sogni (Palermo: Sellerio, 1992), a work in which Tabucchi hypothesises 
the dreams made by twenty artists and writers as different as, among the others, Pessoa and Freud. 
249 Ibid., p. 17. 
250 ‘Una sciarada’, in Fernando Pessoa, Il Marinaio. Dramma statico in un quadro, trans. by Antonio 
Tabucchi (Turin: Einaudi, 1988), pp. 51-59 (p. 58). 
251 Tabucchi discusses the same paradox of the two guardians in La gastrite di Platone, where he explicitly 
acknowledges how literature offers the possibility to ‘[l]eggere la realtà «al rovescio» […] con una logica che 
non ubbidisce a una sequenza conformista della realtà, e che ha uno statuto agnitivo’, inasmuch as ‘per 
arrivare alla verità bisogna sempre stravolgere l’opinione di un’opinione’ (pp. 24-28). 
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corridoio gli restituivano la sua voce ripetuta dieci volte’, the same claustrophobic echoing 
is achieved by Tabucchi’s use of repetitions: ‘Infilò un corridoio […] [n]e infilò un altro 
[…] all’ottavo tentativo infilò un corridoio lunghissimo’; ‘Solo io posso sapere come 
uscire di qui, si disse Dedalo, e non lo ricordo. […] Solo io posso sapere come uscire di 
qui, si disse Dedalo, e non lo ricordo’.252 Indeed, it is precisely by producing a parallelism 
between story (the labyrinth as diegetic motif) and discourse (the labyrinth as textual and 
linguistic form) that Tabucchi’s uncanny creates and inhabits the labyrinth. 
Likewise, the mandala might be regarded as another possible configuration of the uncanny 
as an encounter with and discourse of the real (understood as a semiotic limit and void), in 
that it constitutes, albeit paradoxically, ‘un simbolo della totalità’,253 though a non-
saturated form of totality, through which ‘invece di riempire il vuoto, la scrittura di 
Tabucchi apre in un certo senso dei nuovi spazi vuoti’.254 This is precisely what his 
posthumous novel Per Isabel performs,255 wherein the mandala acquires a threefold value. 
The first is ontological, in that it marks a possible representation of and a potential way to 
make sense of human essence, given that, as Tabucchi writes, ‘l’uomo che si è smarrito 
necessita di simbolizzare l’universo con una forma d’arte integrativa’.256 The second is 
epistemological, since it defines how the protagonist Tadeus, trying to discover what has 
truly happened to his missing friend Isabel, patterns his quest, his ‘piccola inchiesta’257:  
 
Sto lavorando con polverine colorate […] un circolo giallo, un circolo azzurro, come in una pratica 
tibetana, e intanto il cerchio si stringe verso il centro, e io sto cercando di arrivare al centro […] per 
arrivare alla conoscenza […]. Diciamo che il mio è una specie di mandala, a suo modo, ma i cerchi 
si stanno stringendo, li ho disegnati, o meglio, li ho percorsi uno per uno, è una strana figura quella 
che viene fuori, sa, ma io sto stringendo verso il centro.258 
 
And, finally, it has a literary dimension that is clearly perceivable in the way in which the 
novel is composed, being divided into nine chapters that correspond to the mandala circles, 
demanding a somewhat paratactic rather than consequential reading. The different 
                                                        
252 Sogni di sogni, p. 16. 
253 I volatili del Beato Angelico (Palermo: Sellerio, 1987), p. 45. 
254 Schwarz Lausten, p. 69. 
255 Arguably, the reader should consider the following passage from the epistolary novel Si sta facendo 
sempre più tardi (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2001) as an anticipated reflection on the last novel: ‘mentre i cerchi si 
facevano sempre più stretti, proprio come nel mandala, lui riusciva ad arrivare al centro, che poi era il 
significato della sua vita’ (p. 145). A centre that is, however, positively void. 
256 Per Isabel, pp. 105-06.  
257 Ibid., p. 79. 
258 Ibid., p. 65-107. 
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chapters, in fact, do not develop along the axis of causality, instead designating a chain of 
signifiers that invites the reader to continue the investigation. In a way, the mandala 
embodies the dual drives inherent in the uncanny: on the one hand, proceeding through the 
different circles involves a movement that oscillates between approach and removal, a 
detour constantly facing its own limits and failures; on the other hand, instead, leading to a 
centre, it describes an itinerary to potential meaning creation. This pattern also generates a 
parallelism between the role and itinerary of the reader and that of the protagonist, given 
that structuring the novel as a mandala is consistent with its belonging to the genre of the 
quest. Interestingly, Agamben observes, what distinguishes, in terms of semiosis, a quest 
from an adventure is the fact that, in the former, experience takes the form of an aporia, 
since it does not develop along a linear route, whereas, in the latter, it is possible to outline 
the experience of a direct journey towards meaning that takes place in the exotic and in the 
extraordinary:  
 
Mentre l’esperienza scientifica è, infatti, la costruzione di una via certa […] alla conoscenza, la 
quête è, invece, il riconoscimento che l’assenza di via (l’aporia) è l’unica esperienza possibile per 
l’uomo. Ma, per lo stesso motivo, la quête è, anche, il contrario dell’avventura […]. Poiché 
l’avventura presuppone che vi sia una via all’esperienza e che questa via passi per lo straordinario e 
per l’esotico (contrapposto al familiare e al comune); mentre, nell’universo della quête, l’esotico e lo 
straordinario sono soltanto la cifra dell’aporia essenziale di ogni esperienza.259 
 
This applies to Tabucchi’s writing, since ‘if adventure is taken to mean venturing forth to 
face events, indeed, eliciting events so as to match oneself against them, this is not at all 
what Tabucchi’s characters experience’.260 This is true also of the reader, who gets caught 
up in a tentative process of sense-building independent of any actual meaning. In this way 
there is, therefore, a precise consonance between the topological rationale of the quest and 
the logic of defamiliarisation that is essential to the unheimliche. 
 
Ultimately, Bodei observes, Tabucchi’s main concern does not relate to how it is possible 
to know the world but, rather, to how it is possible to make sense of it and of our living in 
it: 
 
Tabucchi mostra nel concreto quel che ogni opera d’arte riuscita dovrebbe fare: aprire un mondo, 
stabilendo connessioni e ramificazioni tra vari comparti di senso, prima separati e distanti, e 
                                                        
259 Infanzia, pp. 23-24. 
260 Luigi Surdich, ‘The Constant Search for Oneself’, in ‘Antonio Tabucchi. A Collection of Essays’, ed. by 
Bruno Ferraro and Nicole Prunster, Spunti e ricerche, XII (1996), 158- 72 (159). 
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generando scintille e illuminazioni che si riverberano sull’esperienza. […] L’opera letteraria ci mette 
infatti in rapporto con tutto ciò che eccede la nostra immediata capacità di comprensione, con la 
densità delle esperienze più estranee e sconosciute. Elabora l’inquietudine senza sopprimerla.261  
 
What, therefore, is this uncanny which, paraphrasing Bodei, literature enlarges and makes 
intelligible? And in what ways does it affect the writer’s literary discourse? In this chapter, 
I will suggest a possible answer to the first question, scrutinising Tabucchi’s reflection on 
the uncanny, identifying to what extent it overlaps with Agamben’s interpretation and what 
specific elements it adds. According to the Italian philosopher, the uncanny encompasses 
three levels: linguistic, ontological and temporal. I will argue that, in his discussion of the 
concept, Tabucchi incorporates all of these. However, the writer inserts a further 
dimension that identifies the uncanny in terms of poetics. For literature to be uncanny, in 
fact, means being disquieting and interrogative. And, specifically, the poetics of the 
uncanny unfolds as an interrogation aiming at complicating literary signification, 
producing a topological articulation of the two moments and movements already present in 
Agamben’s account: feeling uncanny and being uncanny.  
Addressing the second question, I will examine how the unheimliche functions within the 
writer’s literary discourse, focusing on three narrative approaches through which Tabucchi 
arranges the topological dynamics of the uncanny into generative conversation. While in 
Tabucchi’s fictions these strategies overlap and intermingle, I shall keep them separate in 
order to accentuate their specificity. I will discuss the logic of play (chapter 3), the reversal 





2.2 Tabucchi and the Uncanny: a Literary Approach  
 
Tabucchi articulates his theoretical reflection on the uncanny and the (Freudian) 
unheimliche in two main texts. The first is a speech given at the University of Siena in 
1997, entitled ‘Dal desassossego di Fernando Pessoa fino all’assurdo beckettiano’, now 
contained in the anthology Parole per Antonio Tabucchi. The second is the essay 
                                                        
261 ‘Giochi proibiti’, pp. 121-22. 
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‘Controtempo’, which is included in the posthumous collection Di tutto resta un poco and 
was often used as a working draft for other articles and talks.262  
 
However close they may be, Tabucchi’s uncanny is not (solely) Freud’s unheimliche. 
Exemplarily, as already stated, the writer adopts the term ‘Inquietudine’, rather than the 
properly Freudian ‘perturbante’. Choosing a substantive instead of the adjective 
immediately suggests that the writer intends to engage with and conceptualise the uncanny 
on an ontological plane: Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ is a condition, before and beyond being 
an affective property. Likewise, by capitalising the term, Tabucchi seeks to emphasise 
how, although it ‘percorre il Novecento con varie sfumature’, and despite adopting 
different phenomenological manifestations, this ‘Inquietudine’ constitutes the common 
ground to them all, for it is exactly the (un)grounding (essence) of human beings.  
Tabucchi approaches the uncanny from a literary perspective and situates it within a 
constellation of literary categories and experiences which, springing from Pessoa’s 
desassossego (i.e. disquiet), composes what he calls a unique ‘blocco semiologico’.263 In 
particular, the writer finds in the nocturne264 and the absurd two archetypical (modern) 
demonstrations of this ‘Inquietudine’, which nonetheless remains irreducible to them. 
While the nocturne, which also incorporates the fantastic, lacks a proper ontological 
                                                        
262 As Dolfi indicates: ‘Si tratta di un testo che ha subito numerosi rifacimenti […] spesso utilizzato con 
significative varianti come traccia per articoli (Novecento. Il filo dell’inquietudine, in ‘Il Corriere della Sera’, 
2 gennaio 1998), incontri e conferenze (basti ricordare quella alla Normale di Pisa del 23 maggio 2008: Il filo 
dell’Inquietudine. Un percorso nella letteratura del Novecento dal Desassossego di Pessoa, al ‘rimorso’ di 
Gadda, alla ‘rabbia’ di Pasolini; e gli interventi per un viaggio in Israele, evocati da Tabucchi in 
Osservando il Novecento. L’inquietudine di Gadda e il ‘desassossego’ di Pessoa […], in ‘Micromega’, 1, 
1999, pp. 249-254)’ (Di tutto, pp. 279-80). Despite the fact that the two texts partially overlap, I have 
preferred to keep them separate, in that they focus on different, yet equally important, aspects of the uncanny. 
263 ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 67. 
264 Following Tabucchi, I adopt the category of nocturne rather than that of the fantastic, for the latter is 
traditionally used to define a genre or a literary mode – namely the presence of ‘structural features underlying 
various works in different periods of time’ (Jackson, p. 7). With the term nocturne, at least in light of 
Tabucchi’s use of this category, similarly to the uncanny, the focus shifts from the analysis of thematic and 
structural elements to that of their possible ontological value. In effect, Tabucchi openly criticises the most 
traditional definition of the fantastic, such as Todorov’s one. Doing so, he proposes a definition of the 
fantastic as a possible configuration of a research that is, however, uncanny. In particular, Tabucchi affirms 
that fantastic is ‘il phántasma (nel senso etimologico del greco antico), l’apparizione extra-naturale di una 
vita che non si è mai coagulata […] nel reale ed è rimasta nella dimensione del possibile [… che] indaga 
oltre il reale, nel mistero delle cose, come alla ricerca della loro essenza […] e ciò crea un inedito 
Unheimlich, un iper-Perturbante’ (Di tutto, pp. 106-07).  
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problematisation, hence comparing solely to an uncanny feeling – and not to the state of 
being uncanny –, absurdist literature seems to remain caught within a negative semiosis, a 
structural impossibility of meaning, which the post-nihilistic approach of the unheimliche 
refuses and negates. 
 
 
2.2.1 Situating the Uncanny: Between Nocturnal Feeling and Ontological Absurdity 
 
The nocturne is mentioned twice in the text ‘Dal desassossego’. Firstly, Tabucchi refers to 
Hoffmann’s Nachtstücke while discussing the Freudian uncanny, observing how ‘Freud 
costruisce fra l’altro la sua teoria del cosiddetto perturbante, dell’Unheimliche, intorno a un 
testo letterario che è un racconto di Hoffmann [… che] appartiene ai Notturni’.265 This 
alludes to the writer’s awareness that the nocturne has been the most familiar literary form 
embraced by the poetics of the uncanny. It is, in fact, a category Tabucchi also adopts to 
characterise one of his novels, Notturno indiano,266 and that applies to all those motifs and 
structures that belong to the catalogue of the fantastic used throughout his work. However, 
as Brizio-Skov points out in her analysis of Requiem, the writer’s poetics gestures beyond 
the (nocturnal) fantastic and towards the postmodern, for while the former presupposes a 
stable notion of reality and is bound up with epistemological doubts, the latter triggers 
ontological questions.267 Provided that there are fantastic elements in Tabucchi’s texts, 
they function as ‘una sorta di sfondo, di ambientazione che pone [… il lettore] in uno stato 
di maggiore sensibilità (leggi: tendenza all’angoscia)’. 268  Nocturnal themes serve to 
                                                        
265 ‘Dal desassossego’, pp. 67-68. Freud’s analysis of Hoffmann’s short story The Sandman, included in his 
1919 essay, at once legitimates and inaugurates a critical exploration of the mode in which the unheimliche 
and the fantastic intertwine. It is in the fantastic, in fact, that Freud finds the representation of the entire 
repertoire of themes proper of the uncanny. As a consequence, literary scholars, on the one hand, and 
thinkers of the uncanny, on the other, have often investigated the relationship between the two concepts, 
eventually accepting the idea of the fantastic as the most typical fictionalised transposition of the Freudian 
uncanny. See: Florea Marius-Virgil, ‘The Fantastic or the Uncanny Fantasy’, in Petroleum - Gas University 
of Ploiesti Bulletin, Philology Series, 62.1 (June 01, 2010), 107-14; Fantastic Literature: A Critical Reader, 
ed. by David Sandner (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); George Aichele, ‘Postmodern Fantasy, Ideology, and 
the Uncanny’, Paraxadora: Studies in World Literary Genres, 3.4 (1997), 498-514; Terry Castle, The 
Female Thermometer: Eighteenth- Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
266 Notturno indiano (Palermo: Sellerio, 1984). 
267 Brizio-Skov, p. 126. 
268 Andrea Bellavita, Schermi perturbanti. Per un’applicazione del concetto di Unheimliche all’enunciazione 
filmica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2005), p. 251. 
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emphasise the taking place of the uncanny as a dynamic process of signification, of which 
they are only one possible and superficial configuration. 
This becomes clear with the second reference Tabucchi makes to the concept, when the 
accent shifts from the nocturne in literature to the nocturnal side of literature as such. 
Quoting Magrelli’s commentary on a night scene included in Wystan H. Auden’s poem 
The Age of Anxiety (1947), Tabucchi asks ‘se questa notte abbia un’azione straniante e se 
questa notte sia la semplice notte del giorno solare o sia piuttosto […] una metaforica 
tenebra che avvolge l’uomo di questa età dell’ansia’.269 However, he provides no answer, 
focusing on the estranging presence of the night rather than on its function, on its affective 
property instead of its ontology. Here, Tabucchi reaches the threshold of a possible 
nocturnal ontology. But he stops. And moves his arguments in the direction of Freud’s 
unheimliche. This is revealing of the fact that the nocturnal forms an essential but partial 
dimension of the poetics of the uncanny, occurring as one of the possible discursive 
strategies that this poetics orchestrates. If, Dolfi affirms, with the Italian writer ‘il notturno 
[…] da funzione passiva […] si fa attivo, può diventare una scelta’,270 it is a choice 
Tabucchi makes alongside others, or rather, it explains only half of his poetics. For, the 
uncanny comprises two movements: the first is oriented towards the practice of de-
realisation and demystification of reality – the world seems to lose its significance – and 
exposes all its fractures; the second, on the other hand, tries to make sense of and sustain 
these gaps without trying to fill them. The nocturnal category, accentuating the estranging 
element of the uncanny experience, falls short of investigating the uncanniness that is 
experienced. Nocturnal literature addresses the moment when man no longer feels at home, 
as his network of familiar meanings ‘loses its articulation and everything slips into an 
undifferentiated mass’.271 But, with the unheimliche, this kind of epistemological loss 
deepens into and reveals human beings’ ontological homelessness. For the nocturne to 
move from being an epistemological crisis to being an ontological condition – that is, the 
investigation and representation thereof – it requires ‘una nuova presa di coscienza […] 
dietro le tracce di un notturno allegorico […] riaccendere il lume dell’allegoria della 
luce’.272 The nocturne can enter Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny solely to the extent to 
                                                        
269 ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 71. Auden’s poem The Age of Anxiety (New York: Random House, 1997) is set in a 
New York bar during the Second World War, where four strangers (three men and a woman) meet and drink 
together, while reflecting on the purposelessness of their lives and of the human condition. 
270 Anna Dolfi, ‘Premessa’, in I ‘notturni’, pp. 11-21 (p. 16). 
271 Withy, p. 56. As Pocci observes, the nocturne expresses ‘epistemological uncertainty’ (414). 
272 Enza Biagini, ‘Riflessioni a margine del notturno’, in I ‘notturni’, pp. 383-403 (pp. 401-02). 
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which it is incorporated into a structure of awakening, though not an awakening from but 
rather inside and to the nocturnal.273  
 
The necessity to combine a denaturalisation and re-articulation of sense also arises in 
relation to the other literary experience included within Tabucchi’s constellation of the 
uncanny: the absurd. The latter in fact constitutes an exemplary, 274  albeit partial, 
configuration of that sense of unfamiliarity that lies at the core of Pessoa’s desassossego 
and of Tabucchi’s thinking of the unheimliche.275 Nevertheless, it is marked by an 
impossibility of meaning, lacking therefore that moment of decidability, which, on the 
contrary, characterises the uncanny. Decidability means, in effect, never stop asking 
interrogatives, never stop creating sense. 
 
Si tratta di un sentimento abbastanza nuovo, tipico del nostro secolo, perché mai prima, a mio 
avviso, si era manifestato nella storia della letteratura. L’assurdo e l’incomprensibile, l’indicibile, è 
ciò che passa davanti ai nostri occhi, che si svolge davanti ai nostri occhi e che possiede una logica 
formale, però è carente di logica sostanziale, vale a dire è incapace di dare una risposta alle 
domande che noi ci poniamo.276 
  
With the expression logica sostanziale the author designates a peculiar functioning of his 
literary discourse, which combines a metaphysical need for significance together with the 
choice of the uncanny as a potential way to complicate and, at the same time, to reach a 
proposal of meaning. The absurd remains within a logic that is merely formal and based on 
the principle of non-contradiction, therefore blocking men’s interrogatives in a lack of 
answers. On the contrary, the unheimliche entails ‘una forma di conoscenza diversa da 
                                                        
273 This will be developed in chapter 4. 
274 ‘Camus formula proprio in termini narrativi quel concetto di estraneità perturbante che dall’inquietudine 
all’ansia, al male di vivere, all’inadeguatezza della vita oltrepassa ormai i confini esistenziali per sfiorare il 
metafisico’ (‘Dal desassossego’, p. 73). 
275 In her study of Heidegger’s unheimliche, Withy recognises a similar structure within absurdist and 
uncanny experience, since the absurd feeling also arises when we experience ‘a self-contradiction internal to 
the mind, which desires to know the world as it is in itself but must employs means incommensurate to that 
end (namely, humanizing thinking)’ and is therefore revealing of human beings’ absurdity (p. 38). However, 
this does not confute the idea of an ontological distance between the two. 
276 Tabucchi, ‘Il mio tram attraverso il Novecento’, in Parole per Antonio Tabucchi, pp. 51-64 (p. 55). 
Tabucchi’s assumption is very close to the most credited definitions of the absurd, for which the latter 
conceives of ‘the human world as possessing no inherent truth, value or meaning’ and where man undertakes 
a ‘fruitless search for purpose and significance’. A Glossary of Literary Terms, ed. by M.H. Abrams and 
Geoffrey Harpham, eleventh edition (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2014), p. 1. 
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quella pragmatica e per questo disturbante’, founded precisely upon ‘il diritto ad indagare 
con la scrittura letteraria il non conosciuto, il non dato […] secondo una logica sostanziale 
e non solo formale’.277 This potentiality of meaning, which distinguishes the uncanny from 
the absurd, follows from their different ontological views: the absurd postulates an 
ontological lack of sense,278 which in turn renders every attempt at signification arbitrary 
and nonsensical; the uncanny,279 however, specifically in Agamben’s account, entails an 
ontology established upon potentiality, which eschews univocal meaning and embraces the 
capacity to think the process of sense making in the face of the modern vacuum – what 
Tabucchi defines as ‘una realtà composita e complessa e […] piena di buchi’.280 The 
absurd sees the void – semantic, epistemological and ontological – negatively as a lack and 
limit; the uncanny, on the other hand, sees it positively, as the clearing and uncovering of a 
different possibility for the production of sense.  
 
 
2.2.2 Tabucchi and Freud’s Uncanny 
 
The titles of Tabucchi’s main reflections on the uncanny (‘Dal desassossego di Fernando 
Pessoa fino all’assurdo beckettiano’ and ‘Controtempo’) are revealing of his stance on the 
concept, inasmuch as both the focus on a certain literary period – the twentieth century – 
implicated by the reference to Pessoa and Beckett, and the idea of a counter-turning 
caesura and disjointedness designated by the term ‘controtempo’ allude to the central place 
occupied by the temporal dimension. And this is so not only because the latter reveals the 
estrangement, the hiatus that opens between the subject and the real, but also in that it 
situates this traumatic fracture within the perimeter of modernity. For Tabucchi, the 
uncanny is a dimension inherent to modernity that finds in literature a peculiar 
seismographer: if modernity is uncanny insofar as it is traumatic, ‘questo trauma può farsi 
                                                        
277 Elisabetta Bacchereti, ‘Tabucchi almost noir’, in I ‘notturni’, pp. 65-86 (p. 71). A logic or, rather, a pre-
logic, is precisely the way in which Tabucchi defines the functioning of literature in his ‘Elogio della 
letteratura’ (Di tutto, p. 16). 
278 Accordingly, with the absurd, ‘[i]l linguaggio […] non rivela niente e non è più portatore di senso’ (‘Dal 
desassossego’, p. 73). 
279 The absurd comprises at once ‘an epistemological claim that narratives fail to provide access to what has 
happened (reality remains fundamentally incomprehensible) and an ontological view according to which 
human reality lacks meaningful connections and evades attempts at narrative sense making’. Hanna 
Meretoja, ‘Narrative and Human Existence: Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics’, New Literary History, 
45.1 (Winter 2014), 89-109 (93). 
280 Piccole finzioni, p. 155.  
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agente di altissima letteratura’.281 In the article ‘Osservando il Novecento’, of which 
‘Controtempo’ constitutes a draft, the author lists a number of factors that distinguish the 
modern uncanny from its previous occurrences: 
 
L’inquietudine novecentesca ha certamente le sue radici nell’Ottocento, radici in gran parte 
romantiche. E comunque l’inquietudine in quanto tale non è patrimonio del nostro secolo: altre 
epoche hanno conosciuto una dimensione analoga. Ciò che tuttavia identifica l’inquietudine 
novecentesca è la presenza di alcune riflessioni razionali che si ripercuotono sull’atteggiamento 
emotivo. Queste riflessioni nascono banalmente dall’osservazione della realtà circostante. La più 
importante tra esse è la coscienza concreta che l’umanità può scomparire dalla faccia della terra. 
[…] Oltre la paura della scomparsa del genere umano ci sono però altri elementi distintivi di questo 
sentimento. Il più evidente, quello che rende la nostra ansia diversa da quella dei nostri antenati, è il 
fatto che essa sia stata, nel nostro secolo, sistematizzata, innanzitutto dalla psicoanalisi e da Freud. 
Nell’Ottocento c’è solo un annuncio dell’inquietudine moderna, il Novecento la esprime 
chiaramente.282 
 
What should be emphasised in this passage is the centrality Tabucchi attributes to Freud283 
and to psychoanalysis, although, this time, it does not specifically address and refer to the 
Freudian unheimliche. Not only is Freud fundamental in Tabucchi’s theorisation of the 
uncanny as ‘inquietudine’, which, for the writer, thanks to Freud, acquires the status of a 
concept that can be expressed or represented; also, more subtly and importantly, Freud’s 
psychoanalysis gives rise to an understanding of this ‘inquietudine’ as a movement of 
signification and mechanism of textual production. The fact that ‘il Novecento la esprime 
                                                        
281 Di tutto, p. 31. 
282 ‘Osservando il Novecento’, Micromega, 1 (1999), 249-51.  
283 The writer also engages with Freud’s unheimliche in the following literary works: in Gli Zingari e il 
Rinascimento, Tabucchi reflects on the proximity between the uncanny and the so-called Stendhal syndrome: 
‘Se il sentimento di ‘Unheimlich’, come Freud definisce il disagio che ci può assalire di fronte a ciò che ci 
perturba per le sue categorie diverse da quelle che normalmente possediamo, deriva di solito dalla visione di 
qualcosa di terrificante o di spiacevole, forse lo stesso sentimento di ‘Unheimlich’ può provenire da 
un’eccessiva bellezza alla quale non siamo abituati’ (pp. 56-57). In La gastrite di Platone (p. 26) Tabucchi 
explicitly associates the uncanny with the investigation of history: ‘E se alla reversibilità del Tempo si 
sostituisce la reversibilità della Storia, la lettura si fa ancora più interessante e può riservare sorprese, 
soprattutto quando le cause sono avvolte nel mistero. […] è davvero il Perturbante di Freudiana memoria, 
non più desunto da un racconto di Hoffmann, ma dalla Storia’. Freud’s unheimliche is also quoted in the 
novel Tristano muore. Una vita (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2004) as a possible scientific explanation for déjà vu: 
‘Freud invece ha indagato sul déjà vu nei suoi studi sull'Unheimliche, che voi italiani avete chiamato il 
perturbante, perché in effetti il perturbante accompagna spesso il déjà vu’ (p. 122). 
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chiaramente’ means that it recognises it as mode of sense making and linguistic expression 
and, in a way, allows it to speak. 
 
In ‘Dal desassossego’ Tabucchi makes an explicit reference to Freud’s 1919 essay. Having 
signalled both the difficulty inherent to the Italian translation of the German term 
unheimliche and how this linguistic dimension of the uncanny seems to be confirmed by 
the fact that Freud’s theorisation is centred on a literary work, the writer finally formulates 
his own understanding of the Freudian unheimliche: 
 
Il termine freudiano […] fa riferimento a un qualcosa che turba perché non è familiare al soggetto. 
La parola contiene, negandola, l’indicazione di casa, focolare e anche patria: l’Unheimliche è ciò 
che non è familiare, è lo straniero, è ciò che ci è estraneo. Qualcosa a cui non siamo abituati, è 
questo che provoca turbamento e quindi che ci dà inquietudine.284   
 
Once again, this passage confirms the fact that Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ – Tabucchi’s 
uncanny – is not reducible to and does not overlap with the Freudian unheimliche, as the 
latter is said to produce the former (‘l’Unheimliche […] dà inquietudine’). 
Furthermore, it is revealing of how the writer understands Freud’s unheimliche. Tabucchi 
seems to be reducing the Freudian uncanny to a simple opposition between familiarity and 
unfamiliarity. However, for Tabucchi, the term ‘estraneità’, as well as the semantic sphere 
to which it belongs (that of extimacy), defines a distinctive relationship, a different logic of 
interaction between the two elements that are implied, between what is familiar and 
habitual and what is not. This is a kind of mutual relationship, wherein that which is 
‘estraneo’ is neither inside nor outside the familiar but blurs any threshold between the 
two: it inhabits this threshold. Uncanny is precisely that which ‘disturbs any 
straightforward sense of what is inside and what is outside […] an experience of 
liminality’.285 In a sense, the uncanny does not overlap with one of the two terms that are 
placed in correlation; rather it is the moment of defamiliarisation and estrangement that is 
produced as an output of such interaction. Therefore, in Tabucchi too, the uncanny – in 
both its Freudian sense and his own – occurs not as a simple negation of the familiar. It is 
not outside of it; rather it marks its inner reversal. It arguably functions similarly to what 
Tabucchi designates as the reverse. In the preface to the second edition of Il gioco del 
rovescio, the writer traces the aetiology of his idea of ‘rovescio’, affirming that:  
 
                                                        
284 ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 68, italicised. 
285 Royle, p. 2. 
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Tutti [i racconti di questo libro] sono legati a una scoperta: l'essermi accorto un giorno, per le 
imprevedibili circostanze della vita, che una certa cosa che era ‘così’ era invece anche in un altro 
modo. Fu una scoperta che mi turbò.286  
 
What appears uncanny to Tabucchi is not (merely) the fact that something turns out to be 
different from what he thought it was. On the contrary, the term ‘anche’ denotes a 
(topological) condition of simultaneity and ambivalence. Tabucchi is not simply referring 
to the discovery of a reverse, negative side of a positive, familiar one – which was, for 
instance, at the basis of Saussure’s identification of the signified/signifier pair with the 
recto and verso of a sheet of paper, and in general of representational discourse, and which 
would confine the uncanny solely to the epistemological level. He is referring to a process 
of othering, of investigating how this ‘positive’ and habitual side can be – and indeed is – 
extimate to, uncannily other than itself, thus projecting the unheimliche onto an ontological 
dimension.  
An archetypical demonstration comes from the short story ‘Lettera da Casablanca’, 
included in Il gioco. In this text uncanny extimacy and reversal are used to problematise 
the main character’s gender identity. The protagonist is, in fact, a transgender (almost a 
drag-queen performer: Giosefine, although the real name is Ettore) waiting to undergo a 
surgical operation to become a trans-sexual. (S)he writes a letter to his/her younger sister 
Lina, whom (s)he hasn’t seen for 18 years (after the ‘fatto’, arguably the killing of their 
mother by their father). Clearly, the protagonist’s gender identity is ambivalent, familiarly 
male (‘così’) and, at the same time, unfamiliarly female (‘anche in un altro modo’). 
Linguistically, this is conveyed through the oscillation between male and female pronouns, 
nouns and adjectives: ‘quando fui mandato’, ‘ero tuo fratello’, ‘ero un ragazzino 
malinconico e distratto’, ‘ero bella, ero giovane, ero felice’.287 Linguistic ambivalence 
reaches its climax at the end of the story, when the protagonist asks the sister to be buried 
next to their mother’s tomb: ‘Voglio essere sepolto accanto a lei […]. Non fare mettere 
iscrizioni sulla lapide […] solo il nome, ma non Ettore: il nome con cui firma questa lettera 
[…] la tua Giosefine’.288 
Likewise, the reversal informs Tabucchi’s narrative strategy: his use of spatial 
discontinuities (as the story moves between Italy, Argentina and Morocco) and visual 
doublings (the images of the window and the palm, which belong both to a childhood 
memory and to the scenario the protagonist actually sees, at the diegetic present of his/her 
                                                        
286 Il gioco, p. 5, italicised. 
287 Ibid., pp. 28-39. 
288 Ibid., p. 40, italicised. 
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writing, from the hospital in Casablanca); the intended confusion between actuality (what 
happened) and potentiality (what might have happened), as the protagonist, thinking about 
his/her mother’s childhood holidays, confesses how ‘[l]e ho tanto desiderate, le ho tanto 
immaginate che a volte mi succedeva uno strano sortilegio e mi ricordavo di vacanze […] 
eravamo io e te […] solo che tu invece di essere te eri la mamma da piccola’.289  
  
The ontological dimension of Tabucchi’s ‘rovescio’ is exemplarily illustrated also by the 
short story ‘I morti a tavola’. The text follows the life of a retired Stasi agent wandering 
around Berlin while he heads towards the cemetery to visit the tombstone of one of his 
former, most famous targets, Brecht. The protagonist’s subjectivity is immediately 
characterised in terms of an optical doubling and division, as when he stares at his image 
mirrored by a tram ‘una striscia di gomma lo divid[e] in due’. However, what might seem 
to be a mere optical effect soon acquires an existential meaning: ‘[v]a bene diviso in due, 
mio caro, sempre diviso in due, metà di qua, metà di là, è la vita, così è la vita’.290 The 
episode metaphorically alludes to the fact that adhering to a regime of surveillance offered 
the protagonist the only warranty of a stable, fixed subjectivity, as he identified himself 
with and worked as a sort of prosthetic eye for the government. For, the individuals he had 
to spy on were both visual targets to be surveilled – hence optically subjugated – and the 
illusionary reflection of his subjectivity – thus optically alienating him –, inasmuch as and 
to the extent to which he was able to separate himself and build his identity in relation to 
and in opposition to theirs: 
 
Si disse: no, vado a piedi, domino meglio la situazione. La situazione, ma quale situazione?, beh, la 
situazione che era abituato a dominare in altri tempi. Allora sì, che c’era gusto: il tuo Obiettivo ti 
camminava davanti, ignaro, tranquillo, se ne andava per i fatti suoi. E anche tu, apparentemente, te 
ne andavi per i fatti tuoi, ma niente affatto ignaro, anzi. Del tuo Obiettivo conoscevi alla perfezione i 
tratti somatici dalle fotografie che ti avevano fatto studiare, avresti potuto riconoscerlo anche nella 
platea di un teatro. Lui invece di te non sapeva niente, tu eri per lui un volto anonimo come milioni 
di altri volti anonimi al mondo. Lui andava per la sua strada, e andando per la sua strada ti guidava, 
perché dovevi seguirlo. Lui rappresentava la bussola del tuo percorso, bastava seguirlo.291 
 
Nonetheless, the gaze initiated by his dominating surveillance of his targets is not the only 
scopic field in which the charater’s identity is grounded and divided. When, following the 
collapse of the German Democratic Republic, he decides to examine the secret archives, 
                                                        
289 Ibid., p. 30. 
290 Il tempo invecchia, pp. 81-82.  
291 Ibid., p. 86, italicised. 
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the protagonist realises how, believing himself to be a watching eye, he had unofficially 
been looked at for his entire life: 
 
Di me, invece, non sapevo niente. Credevo di sapere tutto, e di me non sapevo niente. […] Che 
Renate mi ha tradito per tutta la vita l’ho scoperto solo due anni fa, quando hanno aperto gli archivi. 
Chissà perché mi venne in mente che anch’io potevo avere una scheda come tutti. Era una scheda 
completa, dettagliata, di chi è stato spiato ogni giorno. La voce ‘Familiari’ era un intero dossier, con 
fotografie prese col teleobiettivo.292 
 
Thus the regime eventually appears as both the familiar guarantor of a fixed identity and 
the unfamiliar blindspot exposing the character’s blindness, which, as the previous quote 
demonstrates, was entirely based on the wrong equation of visual mastery – ‘dominare’ 
defines the spy’s existential action – and visual invisibility, his anonymous condition.  
 
To summarise, although critics have commonly understood Tabucchi’s ‘rovescio’ as a 
modality to read and decipher reality, my interpretation seeks to think it as a modality of 
being.293 As for the term ‘così’: it anticipates a fundamental trait of the uncanny qua 
poetics and, in particular, of its committed facet. For, Tabucchi writes in his ‘Elogio della 
letteratura’, ‘la letteratura è essenzialmente questo […] il dubbio che ciò che l’istituzione 
vigente vuole sia così, non sia esattamente così’.294 Here the word ‘così’ works as the 
indicator of an imposed, univocal and hypostatised view. So the functioning of the 
uncanny as a topological reversal constitutes the fundamental nexus between the 
interrogation of the real and the possibility of dwelling in it, by recovering and affirming 
its openness, its being otherwise, its triggering a quest of sense that can never be ultimate 
or totalising.295  
                                                        
292 Ibid., pp. 97-98. As Francese comments, ‘[o]ne innovative charge of Tabucchi’s fictions is the manner in 
which his fictional writings lead his readers to see themselves being seen. Il tempo invecchia has at its core 
the awareness that the other, the observed, does indeed look back’, and, in particular, ‘the reader sees how 
seeing and being seen, the basis of human community, was transmogrified into a pathology by 
totalitarianism, destroying the social fabric’. ‘Memory and Nostalgia’, p. 927. 
293 My position is close, for instance, to Jansen’s, who retrieves the ontological component of Tabucchi’s 
reversal game in its Pessoan origin. Monica Jansen, ‘Tabucchi: molteplicità e rovescio’, in Piccole finzioni, 
pp. 13-46 (p. 139): here, Jansen quotes from Tabucchi’s Un baule pieno di gente, where he characterises 
Pessoa’s reversal as ‘la perversione di abdicare al reale per possedere l’essenza del reale’ (pp. 23-24). 
294 Di tutto, p. 12, italics in the text. 
295 Giglioli accentuates the nexus existing between Agamben’s idea of potentiality and the semantic 
perimeter of the term ‘così’ arguing that ‘potenza significa poter essere diversi, un così che potrebbe anche 
non essere così’. Daniele Giglioli, Critica della vittima (Rome: Nottetempo, 2014), p. 108. 
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In conclusion, having situated the uncanny in relation to other related literary categories, 
observing how, for Tabucchi, following Freud’s key theorisation, it is with modernity that 
it evolves into a modality of signification built around a logic of reversal, I will now turn to 
a closer analysis of the writer’s ‘Inquietudine’. 
 
 
2.3 Tabucchi’s Uncanny: Time, Ontology, Language 
 
Similarly to Agamben, Tabucchi examines the uncanny in its temporal, ontological and 
linguistic configurations, reaching a definition of the unheimliche as a topological 
articulation of sense. The following three sections investigate the extent to which their 




2.3.1 Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ and Time: Feeling Uncanny 
 
As with Agamben’s modern alienation, for Tabucchi the uncanny represents the 
experience of temporal disjointedness. The mutual estrangement that occurs between the 
subject and the world finds its most adamantine manifestation in one’s lack of 
synchronicity with the time he inhabits, which is tantamount to the emergence of an 
estranging temporality within chronological time. This temporal hiatus and interplay, 
which Tabucchi calls ‘la non coincidenza del proprio tempo individuale con il tempo 
collettivo’,296 reaches its climax with modernity. Positing Auden’s The Age of Anxiety as 
an exemplary manifestation of the uncanny in literature, Tabucchi writes that: 
 
La parola forte che connota il suo libro è appunto ‘ansia’, che ha certo un altro valore da disquiet 
con cui è stato tradotto Il Libro dell’Inquietudine di Pessoa […]. Comunque anche l’altra parola del 
titolo del poemetto di Auden è molto importante, the age, ‘età’, e questa combinazione di ‘età’ e di 
‘ansia’ mi sembra interessante perché è una parola che radica fortemente l’ansia a un certo momento 
storico; il fatto di mettere accanto alla parola ‘ansia’ la parola ‘età’ è un modo per inserire l’ansia 
nella storia […].297  
 
                                                        
296 Di tutto, p. 22. 
297 ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 69. 
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What comes to the fore with modernity is, as for Agamben, a feeling of the uncanny as the 
modality of experience. The idea of ‘ansia’ evokes Heidegger’s angst and Agamben’s 
alienation and, unlike Pessoa’s disquiet, fades from the existential into the ontological. For, 
the feeling of the uncanny is not solely the negative moment of self- and world-
withdrawal, but also the grounding of a potential signification.  
 
In effect, Pessoa’s desassossego is not Tabucchi’s uncanny. There are two main 
differences between the two. To begin with, desassossego is characterised by an existential 
rather than ontological concern. Pessoa’s desassossego is, as Tabucchi explains it,298 a 
privation, a lack of something that appears to exist despite being remote: the homely, the 
familiar dwelling within a meaningful world. Disquiet belongs to the phenomenological 
level, for it retains the belief in a possible homeliness. It designates solely an 
epistemological loss of meaning. On the contrary, anxiety, hence the feeling of the 
uncanny, radicalises 299  Pessoa’s disquiet to the point to which it evolves into an 
ontological300 condition: not solely ‘man does not belong in the world even if he may 
experience a familiarity with it’,301 but also this homelessness is the positive cause and 
mode in which the individual’s quest for meaning takes place. In this regard, it is 
interesting to observe, with Carotenuto, that ‘il sentimento dell’inquietudine scatena anche 
paura e angoscia, ma la sua cifra distintiva è un’altra, e ha a che fare con una forte 
ambiguità […] in cui la paura è unita alla fascinazione, la voluttà al terrore, la repulsione 
all’attrazione’.302 Uncanny anxiety is more of an after-effect of a certain ontological 
structure.  
                                                        
298 ‘Desassossego è un regressivo verbale che indica mancanza di sossego, cioè di quiete’ (Di tutto, p. 20). 
299 First, with anxiety, Tabucchi’s uncanny moves from a feeling of estranging detachment from the world to 
that of one’s impossible coincidence with oneself, hence from world- to self- withdrawal. In fact, if Pessoa’s 
disquiet entails ‘un disagio di vivere, un’estraneità nei confronti della realtà circostante’, with anxiety 
‘l’Inquietudine si è trasformata in tale disaccordo con il reale che ha intorno da farlo sentire straniero perfino 
a se stesso’ (ibid., pp. 21-23). Second, anxiety opens onto the essence of human beings as creators of sense 
insofar as it questions signification itself. For, feeling angst, men become ‘estranei persino al linguaggio’, 
that is, their proper mode of being. Significantly, as he affirms of Pessoa in Requiem, speaking to his 
‘Convitato’, ‘la sua inquietudine si aggiunge alla mia e produce angoscia’ (p. 119). 
300 ‘L’importante è proprio questo sentimento di estraneità che provoca l’ansia […]. Il poeta è straniero, la 
realtà che lo circonda, addirittura il suo volto riflesso nello specchio è unheimlich, non è familiare, possiede 
un’estraneità tale che provoca il turbamento, l’inquietudine, anzi qui l’ansia’ (‘Dal desassossego’, p. 71). 
301 Masschelein, p. 140. 
302 Aldo Carotenuto, Il fascino discreto dell’orrore. Psicologia dell’arte e della letteratura fantastica (Milan: 
Bompiani, 1997), p. 43, italics in the text. 
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Second, even when it attempts a metaphysical interrogation, Pessoa’s desassossego is 
entirely solipsistic and passive, for the subject meditates on being and the world in a 
condition of social isolation and retreat from any form of practical agency. Exemplarily, 
Pessoa’s Bernardo Soares lives his disquiet all alone, passively looking at the window. On 
the contrary Tabucchi’s uncanny, as chapter 5 will make clear, entails the recuperation of a 
social dimension wherein the subject actively relates to the others.  
This second dissimilarity between Pessoa’s desassossego and Tabucchi’s uncanny is best 
illustrated by the different ways in which they integrate the temporal category of saudade. 
Trying to define the latter, Tabucchi explains how: 
 
In italiano (come anche in altre lingue europee) la Saudade viene generalmente tradotta con 
‘nostalgia’. Parola inadeguata, ma soprattutto troppo giovane per un termine così antico come 
la Saudade. Semmai, se proprio volessimo andare in direzione nostalgica, meglio tornerebbe 
all’uopo il ‘desío’ dantesco, che nello strazio reca una tenera dolcezza, visto che quel desío (a cui 
l’ora volge) intenerisce il cuore a chi naviga in mari lontani. Ma della parola ‘desío’ si è perso l’uso. 
Oggi lo si chiamerebbe ‘struggimento’. Forse ‘magone’. Com’è noto la ‘nostalgia’ fu coniata nel 
Settecento da Johannes Hofer, che indicava con essa la ‘malattia del paese’ (Heim Weh) dei soldati 
mercenari svizzeri, che lontani a lungo da casa a un certo punto deperivano, cadevano in malinconia 
e si ammalavano […]. Ma per Eduardo Lourenço, il maggior filosofo portoghese vivente, che si è 
fatto etnologo dell'anima lusitana (O labirinto da Saudade) la Saudade è qualcosa di più di tutto 
questo: quasi una categoria dello spirito che non si trova altrove (la Saudade è una cosa che solo i 
portoghesi hanno perché hanno una parola per dire che ce l’hanno, ha scritto Pessoa), una 
Stimmung che costituisce anche un labirinto nel quale i portoghesi sono penetrati (o si sono rifugiati) 
senza riuscire a trovare più una via d’uscita.303 
 
Meaningfully, in an interview, Tabucchi clarifies the proximity he sees between saudade 
and disio, in that the latter ‘è una parola molto complessa che indica uno slancio, un 
rimorso, un’aspirazione. La saudade può essere nostalgia del futuro, un desiderio del 
futuro’. 304  From this it follows that: first, saudade defines a temporal category, a 
distinctive experience of time, which disrupts the chronological continuity of past-present-
future by inscribing over it the dichotomy between possibility and actuality. There are, in 
effect, four possible configurations of saudade: nostalgia of the past, i.e. of what took 
place and is now gone; nostalgia of the present, i.e of the moment one is actually living;305 
metaphysical nostalgia, that is a nostalgia of the possibile, of what could have been but did 
not actually take place, and which rejects historical facts in favour of their essence; and, 
                                                        
303 Di tutto, p. 58.  
304  Romana Petri, ‘Uno scrittore pieno di gente’, Leggere, n. 61 (June 1994), 68-75 (72). 
305 Viaggi e altri viaggi, p. 170. 
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finally, nostalgia of the future, namely of what could be different, in the present and in the 
future. 
Second, and this is decisive to understand the difference between desassossego and 
uncanny, saudade oscillates between the two poles of passive, nostalgic contemplation (the 
first three types of nostalgia) and active aspiration (nostalgia of the future). Nostalgia of 
the past and the present and metaphysical longing characterise the solipsistic retreat of the 
subject of desassossego, who sees himself living, or meditates upon and writes about his 
life without properly living it. On the contrary, the uncanny is driven by a nostalgia of the 
future, since the subject’s lack of synchronicity with collective, historical time, rather than 
blocking him in a condition of isolated passivity, positively becomes a space of difference 
from and resistance to a pre-given, dominant situation.306 As stated in the introduction, this 
is what allows Tabucchi and his characters to be ‘contemporanei’, i.e. to take a step outside 
the historical time thye inhabit, to be able to perceive the obscure kernel or the hidden 
potentialities of the latter. Thus Francese explains,  
 
Tabucchian saudade is a utopian nostalgia for the future that ‘coincides with the dream of a different 
history, with the hope for change.’ It is a retrieval and elaboration of the past that provides needed 
orientation within the electronic-paced intensity of the present. In this scheme of things, literature, 
by looking both to the past and to the future, can provide points of orientation capable of contrasting 
the eternal present of media culture; if and when it does, it can make individual and collective time 
coincide once again.307 
 
This is all the more important if one considers how, discussing the temporal dimension of 
the uncanny in relation to Auden’s The Age of Anxiety, Tabucchi’s focus on the term ‘age’ 
anchors the unheimliche to the historical dimension of modernity and postmodernity, for, 
to him, ‘un rapporto sfasato con il Tempo quale dimensione in cui non riusciamo più ad 
abitare, un rapporto guasto con la Storia […] pare appartenere in pieno al Novecento’.308  
 
An exemplum of this reciprocity between the traumatic view of historical time (the non-
coincidence of individual and collective time) and the temporal dimension of the literary 
unheimliche (nostalgia of the future) may be found in the short story ‘Notte, mare o 
                                                        
306 Exemplary, in this regard, is Pereira’s story, which I shall discuss in chapter 5. 
307 Joseph Francese, ‘Memory and Nostalgia in Antonio Tabucchi’s Last Two Books’, The European Legacy, 
17.7 (2012), 918-34 (930). 
308 Di tutto, p. 20. 
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distanza’, part of the 1991 collection L’angelo nero.309 The text narrates a night of violence 
that occurred in Salazar’s Portugal when, following an evening of wine and poetry spent at 
the home of Tadeus, a poet in his fifties, four young friends (Luisa, Tiago, Michel, Joana) 
on their way back home through the streets of Lisbon are stopped, searched and questioned 
by a member of the regime’s secret police, who intends to teach them some political 
lessons. The lesson dealt out by the political policeman reaches its climax in the arrogant 
recollection of the unspeakable atrocities he himself committed in the Portuguese colony 
of Angola.  
There are two narrative levels in the story: the one inhabited by a male character 
imagining/remembering that 1969 night of violence and where the heterodiegetic narration 
takes place; the lower one, where the imagined/remembered episode occurs. Through the 
central elements of time, the night and imagination, the text gives form to the protagonist’s 
repeated attempts at making sense of and giving expression to a traumatic episode of the 
past, which is both a semantic vacuum and a semiotic hole. By provoking disquietude, the 
text functions as a sort of message in a bottle, warning the reader about some similarities 
(s)he might find with the current historical situation. 
Time is an essential feature in and for the text. A certain temporal estrangement 
distinguishes not solely Tadeus, who ‘non aspettava di meglio che una complicità per fare 
le ore piccole e quando leggeva poesia perdeva la nozione del tempo’,310 but also the entire 
historical situation, where ‘il tempo fa fssssss, come un pallone che si affloscia’ and ‘si 
incomincia a vivere in un mondo senza atmosfera, sotto vuoto’.311 It is a story dominated 
by the night, a ‘notte anticipata’ that ‘occupava lo spazio con la sua presenza e aveva 
creato una pozza immobile, un maleficio nel quale […] si sentivano prigioniere le persone 
che occupavano quella stanza’.312 This is also a metaphorical night, the taking place of a 
temporal dislocation that is revealing of uncanny homelessness, for all the characters feel: 
 
[U]n disagio, come una tenue malattia; non paura; piuttosto un misto di sicurezza e struggimento, 
come sentirsi profughi in una città che era la loro e avere nostalgia della loro vera città, che era 
quella stessa, ma in un altro momento che non fosse quella sera ostile, quella notte, con le sue onde 
malefiche che vibravano pronte a scaricarsi.313 
                                                        
309 L’angelo nero (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991). Remorse, violence and death are the main themes of this 
collection, which, Tabucchi explains, originates from ‘quel luogo doloroso e privilegiato, per guardare il 
mondo, che è l'esperienza del malessere’ (The New Italian Novel, p. 217). 
310 L’angelo nero, pp. 33-34. 
311 Ibid., italics in the text. 
312 Ibid., p. 35. 
313 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Analogously, the peculiarity in the structure of this short story resides in the fact that the 
narration constantly blurs the line between memory and imagination, positing the 
imaginative element as the possibility of fulfilling signification of and coming to terms 
with the past: 
 
E tutto ricominciava, nell’immaginazione di chi immaginava quella notte, come una pantomima o 
una stregoneria: come povere creature condannate a una ripetizione insensata, forzate a mimare e a 
ripercorrere il preludio all’avventura atroce che le aspettava nella notte e che una immaginazione 
non aveva il coraggio di far loro vivere come dovevano viverla. […] E fu a quel punto che arrivò la 
cernia. […] Ma questo dipendeva dall’immaginazione di chi pensava a come avrebbero potuto 
essersi svolti i fatti quella notte. Così, a quel punto, la sua immaginazione produceva una cernia.314 
 
What characterises the text is, in effect, a pervasive sense of circularity, as it begins and 
concludes with the act of its own narration, unfolding a narrative based on the interaction 
between the proceeding of imagination and what is imagined. In a sense, blending plural 
temporal layers engenders imaginary memories. Significantly, the linguistic transposition 
of such a temporal oscillation is rendered through the intermingling of two grammatical 
moods (indicative and conditional) and three main tenses (imperfect, past historic and 
present). The present indicative, however, does not refer to the temporal positioning of the 
character imagining/recalling the scene, as the reader would expect. On the contrary, the 
present tense is used to signal the appearance of a grouper, hence characterising the instant 
of highest proximity to the uncanny and to trauma alike –‘[p]erò ormai c’è un pesce, 
insieme a loro […] in questa notte evocata è lì, presente’.315 Trying to signify a traumatic 
episode – ‘come se quella vicenda dovesse concludersi, sciogliersi, o trovare una piega 
nella quale nascondere se stessa’316 – Tabucchi creates a narrative that, as I will argue in 




2.3.2 Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ and Ontology: Being Uncanny 
 
Moving on to the second dimension of the uncanny, I previously indicated that one of the 
reasons for the irreducibility of the uncanny to a feeling is its being bound up with 
                                                        
314 Ibid., pp. 36-39. 
315 Ibid., p. 40. 
316 Ibid., p. 47. 
  93 
ontological questions. Already with Agamben, the uncanny, overcoming the metaphysical, 
nihilist fracture, configures itself as man’s only authentic dwelling place, as the possibility 
of finding familiarity, within and through defamiliarisation. Tabucchi identifies the 
constellation of the uncanny issuing from Pessoa’s desassossego with a ‘senso di 
estraneità’ that ‘funziona a doppio senso, cioè dalla realtà verso il poeta […] e dal poeta 
verso la realtà’,317 where the process of subjectification takes place within the tentative 
symbolisation of the real. However, with Tabucchi, this interplay also occurs on an 
ontological level that transcends the existential one. While the existential perspective 
questions one’s sense and identity, the ontological one speaks to (human) beings as such. 
For Tabucchi, this means asking and exploring man’s (interrogative) mode of being or not-
being-at-home within an unsaturated world. Or, more precisely, Tabucchi’s ontological 
concern moves him – and his characters – from the (still existential) questioning of the 
sense of their life to reflecting on the way in which the latter can be signified. For, it is 
only by trying to make sense of one’s life that one ‘properly’ is. 
 
This is evident, for instance, in the novel Il filo dell’orizzonte. Despite his natural 
indolence, Spino, who works in a morgue, abruptly becomes the protagonist of a detective 
story aiming to discover the identity of the victim of a shoot-out between the police and a 
group of alleged terrorists: a young man – symbolically called Carlo Nobodi – no one 
seems either to know or care about. This text elicits plural levels of reading. Firstly, there 
is the ethical and political dimension, linked to a specific contingency, which is the murder 
of a suspected terrorist, but that, at the same time, conveys the entire atmosphere of the 
Italian ‘70s; Tani comments, ‘il fatto che il doppio di Spino, Carlo Nobodi, fosse stato in 
vita, con tutta probabilità, un terrorista propone l'eversione come una strada che negli anni 
settanta poteva essere imboccata facilmente da chiunque’.318 This is all the more true if one 
considers the genesis of the novel which, Surdich explains, lies in a long story called 
Perdute salme, which was inspired, in turn, by some news about the killing of four 
terrorists in Genoa.319  However, the political facet is coupled with the ethical one, 
originating in Spino’s belief that ‘non si può lasciar morire la gente nel niente […] è come 
se uno morisse due volte’.320 Accordingly, the reader is required to move on to an 
existential level, which derives from the ethical imperative posited by the unidentified 
corpse and evolves into a search for the self (Spino’s) through the other: ‘colui che cerca e 
                                                        
317 ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 68. 
318 Stefano Tani, Il romanzo di ritorno (Milan: Mursia, 1990), p. 160. 
319 ‘The Constant Search for Oneself’, 169. 
320 Il filo dell’orizzonte (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1986), p. 51. 
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colui che è cercato scambiano i ruoli, e il giallo […] diventa una metafora della ricerca 
interiore in cui le persone cercano se stesse e la propria identità attraverso l'altro’.321 For, 
Surdich observes, ‘the goal […] is not cognition but re-cognition’.322 Still, Spino’s method 
of investigation is ‘diverso e apparentemente incongruo’ since it obeys ‘una logica 
implacabile come una geometria ignota: qualcosa di intuibile ma impossibile da formulare 
in un ordine razionale o in un perché’,323 as a consequence of reality itself. Finally, the 
novel demands a metaphysical interpretation. If it is true that detection and quest are 
structured around a ‘sforzo continuo, imposto dalla vita stessa, per ristabilire la relazione 
divenuta incerta tra individuo e società, nel senso di un ordo ontologico, di un accordo tra 
essere e essente’,324 in Tabucchi’s case this leads to no ‘integration in a higher order’.325 If 
one assumes that ‘il filo dell'orizzonte, un luogo geometrico che si sposta con il nostro 
sguardo […] è metafora dell'irraggiungibilità del senso e del fallimento del progetto 
conoscitivo inteso come progetto razionale’,326 this is due to the fact that, for Tabucchi, as 
already indicated, it is the real itself that is made up of blank spaces, and that, 
consequently, hollows out any definitive signification. The possibility of performing 
several readings and, in particular, the centrality of the metaphysical level are achieved by 
turning an epistemological genre into an ontological one, moving the story from detection 
to signification. Tabucchi defines Il filo as ‘modellato e modulato sulla struttura del 
romanzo poliziesco’, that, to him, represents a specific modality of ‘una letteratura 
interrogativa’.327 Yet Pinzuti indicates that with this novel ‘il giallo in quanto genere si 
spezza proprio nel mutamento dal classico who done it […] nel più perturbante who is he 
addirittura ipostatizzando la domanda principale dell’ontologia: is he?’.328  
Facing the trauma of the real, Tabucchi’s uncanny describes a process of semiosis that 
rather than answering questions constitutes a climatic redefinition of his own 
interrogations. This is why I share Scrivano’s view that ‘non si tratta tanto di scoprire 
qualcosa attinente ad un delitto, quanto mostrare che non si verrà a capo di nulla, ed anche 
                                                        
321 Schwarz Lausten, p. 80. 
322 ‘The Constant Search for Oneself’, 159. 
323 Il filo, p. 98. 
324 Erich Köhler, L’avventura cavalleresca. Ideale e realtà nei poemi della Tavola Rotonda (Bologna: Il 
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326 Schwarz Lausten, p. 132. 
327 Conversazione con Antonio Tabucchi, p. 19. 
328 Eleonora Pinzuti, ‘Sub specie Jankélévitch’, in I ‘notturni’, pp. 143-54 (p. 147). Similarly, Brizio-Skov 
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  95 
se questo accadesse, conta solo aver indagato […] il racconto non è di cose, ma è il 
racconto stesso’.329 For the gesture of deciphering the sense of reality that characterises the 
traditional detective novel and the metaphysical view it embodies, Tabucchi substitutes the 
urgency and potentiality to preserve and to create meaning. In this respect, Brizio-Skov 
speaks of ‘una specie di intossicazione semiotica’ where ‘invece di partire dai segni per 
ricostruire la realtà, passa da segno a segno in un processo arbitrario in cui i segni non 
additano, ma diventano la realtà’,330 in which signs become the discourse of the real. That 
Tabucchi’s text triggers multiple readings is consistent with his reformulation of the 
detective novel in ontological rather than epistemological terms, for it acquires a ‘valore 
metafisico e costringe il lettore a porsi quesiti ai quali è impossibile rispondere, ma che 
danno un senso profondo alla sua esistenza’331:  
 
The metaphysical detective story does not have the narcotizing effect of its progenitor; instead of 
familiarity, it gives strangeness, a strangeness which more often than not is the result of jumbling 
the well known patterns of classical detective stories. Instead of reassuring, they disturb. They are 
not an escape, but an attack.332  
 
Ultimately, Tabucchi’s reader is asked to integrate and mutually contaminate the reading 
with his own life, as ‘the solution cannot be had by breaking a seal in a book – the solution 






2.3.3 Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ and Language: Saying the Uncanny 
 
The analysis of the linguistic dimension of the uncanny represents the conclusive step in 
Tabucchi’s survey of the concept. In a sense, what the uncanny – and the uncanny in 
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49). 
330 Brizio-Skov, p. 95. 
331 Brizio-Skov, p. 97. 
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Tabucchi’s opus – proposes, is the possibility of exiting the grid of predetermined, 
nihilistic meanings by undertaking a specific experience through and within language:  
 
Il discorso conclusivo che volevo fare è che siamo arrivati al linguaggio che diventa estraneo […]. 
Insomma, le parole per dirlo sono le parole dello stesso linguaggio scoppiato, il linguaggio estraneo, 
l’Unheimliche arriva attraverso il linguaggio.334 
 
Since the ontological encounter with the real is disturbing and uncanny and takes place 
through linguistic symbolisation, it follows that the uncanny becomes the rationale that 
structures language itself, the being of language, a distinctive modality of linguistic 
experience. Tellingly, in his critical survey, Tabucchi provides two different examples of 
this linguistic unheimliche. Firstly, he observes how, in Auden, anxiety manifests itself 
through ‘un farfuglio […] discorso molto confuso, molto imbrogliato’ where ‘il linguaggio 
diventa incomprensibile […] siamo al balbettio’.335 Then, Tabucchi focuses on Samuel 
Beckett’s 1953 play En attendant Godot, as an archetype of a work to which,  
 
[N]on è più consentito neanche il linguaggio della logica comunicativa, solo un balbettio che […] fa 
la parodia alla gag […] che è priva di valore rivelatorio. Questo brogliaccio, questo linguaggio che 
Auden definisce in un certo modo, e che invece Beckett, andando al di là di Auden, fa agire. Questo 
linguaggio che Auden definisce incomprensibile o assolutamente illogico, Beckett lo prende e lo 
mette in scena e lo fa vivere, diventa proprio le parole che vengono dette.336  
 
The uncanny, therefore, turns language into a form of babbling337 and a gag. Linguistic 
estrangement also affects the functioning of the reversal game. As Tabucchi writes in ‘Il 
gioco del rovescio’, recounting the origin of the game:  
 
                                                        
334 ‘Dal desassossego’, p. 74. 
335 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
336 Ibid., pp. 73-74. In Beckett’s play, the two protagonists Vladimir and Estragon wait in vain to meet a man 
named Godot. 
337 Significantly, Agamben investigates these same linguistic experiences. Firstly, in Infanzia e storia, the 
philosopher defines precisely ‘l'ingresso nel balbettio dell'infanzia’ (p. 51) as that which signals man’s entry 
into history, but also as that which persists, in all speech, as its own transcendental condition of possibility. 
Babbling, in fact, is inherent to the semiotic, the taking-place of language regardless of actualised meaning. It 
is the experience of signification as potentiality and of potentiality as signification. Secondly, in Agamben, 
the gag also comes to be defined as ‘a kind of silent condition of possibility for speech’. Deborah Levitt, 
‘Gesture’, in The Agamben Dictionary, pp. 79-82 (p. 81). In this case, however, the term ‘gag’ is used with 
the English meaning (i.e. ‘something you put in someone’s mouth to prevent them from talking’), while 
Tabucchi uses it with the Italian meaning (i.e. ‘joke’). 
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Il gioco consisteva in questo, diceva Maria do Carmo, ci mettevamo in cerchio, quattro o cinque 
bambini, facevamo la conta, a chi toccava andava in mezzo, lui sceglieva uno a piacere e gli 
lanciava una parola, una qualsiasi, per esempio mariposa, e quello doveva pronunciarla subito a 
rovescio, ma senza pensarci sopra, perché l'altro contava uno due tre quattro cinque, e a cinque 
aveva vinto, ma se tu riuscivi a dire in tempo asopiram, allora eri tu il re del gioco […].338 
 
Interestingly Palmieri provides an accurate examination of the rationale implicated by the 
reversal game, noting that: 
 
La lettura retrograda di un lessema può produrre tre tipi linguistici differenti: 
a) una neoformazione priva di senso: es. ‘asopiram’; 
b) un palindromo: es. ‘ossesso’; 
c) un bifronte: es. ‘Roma’ – ‘amor’. 
 
Accettando l’idea che rovesciare le parole sia rovesciare anche le cose, o piuttosto, vederle da un 
altro punto di vista, in quale di queste categorie si colloca il gioco di Tabucchi? Probabilmente 
nell’ultima dove la sequenza rovesciata non produce una distruzione del senso, ma un nuovo senso 
per così dire inedito.339 
 
Palmieri correctly postulates an implicit nexus between the functioning of the reversal as a 
linguistic game experienced by the characters in Tabucchi’s works and as a modality of 
Tabucchi’s own literary discourse, what he calls the ‘gioco di Tabucchi’. Next, he 
identifies which processes of sense making are at stake in this practice of reversing the 
signifier, concluding that, in Tabucchi’s case, this leads neither to nonsense nor to 
tautology, but rather to a new semantic formation. I agree with Palmieri in that, in my 
view, the uncanny constitutes a semiotic process that investigates the limits of signification 
itself. However, there is a passage missing in the scholar’s reasoning. I believe that 
Palmieri is wrong in positing the couple signifier-signified at the centre of his reflection. 
What Tabucchi concentrates on is, on the contrary, a gesture, an experimentum linguae 
made possible by the uncanny within and of language, where ‘il legame tra il significante e 
il significato è interrotto […] e il significante ha raggiunto la sua autonomia dalle leggi di 
significazione’,340 and where what is produced is not meaning but what Bellavita calls ‘un 
vortice di senso’.341 Consequently, I think that all three of the linguistic categories 
identified by Palmieri embody and structure a potential process of sense making. 
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An example of the linguistic unheimliche can be found in the short story ‘I pomeriggi del 
sabato’, which is part of the collection Il gioco del rovescio. Here, the traumatic real 
materialises as the death of the father and where the young son tries to accommodate the 
vacuum of his loss, to make sense of and within it through a peculiar experimentum 
linguae, the study of Latin declinations. As Schwarz Lausten observes, this constitutes 
‘una sorta di silenzio o non detto o meglio indicibile in quanto […] linguaggio senza 
referente e senza significato logico che appartiene piuttosto a una dimensione pre-
linguistica dell'infanzia perduta’342: an assumption that echoes Agamben’s idea of infancy. 
It also marks a possibility of sense making through the uncanny. This is why I would 
counter Ammirati’s interpretation, wherein the young son ‘incarna la ragione e la 
razionalità  (razionale è la materia che studia tutto il giorno nella sua camera: il latino) e 
perciò non sa vedere i fantasmi’.343 Likewise, I do not share Schwarz Lausten’s opinion, 
according to which the child’s babbling as well as his ‘abitudine […] di cancellare le frasi 
con tante piccole crocette, come un filo spinato’344 represents a tentative process of 
repression. Quite the opposite: what is at stake here is a gesture of disavowal, the othering 
of language that allows for the encounter with the real and the dwelling within an 
unsaturated symbolic. The father is, in fact, neither a nostalgic absence nor a hallucinatory 
presence, but both things at the same time. Accordingly, the act of crossing out written 
words is best understood as a gesture through which the uncanny, by estranging language, 
tests both the conditions of possibility and the limits of literature to signify the real. This 
requires, in turn, a specific approach on the part of the reader: thus, in the protagonist, one 
should read a projection of both the author and the reader. On the one hand, this short story 
constitutes a miniature of Tabucchi’s overall poetics of the uncanny insofar it illustrates the 
interaction between the traumatic real, the uncanny and the latter’s ethical stance. In effect, 
for the writer, as already noted, the real is traumatic in a dual sense,345 in that it testifies to 
the potentiality of things to be otherwise, by revealing the presence of our inner world 
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within what we call reality or outer world – in the case of this text, the possibility for the 
father to be still alive – and because it represents a blank space within signification, which 
the uncanny performs through non-representational language, here exemplified by Latin 
language. And herein, precisely, lies the precondition for its ethical dimension, given that it 
is in the process of estrangement that the unheimliche makes room for the re-articulation of 
one’s being in the world – in this case, the son’s experience of dealing with his loss. On the 
other hand, if, for the son, ‘l’estraneità della lingua’346 carries within itself a sense of 
absurdity and fear, to the reader, stressing linguistic opacity, it signals the instauration of a 
specific fictional agreement founded upon the necessity to experience language and 
literature as an interrogative practice. Consequently, while the young kid’s use of Latin – 
as exemplified by his repetition of the formula ‘strix-strigis strix-strigis’,347 which ‘è un 
effetto fonosimbolico molto efficace […] inquietante […] nel senso del perturbante 
freudiano’348– belongs, like the enigma, ‘alla sfera dell’apotropaico […] che respinge 
l’inquietante attirandolo e assumendolo dentro di sé’, for it ‘conduce nel cuore di ciò da cui 
tiene a distanza, è il modello di questo rapporto con l’inquietante’349, it also gives shape to 
a potential itinerary that should be followed by the reader in approaching Tabucchi’s 
poetics of the uncanny. This requires, in fact, paying attention to blank spaces and 
omissions, in order to generate meaning. Tabucchi’s texts elicit an interpretative activity 
that is constantly aware of its potentialities and limits, which, as Perli suggests, follows an 






2.4 Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ and Poetics: the Quest(ion) of the Uncanny 
 
As stated in the introduction, Tabucchi’s poetics is inherently uncanny by virtue of the fact 
that the writer ascribes to literature a specific, disquieting function: that of making room 
for and trying to give answers ‘alle necessità religiose dell’uomo’. Likewise, and 
                                                        
346 Il gioco, p. 72.  
347 Ibid., p. 63. 
348 Piccole finzioni, p. 157. 
349 Stanze, p. 164. 
350 Antonello Perli, Auctor in fabula. Un essai sur la poétique de Tabucchi (Ravenna: Giorgio Pozzi Editore, 
2010), p. 76. 
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conversely, his conceptualisation of the uncanny as interrogative semiosis cannot be 
excluded from his own literary experience, where Tabucchi puts into practice his view of 
literature qua disturbing questioning of sense. 
In an attempt to scrutinise the way in which the uncanny gives form to Tabucchi’s literary 
discourse, I will read a passage from Requiem where meta-fictional theorisation and 
narrative actualisation of the unheimliche are blended. Accordingly, I will examine: how 
Tabucchi’s poetics proposes a non-representational process of sense making, and how it 
articulates a topological, rather than mimetic, realism. The presentational351 nature of 
Tabucchi’s writing derives from the fact that its focus and purpose is an experience of 
language’s signifying function regardless of content. Tabucchi’s presentational literature is 
the equivalent of Agamben’s experimentum linguae, or the taking place of language as 
such. Speaking of realism, though not one that is told and telling,352 owes instead to the 
fact that: 
 
La maestria di Tabucchi consiste proprio nel tenersi simultaneamente a distanza sia dalla letteratura 
come rifugio e fuga dalla realtà, sia dal realismo o verismo come pretesa di rispecchiamento 
impersonale. Egli ‘spiazza’ il lettore rispetto alla realtà del quotidiano, violandone i canoni più 
banali, ma solo al fine di darne indirettamente una visione più perspicua […] un depotenziamento di 
realtà che però la esalta.353 
 
‘Spiazzare’ the reader through ‘un depotenziamento di realtà che però la esalta’ suggests 
how Tabucchi’s realism consists precisely in his attempt to address that possibility of sense 
– the taking place of signification – that lies behind, beyond pre-given structures of 
meaning. It is therefore topological because it combines at once an estrangement of and 
engagement with language’s signifying function. 
 
In the second chapter of Requiem, waiting to meet his Convitato, the protagonist undergoes 
an uncanny experience of semiotisation: he suffers from ‘un attacco d’ansia’, feeling ‘un 
                                                        
351  I derive this notion from Bollas: ‘I shall distinguish between the “presentational” and the 
“representational”, between self-presentation and self-representation. Presentation (in any context) is the 
form of a being or a communication; representation refers to the content of a communication’. Christopher 
Bollas, China on the Mind (Hove and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 6. 
352 To be more precise, Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny cannot be considered in terms of a realism of 
telling if one merely continues to associate the latter with traditional mimetic strategies such as impersonal 
narration, detailed description or the use of straightforward chronology. On the contrary, it can be regarded as 
a realistic discourse when it is believed to adopt an estranging approach precisely because it reproduces those 
estranged elements constitutive of the real, thus opposing a realism of the real to the realism of reality.  
353 ‘Giochi proibiti’, pp. 122-34. 
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fiume dentro’ that ‘fa sudare’ and forces him to stop by the cemetery of Lisbon in order to 
buy some t-shirts from an Old Gipsy Woman.354 Angst, however, as previously observed, 
works both as an uncanny feeling and, in this case, as (literary) insight. The ‘Vecchia 
Zingara’, in fact, offers to read his palms: ‘figlio mio, te lo dico io cos’hai e perché stai 
sudando in questa maniera’.355 Her reading reveals the protagonist’s (and Tabucchi’s) 
uncanniness: 
 
La Vecchia Zingara si appropriò della mia mano sinistra e guardò con molta attenzione il palmo 
aperto. […] Figlio, disse la vecchia, ascolta, così non può andare, non puoi vivere da due parti, dalla 
parte della realtà e dalla parte del sogno, così ti vengono le allucinazioni, sei come un sonnambulo 
che attraversa un paesaggio a braccia tese e tutto quello che tocchi entra a far parte del tuo sogno, 
anch'io che sono vecchia e grassa e peso ottanta chili, mi sento dissolvere nell'aria a toccarti la 
mano, come se anch'io facessi parte del tuo sogno. […] Sarà un giorno di tribolazione ma anche di 
purificazione, forse poi sarai in pace con te stesso, figliolo, perlomeno è quello che ti auguro.356  
 
Hallucination357 is the term used to describe both the hiatus and the interplay occurring 
between reality and dream, between the net of accustomed meanings and what dissolves or 
suspends it. It compares to the experience of world- and self-withdrawal inherent in the 
taking place of the uncanny. It is a topological articulation or clearing: hallucination 
produces a fracture that is also a path, as the narrator ‘attraversa un paesaggio’ he himself 
created. And, like the uncanny, it designates the lacking or fading away of familiar 
structures of meaning, as well as the opening up of a different modality of sense making. 
The dichotomy between living ‘dalla parte della realtà’ and living ‘dalla parte del sogno’ 
could be read through the linguistic signified/signifier opposition. While the first terms in 
each pair entail a certain closure and saturation of meaning, the second ones involve a 
subtraction, a sliding away of sense. Tabucchi’s uncanny hallucination, however, lives 
‘dalla parte della realtà e dalla parte del sogno’, for it inhabits the bar that at once joins and 
divides the signifier/signified. Tabucchi affirms that an hallucination ‘è come un sogno che 
sai di sognare, e in questo consiste la sua verità: nell’essere reale al di fuori della realtà’.358 
The truth of hallucination lies in its producing a step backward beyond Saussurean 
semiosis, in relation to which it is both internal and external: it is external because the 
unheimliche negates or deactivates familiar structures and structuring modes of sense, and 
                                                        
354 Requiem, p. 22. 
355 Ibid., p. 29. 
356 Ibid., italicised. 
357 It should not be forgotten that the subtitle of the novel is Un’allucinazione. 
358 I volatili, p. 40. 
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internal since as uncanny signification brings up and can be located in its disturbance, 
modification, or othering of men’s linguistic experience. Tribulation is Tabucchi’s term for 
the uncanny estrangement of familiar networks of sense, for the disquieting moment of 
epistemological not-being-at-home; purification is how he calls that of ontological 
homelessness, the uncovering of the fact that what makes human beings is their being 
creators of signification. Still, in Requiem mourning generates purification. As stated in the 
introduction, this novel combines both mourning and melancholia; the ability to expose 
and sustain the fractures inside signification – the very essence of purification – 
corresponds exactly to Tabucchi’s capacity to deal with the loss of familiar significance, 
and to his discovery that being human is tantamount to being able to dwell within an 
unsaturated experience of sense making. In a sense, uncanny semiosis is a melancholic 
mourning for Saussurean signification, as it bears the semantic void it uncovers in the latter 
without attempting to fill it.359  
Focusing on literature, Tabucchi’s hallucination orchestrates an experience of the other in 
language, of the othering of language, of language as such in its unfolding, which 
dismantles and transcends any representational constraint. 360  Uncanny writing is an 
interrogative modality of sense making that resists consequentiality, saturation and closure. 
That of the character – as well as of the author –, therefore, is not incapacity to 
discriminate between reality and dream, but rather the desire and urgent need to bring them 
into dialogue. For, the task of uncanny literature is exactly ‘to maintain this passionate 
movement toward an intimate strangeness opened by language at the heart of the ordinary 
and familiar and to speak the language that would keep it open’.361 Uncanny is ‘il tentativo 
di dare forma ad un incontro con la realtà per cui […] l’elaborazione di adeguate strutture 
narrative non precede questo incontro ma è prodotta nel momento stesso in cui ha 
luogo’.362 This is why Tabucchi’s poetics belongs to and accentuates the presentational 
                                                        
359 As in the introduction, I follow Agamben’s reading of melancholia, which moves away from a 
pathological interpretation and explicitly relates to uncanny semiosis: melancholia is here defined as a 
positive possibility and ability to experience and encounter what would otherwise remain unattainable, that 
is, the taking place of signification itself. 
360 Moreover, Trentini suggests the importance of considering hallucination as Tabucchi’s indication of the 
necessity of a ‘reflection on literature’ and writing. Nives Trentini, ‘Towards a Study of Dream in Antonio 
Tabucchi’, in Spunti e Ricerche, 71-96 (87). 
361 Jeff Fort, ‘Introduction’, in Aminadab, by Maurice Blanchot (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2002), p. xvii. 
362 Luca Somigli, ‘Negli archivi e per le strade: considerazioni meta-critiche sul ritorno alla realtà nella 
narrativa contemporanea’, in Negli archivi e per le strade. Il ritorno alla realtà di inizio millennio, ed. by 
(Rome: Aracne, 2013), pp. I-xxii (p. xvii). 
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rather than the representational dimension of literary language, shifting towards what 
Benedetti calls ‘ideologia del performativo’, for which literature should ‘aprire nuovi punti 
di vista, […] far vedere ciò che non si vede’.363 
 
Moreover, the fact that hallucination lies in-between the symbolic and the real determines, 
as a consequence, the identification of the character’s – as well as of Tabucchi’s – posture 
with that of a sleepwalker. If hallucination etymologically defines a ‘wandering of the 
mind’,364 sleepwalking dramatises or choreographs the narrative rhythm of such drifting: 
this is a quest, which is also a questioning. This identification with a ‘sonnambulo’ 
introduces us to the second element that distinguishes Tabucchi’s poetics: the uncanny as a 
practice of topological realism.  
 
Tabucchi is a sleepwalker in that he cannot peacefully sleep the dream of reality nor can he 
escape from it, or get outside of it, for the ‘sonnambulo’ is the one in the process of 
awakening from sleep, but solely and to the extent to which he remains inside it, to disturb 
and resist it. The sleepwalker produces a vacuum inside the dream of reality, just as the 
uncanny investigates, creates and dwells within the ruptures of signification itself. 
Similarly, in the prologue to Donna di Porto Pim, Tabucchi adopts a geographical 
vocabulary to describe what he calls his ‘paradossale senso di realismo’365:  
 
Ho molto affetto per gli onesti libri di viaggio e ne sono sempre stato un assiduo lettore. Essi 
posseggono la virtù di offrire un altrove teorico e plausibile al nostro dove imprescindibile e 
massiccio. Ma una elementare lealtà mi impone di mettere in guardia chi si aspettasse da questo 
piccolo libro un diario di viaggio, genere che presuppone tempestività di scrittura o una memoria 
inattaccabile dall’immaginazione che la memoria produce – qualità che per un paradossale senso di 
realismo ho desistito dal perseguire […].366 
 
Tabucchi’s realism is paradoxical in the etymological sense of the term, because it goes 
against and disrupts accepted views, interrupting the conventional equation of realism with 
                                                        
363 Carla Benedetti, Pasolini contro Calvino. Per una letteratura impura (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1998), 
pp. 127-31. 
364 ‘From Latin alucinari to wander in the mind + -ation indicating a process or condition’. ‘Hallucination’, in 
A Dictionary of Psychology, ed. by Andrew M. Colman, third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 331. 
365 Donna di Porto Pim e altre storie (Palermo: Sellerio, 1983), p. 9. 
366 Ibid., pp. 9-10, italics in  the text. 
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familiarity.367 It is, however, topological in that, like the sleepwalker, it juxtaposes and 
aligns, in a critical constellation, familiar reality and estranging real. It is based upon a 
spatial articulation between what belongs to the actual realm of the symbolised ‘dove’ and 
what, instead, gestures towards ‘quello immaginifico dell’altrove’,368 that resides at its 
innermost core. As Dolfi comments,   
 
Ciò che cerca (e che invita a cercare) è un altrove che abbia radici nel reale e che ne sfugga, ma 
muovendo da quello. ‘Onesto’ è il libro che non si scatena nella fantasia, ma offre le alonature del 
possibile, i segni della deregulation, il punto […] che potrebbe non tenere. Quel mondo alternativo 
che mantiene le tangenze col nostro, seguendo le piste dei tracciati inattuati […].369 
 
To conclude, the narrator’s encounter with ‘la Vecchia Zingara’ in Requiem is a meta-
fictional reflection on the uncanny as an on-going interaction between two complementary 
tensions. The first moment or movement of the uncanny is that of disturbance and 
defamiliarisation of axiomatic interpretative grids and values (Tabucchi’s ‘dove’) and 
modes of sense making (Saussurean semiology). It is aware of the opacity of our 
interpretations and of how these create a paradigm of familiarity and stability. Stressing the 
artificiality of reality, the uncanny ‘enables critical reflection on how cultural narratives 
steer our self-understanding and regulate our being in the world with others’.370 The 
second moment or movement of the uncanny is that of decidability, of a commitment to 
and engagement with language’s signifying function (Tabucchi’s ‘altrove’). This builds on 
the view that the way in which individuals experience the world is through a constant 
negotiation of sense, the conditions of possibility and limits of which are explored and 
exposed by the unheimliche.  
In the end, Tabucchi’s ‘Inquietudine’ is the mode in which literature engages with the 
question of how it is possible to live authentically and meaningfully, that is, in accordance 
with man’s ontological condition as sense maker, by giving rise to a disquieting and 
disturbing linguistic experience. The next three chapters will examine the ways in which 
Tabucchi’s texts issue from and give form to this quest(ion) of sense, moving from a 




367 Nelson Goodman, ‘Realism, Relativism, and Reality’, New Literary History, 14.2 (Winter, 1983), 269-72. 
368 Tommaso Tarani, ‘L’inutile faro nella notte. I raggiri del fantastico in Donna di Porto Pim’, in I 
‘notturni’, pp. 159-87 (p. 162). 
369 Dolfi, Tabucchi, la specularità, il rimorso (Rome: Bulzoni, 2006), p. 15, italics in the text.  
370 Meretoja, 104. 
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To summarise, in his theoretical discussion of the uncanny Tabucchi suggests how: 
• Despite its proximity to the postmodern problematisation of ontology, the uncanny 
is not comparable to some postmodern ‘anything goes’.  
• On the contrary, it is a process of interrogation, interrupting reassuring readings 
and opening up to ambiguity, which calls for the reader’s participation. 
• Moreover (his) uncanny (‘Inquietudine’) is not equivalent to the literary nocturne 
or the absurd, or to Pessoa’s desassossego. 
• Likewise it is not reducible to the Freudian unheimliche, although Tabucchi’s 
reading of the latter is pivotal to his understanding and conceptualisation of the 
uncanny. 
• For, Tabucchi’s Inquietudine, similarly to Agamben’s uncanny, encompasses a 
fourfold dimension: temporal (the uncanny as temporal disorientation, which 
reaches its climax with modernity); ontological (the fact that men always engage 
with metaphysical questions and exist as creators of sense); linguistic (the uncanny 
as unfamiliar semiosis); and literary (the uncanny as poetics, i.e. as a disquieting, 





















3.1 Tabucchi Ludens, or: Games Characters Play 
 
Stating that Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny produces a quest(ion) of sense addresses the 
fact that the writer sees his literary experience as an example of ‘Inquietudine’, that is as a 
disquieting, interrogative modality of sense making. This philosophical enquiry underlying 
the writer’s works has been made evident in the previous chapters by using Agamben to 
read Tabucchi’s theoretical reflection on the uncanny. Accordingly, chapters 3 to 5 set to 
explore the narrative, rhetorical and discursive strategies, modes and motifs Tabucchi 
adopts in his texts to produce the uncanny.  
 
In particular, this chapter argues that play constitutes the first step in or the configuration 
of Tabucchi’s uncanny poetics. Play designates the ‘ludic economy’, a type of set of rules 
operating throughout his opus, on which the ‘language games’ produced by each text are 
grounded.371 These textual games tend to have diegetic equivalents, as Tabucchi inserts a 
wide range of games covering all four of the modalities theorised by Roger Caillois into 
his fictions: those of agon or competition, mimicry or make-believe, alea or chance and 
ilinx or vertigo.372 Examining the games in the texts is therefore essential in order to fully 
appreciate the games of his texts and comprehend the way in which Tabucchi’s play works 
at the level of both content and form. 
 
Agonistic games are those based on competence and competition, such as in sport or chess, 
where players actively try to direct the result of a match; mimicry is founded on the 
illusion of the games functioning as the reality they imitate and simulate, such as in role 
play or stage performances, thus involving a preliminary suspension of reality; the 
category of alea, the Latin word for ‘dice’, includes all those games mostly based on 
chance, as hazard games, where players are relatively passive; ilinx, the Greek term for 
‘whirlpool’, describes games incorporating a certain loss of perceptual stability, physical 
disorientation and euphoria, such as with children turning around to feel dizzy o jumping 
elastics. To begin with the first category, that of ludic competition, by narrating the dreams 
                                                        
371 This distinction between literary play and games is identified in Warren Motte’s Playtexts. Ludics in 
Contemporary Literature (Lincoln&London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
372 Roger Caillois, Man, Play, and Games, trans. by Meyer Barash (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1961).  
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dreamt by the Greek poet Pindar while attending the Olympic Games, the short story ‘Una 
giornata a Olimpia’, included in the second edition of Il gioco del rovescio, offers an 
archetypal illustration of the category of agon and of its link, in Tabucchi’s fictions, with 
the act of writing, as the Games provide the inspiration for Pindar’s Olympian Odes, which 
Tabucchi partly quote in his text. Indeed, in the story this nexus is explained by the fact 
that both play and poetry have a similar rhythm and pattern, by virtue of their being ruled 
by Time, defined as ‘l’armonia e il movimento, la battuta e il ritmo’, so that, Pindar 
observes, ‘la gara è come la musica, la danza e la poesia’.373 Like literature, play is 
(acknowledged as) a semiotic experience of sense creation. 
This understanding of the relationship between agon and literature is explored further with 
the description of the pool match between the narrator and the Maître of the Casa do 
Alentejo in Requiem. In this case the game, rather than being a source of poetic inspiration, 
works as a double and prefiguration of the unfolding of the story itself and of its tempo, 
that is of the protagonist’s unconscious quest for his Convitato and for the figures of his 
past – and, more specifically, of his later meeting with Isabel; this adds to the match an 
element of chance – meaningfully, the protagonist speaks of ‘una scommessa, piuttosto 
uno scongiuro, un esorcismo, una domanda al destino’ –:  
 
Mi andava solo di star lì, a fumare, a guardare il biliardo con quella strana combinazione geometrica 
che le biglie avevano formato sul piano e che dovevo superare. Lo strano percorso che la mia biglia 
avrebbe dovuto disegnare […] mi parve un avvertimento: era evidente, quella parabola impossibile 
che dovevo realizzare sul biliardo era la stessa parabola che stavo compiendo quella sera […] e così 
feci una scommessa con me stesso, ma non propriamente una scommessa, piuttosto uno scongiuro, 
un esorcismo, una domanda al destino, e pensai: se ci riesco Isabel appare, se non ci riesco non la 
vedrò mai più.374  
  
Playing cards (agon) is then endowed with a seemingly metaphysical significance in the 
detective novel Il filo:  
 
[I]l vecchio faceva un solitario al tavolo accanto al suo e ogni tanto lo guardava con gli occhietti 
mongoli, ammiccando sorridente alle carte che non tornavano. Lo ha invitato a giocare e hanno fatto 
una briscola, entrambi molto attenti al gioco, come se fosse la cosa più importante del mondo e da 
essa dipendessero le sorti di un avvenimento che non sapevano quale fosse ma che indovinavano 
superiore alla realtà delle loro presenze.375 
 
                                                        
373 Il gioco, p. 158. 
374 Requiem, p. 101. 
375 Il filo, p. 25.  
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Spino, the protagonist, also plays with a tarot book, seeking a potential sense (the game of 
alea) that may orient his search for the corpse’s identity:  
 
Sul tavolo […] c’era un libro che parla di destino e di tarocchi […] ‘Non so se le piacerà, padre’, ha 
aggiunto, ‘è un libro che parla delle strane combinazioni della vita’. Il prete ha sorriso 
e lo ha guardato con indulgenza. ‘Solo Dio conosce tutte le combinazioni dell'esistenza, ma 
solo a noi spetta di scegliere la nostra combinazione fra tutte quelle possibili’, ha detto, ‘solo a noi’. 
E così dicendo ha spinto il libro verso il suo interlocutore. Allora, per gioco, Spino l'ha preso e l'ha 
aperto a caso, senza guardare. Ha detto: ‘Pagina quarantasei’, e con voce grave, come se fingesse di 
essere un cartomante, ha letto il primo paragrafo. Hanno riso per educazione, come si conviene dopo 
una frase scherzosa, e quel loro ridere significava anche un commiato […].376 
 
Pretending to be a fortune-teller, Spino anticipates a truth he will realise only at the end of 
the story, ‘che c’è un ordine delle cose e niente succede per caso; e il caso è proprio 
questo: la nostra impossibilità di cogliere i veri nessi delle cose che sono’.377 Tarots typify 
a pattern of signification that illuminates, almost en abyme, the ludic ontology of the novel, 
the idea of life as a game of contingencies and possible combinations, ‘un gioco dell'oca 
fatto di caselle vuote e di trucchi nel quale lui continua a girare sperando che a un certo 
punto la ruota si fermi e la pallina cada su un numero che dia significato a tutto’.378 If 
Genoa seems ‘un giocattolo dal quale è un sollievo disabituarsi’,379 Spino’s quest is 
informed by the creed that ‘se uno non ha il coraggio di andare oltre non capirà mai, sarà 
solo costretto a giocare per tutta la vita senza sapere il perché’.380 His physical detection 
across the town – ‘vagare in cerca di niente’381 – acquires a sense of vertigo that 
culminates when he is taken up the hill aboard the funicular, and ‘all’improvviso i muri si 
aprono: è come se l’ascensore avesse sfondato i tetti e puntasse direttamente verso il cielo, 
per un attimo ci si sente sospesi nel vuoto’.382 Tabucchi’s writing produces a comparable 
game of ilinx in his ‘attempts to surprise, puzzle or confound’383 the reader, including 
several ellipses – such as the paragraph from the tarot book read by Spino – and loosely 
juxtaposing chapters; the vertiginous discourse disturbs the reader’s competition with the 
narrator to solve the case. As for the novel’s diegetic games, the ludic dimension of 
                                                        
376 Ibid., pp. 45-47. 
377 Ibid., p. 98. 
378 Ibid., p. 71. 
379 Ibid., p. 24. 
380 Ibid., p. 80. 
381 Ibid., p. 71. 
382 Ibid., p. 24. 
383 Peter Hutchinson, Games Authors Play (London and New York: Methuen, 1983), p. 6. 
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mimicry is further represented through Spino’s consistent references to films and literary 
works, which compose a familiar repertoire upon which he draws in his attempt to render 
intelligible the traumatic real he inhabits. The transgression of the boundaries between the 
commonsensical imaginary and the protagonist’s life reaches its climax in three distinct 
episodes of (mis)identification: first the attribution to the anonymous corpse of a nickname 
–‘il Kid’ – borrowed from a movie; second, Spino’s confusion between the cities of Luino, 
where his girlfriend Sara has gone on a school trip, and Duino, which is memorably linked 
to Rilke’s 1923 elegies; and, finally, partly adopting the principle of the play-within-the-
play to problematise the illusionary threshold between life and literature, the character’s 
identification of the corpse with Hecuba:  
 
Ha preso un foglio bianco e ha scritto, in caratteri grandi e anche lui in stampatello: ‘Piange? Chi era 
Ecuba per lui?’. Ha disposto il foglio accanto al biglietto e ha pensato al nesso che li univa. Ha avuto 
la tentazione di telefonare a Corrado e di dirgli: ‘Corrado, ti ricordi questo verso?, ho capito 
perfettamente cosa significa’. […] forse lo avrebbe scritto a Sara […] e anche lei avrebbe capito che 
il guitto che piangeva (ma chi era?), anche se in altra forma e in altro modo vedeva in Ecuba se 
stesso.384 
 
This tragic figure reappears in the short story ‘La maschera è stanca’, a letter an old actor 
writes to his beloved and former partner on stage, ‘dolce Ofelia’; the text constitutes a sort 
of meta-theatrical reflection revealing the identity of theatre and life:   
 
E come luccica, quella lacrima, falsa più di ogni altra cosa falsa, affinché il pubblico possa piangere 
lacrime vere, per l’illusione che al prezzo di un biglietto gli vendiamo ogni sera. Ma il principe di 
Danimarca non permette che il pubblico pianga per un attore che non sia lui: avvicina lo spadino al 
collo del compagno di quel simulatore che finge di piangere, e gli chiede: piange?, chi è Ecuba per 
lui.385  
 
It thus exposes the alienating and hypostatising rationale that underpins a deteriorated form 
of mimicry, for if life is a performance, it is one we are mostly unaware of: 
 
[L]a trovata più geniale fu adoperare quelle due grosse marionette settecentesche […] pupazzi 
meccanici costruiti da quegli antichi artigiani che pensarono in quell’epoca di produrre l’automa 
                                                        
384 II Filo, pp. 97-98. In Greek mythology, Hecuba is the wife of King Priam of Troy. In Shakespeare’s 
tragedy Hamlet, the player performing Hecuba grieving for her dead husband illuminates, by contrast, 
Gertrude’s lack of sorrow over the murder of Hamlet’s father. 
385 Si sta facendo, p. 156. 
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[…] e che […] producevano un effetto di straordinario turbamento. Guardate, cari spettatori, i veri 
attori sono questi, sono marionette meccaniche […].386  
 
The impossibility of eschewing the drama of life is witnessed by the protagonist who 
leaves the theatre only to find himself at the Theatre Museum, a place symbolising 
ontological fossilisation: ‘così passano gli anni, e si invecchia, attaccati alla maschera che 
ci è stata imposta, anche se la si è scelta noi stessi’.387 The mutuality between mimicry and 
alienation is further explored in the short story ‘Piccoli equivoci senza importanza’, where 
the first-person narrator, a journalist, observes a trial involving his long-time friends in the 
opposite roles of judge and suspect, opponents in a game of agon that eventually unfolds as 
‘una recitazione [… una] commedia che ci stavano giocando’.388 Here, play blurs the 
barrier between actors and spectators, since ‘anche il mio semplice guardare loro che 
recitavano la loro parte, anche questa era una parte, e in questo consisteva la mia colpa, 
nello stare al gioco’.389  
Other games of simulation and make-believe range from the theatrical playing of the 
Shakespearean actor Wilfred Cotton in ‘Teatro’, to Nena’s childish desire to ‘giocare alle 
visite, io faccio la signora e tu l’architetto che mi fa la corte’390 in ‘I pomeriggi del sabato’ 
and Piticche’s playing with Pinocchio in ‘Dolores Ibarurri versa lacrime amare’, from the 
circus in ‘Sogno di Lucio Apuleio, scrittore e mago’, to the hypothetical game the narrator 
describes in ‘Libri mai scritti, viaggi mai fatti’.  
 
Alea is represented through the trope of hypotyposis in ‘Sogno di Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, poeta e oppiomane’, which recounts the protagonist’s fatal dice game with 
death, as well as through the motif of the lottery in Requiem, while chance shapes the game 
invented by the young Antero de Quental, ‘Il Cielo e la Terra, dove le pedine erano ciottoli 
e conchiglie, e che giocavano su una scacchiera circolare tracciata nella polvere’, in Donna 
di Porto Pim.391  
If the essence of human beings, our uncanniness, is that of being creators of meaning, then, 
in Tabucchi, alea reveals the role of literature in making and dwelling within a meaningful 
                                                        
386 Ibid., pp. 154-55. 
387 Ibid., p. 156. 
388 Piccoli equivoci, p. 15. 
389 Ibid., p. 16. 
390 Il gioco, p. 63. 
391 Donna di Porto Pim, p. 42. 
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world.392 An example of this can be found when the retired soldier protagonist of the short 
story ‘Nuvole’393 practices ‘l’arte della nefelomanzia’: 
 
[È] una parola greca, nefele vuol dire nuvola, e manzìa indovinare, la nefelomanzia è l’ arte di 
indovinare il futuro osservando le nuvole, o meglio, la forma delle nuvole, perché in quest’arte la 
forma è la sostanza […] ci vuole un’intuizione rapida ma la riflessione è indispensabile.394 
 
Analogously, the narrator of ‘Piccoli equivoci senza importanza’, facing the absurdity of 
the trial that vertiginously swallows up his past friends, recovers a possibility of sense 
making, a pattern to create meaning in the gesture of walking 
 
[C]on passi pausati e lenti, cercando di non calpestare gli interstizi del lastricato, come quando ero 
bambino e con un ingenuo rituale provavo a regolare sulla simmetria delle pietre la mia infantile 
decifrazione del mondo ancora senza scansione e senza misura.395  
 
In Requiem the protagonist evokes a game he used to play with the lighthouse: 
 
Sa che ci facevo io con questo faro, una volta? […] facevo un gioco, di tanto in tanto, quando non 
riuscivo a dormire, venivo in questa stanza e mi mettevo alla finestra, il faro ha tre luci intermittenti, 
una bianca una verde e una rossa, io giocavo con le luci, avevo inventato un alfabeto luminoso e 
parlavo attraverso il faro […] parlavo con i fantasmi.396 
 
A similar game is played in the posthumous Per Isabel; in a castle on the Swiss Alps, the 
protagonist meets Lise, an astrophysicist who, like him, is conducting a personal quest 
informed by Buddhist principles: 
                                                        
392 Negotiating the encounter with the real also means articulating the encounter with the other, such as in the 
short story ‘Voci’, where the protagonist volunteers for a helpline: ‘non buttiamo via quest’incontro, 
qualcosa deve pur significare, mi ascolti, facciamo un gioco, io ho qui un bicchiere davanti a me, lo faccio 
suonare con una matita, tlin, mi sente?, se mi sente faccia altrettanto […]’ (Il gioco, p. 126). 
393 A game with clouds is also represented in the short story ‘Forbidden Games’. I believe Tabucchi derives 
the association between clouds and play from Pessoa’s Livro dos desassossego: ‘Nuvole […] ancora piccole, 
simili a giocattoli di forme poderose, palle irregolari di un gioco assurdo’. Fernando Pessoa, Il libro 
dell’inquietudine. Di Bernardo Soares, trans. by Antonio Tabucchi and Maria Josè de Lancastre, 8th edition 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 2004), pp. 56-57. 
394 Il tempo invecchia in fretta (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2009), pp. 72-73. 
395 Piccoli equivoci, p. 18. Similarly, in Si sta facendo: ‘I pavimenti erano a losanghe bianche e nere […] 
potevo persino stare ora su una losanga nera, ora su una losanga bianca e giocare a scacchi con me stesso, 
fino a darmi scacco matto’ (p. 82). 
396 Requiem, pp. 93-94. 
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Molti anni fa avevo un figlio […] e la vita me l’ha portato via. […] Lo avevo chiamato Pierre, 
continuò, e la natura era stata matrigna con lui, non lo aveva dotato di certe facoltà, ma lui aveva 
una sua forma di intelligenza, e io la capivo […] per esempio, avevamo trovato un codice […] per 
esempio, battere con un cucchiaio su un bicchiere, non so se mi spiego, battere con un cucchiaio su 
un bicchiere […] è necessario studiare la frequenza e l'intensità del messaggio, e io di frequenze e di 
intensità me ne intendevo, faceva parte del mio mestiere nello studiare le stelle all’Osservatorio 
Astronomico di Parigi, ma non fu tanto questo a guidarmi, fu perché ero sua madre e perché si ama 
un figlio più di noi stessi. […] Il nostro codice funzionava perfettamente […] una lingua che gli 
umani non conoscono […]. Stavo al radiotelescopio alla ricerca di emissioni radiogalattiche con 
segnali modulati provenienti da eventuali creature intelligenti, e a mia volta inviavo messaggi 
modulati […]. Era una notte di tempesta di neve […] e in quel momento arrivò il messaggio da 
Andromeda, era un messaggio modulato, lo passai al decifratore e lo riconobbi immediatamente, la 
stessa frequenza, la stessa intensità, in termini matematici era un messaggio che avevo sentito per 
quindici anni della mia vita.397 
  
These four examples share a vision of playing as a modality to structure ludic codes and 
negotiate the encounter with what seems to be exclusively aleatory, but which instead 
follows uncanny patterns of sense making. Playing is, for Tabucchi, a way to symbolise the 
real since, as Lise glosses, ‘l’uomo che si è smarrito necessita di simbolizzare l’universo 
con una forma d’arte integrativa, insomma ha bisogno dei suoi punti cardinali’.398 This 
perfectly captures the uncanny as a topological articulation of sense. 399 
 
Moving on to the fourth modality, ludic vertigo informs the several episodes of flights and 
falls that appear throughout Tabucchi’s works. 400  A telling example is the story of 
Leonida-Leonido – could the dual name hint at his being torn between a twofold impulse, 
                                                        
397 Per Isabel, pp. 103-05. 
398 Ibid., pp. 105-06.  
399 Similarly Tabucchi finds in Pessoa ‘[la] capacità di vivere l’essenza di un gioco […] il gioco di Pessoa è 
giocare il gioco […] la sua finzione vera’.399 Un baule pieno di gente: Scritti su Fernando Pessoa (Milan: 
Feltrinelli, 1990), pp. 8-9. 
400 That of the plongeur is a leitmotiv throughout Tabucchi’s entire opus. Dolfi, for instance, commenting on 
the cover image of L’oca al passo, Klein’s picture Le Saut dans le Vide, asks: ‘Che cosa indica (sulla 
copertina del libro) quel salto nel vuoto? La voce libera dell’artista che a dispetto di tutto si lancia, incurante 
del rischio, per guardare dall’alto le cose? […] Oppure che […] non ci resta ormai che lanciarci nel vuoto, 
visto che, come ebbe a scrivere Montale, « nessuno », anche il più innocente, « è incolpevole »?’. Anna 
Dolfi, ‘Lo Spleen di Parigi e il senso di colpa’, in Echi di Tabucchi/ Échos de Tabucchi. Actes du Colloque 
international d’Aix-en-Provence, 12-13 gennaio 2007, in Italies (2007), 29-45 (29). 
  113 
between walking and flying – in Il piccolo naviglio,401 which narrates how the character’s 
encounter with a wounded bird prompts his game of ilinx, in the form of a derealising 
compulsion to fly, that Tabucchi calls ‘una molla segreta’: 
 
Ma esistono le gru. E le gru sono uccelli migratori che svernano nei paesi mediterranei e nell’Africa 
settentrionale […] Finché un giorno ne arrivò una. […] Leonido la portò a casa sottobraccio […]. 
Forse cominciò a volare proprio quella sera d’autunno, sul viale di casa, con una gru fra le braccia: 
lo spingeva una leggiadria uccellesca, una molla segreta, una natura fino allora taciuta o nascosta 
[…].402 
  
Tellingly, Leonido establishes a pragmatics of meaning production with the animal that 
goes beyond an instrumental, communicative use of language in the direction of a pre-
symbolic production of sense:  
 
Qualcosa successe in quel lontano inverno […] quando un uomo che risponde al doppio nome di 
Leonida-Leonido cominciò a ritirarsi privatamente con l’uccello, a seguirne con l’occhio i passi e i 
brevi voli, a fissare su dei fogli, con schizzi improvvisi, un’apertura alare, una piuma, una vescica 
natatoria, uno scheletro. I due amici trovarono il linguaggio comune che non è né la favella umana 
né la lingua ornitologica, ma un sistema di segni di comunicazione, al di là del raziocinio umano, 
che per comodità e convenzione gli uomini comuni definiscono follia. [….] E si capirono. Risero 
insieme […] e insieme spiccarono lo stesso volo.403 
 
Leonida’s desire to fly is best understood as a path to meaning, as a gesture of world- and 
self-intelligibility; contextually, it retains an ontological value, given that ‘Leonido 
pensava degli uccelli: che fossero nati per pertinacia e per sfida alla natura, per rivincita 
sulle leggi della fisica che li avrebbero voluti goffi e saltellanti sulla terra; insomma che si 
erano ribellati e avevano vinto’.404 Leonido’s uncanny drive diegetically develops as a 
game of vertigo:  
 
Accoccolato davanti alla finestrella […] era intento a dare affettuosi colpetti alle perline del 
lampadario nuziale, allineate come nel gioco delle biglie, sporgendosi a ogni colpo a vederle cadere. 
[…] Argia pianse in segreto […] sulla certezza che la malattia della gravità galoppava nelle vene del 
suo disgraziato consorte.405  
                                                        
401 Leonida is the progenitor of Capitan Sesto, the protagonist of the novel, who remembers his figure in an 
attempt to recollect and narrate the story of his family. 
402 Il piccolo naviglio (1978), 2nd edition (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2011), p. 30. 
403 Ibid., p. 32. 
404 Ibid., p. 33. 
405 Ibid., p. 40. 
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And resembling ‘un fantoccio […] involontario imitatore di fantocci’ is how Leonido is 
described in his attempt to actualise his ascendant impulse, ‘un tuffo: un volo ad angelo di 
dieci metri, dal cornicione che correva sulla parete superiore della montagna, fino alle 
creste inferiori […]’.406  
The hypothetical narration of Leonido’s death is also dual: a realistic chronicle might 
imagine that ‘minato da una paralisi progressiva conseguente alla sua caduta (quella vera), 
si spense seduto su di una sedia sotto un orribile lampadario di vetro’,407 thus adumbrating 
a kind of equivalence between the gravitational force he tried to disobey and the law of 
retaliation. A more absurd version, on the contrary, could recount ‘la scena di una tragedia 
ilare, lieve e velata come le cose del sogno’ in which ‘l’uomo-uccello […] precipita 
dolcemente, trasportato dal vento, come un aquilone dal filo spezzato’: ‘GRAVITAS ME 
RAPUIT’ would be engraved on his tombstone.408  
Furthermore, Leonido’s vertiginous flight anticipates and prefigures another fatal fall; in 
the chapter ‘Aeroplani di carta’, a title that confers a sense of playful lightness upon the 
episode, the protagonist Capitan Sesto hears the story of his girlfriend Ivana’s death:  
 
Ma l’Ivana detta Rosa non stette ad aspettare i poliziotti: fece dietro-front e cominciò a correre con i 
suoi volantini o ‘l’Unità’ che fosse. Forse non si era accorta che dall’altra parte del ponte c’era un 
nugolo di poliziotti che sbarrava l’uscita. […] È impossibile sapere come fece l’Ivana detta Rosa a 
emergere dal nugolo di poliziotti come una catapulta […] Quelli che potevano guardare dalle 
spallette dei Lungarni la videro volare di sotto. La gonna le si gonfiò a palloncino e i volantini, o i 
giornali che fossero, le sfuggirono di mano e disegnarono uno stormo di aeroplani di carta che 
continuarono a svolazzare a lungo in aria […] e poi, volteggiando, alcuni di quei fogli le si posarono 
intorno, altri, invece planarono sull’acqua come tante barchette e partirono dondolando.409 
 
However, Leonida experiences ‘self-withdrawal […] depersonalization’ characterised by a 
feeling of ‘automation and self-spectatorship’ 410  and that is reciprocated by ‘self-
revelation’, one’s understanding of being ‘the kind of entity that has possibilities at all’ and 
that ‘sense-making is a telos to which I’m bound and so to which I am committed’.411 
Ivana’s fall, on the other hand, could be grasped as a dialectics between world-withdrawal 
                                                        
406 Ibid., p. 35. 
407 Ibid., p. 42. 
408 Ibid., pp. 41- 42. 
409 Ibid., pp. 187-88, italicised.  
410 I derive the four-part schema of the uncanny mood from Withy (pp. 64-65).  
411 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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and world-revelation: the former defines the moment when ‘the world loses its articulation 
and everything slips into an undifferentiated mass’412  – expressed here through the 
metaphor of the floating leaflets –, while in the latter ‘the world shows up with its logic or 
structure on display […] as a unified whole – as it hangs together’.413 The latter is 
suggested by the fact that Ivana’s flyers seem to pattern new semiotic configurations and 
intelligible shapes, such as those of a bevy or of some little boats. This last image is all the 
more important since ‘il piccolo naviglio’ from the novel’s title alludes to Sesto’s attempt 
to symbolise, to make sense of his forgotten childhood and to find his real identity and 
sense, thus suggesting a parallelism between the boat motif and (Tabucchi’s) writing.414  
 
Also the short story ‘Gli incanti’ is entirely developed around the gaming model of ilinx, at 
the level of both content and form. First, the narrating child describes the attempt of his 
cousin, a young girl named Clelia, to kill her stepfather, whom she deems responsible for 
her father’s death. She does so by playing voodoo games: ‘le sue mani magre con le unghie 
rosicchiate che sistemavano il vestito bianco di quel bambolotto così curioso, col papillon, 
un risolino: ti piace?, ti piace?, non ti ricorda nessuno? […] tu ripeti con me questa parola 
[…] con convinzione, altrimenti non funziona nulla. E infine quello spillone brandito come 
un pugnale’.415 Immediately, though stupefied by aunt Ester’s words – ‘gioca tanto, tanto, 
ti scongiuro, ragazzino mio. Come preghiera era abbastanza buffa’416 – the child realises 
that ‘ormai non era più un gioco come quelli degli anni precedenti, un gioco così, per 
passare l’estate’,417 and even the girl’s usual toys are endowed with a sense of the uncanny: 
‘guardavo tutte le bambole di Clelia allineate nello scaffale, non mi piacevano quelle 
bambole, avevano qualcosa di cattivo, di minaccioso’.418 Second, the story tracks a 
correspondence between Clelia’s walleye419 and the vertiginously precipitating events. At 
the beginning, ‘l’occhio di Clelia roteava come impazzito […] vorticosamente’ while she 
explains to the narrator that she believes her mother to be ‘stregata […] diciamo meglio, 
                                                        
412 Ibid., p. 56. 
413 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
414 Thus, at the end of the novel, Sesto ‘comprò una penna e un quaderno, perché, per sciogliere finalmente i 
nodi della sua vela, aveva fretta di cominciare a scrivere questa storia’ (Il piccolo naviglio, p. 202). 
415 Piccoli equivoci, p. 59. 
416 Ibid., p. 50. 
417 Ibid., p. 59. 
418 Ibid., p. 54. 
419 Analysing Hoffman’s The Sandman, Freud significantly attaches an uncanny value to the motif of the eye, 
as a symbol of the fear of castration, that is the feeling of being controlled by and at the mercy of an external 
agent. 
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possessa, dato che la fattura era opera di un essere diabolico […] lo zio Tullio come 
Satana’.420 Then, the fact that Clelia ‘si tolse gli occhiali […] e il suo occhio sinistro 
cominciò a girare all’impazzata, non l’avevo mai visto vorticare così’421 signals the success 
of her first voodoo trial on the servant Flora. And finally, ‘si era tolta gli occhiali e il suo 
occhio aveva preso a vorticare, mi guardò in modo terribile, sul suo volto c’era 
un’espressione di terrore e di nausea, e insieme di smarrimento’,422 when her game seems 
to cause her mother’s – and not her stepfather’s – death. The story also comprises several 
games of make-believe that emphasise the protagonists’ naiveté, in contrast to their playing 
with life and death, which function as porous thresholds between inner and outer worlds, 
those same boundaries transgressed by the young girl’s voodoo practices.  
 
Finally, the wordplay Tabucchi orchestrates in the fictional letter ‘La circolazione del 
sangue’ belongs to the category of vertigo: ‘Ebbene sì, a me piacciono i giochi di parole, 
detti anche calembour. Cala cala, caro mio, cala cala che qui tutto cola, ogni parola cola sul 
pavimento e si frange, spillacchera […] sembra un frattale, perché è fratta, poverina, è una 
frazione di noi […]’,423 while ‘Strana forma di vita’ juxtaposes the childish game of ilinx 
to adults’ agon:  
 
[M]agari i nostri papà giocheranno anche a biliardo, che è un gioco che imita la vita perché è pieno 
di angoli retti, ottusi e acuti, che è il percorso che devono fare le biglie, ma noi invece gireremo in 
circolo, il girotondo si fa beffa degli spigoli.424 
 
 
In conclusion, although this is just a sample of the most significant and recurrent games 
Tabucchi’s characters play, it is nonetheless revealing of some trends in his ludic strategy. 
First, central to his texts is the ludic mechanism of mimicry; arguably, this uncovers an 
ongoing identification of reality with (mostly theatrical) play, by virtue of which mimicry 
can be compared to the uncanny experience of sense-withdrawal. Games of make-believe 
in fact expose the discursive construction of reality, and serve to estrange this alienating 
network of pre-given narratives and meanings. However, as Foust observes, synecdochical 
games – those played by characters – have a dual purpose: they ‘reflect the writer’s 
                                                        
420 Piccoli equivoci, p. 51, italics in the text. 
421 Ibid., p. 53. 
422 Ibid., p. 62. 
423 Si sta facendo, p. 57. 
424 Ibid., p. 166. 
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intuitive understanding of play in social experience while acting as metaphors (parts) that 
cue the reader to the narrative’s (whole) thematic purpose’.425 Tabucchi, therefore, and this 
is the second point, also uses play to uncover and represent humanity’s uncanniness. 
Characters play uncanny games of signification in an attempt to produce and negotiate the 
sense of their own lives. While mimicry negates familiar meaning, agon, chance and 
vertigo are the ludic generators of significance. However it seems that, unlike the games of 
alea, those of competition and ilinx aim more at creating a safe place and protecting the 
subject from the traumatic real, and solely to a lesser degree, at really producing new 
patterns of sense – for which the presence of an element of chance appears necessary.   
 
 
3.2 Defining Play: Between Postmodern Irony and Agamben’s Profanation  
 
The section examines Tabucchi’s ludism alongside postmodern irony426 and Agamben’s 
idea of (post-metaphysical) profanation.427 In doing this, it fundamentally addresses two 
questions. Firstly, what is Tabucchi’s play? And secondly, how does the author play? 
Among the many definitions of the term play,428 following Ehrmann’s pivotal ‘Homo 
Ludens revisited’,429 I will first consider (Tabucchi’s) play as an ‘articulation, opening and 
                                                        
425 Ronald E. Foust, ‘The Rules of the Game: A Para-Theory of Literary Theories’, South Central Review, 
3.4 (Winter, 1986), 5-14 (8).  
426 Postmodern irony constitutes ‘the central mode of consciousness of postmodernism and […] marks the 
postmodern attitude of disenchantment towards the totalizing narratives […] and is also one of the main 
strategies used by postmodernist fiction to retain the ability to represent the world while raising awareness of 
art’s own status as cultural artifice and potential instrument of power’. Encyclopedia of Humor Studies, ed. 
by Salvatore Attardo (London: Sage, 2014), p. 589.  
427 Tabucchi explicitly suggests a parallelism between metaphysical nihilism and the literary forms of ludism 
as ‘anything goes’, on the one hand, and between post-metaphysical sense making and a serious 
understanding of the ludic, on the other. For the writer, since antiquity men have lived in the ‘illusione che le 
geometrie, grazie ai loro perimetri e gradi di angoli, riuscissero a circoscrivere i sogni e il desiderio. E qui mi 
infilerei in un labirinto pericoloso se mi mettessi a parlare del labirinto […] per arrivare magari fino alle 
parole incrociate o a certi rompicapi con cui si è misurata persino la letteratura più recente, vedi il compianto 
Georges Perec e i suoi compagni di Oulipo’. Racconti con figure (Palermo: Sellerio, 2011), pp. 237-38.  
428 Broadly speaking, there are two main theoretical threads concerning play and its interaction with 
literature: the mathematical theory of social games based on strategic calculation, and the philosophical-
anthropological approach which includes contributions spanning from Plato to Schiller, and which reaches its 
climax in the systematisation operated by Huizinga’s Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture 
(1938), Caillois’ Man, Play and Games (1958) and Winnicott’s Playing and Reality (1971). 
  118 
closing of and through language’,430 which makes possible and gives shape to the subject’s 
experience of the real. Play is a playing of, over and with the real, a specific modality 
through which to make sense of the world and of one’s dwelling in it: since reality has a 
game-like function,431 play turns out to be a modality of being. This is strictly related to 
postmodern irony, for postmodernism is traditionally equated with the idea of inhabiting a 
world ruled by randomness and chaos: its playful attitude is thus regarded as a reaction to 
this historical condition. While some scholars read postmodern irony as a modality of 
solipsistic retreat and disengagement, to others it signals a specific approach towards a 
potential process of sense making and a form of ethical attentiveness to the present. For 
instance, Erbert opposes postmodern playfulness to a ‘postmodernism of resistance’,432 
where the former is characterised by socio-political passivity and complicity with the 
status quo, while the latter is said to open up a niche of criticism. On the contrary, Wilde 
theorises postmodern ludic strategy in terms of a ‘suspensive irony’ that defines ‘the 
tolerance of a fundamental uncertainty about the meanings and relations of things in the 
world’433 and that is balanced by the so-called ‘generative irony’, which constitutes ‘an 
attempt […] to create, tentatively and provisionally, anironic enclaves of values in the face 
of – but not in the place of – a meaningless universe’.434 These are, indeed, the two 
moments and movements that also punctuate Tabucchi’s ludic discourse – and, more 
broadly, the uncanny: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
429 Jacques Ehrmann, ‘Homo Ludens revisited’, Yale French Studies, No. 41, Game, Play, Literature (1968), 
31-57. Interestingly, Ehrmann reprimands both Huizinga and Caillois for their dichotomisation between play 
and reality, maintaining that ‘play cannot be defined by isolating it on the basis of its relationship to an a 
priori reality and culture. To define play is at the same time and in the same movement to define reality and 
to define culture [… since] the distinguishing characteristic of reality is that it is played’ (55). 
430 Ibid., 56. 
431 Significantly, for Tabucchi the place of happiness is similar to a game: ‘esso consiste di una città tutta 
virtuale […] ha la forma di una scacchiera circolare e si estende per miglia e miglia: e ogni giorno i pellegrini 
con un semplice gesso muovono gli edifici a loro piacimento come se fossero scacchi […]. Al centro della 
scacchiera sorge una torre in cima alla quale posa un’enorme sfera dorata […] questa sfera è il dio. […] 
Arguisco che esso abbia relazione con l’idea della completezza, della pienitudine e della perfezione: un’idea 
altamente astratta e poco comprensibile dall’intelletto umano. Ed è per questo che io ho pensato trattarsi del 
dio della Felicità’ (Donna, pp. 16-17).  
432 Teresa L. Erbert, Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 
433 Alan Wilde, Horizons of Assent. Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic Imagination (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 132. 
434 Ibid., p. 148. 
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O non si scriverà piuttosto per gioco? Ma non il puro gioco, come pretendeva l’avanguardia 
dell’avantieri in Italia e anche altrove, cioè la letteratura intesa come parole crociate che è tanto utile 
per ammazzare il tempo. Il gioco naturalmente c’entra, ma è un gioco che non ha niente a che 
vedere con gli scherzi in cui eccellono certi giocolieri, i prestidigitatori della domenica che sanno 
come dilettare lo spettabile pubblico. È semmai un gioco che somiglia a quello dei bambini. Di una 
terribile serietà. Perché quando un bambino gioca mette tutto in gioco. Prende un sassolino e, seduto 
sul gradino di casa, mentre scende la sera, reggendo il sassolino sul palmo della mano dice che quel 
sassolino è il mondo. Sottolineo: non lo pensa soltanto, ma lo dice, perché è solo quando lo dice che 
il sortilegio si avvera e il sassolino diventa il mondo: è il patto assoluto. Il bambino sa che se quel 
sassolino cadesse il mondo precipiterebbe, l’universo in cui il mondo gira sarebbe perturbato, gli 
astri impazzirebbero e avanzerebbe il caos. Sa che finché durerà il gioco avrà nelle mani le sorti del 
mondo.435 
 
If Tabucchi’s gesture as a writer can be compared to a child toying with the world, in what 
ways and to what extent does the ludic signify the real? Answering this question introduces 
us to the second aspect of play, for ludism entails an idea of looseness, of making room for 
potential movement, though a limited space within a bound system. This is a crucial point, 
since postulating limits or a system in relation to and inside which play operates 
distinguishes Tabucchi’s textual ludism from Derrida’s play of différance,436 or the endless 
deferral of meaning, and brings it closer, for instance, to Iser’s recognition of the ludic as 
the interaction between instrumental and free play.437  
As with the uncanny in general, Tabucchi’s play does not trigger a ceaseless 
supplementation and dissemination of sense. It opens, instead, a locus and modus 
significandi, a negotiation of sense. It works similarly to Agamben’s idea of profanation.  
                                                        
435 Di tutto, pp. 17-18, italicised. This is an interpretation that he substantiates by making reference to 
Caillois and Huizinga: ‘Giocare non significa scherzare, in questo caso. È un gioco che appartiene ai Giochi 
degli uomini, per dirla con il Caillois antropologo; e Huizinga, da parte sua, lo ha spiegato molto bene 
nell’Homo ludens ’. Marco Alloni, Una realtà parallela: dialogo con Antonio Tabucchi (Lugano: ADV, 
2008), p. 41. It is at this level of the ludic as poetics that, I shall argue, the literary discourse questions itself 
as a mode of signification, thus orchestrating textual games in order to explore the possibility of oblique, 
plural, absent, redundant meaning. And, in a way, the ‘patto assoluto’ mentioned by Tabucchi corresponds 
precisely to the fictional agreement he posits to the reader. 
436 ‘One could call play the absence of the transcendental signified as the limitlessness of play, that is to say 
the destruction of ontotheology and the metaphysics of presence’ (Of Grammatology, p. 50).  
437 Wolfgang Iser, Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989). Iser interestingly observes that in literary play ‘we open ourselves up to the 
unfamiliar [….] and become present to ourselves’ (p. 259). 
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First, play has a ‘vocazione puramente profana’ that is ‘[l]a creazione di un nuovo uso […] 
disattivando un vecchio uso’438: like the uncanny, it negates a negative familiarity that has 
in turn repressed the possibility of a non-instrumental experience of and relationship with 
things.439 As Agamben explains in ‘Il paese dei balocchi. Riflessioni sulla storia e sul 
gioco’, reversing the functioning of rituals and of the sacred, play displaces and explodes a 
self-iterating, conservative experience of time: the economy of play is that of a 
disconnection from the time one inhabits and a suspension of the means-ends logic. While 
profanation is radically ludic and affirmative, play turns out to be a major act of 
undoing,440 as it discloses the contingency of and therefore the possibility for things to be 
otherwise.441  
Second, as practice of profanation, play is a sort of counter-apparat, since it aims at 
deactivating ‘anything that has the capacity to capture, order and model the gestures, the 
behaviours, the discourses or the opinions of living beings’.442 Apparatuses admninister 
processes of subjectification or, rather, de-subjectification, since they reduce human 
agency to passive acceptance of pre-established roles. Thus, for instance, a cell phone is an 
apparatus that reduces humans to easily governable numbers. Language, too, is an 
apparatus. It is the most ancient and most important one, given the fact that, as seen in 
chapter 1, for Agamben living beings become proper subjects only by acquiring and 
entering language. In this regard, play neutralises the linguistic apparatus – and its 
appropriation by, among others, law, politics and the mass media – just as the unheimliche 
deactivates Saussurean semiosis. This vision is at the basis of Tabucchi’s ludism, which 
                                                        
438 Profanazioni, p. 99.  
439 Exemplarily, ‘[i]l gatto che gioca col gomitolo come se fosse un topo – esattamente come il bambino con 
antichi simboli religiosi o con oggetti che appartenevano alla sfera economica – usa consapevolmente a vuoto 
i comportamenti propri dell’attività predatoria (o, nel caso del bambino, del culto religioso o del mondo del 
lavoro)’ (ibid.). 
440 In a similar manner, Iser concludes that textual play, though apparently negative, is to be understood in 
the productive terms of negativity ‘which is basically an enabling structure […] far from negative in its 
effects’ (p. 259). 
441 Even Pereira’s progressive becoming aware of his role and of his ethical responsibility – and hence of the 
contingent nature of the (fascistic) reality he inhabits – originates when he ‘capì che era in gioco e che 
doveva giocare. E stranamente capì che era in grado di farlo’ (Sostiene Pereira, p. 22). However, Tabucchi 
explicitly admits and acknowledges the limitedness of his ludus, the existence of forbidden games, which, as 
in the homonymous short story, correspond to the impossibility of undoing what has actually taken place: 
‘perché i giochi dell’essere […] sono proibiti da ciò che dovendo essere è già stato. È il minuscolo eppure 
invalicabile Forbidden Game che ci impone il nostro Attuale’ (Si sta facendo, p. 50). 
442 ‘Introduction’, The Agamben Dictionary, p. 10. 
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defines the uncanny attempt to signify otherwise, to estrange language from its familiar 
uses, to keep it open as a potentiality for sense making. 
 
 
3.2.1 Signifying Otherwise: Playing By/With the Rules 
 
With Tabucchi, ludic profanation occurs in the guise of playing with rather than by the 
rules. Play is the way the uncanny tries to estrange the discursive practices and processes 
of signification inherent in the apparatuses. Playing with rather than by their rules is the 
mode in which his texts and his characters explore and negotiate the possibilities and limits 
of sense making, both of which aim at reappriopriating the signifying function of language.  
The short story ‘Il battito d’ali di una farfalla a New York può provocare un tifone a 
Pechino?’, which is structured around a deposition made by the informer ‘Signor Farfalla’, 
driven and imposed by the fascistic ‘Dottor Coscienza’, plays with the rules of law.443 The 
text might be considered as a metafictional reflection on the genesis and the telling of a 
story, for, as Palmieri observes, ‘è addirittura una metastoria in quanto narra come si 
dovrebbe (e non si dovrebbe) raccontare la storia stessa del racconto […] è un 
microtrattato di retorica narrativa di tipo prescrittivo’.444  Equally, in this light, the allusion 
to chaos theory, already present in the title,445 testifies to the fact that ‘language is 
recognized not as a neutral occasion for the direct transferral of meaning, but as a chaotic 
generator of significance’.446 Likewise, the story might also be read as a confession, both 
religious and judicial – ‘la sua confessione deve cominciare esattamente così […] tutto 
quello che dirà è basato sul pentimento […] lei ha un nome in codice col quale noi 
                                                        
443 Admittedly, the text fictionalises the confession by the ‘pentito’ Leonardo Marino that initiated the Sofri 
trial. Adriano Sofri, head of the leftist movement Lotta Continua, was arrested in 1988 and sentenced to 
twenty-two years in prison for having instigated the murder of the police officer Luigi Calabresi, as testified 
by Marino, who confessed to being the get-away driver in the assassination. Many intellectuals (including 
Tabucchi, Sciascia and the historian Carlo Ginzburg) questioned the validity of Marino’s deposition, which 
appeared to be full of incongruities and omissions. Sofri was released in 2012 as his term of imprisonment 
had been reduced to 15 years. Although acknowledging a sort of moral responsibility for the murder, as he 
had written many ferocious articles against Calabresi, whom he deemed guilty for the death of the anarchist 
Pinelli back in 1969, Sofri has always proclaimed his factual innocence. 
444 Palmieri, p. 131. 
445 The title alludes to the so-called ‘butterfly effect’: one of the main pillars of chaos theory, it was theorised 
by Lorenz in his 1972 paper ‘Predictability: Does the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in 
Texas?’, and it describes how a minor change in initial conditions can massively affect subsequent events. 
446 Peter Stoicheff, ‘The Chaos of Metafiction’, in Chaos and Order: Complex Dynamics in Literature and 
Science, ed. by N. Katherine Hayles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 85-99 (p. 86). 
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abbiamo deciso di battezzarla, […]’. 447  The oscillation between the past and the 
conditional in the linguistic texture of the narrative mirrors the playful to-and-fro 
movement that, hovering between the principle of historical, actualising necessity and that 
of ludic contingency, makes room for the hypothetical:  
 
E allora mi ascolti […] le propongo un gioco. Giochiamo a fare una bella supposizione, è 
d’accordo? […] Le ho detto che stiamo facendo un gioco […] il gioco ora passa in mano sua […] 
giochiamo questo gioco in maniera onesta […].448  
 
However, that ‘Dottor Coscienza’ forcefully determines the rules of the game shows how 
play, in order to create space for awareness and responsibility, needs to undergo a process 
of self-deactivation, profanating those degenerated forms in which it itself has lapsed. At 
what game are we – the characters and the readers – playing? In relation to the characters, I 
would argue for a game ascribable to the dual category of agon, given the contest-like 
quality of the confession, and mimicry, since it thematises and exposes the game, the 
process of storytelling as a rewriting of the real; in a way, agon defines the object of the 
game, while mimicry its how. On the reader’s side, one could equally speak of agon, yet 
played against its own rules. As Iser comments,  
 
[A]gon appears to be directed toward winning the game, but in postmodern literature is frequently 
used to play a losing game. This may entail all conflicts of norms and values being deliberately 
marked as things of the past […] it may also show that all forms of meaning are nothing but defence 
mechanisms designed to achieve closure in a world where open-endedness reigns.449 
 
A similar tension informs L’oca al passo, which aims to profanate450 those media that 
‘hanno appunto lo scopo di neutralizzare questo potere profanatorio del linguaggio […] 
emancipato dai suoi fini comunicativi’.451 The title carries two interrelated references: the 
most explicit and immediate is that to the familiar board game ‘gioco dell’oca’, which 
straightaway signals the ludic dimension permeating the writing; the second alludes to the 
military goose-step, exposing the focus on critical episodes of recent and current history. 
                                                        
447 L’angelo nero, p. 73. 
448 Ibid., pp. 76-81. 
449 Iser, p. 256. 
450 The term ‘notizie’ in the subtitle and the journalistic matrix of the texts collected in this work clearly 
indicates its central issue: the relationship between mass media and literature. 
451 Profanazioni, p. 102. 
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This is a ludic narrative in which the reader is called upon and eventually comes to the fore 
as the co-creator of meaning. As Tabucchi explains:  
 
Il dado è tratto: siete in gioco. Potete giocarlo come volete. Se la vostra indole preferisce la 
consuetudine del pagina dopo pagina […] la vostra lettura sarà solo passiva e il libro vi 
risulterà meno comprensibile perché frutto di un disegno prestabilito. Se invece volete 
prendervi parte attivamente […] avete due opzioni […].452 
 
The address made to those ‘pagliacci funebri che guidano le sorti del mondo’453 in the 
novel’s dedication to Susan Sontag illustrates how, for Tabucchi, a perverted game also 
marks our ontological condition: the world men inhabit is trapped in a self-renovating 
process of carnivalisation, where play has been deprived of its own role,454 as is echoed by 
the reduction of literary games to sterile, authorial exercises or divertissement.  
This is not the case for Tabucchi. Taking the lead from the recognition of the crisis of 
‘lapalissian truth’, the reader is further instructed to choose between two paths455 that 
converge, at the end of every round, on the so-called ‘casella garante’, the space occupied 
by the author’s direct plea to and accusation against Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who was 
President of the Italian Republic at the time. The collection is split into seven sections, 
preceded by an introduction and followed by an authorial epilogue; every section – which 
corresponds to a round – comprises, in turn, various articles, each equivalent to a square in 
the board game. Still, the writer admits that he has orchestrated an ‘insolito gioco dell’oca’ 
in that it ‘sembrava lasciarvi scegliere tra due opzioni di percorso, ma conduceva allo 
                                                        
452 L’oca al passo, p. 17. 
453 Ibid., p. 5 
454 Agamben affirms that ‘[i]l gioco come organo della profanazione è ovunque in decadenza. Che l’uomo 
moderno non sappia più giocare è provato proprio dal moltiplicarsi vertiginoso di nuovi e vecchi giochi. […] 
Restituire il gioco alla sua vocazione puramente profana è un compito politico.’ (Profanazioni, p. 111) In 
Bartezzaghi’s words, ‘[l]e diverse forme di degenerazione che Caillois puntualmente indicava sono tutte in 
atto: l’agon produce la concorrenza brutale e priva di regole, l’alea produce la superstizione, la mimicry 
produce la perdita dell’identità, l’impulso alla vertigine produce la ricerca dell’ebbrezza’. Stefano 
Bartezzaghi, ‘Il gioco infinito. Forme, linguaggi, sconfinamenti, patologie’, Aut Aut. Indagini sul gioco 
(January-March 2008), 3-21 (19). 
455 ‘Unless one ignores the author’s recommendations and reads the collection from start to finish in strictly 
linear fashion, the experience of reading this text is therefore one of looping in and out of its various sections, 
changing direction and pace according to the latest instruction.’ Jennifer Burns, ‘Re-thinking Impegno 
(again): Reading, Ethics and Pleasure’, in ‘Postmodern Impegno: Ethics and Commitment in Contemporary 
Italian Culture, ed. by Pierpaolo Antonello and Florian Mussgnug (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 61-80 (p. 
69). 
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stesso punto’.456 Concluding his reading, the reader might therefore experience a sense of 
enjoyment as well as a hint of frustration, finding himself guided by strict instructions 
along pre-established routes. While the opening reference to the dice and the same rules of 
the Italian board game may suggest that this text belongs to Caillois’ category of aleatory 
games, the author’s dominant presence and intention seem to dispute it. Is it, then, merely a 
superficial freedom that one experiences in reading a playful text? The answer is negative. 
As Francese observes, ‘Tabucchi neither seeks to absolve himself from responsibility for 
his text by claiming that the reader is the only creator of meaning, nor does he seek to 
impose a univocal reading’.457 In a way, at the end of the book, the reader finds himself in 
Spino’s condition, since, as Tabucchi writes about the protagonist of Il filo, ‘Spino ha fatto 
un giro a vuoto, è tornato al punto di partenza come nel gioco dell’oca. Alla fine del suo 
percorso capisce che ha giocato al gioco dell’oca, e che forse la vita stessa è un gioco 
dell’oca’.458 Spino concludes his investigation with laughter, the ironical self-awareness 
that, facing the impossibility of reaching an ultimate truth, what remains, and what truly 
matters, is vertiginously revolving around it, dis-locating it. Likewise, the reader of L’oca 
al passo, being involved in a game of ilinx, does not gain access to a new sense or value, 
beyond that of the act of questioning itself. Tabucchi’s literature is ethical to the extent to 
which it is an investigation of sense. This is essential for understanding his insistence on 
defining this work as a literary one, even a novel: 
 
Le pagine di questo libro erano articoli di giornale, e continuano ad esserlo, se lette isolatamente: 
pezzi di una realtà complessa che ci circonda e che si lascia osservare soltanto in parte, tenendo 
aperte le valenze di cui non ci accorgiamo, se ci contentiamo della campionatura, e che si 
spalancano sull’ignoto. […] Il tutto ci è vietato, ma del tutto possiamo conoscere parti sufficienti a 
farci capire di più se riusciamo a collegarle tra di loro […]. In questo libro ho cercato di fare questo, 
intendendolo una forma di romanzo, in maniera forse illegittima per chi concepisce la letteratura 
come un manuale, in maniera più plausibile per chi è convinto che la letteratura sia una forma di 
conoscenza attraverso la scrittura. In questo caso una conoscenza dei legami e delle analogie fra fatti 
e avvenimenti suggerita con le regole di un vecchio gioco italiano, il gioco dell’oca.459 
 
Nevertheless, the ethical potentiality of literature cannot be measured against praxis. As 
Tabucchi writes in the epilogue, ‘il gioco è dunque finito. […] È giusto che uno scrittore, a 
                                                        
456 L’oca al passo, p. 165. 
457 Joseph Francese, ‘Satire and Social Commitment in Tabucchi's L’oca al passo’, MLR, 103.4 (October 
2008), 1006-1020 (1009). 
458 Autobiografie altrui, p. 56. Actually Il filo dell’orizzonte might be described as an ontological quest 
through the detective genre.  
459 L’oca al passo, p. 8. 
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un certo punto, ceda il testimone della visione diretta della realtà e riprenda i suoi 
strumenti più consoni. […] Il futuro è di vostra competenza: pensateci voi’.460 
 
Play also functions as a counter-apparat in the novel La testa perduta di Damasceno 
Monteiro, where the card game ‘Milligan’ turns into a metaphorical representation of 
politics: as Loton, the lawyer, explains to the novice journalist Firmino, who is 
investigating the murder and beheading of a young man in Porto, ‘il Milligan è molto 
interessante […] è basato sulle mosse che ciascun giocatore esegue al fine di frapporre 
trappole per limitare il gioco dell’avversario che viene dopo di lui, e così a catena, come 
nelle discussioni internazionali di Ginevra’. 461  However, the paradoxical logic 
underpinning the card game itself encompasses the possibility of its own undoing, so that 
the barrister plays it as a ‘solitario, in modo da essere simultaneamente me stesso e il mio 
avversario’.462 Doubling the subject playing the game constitutes another example of agon 
played towards losing a game, in Tabucchi’s attempt to disentangle ludic rules from their 
ritualised aspect, estranging conventional instructions and re-articulating them as potential 
patterns of uncanny signification.  
Ultimately, Agamben’s idea of profanation finds its ideal ludic counterpart in the playing 
of mimicry, in the game of (dis)simulation. In Tabucchi’s short story ‘Festival’, mimicry 
discloses, denaturalises and toys with rules to make room for original, free practices of 
meaning creation. Attending an exhibition that pays posthumous homage to a famous 
director, a screenwriter tells the narrator that the filmmaker’s greatest movie is the one that 
never got to be actually shot; a movie set in politicised trials, where the appearance of the 
camera would turn the farce of the court into a game of make-believe: 
   
[E]ro un avvocato dello stato, per conto dello stato difendevo le persone che lo stato voleva 
condannare, non so se capisce il circolo vizioso, stavo dentro un circolo vizioso, ero il cane che si 
mordeva la coda, anzi, ero la coda morsa dal cane. […] Anch’io allora in qualche modo stavo al 
gioco […] ma si sta al gioco anche se è truccato quando si spera che un giorno esca la carta 
vincente, è questa la perversità del circolo vizioso […]. E l’imprevisto fu che la porta dell’aula si 
aprì […] e fece entrare un giovanotto che portava una macchina da presa e un microfono […].463  
 
The repeated, almost obsessive use of the words ‘stato’ and ‘circolo vizioso’ try to convey, 
from a linguistic point of view, the pervasiveness of a politicised state, the exclusive 
                                                        
460 Ibid., p. 167. 
461 La testa perduta di Damasceno Monteiro (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1997), p. 166. 
462 Ibid., p. 167. 
463 Il tempo invecchia, pp. 126-130. 
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producer and occupier of its own discursive regime. In light of the impossibility of 
escaping a saturated, vicious circle, constituting a sort of ludic loop, it is playful 
contingency – ‘l’imprevisto’ – that provides a potential way out. The act of mimicry, 
which hovers between illusion and referentiality – the filmmaker is defined as 
‘l’illusionista che aveva incantato le fiere cambiando sotto gli occhi degli spettatori il 
numero del circo’ –,464 counters and deactivates the functioning of law precisely by 
exposing and exploiting its fictitious, demystifying nature. Hence when ‘l’imputato […] 
non era neppure una persona, era una recita […] era la maniera di mettere in scena quello 
spettacolo, considerata sovversiva […]. Venga a filmare un processo alla finzione, gli 
dissi, un processo alla pura finzione’,465 the trial to fiction is reversed into, or unmasked as, 
a fictional process.  
The barrister/scriptwriter’s memory is narrated as if it were a game in its own right – 
‘meglio scherzarci sopra’,466 he tells the narrator. It combines several popular proverbs and 
aphorisms – ‘se stasera non dorme piglia un pesce insolito’ or ‘è come Achille e la 
tartaruga’ – and is dominated by the two tropes of hypotyposis, such as ‘la violenza era 
grigia, neanche in bianco e nero, grigia, e io dovevo adeguarmi a quel grigio, perché ero il 
grigio funzionario di uno stato’, and hyperbole – ‘c’era un silenzio, in quell’aula, […] un 
silenzio di tomba […] anzi […] un silenzio d’oltretomba’.467 This playful thread reaches its 
climax at the moment when the screenwriter remembers how he persuaded the director to 
keep filming his trials, despite having run out of film:  
 
Fu così che vennero filmati i miei processi successivi […] con la macchina da presa vuota, e ogni 
volta le sentenze furono generosamente indulgenti. Di quel breve documentario […] le immagini 
girate senza pellicola, sono le più emozionanti, ma queste vivono solo nell’archivio della mia 
memoria […] la cosa più buffa di tutta questa storia è la frase che gli dissi per convincerlo a venire a 
filmare senza pellicola: maestro, qui si tratta della realtà, non di un film. Pensi un po’ alla 
sciocchezza che dissi: qui si tratta della realtà, non di un film.468 
 
Toying with the real, the uncanny undoes and others the apparatuses of reality, 
deactivating their network of naturalised discourses and procedures. Tabucchi’s playing 
with rather than by rules produces a textual game of (dis)simulation that eventually 
exposes how reality is governed by alienation, a deteriorated form of mimicry. 
                                                        
464 Ibid., p. 132. 
465 Ibid., pp. 133-34. 
466 Ibid., p. 127. 
467 Ibid., pp. 126-31. 




3.3 Tabucchi’s Ludism: Illusion and Allusion 
 
Tabucchi’s textual ludism has two main narrative strategies: illusion and allusion. Play is 
etymologically implicated in both terms, but illusion – from the Latin ‘in ludus’, meaning 
‘being within the game’ or that ‘un’illusione (ci) mette in gioco’469 – focuses on how 
Tabucchi questions the interplay between literature and the real. What is at stake when it 
comes to illusion is the first aspect of play, being a specific modality through which it is 
possible to make sense of the real and of one’s dwelling in it. Allusion – from the Latin ‘ad 
ludus’, meaning ‘playing with’ – emphasises, conversely, an estranging approach towards 
the literary modus significandi. It is an invitation to play,470 through which the writer 
explores and questions literature as a practice of signification. Both illusion and allusion 
are revealing of how, for Tabucchi, the ludic forms an attempt to experience language 
freed from metaphysical reification, and of how it inaugurates a rethinking of semiosis on 
an uncanny basis, seeking a modality of signifying otherwise.   
 
 
3.3.1 Tabucchi’s Illusion: Metaleptic Games 
 
Illusion, in Tabucchi, is grounded on the metafictional471 trope of metalepsis. Bound up 
with ideas of boundaries and thresholds, it re-articulates the relationship between writing 
                                                        
469 Ermanno Bencivenga, Filosofia in gioco (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2013), Amazon Kindle e-book (Chapter 7, 
location 881).  
470 And with an invitation to play begin also two texts previously analysed: ‘Il battito d’ali’ and L’oca al 
passo. 
471 Moreover, metafiction is essential in order to differentiate between a loose characterisation of the term 
ludic fiction, understood as literary pragmatics, as the institution of a pact between the reader and the text 
within the two polarities of antagonism and cooperation, closure and open-endedness, and a more 
circumscribed sense by which it defines those texts ‘in which the rules of textual production and operation 
are sufficiently unusual to become noticeable in features of the text itself. […] The ludic is one of the ways in 
which writing can be seen as reflecting on its own production’. David Gascoigne, The Games of Fiction: 
Georges Perec and Modern French Ludic Narrative (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), p. 17.  Stoicheff also suggests 
that it does constitute ‘an investigation of the chaos of meaning’s production [… in which] yet, as in the 
phenomenal world, hidden structures exist within this apparent chaos, which emerge when instability is given 
its due’ (Stoicheff, pp. 87-88). 
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and the real,472 while embodying the ludic movement along the various levels of the text. 
Borrowing Foust’s classification of literary games, the writer’s metaleptic illusion 
constitutes a ‘game of logos’, since it ‘functions as a subliminal cue directing the reader’s 
attention to the homologies between reality and imagination’ and presupposes the belief 
that ‘the entropic structurelessness of natural experience aspires to the condition of fiction, 
that contingency desires to become textuality’ and vice versa.473 Metalepsis produces a 
process of complication and self-questioning that collapses rational mastery and 
hypostatisation: this is precisely how, Schwarz Lausten suggests, ‘invece di riempire il 
vuoto, la scrittura di Tabucchi apre in un certo senso dei nuovi spazi vuoti’.474  
Defined by Genette as ‘any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the 
diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.) or the 
inverse’,475 metalepsis blends ‘the fictional world and the ontological level occupied by the 
author’.476 This narratological figure shares several aspects with the unheimliche: both 
entail ‘a strangeness of framing and borders, an experience of liminality’;477 like the 
uncanny, metalepsis is not a static textual locus, but rather a drive underpinning and 








472 Metalepsis is usually regarded as an illusion-breaking device. However, its association with Tabucchi’s 
ludic strategy of illusion is coherent and consistent with my use of the latter in terms of a problematisation of 
the referential encounter with the real. As Iser indicates, ‘mimicry is a play pattern designed to generate 
illusion. [….] If the illusion, however, is punctured and so revealed as what it is, the world it depicts turns 
into a looking glass enabling the referential world outside the text to be observed’ (p. 256). 
473 Foust, 9. 
474 Schwarz Lausten, p. 69. 
475 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 
234-35. 
476 McHale, p. 213. 
477 Royle, p. 2. 
478 Thus Tabucchi exits, or deactivates, the debate concerning the effect of metalepsis; as for the latter, 
scholars tend to draw a distinction between those who consider it an illusion-breaking device and those who 
champion it as a narratological trigger of aesthetic immersion. See: Karin Kukkonen, ‘Metalepsis in Popular 
Culture: An Introduction’, in Metalepsis in Popular Culture, ed. by Karin Kukkonen and Sonja Klimek 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), pp. 1-21.  
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3.3.2 Use and Forms: Intradiegetic Metalepsis 
 
How does Tabucchi’s ludic metalepsis work? Three main modalities can be tracked in the 
writer’s oeuvre: intradiegetic, extra-textual and peri-textual.  
 
Indicative of the first type, in ‘Dolores Ibarurri versa lacrime amare’ the mother of a dead 
terrorist evokes the games of make-believe his son used to play as a child: Piticche and his 
father ‘si scrivevano delle lettere, facevano un gioco, era un gioco bellissimo, […] 
leggevano dei libri e poi si scrivevano delle lettere come se ciascuno di loro fosse un 
personaggio di libri che avevano letto’.479 Alongside writing, the act of directing/acting in 
a play or a film marks a habitual metaleptic pattern. This can be seen, for example, in 
‘Casta Diva’ with the doubling between the level of the letter in the frame, sent by the 
narrator to his beloved ‘donna gentile’, and that of the letter en abyme, sent by the opera 
director – truly, the narrator’s split disguise – to the same woman, ‘con una cornice, una 
specie di finestra a tutto teatro, grazie alla quale, come in certi quadri di Magritte, il fuori 
sembrava entrare nel dentro e annullarlo’.480 The caesura between the two diegetic levels 
(and the two letters) is signalled both linguistically – ‘Passo, dunque, la mano e mi ritiro 
fra le quinte,’481 says the lover – and visually, through the use of three asterisks, and by 
including the nested letter between double inverted commas and double breaking space. 
Analogously, in ‘Cinema’ the director’s cut literally and textually opens a gap between the 
actors’ lives and the film they are actually shooting, between the desire to re-experience 
their past together and the re-making of the film in which they first met and acted: the 
situation creates an experience ‘tipo cinema-verità, ma finto […] la recita dentro la recita, 
con noi che stiamo lì dentro a recitare noi stessi’.482  
Notturno indiano constitutes the strongest example of a self-erasing and looping text: as 
McHale indicates, ‘the paradoxical continuity between the nested narrative and the primary 
narrative, violating and thus foregrounding the hierarchy of ontological levels’483 generates 
an effect comparable to a visual ‘trompe-l’oeil, deliberately misleading the reader into 
regarding an embedded, secondary world as the primary, diegetic world’.484 In the novel’s 
                                                        
479 Il gioco, p. 99. 
480 Si sta facendo, p. 66. 
481 Ibid., p. 65. 
482 Piccoli equivoci, p. 140. 
483 McHale, p. 120. 
484 Ibid., p. 115. 
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final paragraphs the narrator seems to reverse what has thus far guaranteed continuity and 
consistency to the plot: the fact that he was searching for a friend lost in India: 
 
La sostanza è che in questo libro io sono uno che si è perso in India […] un altro mi sta cercando, 
ma io non ho nessuna intenzione di farmi trovare. […] Ma […] sono uno che non vuole farsi 
trovare, dunque non fa parte del gioco dire chi è. […] Una volta mi conosceva, supponiamo che 
siamo stati grandi amici, un tempo. Ma questo succedeva molto tempo fa, fuori dalla cornice del 
libro. […] Riesce evidentemente a sapere dove mi trovo […] per scenario prendo questo. 
Supponiamo che sia una sera come questa, calda e profumata […] supponiamo che abbia la cravatta 
[…].485   
 
The narrative act is explicitly compared to ludic make-believe, while the plot reversal aptly 
demonstrates the topological functioning of the uncanny. Partly altering McHale’s 
definition, however, the mise en abyme does not ‘foreground the hierarchy of ontological 
levels’. Depth is solely an effect created and accrued by the folding of the writing.  
A vertiginous rhythm moves and confuses, as in a glove turned inside out, the storyworld, 
the narration and the process of reading itself in ‘Voci portate da qualcosa… impossibile 
dire cosa’. This is a meta-ludic narrative, which covers all the categories of game theorised 
by Caillois. The first-person narrator simultaneously plays and describes his personal game 
of literary creation, a game that consists in building a sort of vocal collage of phrases 
captured from strangers, while wandering around Pisa: 
 
A volte può prendere il via con un gioco, un piccolo gioco segreto e quasi infantile che solo tu 
conosci e che per pudore non diresti mai a nessuno, cose così non si fanno, ma è un gioco, diciamo 
uno scherzo con se stessi, o con gli altri […] ignari compagni del tuo gioco, anche se non lo sanno. 
Perché parlano. È un gioco facile, non costa niente, non ci sono regole se non con se stessi […] 
basta una frase e tu decidi che è quella […] ripeti la frase dentro di te un paio di volte, la assapori, 
una buona apertura, come delle buone carte in un poker […] fino a creare una faccenda che non 
esisteva e che ora esiste: la tua storia.486 
 
The turning point in the story occurs when the narrator hears a voice, which actually 
ventriloquises his own remorse, though he attributes it to his long-time friend Tadeus, 
reading it as an urgent request to meet. ‘Voci portate’ enhances the playful element487 both 
in terms of content and form: on the thematic level, the category of agon is included 
                                                        
485 Notturno indiano, pp. 102-07. 
486 L’angelo nero, pp. 13-14. 
487 Dolfi speaks of an ‘ambigua sinonimia di gioco/scherzo (nel passaggio da una positività ludica a una 
ludicità inquietante)’ (Tabucchi, la specularità, p. 183, italics in the text). 
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specifically through the insisted representations of card games – ‘vecchietti sempre col 
cappello, sputano spesso, giocano a carte’ – and football matches – ‘la Juventus sta 
perdendo […] per via del terreno da gioco’ while ‘a ridosso del campo sportivo […] alcuni 
ragazzini vestiti per un incontro di calcio […] aspettano di cominciare la partita della 
domenica’.488 To some extent, the narrator’s game is also informed by agonistic principles, 
given that the conditions of possibility as well as the rationale behind the literary discourse 
are explicitly equated with the rules of card playing: 
 
[C]osì ti guardi intorno sorseggiando il tuo caffè, indeciso sul tavolo da scegliere. A quello di fondo 
c’è un poker drammatico, meglio di no; a quello vicino alla porta c’è uno scopone abbastanza 
animato; al tavolino dei raffinati una briscola a cinque, è un gioco strano la briscola a cinque, 
partecipa del caso e dell’astuzia, è un po’ come il tuo gioco con le parole, bisogna scegliere fra le 
carte che il caso ti attribuisce e grazie a quelle indovinare il tuo complice, perché hai un complice e 
bisogna indovinarlo fra quattro possibili complici, bisogna affidarsi alla sorte e all’intuito, va bene la 
briscola a cinque, avvicini una sedia e ti metti a guardare in silenzio […].489 
 
Contextually, Tabucchi designs a game of correspondences between the narrator’s 
unconscious need for a resolutive appointment with his old, dead friend Tadeus and the 
young kids discussing whether or not to play their football match, considering the adverse 
climatic conditions: in the end, however, both the encounters have to take place on ‘il 
giorno 10 maggio alle ore sei pomeridiane’.490 Arguably, creating tales out of overheard 
conversations also includes a certain amount of alea – so that, at a certain point, ‘puoi 
mettere un punto e aspettare quello che ti porta il destino’ –,491 although, as Dolfi indicates, 
‘il caso è nella possibilità limitata delle frasi disponibili […] ma in quell’ambito sta allo 
scrittore scegliere e decidere’.492  
Reading the text in ludic terms makes it possible to understand and illuminate the 
continuity that exists between the beginning and the end of the story: mimicry fades into 
ilinx, and ludic vertigo – ‘la vertigine che ti cattura lo sguardo e che si trasforma in un 
pizzicore che ti scende lungo la schiena e ti raggiunge le mani che ora si aprono e si 
chiudono da sole sul ferro del parapetto’493 – most likely turns into a factual fall from the 
                                                        
488 L’angelo nero, pp. 15-24. 
489 Ibid., p. 18. 
490 Ibid., p. 25, italics in the text. 
491 Ibid., p. 16. 
492 Tabucchi, la specularità, pp. 192-93. 
493 L’angelo nero, p. 28. Arguably, a similar episode of (ludic) vertigo constitutes the climax of Hoffman’s 
The Sandman, indicated by Freud as an archetypical example of the literary uncanny. Also, Rimini identifies 
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tower. After all, an estranging sense of vertigo pervades and is embodied by writing itself, 
given that, despite its being constructed as a sort of guided reading, the reader is confused 
by several elements: firstly, the loose juxtaposition of different scenes, linked only by the 
narrator’s wandering, at the beginning a simple ‘andarsene in giro’ that speeds up into a 
nervous run – ‘prendi a correre […] acquisti il biglietto ansando […] affretti di nuovo il 
passo’–, and is paralleled by the climatic shifting from a ‘domenica di primavera inoltrata’ 
to ‘una giornata stregata’;494 secondly, the confusion is enhanced by the doubling of the 
stories narrated – the one, ‘il mio defunto marito, quando festeggiammo le nozze 
d’argento’, which constitutes a mere game and is then forgotten, and the other, ‘non sono 
mai riuscito a dirtelo prima, ma ora è necessario che tu sappia’ which is driven, instead, 
by remorse.495 In effect, writing attempts to symbolise the return of a repressed, traumatic 
real, ‘quell’estate, che avevi così accuratamente dimenticato riponendola in una cantina 
sulla quale avevi posato un pesante coperchio. E ora quel coperchio […] si è mosso, è 
slittato aprendo una fessura’.496 Two terms operate here as indicators of the uncanny. The 
first of these is ‘slittato’, which imitates the floating movement of the signifiers, namely of 
the voices earwigged in the story, but which does not, however, represent an endless 
dissemination of sense, given that the protagonist comes to terms – literally – with his 
guilt. The second, similarly, is the word ‘fessura’, which might be considered as an 
analogon for the bar between the signifier and the signified, as the caesura that at once 
divides and joins together conscious and unconscious discourse, representing the gap of the 
real within the symbolic. And, if the other people ‘parlano con gli altri come se parlassero 
fra sé e sé’,497 in a way, the narrator speaks to himself as if he were speaking to – and 
being spoken to by – others, in a ludic discourse – ‘incongruo ma […] molto logico’.498 
This reaches its climax in the use of mechanisms of defence, such as denial (‘non fu colpa 
mia, io non sapevo niente’, ‘io non avrei voluto, te lo giuro, per anni non ho voluto 
pensarci […] l’ho fatto per non sapere, non avrei altre spiegazioni’), ambiguity (‘il 
romanzo fece una brutta fine […] ma era giusto buttare via una creatura a quel modo?’), 
and catachresis (‘l’amico del cuore, anzi, l’amico dell’intelligenza’).499  
                                                                                                                                                                       
several similarities in Tabucchi’s short story with Hitchcock’s 1958 movie Vertigo. Thea Rimini, 
Album Tabucchi. L'immagine nelle opere di Antonio Tabucchi (Palermo: Sellerio, 2011). 
494 L’angelo nero, pp. 13-27. 
495 Ibid., pp. 13-18. 
496 Ibid., p. 21. 
497 Ibid., p. 15. 
498 Ibid., p. 21. 
499 Ibid., pp. 20-26. 
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Thirdly, the reader ultimately precipitates with the narrator in his vortex of inner thoughts, 
a stream of consciousness in which free reported speech and a plethora of interrogations 
render any full stop difficult, indeed almost impossible to reach, even linguistically, while, 
on the contrary, playing his initial game, the protagonist had the opportunity and the ability 
to ‘mettere un punto e aspettare quello che ti porta il destino’.500 If Tadeus’ voice marks an 
‘invito, subdolo e maligno, […] una sfida, una tentazione’,501 the narrator also challenges 
the reader, since he plays with and reverses his own rules: while all the voices overheard 
and re-arranged in the form of a narrative are visually italicised, the last sentence – ‘è una 
malattia che oggi si può controllare, dice lui, è un virus simile all’herpes zoster’502 –, the 
clue to make sense of the entire story, runs the risk of going unnoticed within the texture of 
his tale of sorrow. That this phrase refers to remorse becomes intelligible only if this short 
story is read alongside the novel Requiem,503 where the virus is explicitly equated with 
regret: thus, not only does the reader have to mirror the narrator in his gesture of selection 
and extrapolation within a single narration, but they also have to extend the scope of their 
game to Tabucchi’s entire oeuvre.  
 
Another specific intradiegetic case is that of horizontal or intertextual metalepsis, the 
shifting of characters between different fictional worlds, such as books, paintings, 
photographs or films.  
The metaleptic functioning of the short story ‘Vivere o ritrarre’, for instance, is at once 
intertextual and intradiegetic. Here, the narration unfolds along three subsequent embedded 
levels: the ‘Disegnatore’ dreams (the first level) of drawing the figures of a film director 
and of his assistant (second level) in the act of shooting a movie called ‘O ritrarre’ (third 
level) made up of assembled try-outs, though he eventually auditions his very own image 
reflected in a mirror (back to the first level, but with estranging duplication). Tellingly, the 
ludic element is both performed, through metalepsis, and explicitly discussed: ‘oggi 
                                                        
500 Ibid., p. 16. ‘L’ars combinatoria del narratore in seconda persona trasforma i singoli segmenti linguistici 
in un messaggio preciso che […] possono essere letti tutti insieme con un senso compiuto’; analogously, the 
reader is asked to fulfil the sense of the story. Alessandro Iovinelli, ‘I dialoghi manca(n)ti di Antonio 
Tabucchi’, in Echi di Tabucchi, pp. 149-171. 
501 L’angelo nero, p. 23. 
502 Ibid., p. 27. 
503 ‘È un virus molto strano, disse il Copista, pare che tutti ce lo portiamo dentro allo stato larvale, ma si 
manifesta quando le difese dell’organismo sono infiacchite, allora attacca con virulenza, poi si addormenta e 
torna ad attaccare ciclicamente, guardi, le dico una cosa, penso che l’herpes sia un po’ come il rimorso, se ne 
sta addormentato dentro di noi e un bel giorno si sveglia e ci attacca […] ma è sempre dentro di noi, non c’è 
niente da fare contro il rimorso’ (Requiem, p. 79). 
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giochiamo a preparare un film’,504 declares ‘il Disegnatore’ at the beginning of the story, 
who dislikes ‘i giochi che tranquillizzano, tipo i giochi di società. Gli piacevano i giochi 
sovversivi’.505 Proclaiming that ‘il gioco è aperto’, he then goes on to encourage his own 
character, ‘il Maestro’, to start shooting.506 If the latter ‘era abituato a mettere gli uomini in 
cornice e infatti stava aspettando di mettere in cornice […] le comparse del suo nuovo 
film’,507 similarly the narration is sustained by rhetorical strategies of verbal framing: this 
can be seen in the anaphoric repetition of the phrase ‘O ritrarre! Provino […] ciak’ and the 
epistrophic reappearance of the formula ‘Fermo così un istante! Perfetto’, which is 
matched by physical bordering, namely the textual sub-division into numbered chapters 
separated by double spacing. Contextually, Tabucchi also tackles the ontological 
component of metalepsis, reflecting on the ludic interaction (illusion) between literature 
and the real: ‘il Maestro’ wants his ‘Assistente’ to perform ‘il disegnatore che si è svegliato 
dal sogno in cui ci disegnava. […] Voglio fare il ritratto di chi mi ha fatto il ritratto’.508 
The text also emphasises the transgressive stance of metalepsis: the final escape of the 
‘Assistente’, who runs away from the set, moves metalepsis from the level of diegesis to 
that of telling, patterning a game of ilinx. This results from the fugitive’s concluding 
scream for help turning into the ‘Disegnatore’’s yell for awakening, in order to 
‘riguadagnare il senso di realtà’: ‘Accidenti che strano sogno. Ho sognato che disegnavo 
un Maestro per fargli fare dei ritratti e che lui, con la scusa di un Assistente, voleva 
trasformare in ritratto anche me’.509  
In the end, this story might be ascribed to the peculiar and limit case of metalepsis, that of 
the mise en abyme, a ‘perpetual dialectic of interpretation and deconstruction […] that 
stretches, not toward revelation, but around it’.510 An archetypal example of Tabucchi’s 
use of the mise en abyme to structure a convergence between thematised and performed 
play can be found in the short story ‘Il gioco del rovescio’. On the content level, the text 
recounts a game played by the protagonists:  
 
Il gioco consisteva in questo, diceva Maria do Carmo, ci mettevamo in cerchio, quattro o cinque 
bambini, facevamo la conta, a chi toccava andava in mezzo, lui sceglieva uno a piacere e gli 
lanciava una parola, una qualsiasi, per esempio mariposa, e quello doveva pronunciarla subito a 
                                                        
504 Racconti con figure, p. 165. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Ibid. 
507 Ibid., p. 166. 
508 Ibid., p. 178. 
509 Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
510 Stoicheff, p. 90. 
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rovescio, ma senza pensarci sopra, perché l'altro contava uno due tre quattro cinque, e a cinque 
aveva vinto, ma se tu riuscivi a dire in tempo asopiram, allora eri tu il re del gioco […].511 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, this linguistic game constitutes an example of experimentum 
linguae, which reverses the familiar use of language as a tool of communication, insofar as 
‘il legame tra il significante e il significato è interrotto […] e il significante ha raggiunto la 
sua autonomia dalle leggi di significazione’.512 But this childish game is also literary, 
since, as Maria do Carmo affirms, the king of it was Pessoa. However, in Maria’s case, the 
game evolves into existential fragmentation and political subversion. For this reason, the 
backward game belongs, on the diegetic level, to agon, since it originally occurs as a 
competition between children, with a winner to be crowned, and to mimicry, especially in 
relation to Maria’s alleged feigning of identities. Considering Tabucchi’s textual playing 
with the reader, it extends, on the contrary, to the categories of alea, whose ‘basic thrust is 
defamiliarization […] overturning familiar semantics’,513 and of ilinx, which defines, 
precisely, a kaleidoscopic proliferation of positions and roles. The formal game is triggered 
by Tabucchi’s abysmal encapsulation of Velazquez’s Las Meninas,514 which opens and 
concludes the narration. It is also fostered by Maria’s cryptic posthumous message for the 
narrator, consisting of the word ‘SEVER’, whose palindrome can be decoded either as the 
French for dream or the Spanish for reversal, and which forces the reader to question the 
story’s reliability (is the protagonist dreaming it all?) in a vertiginous agon played towards 
losing the game. According to Maria do Carmo, a potential solution or, at least, a more 
complex understanding of the canvas and of the backward game tout court lies in the figure 
depicted in the background of the painting, with whom she eventually coincides, in the 
narrator’s dream. But the latter’s final question for the woman – ‘tu vedi il rovescio del 
quadro, che cosa si vede da codesta parte?’515 – remains unanswered. For, as stated in 
chapter 1, uncanny semiosis is not about deciphering an obscure meaning, but rather about 
uncovering a different modality of signification. Playing ‘il gioco del rovescio’ signifies, 
therefore, reversing, playing with and not by its rules. The narrator might make sense of 
Maria’s puzzling message solely by leaving its presumed ambiguous content in the 
background and focusing instead on its form. In the end, ‘il gioco del rovescio’ brings up 
                                                        
511 Il gioco, p. 14. 
512 Bellavita, p. 104. 
513 Iser, p. 256. 
514 Significantly, the painting (1656) is structured around the metafictional devices of metalepsis and mise en 
abyme, as it depicts Velazquez in the act of painting Las Meninas. 
515 Il gioco, p. 24. 
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no new signified but uncovers a ludic, non-consequential and unsaturated pattern of 
meaning creation.516 Or rather, the only thing that Maria reveals to the narrator is man’s 
uncanniness, the fact that asking about the sense of one’s life means asking in what ways it 
can be made meaningful.  
 
 
3.3.3 Extradiegetic and Peritextual Metalepsis 
 
The second type of metalepsis in Tabucchi’s work is the one characterised by the 
interaction between fictional discourse and extra-textual universe, in a sort of extradiegetic 
metalepsis. In particular, halfway between horizontal and extra-textual metalepsis is the 
writer’s simultaneous appropriation, as characters, of Pessoa’s historical figure and of the 
latter’s imaginary heteronyms. In Gli ultimi tre giorni di Fernando Pessoa the dying 
Portuguese author is visited by his heteronyms, who inhabit the embedded narrative of a 
hallucinated dream, one level below the chronicle of his last days: Pessoa’s delirium 
lingers between dreams – ‘Pessoa si sedette su una poltrona e cominciò a sognare’ – and 
insomnia – ‘una pace strana, come se una nebbia fosse calata su di lui’.517 Contrarily, in 
Requiem, not only does the protagonist encounter ‘vivi e morti sullo stesso piano’,518 but 
he also structures a narratological syncretism, meeting, on the same narrative level, both 
Pessoa and some characters derived from the heteronym Bernardo Soares’ Livro dos 
desassossego, the book the protagonist is reading at the beginning of the novel and which 
prompts the first-person narrator’s hallucination. Delusions, dreams and hallucinations 
constitute exemplary manifestations of ontological metalepsis,519 and Tabucchi adopts 
them to illuminate the interference existing between the fictional world and the actual one, 
as well as between unconscious thoughts and lucid wakefulness.520 Thus, the construction 
                                                        
516 After all, ‘il pieno […] è una forma di salvezza, o comunque di accettazione di ciò che tutti siamo’ (Si sta 
facendo, p. 146). 
517 Gli ultimi tre giorni di Fernando Pessoa. Un delirio (Palermo: Sellerio, 1994), pp. 15-22. 
518 Requiem, p. 7. 
519 ‘Ontological metalepsis opens a passage between levels [… that] must be separated by the type of 
boundary that I call ontological: a switch between two radically distinct worlds, such as “the real” and “the 
imaginary”, or the world of “normal” (or lucid) mental activity from the worlds of dream or hallucination’. 
Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative Across Media. The Languages of Storytelling (Lincoln, NE and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004), p. 442. 
520 In psychoanalysis, metalepsis ‘is equivalent to the uncanny intuition of the unconscious’. Giuseppe 
Civitarese, The Intimate Room. Theory and Technique of the Analytic Field, trans. by Philip Slotkin (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 58. 
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of Sogni di sogni is entirely metaleptic, as it based on the author dreaming other people’ 
dreams. Similarly, in the short story ‘Sognando con Dacosta’, the speaking voice explains 
that ‘lui stava facendo il suo sogno e io entrai da visitatore’,521 while in the fragment 
Esperidi. Sogno in forma di lettera, the narrator realises that ‘ho sognato che ti scrivevo 
questa lettera, e che io non ero il Greco che salpò a cercare l’Occidente e non fece più 
ritorno, ma che lo stavo solo sognando’.522  
Analogously, Pessoa or ‘un attore […] oppure, se più vi piace, […] Pessoa che finge di 
essere un attore che stasera interpreta Fernando Pessoa’523 is the protagonist of Tabucchi’s 
Il signor Pirandello è desiderato al telefono, the first of his two Dialoghi mancati and that, 
as the title suggests, represents a hypothetical phone call Pessoa made to Pirandello, set in 
a Portuguese asylum in 1935:  
 
Vorrei telefonare a Pirandello,/ forse lui saprebbe aiutarmi/ a uscire da questa situazione/ lui ci sa 
fare coi personaggi/ che si trovano intrappolati, schiavi/ di un ruolo e di una maschera.524  
 
In this play, Tabucchi blends intertextual and diegetic metalepses in order to theorise and 
dramatise the possibility of freedom and authenticity internal to playful motion, in 
contraposition to the ‘vera commedia che ogni giorno recitiamo’.525 Feigned madness – 
‘una recita in un manicomio per pronunciare un monologo sconnesso e fingere che sono 
sublime’, a ‘stupida illusione […] pagata quattro soldi’526 – triggers mimicry, emphasising 
the theatrical permormativity of the writer’s metaleptic ludism. Accordingly, the element 
of alienation – ‘in mezzo alle scapole ha una chiave come quella dei giocattoli, enorme’ 
while the choir greets the protagonist as a ‘poeta pupazzetto’527 – is both radicalised and 
reciprocated by the exploration of the illusionary threshold between fictional and actual 
feeling. As with the figure of Hecuba in Il filo dell’orizzonte, the protagonist confesses: 
‘una volta […] interpretai un giovane attore che si innamorava dell’arte […] e quella sera 
piansi di emozione estetica nel sentire ciò che recitavo’.528  
                                                        
521 Racconti con figure, p. 81. 
522 Donna di Porto Pim, p. 18. 
523 I dialoghi mancati (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1988), p. 16. 
524 Ibid., p. 28. 
525 Ibid., p. 31. 
526 Ibid., pp. 25-31. 
527 Ibid., p. 19. 
528 Ibid., p. 24. 
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Finally, a peculiar, controversial case of extratestual metalepsis, in which reality folds back 
on fiction, lies at the origin of the short story ‘Il battito d’ali’. As Tabucchi explains in the 
article ‘Sofri, una grazia per l'Italia, signor presidente’: 
 
Era il 1989, mi pare, era appena cominciata la tua Odissea e io avevo letto sui giornali di un signore 
che […] vi inchiodava con la sua spontanea testimonianza [….]. L’incerta testimonianza […] mi 
suggerì allora un racconto intitolato: Può il battere d’ali di una farfalla a New York provocare un 
tifone a Pechino? […] Il mio racconto […] fu subito oggetto di un’occhiuta magistrata, la dottoressa 
Laura Bortolé Viale, che lo inserì nella sentenza del primo processo d’appello, del 1991, in 
compagnia di un libro di Leonardo Sciascia […]. Era la prima volta in Italia, dall’Inquisizione e dal 
Ventennio fascista, che due opere di letteratura venivano pubblicamente indicate al rogo dalle 
istituzioni giudiziarie. Ciò mi seccò assai. Fra l’altro anch’io avevo letto attentamente le teorie sulla 
cosiddetta «autonomia del personaggio» come ci insegnavano gli strutturalisti e i narratologi 
dell’epoca, e trovai dignitoso protestare: come si permetteva la signora magistrata, di violare 
l’intoccabilità dell’autonomia del mio personaggio? […] Oggi, passati dodici anni, devo ricredermi 
[…] quel personaggio è davvero Leonardo Marino. Nel senso che dai processi che sono seguiti, 
Marino ha fatto di tutto per assomigliare al mio personaggio. È diventato il mio personaggio. Mi ha 
copiato.529 
 
The third type of metaleptical ludism employed by Tabucchi erases the barrier between 
peritext and narrative stricto sensu, manipulating the ‘material’ borders of his books. A 
telling example can be found in the novel Tristano muore, where the image that appears on 
the cover of the physical book – the one actually signed by Tabucchi – seems to converge 
with the picture that Tristano, in his last goodbye, offers to the writer/transcriber of his 
memories, precisely with the intention of using it as the illustration for his (intradiegetic) 
biography: ‘È una bella foto, gliela regalo, la metta sulla copertina del suo libro, non è 
Tristano ma lo è un po’ visto che è suo padre’.530 As Brizio-Skov comments, ‘Tabucchi ha 
creato un circolo vizioso: la fine riporta all’inizio, il testo al peritesto, la finzione alla 
realtà, il presente al passato, il figlio al padre’.531 The authorial game of mimicry, which 
plays with illusion and (dis)simulation, translates into a vertiginous space of reading. This 
                                                        
529 Tabucchi, ‘Sofri, una grazia per l'Italia, signor presidente’, L’Unità, 1 August 2002, p. 31. 
530 Tristano muore, p. 162. 
531 Flavia Brizio-Skov, ‘Storia, Letteratura e Ontologia nell’opera di Antonio Tabucchi’, in Pour Tabucchi. 
Les Rencontres de Fontevraud. Colloque Littéraire (Saint-Nazaire: Meet, 2009), pp. 196-215 (p. 207). 
Tabucchi formulates a similar reflection about the cover image of Si sta facendo sempre più tardi in his text 
‘Storia di un’immagine’. As the title reveals, this text constitutes a fictional narration, despite being included 
in Autobiografie altrui, the hybrid collection in which the writer explores his own poetics. Significantly, in a 
vertiginous game of ilinx, on the cover of Autobiografie altrui appears a picture of Tabucchi himself reading 
Si sta facendo sempre più tardi. 
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introduces us to Tabucchi’s exploitation of the paratext 532  and, specifically, to his 
inhabiting of the peritext: since the unheimliche is ‘associated with an experience of the 
threshold, liminality, margins, borders, frontiers’,533 the peritext constitutes an uncanny 
space for excellence. The peritext is the place of agon, where Tabucchi advances and 
stipulates his fictional pact with the reader; it is also the locus of alea, which toys with the 
impossibility of any attempt to ‘voler tracciare i confini esatti fra le cose che sono, di 
credere di misurare al millimetro dove finisce la realtà e dove comincia la finzione’.534 
Lastly, it is in the peritext that Tabucchi’s game of ilinx occurs, given that ‘al contrario di 
quanto affermano critici autorizzati, la copertina di un libro, oltre che una soglia, può 
essere una tromba delle scale nella quale si precipita ignari’.535  
 
 
3.4 Tabucchi’s Allusion 
 
While metaleptic illusion foregrounds the ontological component of Tabucchi’s ludic 
uncanny, allusion – though the two strategies most often tend to overlap536 – addresses its 
linguistic dimension, as it tries to articulate an experience of language freed from 
communicative constraints and pre-determined meanings, encompassing and moving along 
different threads of signification. 
As a literary device, allusion defines a peculiar modality of referring that ‘awakens the 
addressee to grasp a meaningful cultural unit borrowed from other texts or discourses by 
using a suggestive signal’.537 Interestingly, Perri compares it to Freud’s description of 
                                                        
532 ‘Come se non bastasse [… Tabucchi] tende a destabilizzare il lettore anche attraverso il paratesto, ovvero 
lasciando travasare la fiction in prefazioni, note, epiloghi, in tutto quell’apparato testuale che normalmente il 
lettore considera veritiero […] una tale tecnica destabilizza ulteriormente il lettore e serve a metterlo di fronte 
al fatto che la verità non esiste, ma esistono molte possibili verità, a dimostrazione che la soglia tra realtà e 
fiction è alquanto porosa’ (ibid., p. 197). 
533 Royle, p. vii. 
534 Autobiografie altrui, p. 122. 
535 Ibid. 
536  Tellingly, Schwarz Lausten underscores the ontological valence of Tabucchi’s intertextuality: 
‘L'intertestualità conferma l'importanza della narrazione non solo come ‘metodo’ di conoscenza del mondo, 
ma anche come parte della formazione o della costruzione dell'identità […]. La presenza di più strati nella 
voce narrante, e del gioco tra reale e immaginario rappresenta un soggetto che non sa esprimere certezze, ma 
solo ipotesi, dubbi, frammenti, un soggetto che continua tuttavia a cercare un modo di vivere e di esprimere 
questa condizione inquieta’ (p. 111). 
537 Marko Juvan, History and Poetics of Intertextuality, trans. by Timothy Pogaĉar (West Lafayette, IN: 
Purdue University Press, 2008), p. 29. 
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jokes as ‘the rediscovery of something known’,538 which, indeed, also constitutes an apt 
explanation of the uncanny: analogously to the unheimliche, allusion deals with the 
articulation of temporal doubling and returns, playing over a familiar textual reality. On the 
other hand, a ludic interpretation of allusion, rooted in and legitimated by its etymology, 
radically accentuates its metafictional, estranging rationale: playing with a constellation of 
discourses, with(in) allusion, writing eventually toys with and reflects upon itself. So, I 
adopt the term allusion to designate a formal game, a ludic exploration and manipulation of 
the possibilities and of the limits inherent in literary sense making. It is a form of textual 
play with literary and cultural discourses, between Tabucchi’s texts and between one text 
and the reader.  
There are two main allusive practices in Tabucchi. The first, a sort of ‘intertextual 
allusion’, 539 is based on intertextual quotations and internal repetitions. It is intertextual to 
the extent to which it creates ‘a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of 
culture’.540  
Thus, intertextual allusion is playful precisely because it toys with and elicits the reader’s 
involvement: the signifying mechanism of allusion stimulates the reader’s participation in 
the construction of the text’s signification. Tabucchi’s familiar sources of intertextual 
allusion serve as instructions for the reader, providing the rules according to which the 
writer’s text could – and has to – be played. In a way, ‘intertextual allusion’ eventually 
comes to define another modality Tabucchi plays with, rather than by the rules, an 
‘anagogic game of cooperative competition’ between the author and his audience.541 
The second allusive practice – ‘enigmatic allusion’ – further stresses the importance of the 
reader’s contribution, for it addresses and gives form to the interrogative and disquieting 
nature of the uncanny poetics, as Tabucchi posits questions that, far from demanding and 
reaching a closure, explore and problematise literary signification. Enigmatic allusion is a 
type of ‘structural game’, in that it has a quest-like logic working as ‘a heightened 
simulacrum of the agonistic and usually unstructured competitions of daily life’.542 In 
Caillois’ classification, it belongs to agon, since it engages the reader in the process of 
                                                        
538 Carmela Perri, ‘On Alluding’, Poetics, vol. 7 (1978), 289-307 (301). 
539 In 1966, Kristeva first defines intertextuality as ‘a mosaic of quotations [for which] any text is the 
absorption and transformation of another’. Julia Kristeva, ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’, in Desire in 
Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980), pp. 64-91 (66). 
540 Roland Barthes, Images, Music, Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 146.  
541 Foust, 10. 
542 Ibid., 9. 
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sense making itself. Like the intertextual one, it might be defined as anagogic, although the 
aspect of cooperation is less present and influential. 
 
 
3.4.1 Intertextual Allusion 
 
By definition, allusive writing estranges and transforms what might be taken as 
commonsensical literary repertoire: this explains its habitual convergence with the practice 
of intertextual quotation without quotation marks, both as ‘indirect reference and 
phraseological adaptations’.543  
Tabucchi’s short story ‘Il piccolo Gatsby’, included in Il gioco del rovescio, constitutes an 
archetypical demonstration of how – and why – intertextual allusion works. First, its 
inclusion in the collection Il gioco del rovescio offers a preliminary suggestion as to the 
kind of involvement on the part of the reader that the text seeks: 
 
Il continuo rinvio ad altri testi sovverte […] l’apparente unidirezionalità e orizzontalità della lettura 
a favore di un gioco del rovescio che […] coinvolge il lettore e il suo rapporto con la parola scritta. 
A chi legge, si impone pertanto la necessità di ritornare sui propri passi, di ri-leggere, di compiere al 
pari dell’io narrante un percorso rovesciato. […] Il processo interpretativo viene così costantemente 
sospeso e differito, costringendo il significato degli eventi in una posizione precaria e mutevole: 
quanto era stato interpretato in un modo può venir reinterpretato in maniera diversa e ciò che era 
insignificante può essere reso significante.544 
 
Thus, as far as the reader is concerned, intertextual allusion is ludic to the extent that it is 
driven by the uncanny logic of topological reversal. And, in effect, Tabucchi provides, in a 
footnote before the story’s incipit, a sort of set of preliminary reading instructions.  
Second, the text embodies a certain number of italicised quotations without quotation 
marks that, alongside what immediately strikes the reader as an ironic title, clearly expose 
its intertextual nature.  
 
                                                        
543 ‘So the two phenomena generally conflated under the term allusion differ from each other in a number of 
important respects. True, there is a playfulness in each: indirect references are like a riddle or trivia question 
[…] phraseological adaptations are like a sophisticated version of peekaboo or fort-da, in which a treasured 
object, having disappeared from view, delightfully reemerges’. Gregory Machacek, ‘Allusion’, MLA, 122. 2 
(March 2007), 522-36 (527-28). 
544 Michela Meschini, ‘Tra storia e finzione: il gioco del tempo nella narrativa di Antonio Tabucchi’, 
Quaderni d’Italianistica, 19.1 (Spring 1998), pp. 71-91 (p. 81). 
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The game Tabucchi plays, both inside and through the story, is a questioning of literary 
signification, of how literature negotiates and gives form to a meaningful experience 
with(in) the world. An allusive text ‘non esaurisce la rappresentazione; anzi, la costringe a 
rinnovarsi ad infinitum, e a offrirsi sempre nuova all’occhio del pensiero, immettendo 
l’opera nell’inarrestabile movimento della vita’.545 In this way, Tabucchi’s allusion also 
allows for a game of vertigo, as the text ‘aims at bringing out the rear view of the positions 
yoked together in the game’. 546  That is, it forces characters and readers alike to 
problematise their own assumptions and values. 
The story (the third element) in fact develops a parallelism between the narrator’s and the 
author’s intentions. The former directly addresses his (past) lover to finally denounce and 
unmask the hypocrisy and falsity of their personal and social lives. The narrator is a kind 
of ‘impotential’ writer, who cannot and does not want to write the novel everyone expects 
from him, as he spends his life in the company of middle-class people utterly making up 
their existence, drinking champagne, listening to some jazz music and discussing literature 
on the French Riviera. The story is written like a game of agon, for the narrator challenges 
the woman to quit the game they used to play: that of living like characters from Gatsby’s 
fictions, in a sort of existential mimicry: 
 
Inevitabilmente mi si chiedeva l’inizio del libro, tutti trovavano delizioso che io sapessi a memoria 
gli inizi dei romanzi di Fitzgerald: solo gli inizi, che erano una mia passione [...] il gioco era aperto, 
era bastato questo per dare il via. […] nonostante il mio vecchio romanzo, io non avrei mai saputo 
scriverne un altro […]. Io sapevo solo a memoria inizi di romanzi altrui, appartenevo a una storia 
affine, ero un personaggio trasmigrato da un altro romanzo, la sua stilizzazione in una dimensione 
minore […]. Io ero un gioco nel nostro gioco: ero il tuo caro piccolo Gatsby. Basta, non avevo più 
voglia di recitare.547 
 
However, the narrator manipulates textual allusions that play against the rules of his own 
game, misattributing false quotations or concluding his narration with Fitzgerald’s final 
words – this time from The Great Gatsby – and hence contradicting his initial confession 
of only knowing the American author’s incipits. He himself plays with rather than by the 
rules, searching for a way to signify otherwise, breaking away from the annihilating 
discourse of the reality he inhabits. 
                                                        
545 Nicola Gardini, Lacuna. Saggio sul non detto (Turin: Einaudi, 2014), Amazon Kindle e-book (Part 3, 
chapter 4, location 2648).  
546 Iser, p. 256. 
547 Il gioco, pp. 82-84, italics in the text.  
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This is consistent with the purpose of Tabucchi’s uncanny and intertextual allusions, that 
of being disturbing, estranging interrogations of sense.  
 
A disquieting quest(ion) also animates the writer’s practice of intra-textuality or internal 
quotation. In an exemplary manner, in Si sta facendo sempre più tardi, a collection of 
seventeen (love) letters ‘whose authors are overwhelmed by impossible regrets […] their 
needs to somehow make amends for the past […] contemplating the relationship of love to 
life and death’,548 the repetition of several phrases, such as ‘Come vanno le cose. E cosa le 
guida: un niente’, or distinctive terms, like ‘frattempo’,549 activates the writer’s ilinx, his 
attempt to embody knots and clearings of sense within the text. Arguably, this narrative 
vertigo finds its diegetic manifestation in the motif of the net, further illuminating the 
allusive play of the novel. In the prologue, Tabucchi quotes the refrain from a folk song 
that alludes to a ludic to-and-fro movement, and which might imply a possible 
interpretation of this volume: ‘Avanti, ‘ndrè/ avanti, ‘ndrè/ che bel divertimento/ Avanti, 
‘ndrè,/ avanti, ‘ndrè/ la vita è tutta qua’.550 Countering Roelens’ opinion, I believe that this 
collection is not a case of Derridean ‘destinerrance’;551 on the contrary, these are stories in 
the form of letters one might imagine that the seventeen male senders were writing not 
(solely) to their female addressees, but, more deeply, to themselves, or that these were 
‘unidirezionali’, as Tabucchi suggests in ‘In rete’.552 These texts are crossed and driven by 
a playful counterturning motion – and, significantly, ‘circolare’ is the way in which the 
writer describes the final, eighteenth letter, which was sent to all the other male senders by 
Atropos, one of the three fates in Greek mythology.  
‘La lettera è un equivoco messaggero’,553 Tabucchi declares in his post-scriptum: as such, 
it is a form of split self-investigation, a looping quest. If, as Athropos writes about the 
dispatchers, ‘ciascuno a suo modo, nella sua vita, ha cercato di liberarsi da un filo, fosse 
                                                        
548 ‘Tabucchi’s Fragments of Lovers’ Discourses’, 389. 
549 In the novel, the expression ‘Come vanno le cose. E cosa le guida: un niente’ is used several times: pp. 41, 
109, 183. The same phrase appears already in Piccoli equivoci, p. 71. As for the term ‘frattempo’, it occurs 
on pages 26, 92, 110. 
550 Si sta facendo, p. 9. 
551 Piccole finzioni, p. 149. Derrida coined the neologism ‘destinerrance’ to signify the wandering nature, or 
the possibility of not reaching its destination, its addressee, inherent in the functioning of a letter; 
significantly, Hillis Miller compares this to a ‘loose thread in a tangled skein that turns out to lead to the 
whole ball of yarn’. Joseph Hillis Miller, ‘Derrida’s Destinerrance’, MLN, 121.4 (September 2006), 839-910 
(893). 
552 Autobiografie altrui, p. 85. 
553 Si sta facendo, p. 224. 
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esso spinato o meno’,554 perhaps each letter is precisely this thread that they are all playing 
with, and both its functioning and purpose might be related to play as a tentative 
symbolisation of their lost or missed love.555  
 
 
3.4.2 Enigmatic Allusion 
 
Alongside estranging pre-existing texts, Tabucchi’s allusion functions according to the 
ludic principle of the enigma, a modality of saying – too much and too little – obliquely. 
This takes the form of rebuses and equivocations, a zigzagging between images and words, 
a hybridisation of plural languages and different genres of discourse, as well as, literally, 
mis-directions and detours, both physically – through the use of footnotes, endnotes, maps, 
indexes, cross-references and the paratext, to engage the reader in the game – and by 
scattering false, irrelevant clues and omissions throughout his opus. 
Tellingly, in his detective stories – such as Il filo dell’orizzonte or Notturno indiano – the 
enigma is posited and formulated, but gets no final resolution.556 It falls short of the 
intermediate passage of equivocation, so that no conclusive disclosure discharges the story. 
Tabucchi’s enigmatic allusion integrates agon and vertigo; it challenges the reader to find 
the solution while countering any linear reading.  
The short story ‘Rebus’ offers the most prominent example of enigmatic allusion. The 
first-person narrator recounts a past, misterious adventure, when he, a young mechanician, 
was paid by a noble woman, with whom he fell madly in love, to drive her to Biarritz and 
take part in a race. However, detours, sabotages, missed encounters and sudden departures 
punctuate the journey and, as the protagonist is finally left alone, many questions arise. For 
example, was her husband trying to kill her? Or did they use the narrator simply to 
smuggle illegal stuff hidden in the car? As the title suggests, this text offers a narrative 
enigma that not only withdraws any possible solution but also questions the validity of any 
attempt at finding one: ‘per esempio io non starei qui a raccontare una storia, a proporre un 
                                                        
554 Ibid., p. 215. 
555 Thus the man sending the first letter, ‘Un biglietto in mezzo al mare’, says: ‘C’è una rete nella quale pare 
sia ormai impossibile non essere catturati, ed è una rete a strascico. In questa rete io insisto a cercare i buchi’ 
(ibid., p. 13). The importance of the image of the thread is also confirmed by the use of the mythic figures of 
the Three Fates and of Ariadne, whose ‘Lettera al vento’ Athropos sends back to all men writing in the novel. 
556 The driving force behind the enigma in Tabucchi’s writings may also be interpreted by making reference 
to Barthes’ ‘hermeneutic code’, which designates ‘the various (formal) terms by which an enigma can be 
distinguished, suggested, formulated, held in suspense, and finally disclosed’. Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. 
by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 19. 
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rebus che non ha soluzione, o ha una soluzione che è inevitabilmente quella che ebbe e che 
io ignoro’.557  For, ‘Rebus’ is an interrogative text, which concludes on a series of 
unanswered questions, mirrored, on the diegetic level, by the characters’ vertiginous 
journeys:  
 
Un appuntamento e un viaggio […] mi riferisco alla vita, naturalmente […] e poi nel grande viaggio 
si fanno dei viaggi, sono i nostri piccoli percorsi insignificanti sulla crosta di questo pianeta che a 
sua volta viaggia, ma verso dove? È tutto un rebus.558 
 
The story has, as its ideal centre, the Bugatti’s elephant,559 of which the narrator says that 
‘quello era un vero simbolo, misterioso da decifrare come tutti i simboli’.560 Bearing in 
mind that a rebus is a ‘discourse disguised as visible object’,561 it might be argued that the 
elephant is the visible object behind which hides a symbolic discourse (as for the previous 
quote). In turn, the image of the elephant and its disguised discourse (first or diegetic 
rebus) constitute the visible object standing for Tabucchi’s discourse: they are revealing of 
how the story forms an investigation of the mode in which it is possible to articulate a 
symbolic narration (second or narrative rebus). Thus the motif of the rebus, best 
understood through the image of the Bugatti’s elephant, figuratively alludes to Tabucchi’s 
deeper, uncanny enigma: how signification works.  
It is in order to observe the latter that Tabucchi explores the nexus between play and 
dream. The story opens with an oneiric sequence:  
 
Stanotte ho sognato Miriam. […] A volte una soluzione sembra plausibile solo in questo modo: 
sognando. Forse perché la ragione è pavida, non riesce a riempire i vuoti fra le cose, a stabilire la 
completezza, che è una forma di semplicità, preferisce una complicazione piena di buchi.562 
 
It ends on a similar affirmation that ‘a volte, quando si è bevuto un po’, la realtà si 
semplifica, si saltano i vuoti fra le cose,  tutto sembra combaciare e uno dice: ci sono’.563 
                                                        
557 Piccoli equivoci, p. 30. 
558 Ibid. 
559 As Miriam’s Bugatti lacks the original elephant, the narrator has a copy made for her, which, however, 
gets mysteriously substituted at the end of the story. Furthermore ‘Elefante perduto cerca Bugatti del 
Ventisette’ is the advertisement the narrator eventually, though unsuccessfully, leaves on a newspaper hoping 
to find the woman again (p. 46). 
560 Ibid., p. 37. 
561 Jean-François Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, trans. by Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. 297. 
562 Piccoli equivoci, p. 29. 
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The mode in which the narrator eventually addresses his audience testifies to the latter’s 
incapacity to eschew the game:  
 
[T]i propongo un rebus, vediamo come lo risolvi. Ma poi perché a lei interessano i rebus, ha la 
passione dell’enigmistica o forse è solo la curiosità sterile di chi osserva la vita altrui? […] Ma a lei 
perché interessano le storie altrui? […] Non le sono sufficienti i suoi propri sogni?.564 
 
The protagonist – and his interlocutor – therefore constitutes a sort of model reader, and 
‘poiché il disegno sfugge sia a lui che al lettore, dal piano dei piccoli rebus si passa al 
rebus universale, al mondo come rebus’.565 In effect, playing rebus has an ontological 
scope, as ‘sa come è la vita, è come una tessitura, tutti i fili si intrecciano, è questo che un 
giorno vorrei capire, vedere tutto il disegno’.566 If life has the form of a picture-puzzle, in 
what way is it possible, therefore, to dwell in it? What does it mean to play with, or make 
sense of it? Arguably, the idea of the entanglement of rebus with dreams is derived from 
Freud, for whom ‘[a] dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort’.567 However, unlike Freud’s 
explanation of the dream-work, the (oneiric and/or ludic) enigma is not a search for an 
obscure, latent meaning or truth. The story hides no codified message for the reader to 
decipher. Tabucchi’s enigmatic allusion is a different kind of saying, as with Agamben's 
Sphinx, inasmuch as it exposes the mechanism and the limits of linguistic signification. In 
a sense, Tabucchi’s enigmatic allusion is a symbolic play, a mode that language toys with 
and from which it estranges itself. 
 
This is something Tabucchi discusses in the fourth chapter of Notturno indiano, where the 
protagonist encounters a dying man at the Railway’s Retiring Rooms in Bombay:  
 
‘Cosa ci facciamo dentro questi corpi’, disse il signore che si stava preparando a stendersi nel letto 
vicino al mio. La sua voce non aveva un tono interrogativo, forse non era una domanda, era solo una 
constatazione, a suo modo, comunque sarebbe stata una domanda alla quale non avrei saputo 
rispondere. […] Da lontano veniva una voce lenta e monotona, forse una preghiera oppure un 
lamento solitario e senza speranza, come quei lamenti che esprimono solo se stessi, senza chiedere 
                                                                                                                                                                       
563 Ibid., p. 46.  
564 Ibid., pp. 30-46.  
565 Brizio-Skov, p. 114, note 26. 
566 Piccoli equivoci, p. 32. 
567 Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, in The Standard Edition, vol. iv (London: Hogarth, 1955), pp. 1-
338 (p. 278). 
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niente. Per me era impossibile decifrarlo. L’India era anche questo: un universo di suoni piatti, 
indifferenziati, indistinguibili.568 
 
The character’s failure to decipher the interlocutor’s – as well as, more generally, India’s – 
words and voices does not stand for a mutual inability to communicate between Western 
and Eastern cultures; quite the opposite, this scene introduces and solicits a different 
semiotic approach, from both the narrator and the reader. The two elements of a presumed 
interrogation without a question mark and of a prayer, perhaps a lamentation, which, 
however, asks for nothing, express and perform a modality of signification comparable to 
the Sphinx’ enigma: they do not require an answer, triggering, instead, a process of 
questioning and problematisation. The impossibility of deciphering made explicit by the 
character indirectly expose the limitedness of a rational semiosis: what is really at stake, 
therefore, is not the applicability and relevance of the Western deciphering model when it 
comes to the Eastern world, but, more radically, the limitation inherent in the model itself. 
Significantly, the dialogue between the protagonist and the old Indian man touches upon 
this aspect: 
 
Parlava un inglese molto elegante, con piccole pause e le congiunzioni leggermente strascicate ed 
esitanti, come si usa in certe università, me ne accorsi. ‘Practically… Actually’, disse, ‘che parole 
curiose, le ho sentite tante volte in Inghilterra, voi europei usate spesso queste parole’. Fece una 
pausa più lunga, ma capii che il suo discorso non era finito. ‘Non sono mai riuscito a stabilire se è 
per pessimismo o per ottimismo’, riprese, ‘lei cosa ne pensa?’.569 
 
In a way, the old man’s speech demonstrates and dramatises, through its overtly elliptical 
rationale – illustrated by the use of ellipses and the break taken between the two sentences 
– the necessity to literally punch holes in Western metaphysical-nihilist semiosis, which, as 
evidenced by the two English adverbs, is exclusively founded upon actuality and utterly 
dismisses the logic of potentiality that, by contrast, structures uncanny semiosis. In the end, 
potentiality is the word for the uncanny’s capacity to sustain the gaps it exposes inside 




568 Notturno indiano, p. 38. 
569 Ibid., p. 41, italics in the text. The same reflection also reappears in ‘La frase che segue è falsa’: ‘Forse la 
nostra conversazione fu abbastanza stravagante: in realtà essa partì da due avverbi molto usati in Occidente 
(practically e actually) e poi tentammo di risalire alle categorie mentali che presiedono a avverbi come questi. 
Il che ci condusse, con una certa logica, a parlare del pragmatismo e della trascendenza’ (I volatili, p. 42). 
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To summarise, Tabucchi uses textual and diegetic games: 
• To arrange a new, unfamiliar experience of sense making; 
• By estranging, i.e. profanating or de-activating pre-existing, familiar semiotic 
modes, discourses and apparatuses (including language and literature); 
• Through playing with rather than by their rules – what I called ‘signifying 
otherwise’. 
• In effect, Tabucchi’s play is defined as a playing of, over and with the real, a 
specific modality through which to make sense of the world and of one’s dwelling 
in it.  
• This is strictly related to postmodern irony, for postmodernism is traditionally 
equated with the idea of inhabiting a world ruled by randomness and chaos: its 
playful attitude is thus regarded as a reaction to this historical condition. 
• Tabucchi’s textual play is based on two main narrative strategies: illusion and 
allusion. Illusion problematises the interplay between literature and the real, while 
allusion is a form of textual play with literary and cultural discourses, between 
Tabucchi’s texts and between one text and the reader.  
• Likewise, play is also a diegetic motif, as Tabucchi’s characters play games of 
agon, alea, mimicry and vertigo. In particular, Tabucchi uses diegetic play to 
uncover and represent humanity’s uncanniness. Thus, characters play uncanny 




















4.1 Signifying the Other: the Semiotic Unconscious 
 
Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny sees literature as a way to deal with human beings’ need 
for sense and sense making. In this regard, Tabucchi’s uncanny can be best understood 
through Agamben’s reflection on the topic, whereby the latter is defined as a unique 
experience of semiosis. In chapter 2 I argued that this is made evident by the two purposes 
Tabucchi assigns to his personal narrative production: those of disturbing and questioning. 
In the previous chapter I discussed how this emergence of the uncanny as a semiotic 
problematisation lays at the core of Tabucchi’s playful attempt to signify otherwise, 
namely to expose and dismantle all those mechanisms through which meaning is familiarly 
produced. By the same token, this chapter examines how Tabucchi’s ‘rovescio’ may be 
interpreted as the writer’s attempt to signify or express the other, i.e. the signifying 
function inherent in men’s uncanny experience of language, that is: the unconscious. 
 
This chapter formulates the hypothesis that, in Tabucchi’s poetics, it is through the 
narrative practice of the ‘rovescio’ that the writer’s uncanny tries to make room for the 
unconscious, for what resists and disturbs the Saussurean sign. As discussed in chapter 2, 
in the preface to the second edition of Il gioco del rovescio, the writer traces the aetiology 
of his idea of ‘rovescio’, affirming that:  
 
Tutti [i racconti di questo libro] sono legati a una scoperta: l'essermi accorto un giorno, per le 
imprevedibili circostanze della vita, che una certa cosa che era ‘così’ era invece anche in un altro 
modo. Fu una scoperta che mi turbò.570  
 
Tabucchi’s reversal therefore is twice other: it is (first) the ability to look differently at 
what is (second), at the same time, familiar and unfamiliar, always unsaturated. The idea of 
the unconscious as ‘other’ overtly resotanes also with Lacan’s view of the latter as the 
‘discourse of the Other’. For Lacan the capitalised Other refers to the symbolic order, to 
the language we are born into, must acquire and learn to speak, as well as to the discourses 
of the persons around us. By the same token, for the French psychoanalyst, that the 
unconscious is ‘the discourse of the Other’ means that it is a signifying function shaped by 
the symbolic, namely that we articulate our own desire through and in relation to the 
                                                        
570 Il gioco, p. 5, italicised. 
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discourses and desires of other individuals. From this perspective, the idea of the 
unconscious as other is strictly related to Lacan’s and Agamben’s conceptualisation of the 
uncanny as unfamiliar semiosis, which is pivotal to Tabucchi’s poetics, for two main 
reasons: first, because it emphasises the fact that the unconscious is a discourse, a chain of 
signifying elements, a sense making process; second, since it addresses the transindividual 
dimension of the unconscious, which is uncannily extimate, at once internal and external to 
the subject. Accordingly, the relationship between the uncanny and the unconscious as 
other in Tabucchi can be summarised in the following way:  
 
unconscious: consciousness = uncanny semiosis: Saussurean semiosis 
 
The unconscious is the other in that it is the site, the taking place of a different discourse, 
of an unfamiliar, reversing and disturbing signification. From this perspective, while 
chapter 3 analysed Tabucchi’s deconstructive strategies – how he collapses familiar 
processes of meaning creation –, this chapter aims at exploring the modes in which 
Tabucchi’s opus opens novel spaces for (unconscious) sense making. For, Tabucchi’s 
poetics of the uncanny signifies the other insofar as it makes room for an interrogative, 
unsaturated experience of signification (the discourse of the unconscious, the unconscious 
as discourse). 
In particular, by unconscious I mean: 
 
[A] function of personality [that] expresses the deepest psychological capacity that human beings 
possess for making sense of experience: the ability to compose the ‘poetry’ of reality, that is, to see 
it from different angles, as something rich and positively ambiguous.571 
 
Nowadays this definition of the unconscious as semiotic – remarkably similar to 
Tabucchi’s own definition of ‘rovescio’ 572  – is commonly accepted and shared in 
psychoanalysis:  
 
Generally speaking, we can distinguish three ways of conceptualising the nature of the unconscious. 
The classical view of the unconscious is that of a motivational force. This reminds us of the 
definition of the concept of drive given by Freud: a demand made upon the mind for work. A 
                                                        
571 Giuseppe Civitarese, Truth and the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis, trans. by Adam Elgar, Ian Harvey and 
Philip Slotkin (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 92, italicised. 
572 This conceptual proximity owes to the fact that both ‘rovescio’ in Tabucchi’s definition and the 
unconscious in Civitarese’s explanation designate (first) a specific way of looking at things, an ability to 
make sense of a reality that (second) is uncannily ambivalent, unfamiliar and unsaturated. 
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different conception is that of the unconscious as a sort of programme of information processing 
[…] put forward both by attachment theorists […] and by psychoanalysts influenced by cognitive 
theory […]. It is a third viewpoint that introduces the postmodern attitude: it deals with the 
unconscious from a semiotic angle, seeing it as a generative matrix of symbolization processes, and 
therefore as a semiotic process through which the subjects involved in the discourse organize the 
sense of the experience. [T]his position can be considered transversal and can be found in 
numerous models: in intersubjective theory, with its attention to the dialogical processes of co-
construction of meaning; in the Lacanian idea of the linguistic structure of the unconscious; in the 
bi-logic model of Matte Blanco, which treats the unconscious as a peculiar form of categorization; 
and in Bion’s vision of the group as a phantasmatic field, shaping the minds of the participants.573 
 
Likewise, as I intend to argue, this is a view of the unconscious Tabucchi addresses and 
adopts in his writings, in opposition to a formulation of the unconscious as an obscure 
(improper) meaning to be decrypted or (solely) as a reservoir of repressed contents.574 The 
latter lies at the core of a lay understanding of psychoanalysis, which Tabucchi openly 
criticises. That the narrator in Requiem declares ‘l’Inconscio, voglio dire, ormai 
l’Inconscio io ce l’ho, l’Inconscio uno se lo prende, è come una malattia, mi sono preso 
il virus dell’Inconscio, capita’, 575  is ‘symptomatic’, in turn, of Tabucchi’s refusal to 
embrace any theoretical reduction of the unconscious to a reservoir of repressed drives and 
complexes, as well as of his distance from any simplistic belief in psychoanalysis as a 
positivistic science, in opposition to which he elicits and proposes to take into account their 
ontological scope.576 Tabucchi is interested in what psychoanalysis and the unconscious 
can say and reveal about men’s being as producers of sense. Accordingly, also for 
Tabucchi the unconscious is semiotic. And the latter defines ‘a modality of working of the 
mind […] a specific form of semiotization of the experience’;577 a mechanism of sense 
making, the taking place of uncanny signification as ‘una dislocazione della stessa 
strutturazione metafisica del designare’,578 which produces unfamiliar meaning.  
                                                        
573 Sergio Salvatore, ‘Steps Toward a Dialogical and Semiotic Theory of the Unconscious’, Culture & 
Psychology, vol. 12 (2006): 124-36 (129), italicised. 
574 That of repression is only one of the function of or process activated by the semiotic unconscious. This is 
why psychoanalysts distinguish between repressed and non-repressed unconscious contents.  
575 Requiem, p. 18. 
576 This is clearly illustrated by his assertion, in Si sta facendo, that: ‘I divani degli psicoanalisti non mi 
piacciono, perché sono pieni di pulci dei pazienti che vi sono stati sdraiati […] l’anima risiede nel sangue. 
Non in tutto il sangue, naturalmente, ma in un solo globulo’ (pp. 89-90). 
577  Sergio Salvatore and Claudia Venuelo, ‘The unconscious as symbol generator’, in Symbolic 
Transformation: The Mind in Movement Through Culture and Society, ed. by Brady Wagoner (London: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 59-73 (p. 60). 




4.2 Tabucchi’s ‘rovescio’ 
 
The reversal has been widely acknowledged as being Tabucchi’s distinguishing trait; the 
writer declared himself to be ‘incline a considerare “tabucchiano” […] una “poetica 
del rovescio” […] il tentativo di guardare anche l’altra faccia della medaglia, continuando 
però a guardare anche la prima faccia’.579 However, in spite of the importance ascribed to 
the element of ‘rovescio’ and to its problematisation of the visual process as a sense 
making mechanism, it has never been explicitly and thoroughly considered in relation to 
the unconscious. I intend to fill this gap by suggesting how, through his counterturning 
gaze, Tabucchi’s narrative tries to articulate the psychic unconscious, inasmuch as the 
latter constitutes an idiomatic site or mode of uncanny semiosis.  
 
The next sections will address the following questions: What is the unconscious for 
Tabucchi? How can it be narrated? And why is it relevant to a study of his poetics of the 
uncanny? Firstly, I will explore the writer’s appropriation and understanding of the 
unconscious, clarifying its nexus with the gaze as well as the extent to which it may be 
understood both in individual and collective terms. 
For, Tabucchi’s writings metaphorically orchestrate a modality of vision that, collapsing 
ocularcentric imperatives, produces a different discourse of truth580: 
 
Tabucchi cerca di esplorare la realtà umana e sovrumana attraverso l’intenso scrutare, anzi 
attraverso una prospettiva del guardare […] che sa farsi molto ossessiva e anche patologica. A volte 
un semplice sguardo anima un rapporto tra l’io e il suo ambiente. Guardare è una necessità 
impellente dell’animo inquieto […]. Si tratta di una funzione complicata del guardare. […] In 
Tabucchi guardare è cercare qualcosa dappertutto, da ogni posizione e da ogni prospettiva.581 
 
 I will then investigate the diegetic objects and discursive modalities through which the 
unconscious is articulated and signified in his texts. And lastly, I will demonstrate how and 
why the gesture of the ‘rovescio’ becomes wholly intelligible only if situated within and 
considered through the uncanny.  
                                                        
579 Alloni, p. 39. 
580 With Royle, it might be argued that the unconscious alethic discourse as a quest(ion) of sense is what 
informs ‘language’s uncanny power to refuse the truth that nonetheless it never stops demanding’ (p. 61). 
581 Franco Zangrilli, Dietro la maschera della scrittura. Antonio Tabucchi (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 




4.2.1 The Individual Unconscious 
 
Arguably, in Tabucchi, the unconscious designates ‘l’eccedenza del senso (sulla razionalità 
volta all’oggettività e ai significati) [...] un radicamento nel mondo e un’apertura al mondo 
in una dimensione di senso di cui i significati oggettivi e l’identità dell’io sono effetti, 
prelievi, misconoscimenti e riduzioni’.582  
In ‘Il penoso caso del Signor Silva da Silva e Silva. Storia però di una bella amicizia’ 
Tabucchi narrates the story of a Portuguese man who, since his early childhood, has 
repeatedly seemed to present all the unmistakable symptoms of a particular disease, yet 
each time without being actually affected by the presumed, corresponding malaise. The 
man eventually decides to be treated by a Portuguese doctor and, then, by an English 
psychoanalyst, who successfully reconstructs the cause of his tribulations, the trauma of 
being menaced by the assault of a horse when he was just a kid. The story ironically, 
uncannily literalises Freud’s case of the little Hans583: 
 
Fu così che cominciò l’analisi psicoanalitica […] ed essa andò avanti per molti anni, non solo 
perché le terapie psicoanalitiche, come è noto, sono lunghe, ma soprattutto perché il complesso che 
scatenava i micidiali sintomi delle inesistenti patologie del signor Silva da Silva e Silva era davvero 
molto rimosso, in un profondissimo buchino degli abissi del suo inconscio […]. Finché un giorno, 
nel suo racconto sconnesso, che il dottor Costa da Costa e Costa, con un’eco vagamente lacaniana, 
definiva il Verbo dell’Io in panne, il signor Silva da Silva e Silva rammentò il puledro. […] Il dottor 
Costa da Costa e Costa […] desunse un trauma metaforicamente fallico […] come era successo al 
piccolo Hans. Povero piccolo Hans! Povero piccolo Silva da Silva e Silva!584 
 
In the end the protagonist is able to relive the primary scene of his trauma, and thus to 
symbolise it, paradoxically at the moment when (coup-de-théâtre!) the unconscious logic 
of the après-coup585 turns into a far too real, mortal blow, that of being hit by a bus: 
 
                                                        
582 Paolo Gambazzi, L’occhio e il suo inconscio (Milan: Raffaello Cortina Editore, 1999), pp. 14-27.  
583 This is one of Freud’s most famous case studies (1909): it concerned the observation of a five-year-old 
patient whose phobia of horses was then interpreted as symptomatic of a fear of castration within the wider 
psychoanalytical frame of the Oedipus complex.  
584 Racconti (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2005) pp. 408-09. 
585 The Freudian concept of deferred action describes the a-temporal and a-causal functioning of the 
unconscious by means of which a later fact engenders the memory and the tentative signification of an earlier 
episode or experience, which, however, had not entered consciousness. 
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Era proprio vero, quel puledro aveva proprio minacciato di investirlo, terrorizzando il suo inconscio 
per tutta la vita. L’avere rivissuto la scena traumatica con la consapevolezza dell’analisi lo fece 
sentire un uomo del tutto diverso. […] Uscì dal portone pensando alla sua nuova vita […] sul 
marciapiede opposto vide una cabina telefonica, di quelle tipiche inglesi […]. Vi si diresse 
risolutamente […] guardando con prudenza alla sua sinistra. L’autobus a due piani, tipico londinese, 
lo investì in pieno, travolgendolo, senza neanche tentare di frenare.586 
 
On the other hand, this narrative move is indicative of the writer’s overall approach to the 
notion of the unconscious – and to psychoanalysis tout court – insofar as it might be 
argued that, in Tabucchi’s opus, similarly to Silva da Silva e Silva’s situation, 
psychoanalysis is present(ed) in a disguised, oblique form, through a plethora of 
symptoms, and yet never entirely accepted. This is due to the fact that Tabucchi mocks and 
rejects a lay understanding of psychoanalysis. In effect, the unconscious is not something 
that can be deciphered. By not paying attention to the reversal – which is the real nature of 
the unconscious – that is, by looking in the wrong direction, Da Silva is overwhelmed by 
the unconscious. For, in this story, the unconscious, like England, is another country, 
where everything, including driving, works differently.   
Tabucchi’s unconscious is a labyrinth and a fracture, the production of unsaturated sense: 
 
[L]a prima volta in cui visitai Cnosso […] [p]ensavo al labirinto, al suo simbolo misterioso, quasi ne 
cercassi una soluzione. Mi parve di trovarla il giorno dopo nel museo di Heraklion guardandone la 
raffigurazione su una delle più antiche tavolette d’argilla. Mi convinsi che si trattava di un cervello 
umano. La forma leggermente ovoidale, i circuiti che si perdevano in se stessi facendo perdere il filo 
della geometria a chi li guardava mi parvero […] come una TAC arcaica: questo labirinto sei tu 
stesso che mi stai guardando, è il tuo pensiero, mi diceva quella tavoletta. […] Forse ero troppo 
occupato a pensare […] a Freud, ingegnoso Dedalo che aveva pensato di poter percorrere il 
labirinto in senso inverso per trovare il punto di partenza. Ma dov’è il punto di partenza del 
labirinto?587 
 
As indicated in chapter 2, Tabucchi’s unheimliche inhabits the labyrinth rather than trying 
to evade it. Accordingly, the labyrinthine unconscious disrupts any conclusive narrative, 
while also marking the condition that enables writing itself. Tabucchi’s Freudian Daedalus 
must look at and, at that very moment, misses the unconscious in order to authentically 
                                                        
586 Racconti, p. 415. Weber observes that the temporality of the uncanny is ‘that of the ‘coup de théâtre’, of 
theatricality as a coup, a blow or a Schlag that gives the beat, marks time, but also interrupts the expectation 
of a continuous, progressive, linear-teleological course of events’ (The Legend, p. 16, italicised). 
587 Viaggi, pp. 203-04, italicised. 
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dwell in it. The writer explores this idea in his Sogni di sogni, which commences with 
Daedalus’ dream and ends with Freud’s nightmare of being turned into his patient Dora: 
 
La notte del ventidue di settembre del 1939, il giorno prima di morire, il dottor Sigmund Freud, 
interprete di sogni altrui, fece un sogno. Sognò che era diventato Dora e che stava attraversando 
Vienna bombardata. […] Il dottor Freud sentì un grande smarrimento e si lasciò cadere sul divano. 
E in quel momento si svegliò. Era la sua ultima notte, ma lui non lo sapeva.588 
 
Compiling his catalogue of ‘coloro che sognano in questo libro’, Tabucchi hypothesises 
that Daedalus might be considered as ‘forse un nostro sogno’,589 while he writes of Freud 
that: 
 
[I]nterpretò i sogni degli uomini […], intendendo risalire da quelli all’infelicità che ci perseguita. 
Sostenne che l’uomo, dentro di sé, ha un grumo oscuro che egli chiamò Inconscio. I suoi Casi 
clinici possono essere letti come ingegnosi romanzi. Es, Io e Super-Io sono la sua Trinità. E, forse, 
ancora la nostra.590 
 
However, one might read Sogni di sogni backwards, from Freud’s nightmare to Daedalus’ 
labyrinth, that is, not from a reverie towards its lucid, rational explanation, but, on the 
contrary, from wakeful consciousness towards the nocturnal,591 following the movement of 
the uncanny, which awakens to and inside the night. Recalling Agamben’s reproach of 
Oedipus’ folly, this reversed reading would imply a view of the unconscious not as an 
obscure meaning to be rationally deciphered – at the core of the lay understanding of 
psychoanalysis Tabucchi incorporates and criticises in his writings –, but as a fracture to be 
sustained.  
The posthumous story Isabella e l’ombra expresses precisely a view of the unconscious as 
a fissure. The protagonist of this text is Isabella, a famous painter who, already in 
childhood, displayed an ability to ‘pensa[re] per colori’;592 a potentiality of signification 
that her teacher and parents failed, at least at the beginning, to comprehend. The narration 
ends on her decision, as an adult and affirmed artist, to incorporate, alongside colours, also 
the shadow, which finds its symbolic dwelling place in the painting she is creating – 
                                                        
588 Sogni di sogni, pp. 76-77. 
589 Ibid., p. 81. 
590 Ibid., p. 86. 
591 As Loton observes, ‘i sogni non si spiegano, non avvengono sul terreno del formulabile come vorrebbe 
farci credere il dottor Freud’ (La testa perduta, p. 171). 
592 Isabella e l’ombra, p. 11. 
  156 
‘Resta, povera ombra […] sta arrivando la notte e ti inghiottirebbe. Mettiti pure comoda 
nel quadro che preferisci, questa è casa tua’.593 The shadow is Isabella’s blindspot. That it 
inhabits her picture metaphorically alludes to the negative ability of the unconscious, its 
capacity to sustain, and not to fill, but to inhabit the void. For, as discussed in chapter 2, 
what distinguishes man is the uncanny as an ontological homelessness, the possibility and 
power to articulate sense, to create a meaningful, although not totalising (hence nihilistic) 
practice of signification. 
 
 
4.2.2 The Collective Unconscious 
 
Alongside the individual unconscious, Tabucchi’s semiotic other is expressed in the 
dimension of the collective unconscious. I adopt the expression ‘collective unconscious’ to 
define a sociocultural experience and discourse of truth: it designates what has been 
historically – or still is, at the moment of writing – repressed. In Tabucchi, the collective 
unconscious comprises all ‘those untextualized traces of past reality that survive in 
conscious and unconscious memory […] latent, disparate elements of the past […] its 
unwritten detritus’ 594 Following Orlando’s terminology, discussed in chapter 1, I argue 
that the ‘collective unconscious’ in Tabucchi’s texts constitutes both: a ‘ritorno del 
represso formale’, inasmuch as it occurs as a semiotic experience exposing the opacity of 
linguistic signification; and a ‘ritorno del represso ideologico-politico nella sostanza del 
contenuto’, in that what is repressed is a (ideological, political, cultural) discourse that has 
been either accepted by the individual but not by the society (‘accettato ma non 
propugnato’, in Orlando’s terms) or acknowledged solely by a minority group 
(‘propugnato ma non autorizzato’).595 Tabucchi’s collective unconscious, therefore, is 
                                                        
593 Ibid., p. 15. 
594 Narrating Postmodern, p. 108.  
595 Meaningfully, Orlando openly distances his formulation of the collective unconscious from a Jungian one. 
In ‘The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious’, Jung defines the latter as ‘universal and impersonal’, 
which ‘consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes […] which give definite forms to certain psychic 
contents’. Carl Jung, Collected Works, vol. 9, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), par. 110. However, for Orlando, this definition lacks a proper historical problematisation, as the 
Jungian collective unconscious turns out to be ‘estraneo a evoluzione storica’ (Chap 9, para. 7, location 
2893). Accordingly, in this research I follow Orlando’s position rather than Jung’s. Strikingly, in Requiem 
Tabucchi mocks Jungian psychoanalysis, as the character of Tadeus affirms that ‘io ho sempre preferito il 
materiale all’immaginario […] anche l’immaginario collettivo, bisogna cantarglielo chiaro al signor Jung, 
prima dell’immaginario viene la pappa’ (p. 45). 
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made up of those ‘collective desires and wish-images, the forgotten future in the past […] 
of which the individuals were and are aware only in the form of mute suffering and 
anxiety’.596The collective unconscious in Tabucchi’s works comprises all those other 
discourses that constitute a semantic vacuum by virtue of having never entered official 
narrations.  
Similarly to the individual one, it issues from the demand to look differently at what is 
other, as Tabucchi addresses the collective unconscious through a cluster of optical motifs.  
 
This is the case, for instance, with the windows in Piazza d’Italia,597 which embody and 
amplify the dreads and expectations of the inhabitants of Borgo. Tabucchi ascribes to the 
windows the function of Maria’s corpse in ‘Il gioco del rovescio’, that of a blindspot, 
which lacerates any symbolic narrative of collectively traumatic events. Initially, he writes 
that ‘quell’inverno le finestre del paese erano restate cieche per una settimana, perché 
c’erano in giro le febbri’.598 Later on in the novel this equivalence between the gaze and 
the window (and between in-visibility and in-significability) is made even more blatant, on 
the occasion of the Nazis’ devastation of the town: ‘Dicono che all’alba di quel mattino 
partirono le finestre. […] Le case, con le occhiaie vuote, dicevano la resa’.599 Finally, 
Garibaldo’s imminent death – he is shot by the police while publicly protesting against the 
government – is presaged by ‘un gemito di cardini e di legno’ that, in the character’s 
hallucinated dream, allows for an identification between the windows and his tombstone: 
‘si girò a guardare la lapide. Ma non era una lapide, era la finestra di camera sua’.600 
In Piazza d’Italia, alongside the windows, another image, which is related to mechanisms 
of  vision and representation, visualises the collective unconscious: the contrast between 
the ever-changing monument that sanctions the historical advancement of the country and 
the emptiness of the movie theatre.The symbolic reality in which history is 
monumentalised aims at recording and saturating any differential meaning, incorporating 
and adapting, each time, the grand narrative of official events: while at the beginning it is 
noticed how ‘[a] Plinio il nuovo monumento piaceva molto di più: c’era un soldato con 
capelli al vento e sciabola al fianco che offriva sulle braccia una bambina a un signore 
                                                        
596 George Markus, ‘Benjamin’s Critique of Aesthetic Autonomy’, in Walter Benjamin and the Architecture 
of Modernity, ed. by Andrew Benjamin and Charles Rice (Melbourne: Re.press, 2009), pp. 111-28 (p. 125). 
597 Structured as a family saga set in the Tuscan village of Borgo, the novel narrates Italian history from 1859 
to the rise of Christian Democracy in the aftermath of World War II. 
598 Piazza d’Italia, pp. 55-56. 
599 Ibid., p. 109. 
600 Ibid., p. 141. 
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maestoso coi baffi a punta. […] Garibaldi che consegna l’Italia al re’,601 the conclusion 
closely follows Garibaldo, who ‘si accomodò sui piedi della Democrazia cingendola con 
un braccio, per non cadere’.602 In between, the group of statues also witnesses the rise of 
Fascism: 
 
Arrivarono su due macchine, cantando Giovinezza. […] Imbracarono con le funi la statua del re che 
al primo strattone piombò al suolo in una nuvoletta di polvere, senza fare resistenza. Garibaldi per 
alcune notti, offrì l’Italia alla barberia dirimpetto. Qualche settimana dopo ci fu […] il rimpiazzo 
della statua sottratta. […] Il Duce, a torso nudo e con l’elmetto in testa, teneva il mento all’insù e 
pareva che Garibaldi gli facesse un gran favore a offrirgli l’Italia.603 
 
However, this net of familiar meanings upon which historical accounts are founded 
gravitates around a void that finds its expression in the image of the theatre fallen into 
disuse.604 At first, building the theatre seems to mirror and duplicate the aforementioned 
logic of monumentalisation: 
 
Borgo stava diventando una città. Al teatro ci lavoravano speditamente; aveva già la facciata 
completa, con un cornicione neoclassico e la Vittoria di Samotracia che indicava il nome a lettere di 
gesso in rilievo: Splendore. Avrebbe aperto, si diceva, per il prossimo carnevale, con Il paese dei 
campanelli e forse un film: Cabiria.605 
 
Conversely, it is soon made clear how the necessity to occupy and fill any space for 
potential sense lies beneath and behind the monumental attempt to spectacularise history, 
in order to cover up the lack of meaning inherent in historical events:  
 
Lo Splendore era finito. Lo avevano fatto cineteatro […]. Si sentì dire: ‘Lo inaugurano questa 
settimana’. ‘Quando?’ ‘Il giorno tal dei tali’. E si pensava: cosa daranno? Un film, un teatro? […]. 
Poi apparve il cartello di Cabiria […] ‘Lo danno! Questa volta lo danno per davvero’ […] Invece si 
                                                        
601 Ibid., p. 17. 
602 Ibid., p. 143. 
603 Ibid., p. 89. 
604 This scene might be compared to Magris’ analysis of Musil’s 1940 novel The Man Without Qualities: ‘Il 
fulcro ideale dell’impero […] è il palco vuoto dell’imperatore, il palco riservato – in ogni teatro di ogni città 
della monarchia – per l’eventuale visita del sovrano e nel quale il sovrano non compare mai’, and which turns 
into the symbol of ‘verità dell’assenza o della latitanza di senso, che […] non implicano tuttavia mai la 
rinuncia all’esigenza o alla ricerca del senso stesso […] l’esigenza inappagabile ma insopprimibile del 
senso’. Claudio Magris, L’anello di Clarisse: grande stile e nichilismo nella letteratura moderna (Turin: 
Einaudi, 1984), pp. 3-16. 
605 Piazza d’Italia, p. 85. 
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sentì un vocione slittante, e la piazza ammutolì, presa a tradimento. Le prime parole erano: 
‘Combattenti di terra, di mare!’. Fu il primo spettacolo dello Splendore. E fu anche l’ultimo, perché 
era scoppiata la Guerra.606 
 
In the end, the theatre is completely deprived of its proper function, metaphorically 
evolving into a sort of rotten setting to be inhabited by those same voices that have been 
marginalised by any official, historical narrative607: 
 
Accanto al portone, dalla parte sinistra, pendeva il cartello di un film che avrebbe dovuto inaugurare 
il cinema una decina di anni prima. Sulla destra un manifesto giallo, scritto a mano: ‘QUESTA 
SERA AL CINE TEATRO SPLENDOR ALLE ORE 21 COMIZIO POPOLARE SUI PROBLEMI 
DELLA FABBRICA […]’.608 
 
The collective unconscious is at the core of Tabucchi’s second novel, Il piccolo naviglio. 
Indeed, the text explores the dichotomy between official, historical accounts and what has 
been omitted, silenced and repressed from such familiar versions: the narrator Capitano 
Sesto employs memory and the imagination to reconstruct the forgotten story of his own 
family. Yet, ‘forse temendo di aver ecceduto nell’immaginazione’ he seeks ‘un conforto di 
verità nelle autorevoli cronache di uno storiografo locale’, who, however ‘era avaro di 
particolari nel suo impegno statistico; faceva Storia e non storie come quelle di Capitano 
Sesto’.609 To this formal, annalistic chronicle, Sesto opposes the attempted narrative of a 
repressed, collective unconscious made up of ‘frammenti e oggetti disparati: una gru 
impagliata, un quaderno di ricette […], un temperino di madreperla […]’, aware that ‘per 
sciogliere finalmente i nodi della sua vela, aveva fretta di cominciare a scrivere questa 
storia’.610 For, not only can Capitano Sesto’s attempt to deal with and make sense of his 
private trauma – the loss of his mother and the almost integral oblivion of his childhood – 
not be detached from the broader perspective of traumatic, historical episodes such as the 
                                                        
606 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 
607 The exclusion from the official accounts epitomises the characters’ denied political agency. An exemplary 
implication of this can also be found in Garibaldo’s death, at the end of the novel, which occurs when he is 
embracing the statue of democracy, trying to deliver a public speech: ‘“La mia proposta è questa,” gridò 
Garibaldo. Si accomodò sui piedi della Democrazia cingendola con un braccio, per non cadere. […] Il 
monumento era un terreno franco, confine fra la folla e le file dei poliziotti. […] In quel momento si sentì 
uno sparo. Uno solo. Garibaldo sciolse l’abbraccio della statua e lentamente si girò su se stesso. Aprì il 
pugno alzato e il sasso rotolò sulla piazza’ (ibid., pp. 143-45). 
608 Ibid., p. 122. 
609 Il piccolo naviglio, p. 55. 
610 Ibid., pp. 201-02. 
  160 
two world wars and the Italian Resistance. But, even more notably, Sesto can only 
successfully undergo an experience of subjectivation at the moment when he understands 
that signifying the other (his unconscious) goes along with an ethical opening towards the 
other(s) (the collective unconscious). 
In exemplary fashion, Sesto tries to structure a narration of his own infancy, coming to 
terms with those voices – ‘quelle voci che parlano per comandare o per vietare o per 
domandare’ –611 and images – such as entering the disturbing scene of a tapestry – 
experienced long before they could gain access to ‘l’archivio dei ricordi ricordabili’612: 
 
E pensando e ripensando, frugando in un archivio in cui aveva schedato i ricordi ricordabili […]  in 
oscuri cantucci, rimuoveva tappezzerie, riascoltava conversazioni di cui gli restavano schegge, 
frammenti, spezzoni rosicchiati e ammuffiti […].613 
 
After his mother’s death, he chooses silence, resisting the temptation ‘di aprire la benché 
minima breccia nella sua campana di vetro, il più piccolo forellino attraverso cui si 
potessero insinuare le voci che parlavano per domandare, per proibire o per comandare’.614 
These could be read as instances of the nihilistic, representational regime of metaphysical 
signification, in relation to which Sesto’s silence performs Agamben’s idea of infancy as 
the experience of the taking place of language, before and beyond any rigid signified. Not 
speaking, Sesto dwells in the potentiality to speak, which compares to man’s ‘statuto 
poetico’: his silence is not a lack of sense, but a fracture thereof. 
Capitano Sesto’s narration constitutes, therefore, an attempt to negotiate a possibility of 
meaning and of identity – ‘come una vela da sciogliere’615 –, which has to make room, 
within the symbolic practice of language, for the unconscious. Accordingly, the narrator’s 
poetical apprenticeship, in the conclusive chapters, might be read as an archetypical 
demonstration of the negative capability of the uncanny. For, it is the othering of language 
that makes it possible to dwell within an unsaturated symbolic, as the unconscious is 
                                                        
611 Ibid., p. 114. 
612 Ibid., p. 143. Thus, Sesto struggles to represent both his repressed and non-repressed unconscious: while 
the former defines ‘ordinary repressed memories’, the latter includes ‘the most archaic mnestic traces […] 
registered only in a non-representational form’ and which constitute ‘the only memory available in the first 
two years of life’ (Civitarese, pp. 8-9). 
613 Il piccolo naviglio, pp. 150-51. 
614 Ibid., pp. 146-47. 
615 Ibid., p. 157. 
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‘quella lacuna della nostra storia che attende ancora di essere pensata e scritta’.616 Having 
moved to Florence at the end of his adolescence, Sesto becomes friends with Socrate, ‘un 
vecchio filosofo’ who ‘dialogava con le cose. Le toccava, le accarezzava, le scomponeva, 
gli faceva il solletico, vi si tuffava: le guardava dal di dentro come un sottomarino che fa 
rotta dentro le cose’.617 Significantly, 
 
Fu lì che Sesto […] cominciò a sospettare che per conoscere il mondo bisogna prima di tutto 
conoscere noi stessi. A quel tempo […] cominciò anche a scrivere brevi poesie […] dalle quali 
ricavava poi leggeri aeroplani di carta che faceva planare sull’Arno […]. Imbiancò l’Arno di 
foglietti che parlavano di una realtà impenetrabile disposta in versi liberi […] perché essi non 
facevano neppure in tempo a essere registrati nell’archivio dei ricordi ricordabili: si 
materializzavano in subitanei aeroplani di carta […].618 
 
This dual movement from the unconscious to consciousness and from empty signs to 
authentic words leads Sesto to experience a sort of uncanny epiphany, which is both de-
realising and revealing: 
 
Ma un giorno Sesto […] si accorse che non aveva aeroplani di carta da buttare nel fiume […] e si 
mise a guardare l’acqua del fiume. […] E come quando l’udito si libera in una discesa, le orecchie 
di Sesto si stapparono ed egli cominciò a sentire il brusio del mondo che scorreva. Sentiva la voce 
interna delle cose […]. E capì, anche all’improvviso, con un senso di panico e di meraviglia come si 
addice a un poeta senza poesia, di essere il punto di un tempo in progressione […] ed ebbe voglia di 
allungare la mano verso il fiume delle cose per pescarsi, per afferrare il piccolo naviglio detto Sesto 
[…]. [S]apeva solo che esisteva, nascosta da qualche parte, una poesia da scoprire che potesse 
insegnare a navigare al piccolo naviglio […].619 
 
The attempt to make sense of himself, of his own identity, ‘di sillabare un nodo che lo 
ingombrava’, in the belief that ‘sarebbe salpato verso se stesso, avrebbe dato un senso a 
quei due punti sui quali si arrestava la sua unica poesia interrotta’,620 as anticipated, 
reaches its climax when Sesto understands how signifying the other – experiencing the 
unconscious – requires and evolves into the gesture of signifying for the other (in his case, 
Ivana) – as  
                                                        
616  Massimo Recalcati, Elogio dell’inconscio. Dodici argomenti in difesa della psicoanalisi (Milan: 
Mondadori, 2007), p. 70. 
617 Il piccolo naviglio, p. 157. 
618 Ibid., p. 158. 
619 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
620 Ibid., pp. 161-62. 
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[U]no squarcio chiaro, un’illuminazione, una liberazione […] sentì, con un immensa sensazione di 
vuoto, tutto il vuoto che c’era oltre i suoi due punti e si mise a correre senza mèta. Si mise a correre 
verso l’Ivana detta Rosa, senza sapere ancora che esistesse.621  
 
Sesto feels and dwells in the void that uncovers uncanniness, man’s sense of not-being-at-
home, the fact that individuals exist as producers of meaning: the colon symbolises a 
caesura that is also an articulation, a linguistic fold laying bare the taking place of language 
itself. This is the withdrawal, the letting go of familiar sense and the grounding of 
unfamiliarity as the possibility of sense making. Sesto is not, as Pezzin has contended, 
‘significanza senza aggancio alla realtà’,622 as he personifies a demand and a quest for 
unsaturated sense, the non-propositional, poietic language of the unconscious. 
 
 
4.3 Objects and Modes of the Uncanny Reversal: Reconsidering Maria’s Gaze 
 
The next sections focus on the most significant, and thus far less widely addressed, 
diegetic images and discursive modes of the unconscious in Tabucchi. For, the latter forms 
an uncanny gaze that questions and withdraws pre-existing precepts and visual practices, 
seeking a potential view, a different logic of sense making. 
 
Nonetheless, this is evident already in short story ‘Il gioco del rovescio’, the first text to be 
explicitly and programmatically informed by the idea of the reversal, and which is utterly 
dominated by Maria do Cadmo’s gaze. For this reason I will first analyse the story, in 
order to identify and interrogate those motifs and rhetorical strategies associated with the 
unconscious.  
What kind of gaze is Maria’s? And in what ways is it represented or, better, performed in 
its sense making function by Tabucchi’s narrative? That death makes it impossible for the 
narrator to see her body for the last time – ‘Posso vederla?, chiesi. […] Non è possibile, 
disse, è alla clinica Cuf, è morta là, e poi il medico ha dato ordine di chiuderla, non era 
possibile lasciarla aperta, date le condizioni’623 – acquires a metaphorical value of darkness 
and opacity: Maria’s corpse functions as the blindspot within the protagonist’s (and the 
reader’s) eye. This is made explicit when, turning the woman’s regard into the gaze of 
                                                        
621 Ibid., p. 166. 
622 Claudio Pezzin, Antonio Tabucchi (Sommacampagna: Cierre, 2009), p. 21. 
623 Il gioco, pp. 20-21. 
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Velázquez’ painting, Las Meninas, the narrator undergoes an aesthetic and oneiric 
experience that erases the boundary between art and life. Initially, he is informed of 
Maria’s death while staring at the picture: ‘Quando Maria do Carmo Meneses de Sequeira 
morì, io stavo guardando Las Meninas di Velázquez’.624 And symmetrically, the story 
concludes with the protagonist dreaming of ‘linee prospettiche che convergevano verso il 
punto di fuga di un quadro, il quadro era Las Meninas di Velázquez, la figura di fondo […] 
che buffo, quella figura di fondo era Maria do Carmo col suo vestito giallo’.625 The woman 
evades from, is extimate to what can be seen. This is evidenced not only by the fact that 
her corpse is invisible, lying outside the scopic field; but, also, in relation to the figure of 
the painting onto which the narrator overwrites Maria’s appearances. This figure is that of 
the man in the doorway, caught in the act of leaving the scene, of withdrawing from 
representation. He constitutes the geometrical vanishing point626 of Las Meninas, regarding 
whom Maria would say that ‘la chiave del quadro sta nella figura di fondo, è un gioco del 
rovescio’.627  
In the story, the woman’s glance is personified, for instance, by the sound of ‘il motore di 
un piccolo rimorchiatore azzurro’, which initially appears in the guise of the narrator’s 
hallucination – ‘mi trovavo in uno strano dormiveglia, fuori ronzava il traffico della città e 
nella camera ronzava il condizionatore d’aria che però nella mia coscienza era il motore di 
un piccolo rimorchiatore’.628 Secondly, the reader discovers that the little towboat belongs 
to Ode Marittima, a poem by Pessoa’s heteronym Alvaro de Campos, of which Maria 
‘recitava qualche verso’ commenting that ‘Pessoa è un genio, perché ha capito il risvolto 
delle cose, del reale e dell’immaginato, la sua poesia è un juego del revés’;629 ‘il suono di 
una sirena, forse una nave che entrava in porto’630 is later heard by the narrator during his 
discussion with Maria’s husband, Nuno Meneses de Sequeira. And finally, the protagonist 
overhears ‘il fischio lontano di una sirena attutito dal cuscino sul quale poggiavo la 
guancia’ that turns into an oneiric impression inspired by Campos’ ode – ‘e in quel 
                                                        
624 Ibid., p. 11. 
625 Ibid., p. 24. 
626 After all, for Tabucchi, far from signalling the mastery of an enclosed perspectival vision, the vanishing 
point ‘è un luogo geometrico, perché si sposta mentre noi ci spostiamo’ (Il filo, p. 107). Thus, the writer 
appropriates and reverses what was the apex and the key concept behind the geometrical optical regime. 
627 Il gioco, p. 11. 
628 Il gioco, p. 11. 
629 Ibid., p. 13. 
630 Ibid., p. 22. Indeed, Tabucchi once explained that in Pessoa this is the ‘metafora di un Molo Assoluto a 
cui l’uomo approda per poi partire verso l’ignoto’. Viaggi e altri viaggi, (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2010), p. 202. 
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momento la sirena fischiò un’altra volta, la nave attraccò, io scesi lentamente dalla 
passerella e cominciai a seguire i moli’.631  
Answering the first question – what gaze is Maria’s? – therefore means recognising the 
reversal as an ontological gaze, disregarding metaphysical binary oppositions and making 
room for the simultaneous articulating of different, if not opposite, potentialities of sense. 
This is testified by Velázquez’ painting itself,632 which metaleptically represents the 
gesture it is performing: the schism between the perspectival eye and the disquieting 
gazing of the unconscious. Maria’s is the gaze that comes forth and perforates the familiar 
veil of reality, and which becomes visible only in the fissure between different 
perspectives. In Tabucchi’s text this is symbolised by her multiple, controversial identities, 
so that the narrator and the reader never get to know whether she was a conservative 
landowner supporting Salazar’s regime or a subversive republican born to exiled parents in 
Argentina – ‘a Maria do Carmo piaceva molto un gioco, lo ha giocato per tutta la vita […] 
lei deve essere capitato in un suo rovescio’.633 The optical modality of the unconscious, the 
writer’s ‘rovescio’, presupposes a mutual modification between the seer and the seen, 
insofar as the movement and change in point of view of the one corresponds to the 
overturning of the other. Consequently, it could be argued that the uncanny reversal is a 
form of parallax view, borrowing Žižek’s formula for the optical mechanism of the 
(Lacanian) real: 
 
The common definition of parallax is: the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its 
position against a background), caused by a change in observational position that provides a new 
line of sight. The philosophical twist to be added, of course, is that the observed difference is not 
simply ‘subjective,’ due to the fact that the same object which exists ‘out there’ is seen from two 
different stations, or points of view. It is rather that […] an ‘epistemological’ shift in the subject's 
point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ shift in the object itself. Or, to put it in Lacanese, the 
subject’s gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its ‘blind 
spot,’ that which is ‘in the object more than object itself,’ the point from which the object itself 
returns the gaze.634 
                                                        
631 Il gioco, p. 24. 
632 In Tabucchi’s words, ‘si tratta di una tela che […] in realtà è un concetto basato sul punto di vista, sul 
modo di guardare e di essere guardati, e che divaga su ciò che significa guardare ed essere guardati’ (‘La 
letteratura come enigma’, p. 50).  
633 Il gioco, p. 22. 
634 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), p. 17. Similarly in Il filo, shifting 
perspectives are Tabucchi’s narrative equivalent for the protagonist’s metaphysical detection and for its 
underlying tension between semantic blindness and semiotic insights: as Rustioni indicates, ‘linea mobile 
dello sguardo, il filo dell’orizzonte è un luogo geometrico inafferrabile perché muta col variare della 
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This is why, to answer the second question (how does Tabucchi produce Maria’s gaze?), 
the latter works as the centre of a sort of optical and nocturnal narrative vortex. Several 
visual elements belong to the diegetic level. In addition to Las Meninas, one should 
mention: the iterated references to the window, which are emblematically associated with 
the figure of Maria – ‘lei mi aspettava da dietro una finestra’, ‘non ce la facevo più a 
vedere quel cortile dalla mia finestra’;635 the train window, facing which the narrator 
undergoes an experience of depersonalisation – ‘dal finestrino si vedevano le luci della 
cittadina di frontiera’ staring at which ‘provavo una sensazione stranissima, come se 
dall’alto stessi a guardare un altro me stesso’;636 the correspondence between the closed 
environment inhabited by Nuno Meneses de Sequeira and an exhibited, even tangible, 
nihilistic blindness – ‘le imposte erano chiuse e nella stanza ristagnava un odore greve di 
vecchia tappezzeria […] si alzò, andò alla finestra, dischiuse leggermente le imposte’, 
although, while he is mocking the protagonist’s illusion of having known the real Maria, 
‘dalla finestra arrivò il suono di una sirena, forse di una nave che entrava in porto’;637 and, 
tellingly, there is also a merely virtual window, the one described in Pessoa’s heteronym 
Alvaro do Campos’ poem Lisbon revisited, ‘una poesia nella quale una persona è alla 
finestra della sua infanzia, ma non è più la stessa persona e non è più la stessa finestra’, 
which merges optical and temporal illusions, at once offering and dislodging the possibility 
of a palindromic temporality.638 Accordingly, from a temporal perspective, the story 
oscillates between an awareness of the irreversible passing of chronological time and the 
fact that the latter is reversed in a dual sense: collapsing the linearity between past and 
present (mostly on the level of the narration, juxtaposing diegetic present and memories of 
multi-layered pasts), and introducing the dimension of potentiality inside and beyond mere 
actuality.  
The component of unconscious potentiality also informs the second thematic cluster that 
Tabucchi adopts in his strategy of the uncanny ‘rovescio’, which intermingles dreaming, 
insomnia and awakening: ‘Mi svegliò il telefono verso le cinque, o forse non mi svegliò, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
posizione e del punto di vista del soggetto’. Thus, the title of the novel figuratively hints at the optical 
rationale structuring Spino’s quest for a truth – Nobodi’s identity – that is impossible to pin down, which 
Spino helps to shape, as ‘il reale può dirsi conosciuto solo se comunica con quanto in esso rimane 
incommensurabile e al di là di ogni criterio di dimostrabilità’. Marco Rustioni, ‘Un’ignota geometria. Note 
sul Filo dell’orizzonte’, in I ‘notturni’, pp. 209-17 (p. 210). 
635 Il gioco, p. 12-15. 
636 Ibid., pp. 13-14.  
637 Ibid., pp. 20-22. 
638 Ibid., p. 16. 
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mi trovavo in uno strano dormiveglia’; ‘Mi preparai a una notte di insonnia […] ma 
contrariamente al previsto fino ai dintorni di Talavera de la Reina dormii profondamente. 
Poi giacqui immobile, sveglio, a guardare il finestrino buio sul buio deserto 
dell’Estremadura’, up to the conclusion ‘E mi trovai in un altro sogno’.639 The coincidence 
between the reversal and the dream and their triangular relationship with visibility is 
suggested by the narration itself, at the moment when the protagonist realises that the 
French word rêves (dreams) and the Spanish reves (reverse), namely the reverse of the 
term ‘sever’, which the woman left for him as her final note, ‘coincidevano in un punto 
[…] il punto di fuga di una prospettiva […] Maria do Carmo’.640 For, Tabucchi observes, 
‘non solo la realtà è rovesciabile, ma anche il sogno, affinché vadano l’uno incontro 
all’altro, entrambi nel loro rovescio’.641 The unconscious is a mode of semiotic experience, 
a potentiality and mechanism of sense, which is not exhausted in any one signified. A clear 
illustration of this can be found, for instance, in the insisted use of the adverb ‘forse’ 
throughout the story.  
Despite the narrator’s questioning – ‘tu vedi il rovescio del quadro, che cosa si vede da 
codesta parte?’642 – Maria cannot say what she sees from her reversed position, because the 
unconscious defies any monolithic, conclusive attribution of sense. The ambivalence 
intrinsic to her final message points to the need to articulate a negotiation of meaning 
capable of sustaining the nocturnal blindness, which does not seek any final, fixed, familiar 
truth. Looking backward at the reversal, hence re-turning from the linguistic pair 
dream/reverse to the original (English) term ‘sever’, Maria’s message might be read as an 
indication of that very logic of separation or split (between consciousness and the 
unconscious, and the signifier and the signified) that belongs to Tabucchi’s poetics of the 
uncanny, hence suggesting that this is a message that can be neither pinned down nor 
deciphered, producing instead a withdrawal of sense, an incessant questioning instead of 
an answer. But the term ‘sever’ could also allude to Maria’s own parting from the narrator. 
This is a moment of separation and estrangement, which is, however, a productive 
opening: for it is solely the caesura between the two characters that moves him, that makes 
him part with/towards Maria, towards the night, just as it is only the bar in the Saussurean 
sign that triggers uncanny signification. Ending on the narrator’s oneiric de-parture – ‘mi 
                                                        
639 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
640 Ibid., p. 24. 
641 Di tutto, p. 105. 
642 Il gioco, p. 24. 
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incamminai verso quel punto. E in quel momento mi trovai in un altro sogno’643 – the text 





When discussing Tabucchi’s diegetic use of pictures, it is important to assess how the 
camera works in his stories, on what specific aspects of the photographic process the 
author focuses the narrative attention and whether it is aimed at reinforcing the symbolic 
reality or at making room for an uncanny encounter with the real. As Trentini 
contends,‘[m]etafora dello scrivere, la fotografia racchiude in sé la potenzialità di una 
rappresentazione, pur parziale e frammentata, del mondo’. 644  Photography concerns 
Tabucchi because and to the extent to which it constitutes a singular grammar of sense 
making: he uses the dual semiotic facet of the photographic image, that of being both an 
icon and an index, to orchestrate a broader, theoretical juxtaposition between photography 
as representational sign and as poietic gesture.645  
This is what distinguishes, for instance, the photographic approach of the mass media from 
those of the protagonists in Tabucchi’s detective novels Il filo dell’orizzonte and La testa 
perduta. In Il filo, Spino’s search for the identity of the anonymous corpse significantly 
takes place in his spatial as much as symbolic dwelling on the threshold between life and 
death – working in a morgue, he is the one who ‘[a]mministra l’anticamera della definitiva 
scomparsa della loro immagine visibile’.646 
While journalistic chronicles remain attached merely to raw facts – ‘solo pura cronaca, 
senza supposizioni e arabeschi’ –,647 Spino’s own metaphysical detection performs a shift 
in paradigm, from the supremacy of actualised events to the metaphoric plane of possibilia. 
Two main visual turning points accelerate and direct his quest: initially, an observation 
made by his girlfriend while looking at the picture of the deceased in a newspaper – ‘[c]on 
                                                        
643 Ibid. 
644 Nives Trentini, Una scrittura in partita doppia. Tabucchi fra romanzo e racconto (Rome: Bulzoni, 2003), 
p. 90. 
645 In his 1867 article ‘On A New List of Categories’, the philosopher Charles S. Peirce firstly divided signs 
into icons, which are related to their referents through similarity, indexes, having a physical connection with 
their referents, and symbols, which arbitrarily and conventionally signify their objects. 
646 Il filo, p. 10. 
647 Ibid., p. 50. 
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la barba e venti anni di meno potresti essere tu’648 – and, later on, his decision to enlarge a 
picture found in the pocket of the deceased boy:   
 
Nella vasca del reagente i contorni sembrava stentassero a delinearsi, come se un reale lontano e 
trascorso, irrevocabile, fosse riluttante a essere resuscitato, si opponesse alla profanazione di occhi 
curiosi ed estranei, al risveglio in un contesto che non gli apparteneva. […] Un graffio, che 
l’espositore ha ingrandito a dismisura, sfregia diagonalmente i loro corpi e il loro paesaggio. È un 
graffio involontario di un’unghia, l’inevitabile usura delle cose, la traccia di un metallo (chiavi, 
orologi, accendisigari) con il quale quei visi hanno coabitato in tasche e cassetti? Oppure è il segno 
volontario di una mano che voleva elidere quel passato? Ma quel passato, comunque, è ora un altro 
presente, si offre suo malgrado a una decifrazione.649 
 
Three points should be stressed in this quote: firstly, Tabucchi openly compares Spino’s 
gaze to an act of profanation and awakening; secondly, the scratch might be understood as 
a literal and metaphorical punctum piercing the representation, as well as a blindspot in the 
visual field it displays; and finally, the photographic image is adopted as a signifier 
belonging to a different semiosis. Although it seems to offer itself up to a sort of Oedipal 
deciphering, the picture is not a propositional sign, for it has no truth (or identity) to reveal, 
apart from that of its own signifying function (e.g. how identity is constructed). This is 
why Spino’s detection is uncannily structured. He refuses to accept a reality ‘dai contorni 
troppo netti, come una fotografia contrastata, la luce e l’ombra si scontrano con 
prepotenza, senza coniugarsi’, becoming aware that, facing the real ‘è tutto buio, bisogna 
andare a tentoni’, and eventually resolves to follow, in his photographic quest, a ‘logica 
implacabile come una geometria ignota’.650 For Spino, the camera elicits and activates the 
same metaphorical reading that he applies, elsewhere in the text, to the policemen who first 
brought the corpse to the morgue – ‘quattro ragazzi dai capelli scuri e i gesti di sonnambuli 
[…] con l’andatura di chi non capisce bene quello che fa […] un balletto leggiadro e 
funesto la cui sintassi gli era ignota’651 – and to Nobodi’s death itself – ‘Così aveva fatto 
Carlo Nobodi, che da bambino si chiamava Carlito: aveva stabilito un nesso; attraverso di 
lui le cose che sono avevano trovato il modo di disegnare la loro trama’.652 As if facing a 
rebus, Spino somehow has to link the dots and allow the image of truth – the truth as image 
– to emerge. 
                                                        
648 Ibid., p. 32. 
649 Ibid., pp. 54-55, italicised. 
650 Ibid., pp. 73-98.  
651 Ibid., p. 20. 
652 Ibid., p. 99. 
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In La testa perduta Tabucchi brings to its climax the gap separating journalistic 
representation from the idea (illustrated above) of the photographic image as a mode of the 
semiotic unconscious. The protagonist Firmino, a journalist himself, is forced to face, 
accept and incorporate, within his investigation, the mainstream logic of spectacularisation, 
which imposes visual exposure and the publication of close-ups of the beheaded corpse: 
 
L’Acontecimento dedicava al caso la copertina, con un disegno violetto in cui si vedeva la silhouette 
di un corpo senza testa sormontato da un coltello gocciolante di sangue. Il titolone diceva: Ancora 
senza nome il cadavere decapitato.653 
 
The element of superficial voyeurism underpins the entire mediascape in the novel – ‘Era 
una rivista che si chiamava Vultos e dedicava le sue pagine al jet-set portoghese e 
internazionale’ 654  – as also attested to by Firmino’s editor-in-chief’s demand for a 
description of the murder ‘con molti dettagli pittoreschi, calca sul patetico e sul 
drammatico, come un bel fotoromanzo’.655 And, through an optical metalepsis that creates 
a trompe-l’oeil effect for the reader, the narrator zooms in on Firmino’s article and its 
theatrical tone: ‘Lo scenario di questa triste, misteriosa e, aggiungeremmo, truculenta 
storia, è la ridente e operosa città di Oporto’.656 
However, the protagonist struggles with his journalistic eye, as he is personally aware of 
the impossibility to rationally, frontally master the gaze of the real, epitomised by the 
shocking sight of the severed head:  
 
Firmino guardò la testa sul vassoio cercando di vincere la ripugnanza […] prese la macchina 
fotografica e scattò. Fotografò la testa e di lato. […] Firmino sentì un brivido nella schiena pensando 
all’effetto che avrebbe fatto il giornale: peggio di un film dell’orrore. […] In prima pagina la 
fotografia del volto preso di fronte […], nelle due pagine interne il profilo destro e il profilo sinistro, 
e nell’ultima pagina una fotografia classica di Oporto col Douro e il ponte di ferro, naturalmente a 
colori.657 
 
Contrasting with this traditional, postcard-like image of the city sold by the media, the 
protagonist’s attempt to come to terms with the traumatic real explains and produces the 
nocturnal tone of the novel: it is not accidental, therefore, that, towards the end, Firmino’s 
                                                        
653 La testa perduta, p. 52. 
654 Ibid., p. 60. 
655 Ibid., p. 86. 
656 Ibid., p. 89. 
657 Ibid., pp. 76-81. 
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memory of the trial against the policemen accused of Damasceno’s murder fades into a 
sort of reverie:  
 
Di quella giornata Firmino avrebbe poi ricordato soprattutto le sensazioni fisiche, precise e insieme 
quasi estranee, come se non lo riguardassero, come se una pellicola protettiva lo isolasse in una 
specie di dormiveglia nel quale le informazioni dei sensi sono registrate dalla coscienza, ma il 
cervello non è capace di elaborarle razionalmente, e rimangono a fluttuare come vaghi stati d’animo 
[…].658 
 
In Per Isabel Tabucchi establishes a parallelism between the photographic image and the 
mandala, inasmuch as both serve to ‘arrivare alla conoscenza’.659 As the novel develops in 
the form of an inner quest, it is in turn impossible for the narrator – embodying the 
signifying function of the unconscious – to be photographed. The unconscious is described 
as ‘un luogo troppo luminoso, […] così luminoso che l'obiettivo fotografico a volte rimane 
abbagliato’,660 precisely because it is the unconscious itself that functions as a camera in 
the story. Searching for Isabel, the protagonist Tadeus meets a photographer who explicitly 
compares the photographic image to a gaze, that of the real, that of life, from which men 
are always looked at in advance: 
 
Mi […] lasci filosofeggiare, perlomeno su quest’ultima foto, mi viene in mente che qualcuno ha 
detto che la fotografia è la morte perché fissa l’attimo irripetibile. Si passò la fotografia fra le dita, 
proprio come se fosse un gioco di carte, e continuò: ma poi mi chiedo ancora: e se invece fosse la 
vita?, la vita con la sua immanenza e la sua perentorietà che si lascia sorprendere in un attimo e ci 
guarda con sarcasmo, perché è lì, fissa, immutabile, e invece noi viviamo nella mutazione, e allora 
penso che la fotografia, come la musica, coglie l'attimo che non riusciamo a cogliere, ciò che siamo 
stati, ciò che avremmo potuto essere, e contro questo attimo non c’è niente da fare, perché ha più 
ragione di noi, ma ragione di che cosa?, forse ragione del cambiamento di questo fiume che scorre e 
che ci trascina, e dell’orologio, del tempo che ci domina e che noi cerchiamo di dominare.661 
 
Photography can compare to death only if observed as a sign to be deciphered. Yet it is life 
(and thus, metaphorically, the potentiality for signification and literature) when recognised 
as the blindspot in the narrator’s scopic field. Significantly, Tadeus’ search for Isabel 
                                                        
658 Ibid., p. 207. 
659 Per Isabel, p. 65.  
660 Ibid., p. 68. 
661 Ibid., pp. 67. 
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evokes Orpheus’ myth.662 In both cases, a male protagonist (Tadeus, Orpheus) loves a dead 
woman (Isabel, Eurydice) and tries to bring her back to life. In Tabucchi’s novel, though, 
this is purely symbolic, for it is only the narrator’s act of recalling and mourning that 
makes Isabel live again. While Orpheus is the protagonist of a katabasis, as he actually 
descends into underworld regions, Tadeus experiences a nekyia, summoning and 
encountering the dead in what arguably is, however, solely an inner journey. Tadeus is 
driven by remorse: he wants to know what happened to Isabel and if she was pregnant by 
him when they split: ‘volevi liberarti dei tuoi rimorsi, non ero tanto io che tu cercavi, ma te 
stesso, un’assoluzione e una risposta’.663 His quest is structured as a question that he asks 
all the characters he encounters: ‘where is Isabel?’ Nonetheless, it is an uncanny 
interrogation, since no final answer or closure is really possible in the story: the mandala is 
not the discovery of a truth, but its production. 
The couple Tadeus-Isabel already appears in Requiem and in the short story ‘Voci portate 
da qualcosa’: in the two texts, Tadeus is a long-time dead friend of the first-person 
narrator, yet they give no information on whether or not the woman is still alive. The 
situation is reversed in Per Isabel, as Isabel is certainly dead, but the reader is left 
wondering if Tadeus, who defines himself as a pulsar, is also deceased. Yet, Isabel’s tomb 
is twice empty: firstly at the beginning of the story, when her death is just a pretense, and, 
secondly, at the end of the novel, when she tells Tadeus that she was laid to rest in ‘un 
minuscolo cimitero, nel viale di centro, tra le tombe più povere […in] una tomba 
disadorna’,664 which is, however, a cenotaph. Similarly to Maria do Carmo, her corpse is 
out of sight. This constitutes a diegetic and narrative vacuum around which the story 
gravitates without filling it: when the mandala is completed, the void is not filled, but 
rather sustained as such, or, as she tells Tadeus, ‘il tuo centro è il mio nulla in cui mi trovo 
ora’.665 Placing a picture of the woman at the centre of the mandala, Tadeus finally sees 
her: the picture is what keeps the woman visible as invisible, a symbol of that other night 
which makes room for an authentically nocturnal practice of signification. 
 
E in quel momento vidi Isabel. […] E proprio in quel momento mi parve di riconoscere quel golfo e 
le sue luci, e io le chiesi con una certa angoscia, Isabel, dove siamo? Siamo nel nostro allora, rispose 
                                                        
662 The story is well-known: Orpheus, playing his lyre, is granted by the infernal gods the opportunity to lead 
his beloved Eurydice from the underworld regions back to life, on the condition that he resists turning around 
to look at her before full daylight is reached. Yet Orpheus cannot resist, and as a result of his gazing upon 
Eurydice, she is lost forever to the deadly darkness. 




Isabel. Le presi la mano e le dissi: spiegati meglio, ti prego. Il vaporetto ha attraversato la quinta 
parete, rispose Isabel, siamo nel nostro allora, vedi, quelle sono le luci del Portinho da Arràbida, 
siamo partiti da Setùbal, è il vaporetto che ci porta da Setùbal al Portinho da Arràbida, siamo nella 
notte in cui ci dicemmo addio, sul vaporetto di quella notte, ti ricordi?, siamo nel nostro allora. Ma 
non si può essere contemporaneamente nell’ora e nell’allora, risposi, Isabel, non è possibile, ora 
siamo nel nostro ora. L’ora e l’allora si sono annullati, rispose Isabel, tu mi stai dicendo addio come 
a quel tempo, ma siamo nel nostro presente, il presente di ciascuno di noi, e tu mi stai dicendo 
addio.666 
 
‘Questa la porto con me […] di tutto resta un poco, a volte un’immagine’,667 Tadeus 
eventually admits. The picture functions like Orpheus’ gaze: it loses the woman because 
this is the only way to signify her, to sustain her (as a) void.  
 
 
4.3.2 Ocular Instruments 
 
For Tabucchi, binoculars and microscopes function as reversed prosthetic eyes: far from 
improving man’s perspectival sight, they embody and widen the blindspot inherent in 
human vision, which is what makes ocular instruments figuratively work as the basis for 
and the limits to uncanny signification. Binoculars symbolise the uncanny withdrawal of 
the familiar: looking at what is distant distances the viewer from himself and his reality. 
Microscopes embody the uncanny movement of ontological insight, a type of topological 
nearness, offering what Tabucchi calls ‘microprospettiva […] una forma di concentrare 
                                                        
666 Ibid., p. 114-15. Tellingly, in the final chapter Tadeus finds out how his quest has been ‘guided’ by ‘il 
Violinista Matto’, who admits: ‘io conosco tutto il suo percorso, è da quando lei è arrivato che la seguo, anzi 
in qualche modo ho diretto tutto lo spartito […] sono io che dirigo i suoi cerchi concentrici’ (ibid., pp. 112-
14). The final circle, where the encounter with Isabel takes place, is traced by the fiddler himself: ‘[p]oi prese 
il suo archetto e disegnò sulla sabbia un piccolo cerchio. Siamo arrivati al centro, mi sussurrò, mi dia la 
fotografia di Isabel. Io gliela porsi e lui la collocò al centro del cerchio’ (ibid.). Tabucchi derives the figure of 
the Mad Fiddler from Pessoa; in the Portoguese poet’s homonymous poem, written in English between 1911 
and 1917, the mad fiddler really appears as an uncanny guest. Coming from nowhere, his music produces in 
those who hear it a letting go of familiar significance and the abysmal opening up of a different possibility of 
sense making: ‘[…] His music strange did fret/ Each heart to wish 'twas free./ It was not a melody, yet/ It was 
not no melody./ Somewhere far away,/ Somewhere far outside/ Being forced to live, they/ Felt this tune 
replied./ Replied to that longing/ All have in their breasts,/ To lost sense belonging/ To forgotten quests’. 
Fernando Pessoa, ‘The Mad Fiddler’, in Arquivo Pessoa <http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/1908> [Accessed 
28 July 2016]. 
667 Per Isabel, p. 117. 
  173 
l’attenzione, tutta l’attenzione, su un piccolo dettaglio della vita, del tran-tran quotidiano, 
come se quel dettaglio fosse la cosa più importante di questo mondo’.668 
Binoculars are used in ‘Libri mai scritti, viaggi mai fatti’, to decipher  
 
[I] mosaici di ceramica che ornano il cortile della moschea di Ulug Beg, quel motivo di fiori dai 
venti petali iscritto in una stella a dodici punte dalla quale si diramano motivi geometrici che 
finiscono in una sorta di labirinto. Sarà così la vita, chiedesti, comincia in un punto come se fosse un 
petalo, e poi si disperde in tutte le direzioni?.669  
 
Likewise, in ‘Sogno di Giacomo Leopardi, poeta e lunatico’, the poet is taken by his 
beloved Silvia ‘a una finestra dove c’era un cannocchiale’670 from which he sees himself 
watching: he is both the eye and the gaze in the Lacanian scopic field. However, the most 
important occurrences are to be found in the novel Tristano muore, as Tristano meditates 
on the relationship between focal length and the capacity to authentically see the real:  
 
Scrittore, se guardi in biblioteca, accanto al tavolo sotto la finestra c’è il cannocchiale di mio nonno 
e il microscopio di mio padre… Che strano, pensaci un po’, mio padre studiava le vite vicinissime 
col microscopio, mio nonno cercava quelle lontanissime col cannocchiale, entrambi con le lenti. Ma 
la vita si scopre a occhio nudo, né troppo lontana, né troppo vicina, ad altezza d’uomo… .671 
 
In the novel, Tabucchi suggests a sort of reciprocity between the optical instrument and the 
gun: ‘In montagna Tristano portava un mitra a spalle, certo, e con quel mitra diventò l’eroe 
che sai, ma fin là ci andò con un cannocchiale d’ottone a cui era affezionato’.672 The gun 
makes him a hero of the Italian Resistance and allows Tristano to exit the plane of 
chronicle and enter that of History. Likewise, binoculars figuratively mark a sort of visual 
infancy, for they stress the importance of looking at things or situations in unfamiliar ways 
and from different angles, to see how the are and how they might be, to metaphorically put 
them in the right perspective. Accordingly, looking through binoculars before shooting, 
Tristano begins to question how to make sense of his own life: what choices can he make? 
Does he want to be a hero? Is it really worthwhile? In a way,  binoculars distance Tristano 
from a blind adherence to the flow of existence and of the Italian Resistance.  
                                                        
668 Il gioco, p. 130. 
669 Si sta facendo, p. 143. 
670 Sogni di sogni, p. 46. 
671 Tristano muore, p. 41. 
672 Ibid., p. 46. 
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Tabucchi also uses the element of eyeglasses to figuratively express the – solely apparent – 
contradiction between blindness and insight. In Gli ultimi tre giorni di Fernando Pessoa, 
the Portuguese poet asks for his glasses in the face of death:  
 
[È] ora di partire, è ora di lasciare questo teatro di immagini che chiamiamo la nostra vita, sapesse le 
cose che ho visto con gli occhiali dell’anima […]. [S]ono stanco, la mia candela si è consumata, la 
prego, mi dia i miei occhiali.673  
 
It is as if Pessoa were finally able to look straight into and reciprocate the gaze of the real, 
exiting, like Maria do Carmo, the visual field of which he eventually becomes the 
blindspot. Equally, that the cemetery custodian in Requiem suffers from a cataract and is 
obliged to wear glasses symbolically alludes to the unconscious othering of the narrative 
eye, the necessity of seeing otherwise in order to uncover what is other. Arguably, the 
presence and role of spectacles in Tabucchi’s texts could be compared to those images of 
characters with half-closed eyes – such as Volturno from Piazza d’Italia and Spino – and 
who, as he says of Leonida in Il piccolo naviglio, ‘teneva gli occhi socchiusi per poter 





In Tristano muore the recurrent motif of the ‘moscone’ that ‘batte contro lo specchio, 
quello stupido, vuole uscire, pensa che lo specchio sia una finestra’675 may be interpreted 
as a metaphor for the protagonist’s need for some fresh air, for a final reconciliation with 
his own life. This is to be reached through a confession which, like a mirror, divides the 
individual between a subject gazing – the speaking I – and one being gazed upon – the 
third person through which he refers to his past self. This possible reading is reinforced by 
Tristano’s subsequent claim that  
 
[I]o non sono qui per confermare, al contrario… mai fidarsi degli specchi, lì per lì sembra che 
riflettano la tua imagine, e invece te la stravolgono, o peggio, la assorbono, si bevono tutto, 
risucchiano anche te… Gli specchi sono porosi, scrittore, e tu non lo sapevi.676 
 
                                                        
673 Gli ultimi tre giorni, pp. 54-55. 
674 Il piccolo naviglio, p. 21. 
675 Tristano muore, p. 16. 
676 Ibid., p. 55. 
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Far from being the visual confirmation of a stable identity, Tabucchi’s mirror produces  
 
[U]n effetto che può anche adombrare un sortilegio: ci guarda da fuori ma è come se ci frugasse 
dentro, la nostra vista non ci è indifferente, ci intriga e ci turba come quella di nessun altro: i filosofi 
taosti la chiamarono lo sguardo ritornato.677  
 
In exemplary fashion, the woman protagonist of ‘Staccia buratta’ and the child in the short 
story ‘Capodanno’, both from L’angelo nero, glimpse their guardian angel in the mirror, 
which metaphorically embodies their unconscious. In ‘Staccia buratta’, the angel is 
described as having  
 
[I]l volto di una bambina con gli occhi grandi e le treccine scure. Ma il volto era di una bambina 
vecchia, e le ali non avevano piume, ma un pelame scuro e raso come quello di un topo. Fu un 
attimo. Nascose la testa fra le mani e tornò a guardare lo specchio: l’angelo era sparito.678 
 
Similarly, the young protagonist of ‘Capodanno’ wonders whether he would ever be able 
to catch the angel’s reflection:  
 
Si girava di scatto, eppure non riusciva mai a sorprenderlo. Ma sentiva il fruscio delle ali. […] 
Com’era angelo Duccio? […] Avrebbe tentato di vederlo nello specchio. […] Mentre si spogliava 
sbirciava furtivamente nello specchio: angelo Duccio non poteva prevedere esattamente tutti i suoi 
movimenti, forse si sarebbe scoperto.679  
 
A plethora of elements in this text produce a sort of visual field: Duccio, the young 
protagonist, is obsessed with the memory of his fascist father’s execution of a group of 
partisans. However, this is an impossible reminiscence, as he did not see the murder 
directly, but only overheard it, for ‘[d]ietro il buio delle palpebre, nel buio della notte, una 
voce gridò: “Nel Sotterraneo! Portateli nel Sotterraneo!”’.680 This primal blindness, the 
lack of a direct vision of the deadly scene, generates in Duccio a scopic compulsion to see 
the cellar still covered in his dad’s blood: 
 
Si fece avanti e cominciò a perlustrare le pareti col fascio della lampadina. Le macchie erano ben 
visibili, parevano proprio umidità. Ebbe la tentazione di toccarle, ma ritrasse la mano. Tenendo il 
pezzo di carbone bene all’estremità, per evitare il contatto della mano con il muro, le marcò 
                                                        
677 I volatili, p. 51. 
678 L’angelo nero, p. 69. 
679 Ibid., p. 119. 
680 Ibid., p. 122. 
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accuratamente […]. Quando ebbe finito, le macchie erano visibili perfettamente. […] Tracciò le 
croci alla svelta, su ogni macchia, procedendo quasi di corsa. […] Quando uscì si accorse che 
piangeva. In silenzio e a dirotto, senza riuscire a fermarsi.681 
 
Yet, as with ‘la cancellatura a reticolato’ in the story ‘Pomeriggi del sabato’, as discussed 
in chapter 2, the child’s gesture does not constitute a moment of repression. It issues from 
a disavowal, where ‘negation is different from mere absence or blindness’,682 and which 
functions similarly to the unheimliche, in that it simultaneously accepts and dislodges the 
trauma of his father’s violence. The cellar defines a physical and symbolic hole, which, in 
his childish fantasies, the protagonist transforms into the sea bottom – a ‘cripta 
sottomarina’683 – he perlustrates on board Capitano Nemo’s submarine: 
 
In mezzo alla radura […] [n]el centro della croce c’era una cornice ovale, con una piccola fotografia 
sfumata ai bordi: il babbo, vestito di bruno e con la pistola al fianco, salutava eternamente col 
braccio teso gli abissi che gli stavano di fronte.684 
 
Thus, the oneiric unconscious gives form to that scene, that missing dimension of sense, 
which turns Duccio’s actual lack of an image into a theatrical experience of sense making, 
as he produces a ‘meaningful narrative’ that ‘demonstrates the priority of the signifying 





It is possible to identify two main categories in Tabucchi’s windows: the nihilistic, rational 
one that is intended to create and geometrically master a visual, comfort zone, and the 
uncanny one, which disldodges any rigid border between the inside and the outside. As he 
writes in ‘Lettera al vento’,  
 
Finestre: ciò di cui abbiamo bisogno, mi disse una volta un vecchio saggio […] la vastità del reale è 
incomprensibile, per capirlo bisogna rinchiuderlo in un rettangolo, la geometria si oppone al caos, 
                                                        
681 Ibid., pp. 144-45. 
682 Charles Shepherdson,‘Lacan and Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, ed. by. Jean-
Michel Rabaté, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 116-52 (p. 124). 
683 L’angelo nero, p. 111. 
684 Ibid., p. 110. 
685 Theatricality as Medium, p. x.  
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per questo gli uomini hanno inventato le finestre che sono geometriche, e ogni geometria 
presuppone gli angoli retti. [… Ma] le finestre sono solo una pavida forma di geometria degli 
uomini che temono lo sguardo circolare, dove tutto entra senza senso e senza rimedio, come quando 
Talete guardava le stelle, che non entrano nel riquadro della finestra.686  
 
The unconscious window is the frame that functions as a theatrical threshold in ‘Casta 
Diva’: ‘una tela, una specie di enorme finestra a tutto teatro, grazie alla quale, come in certi 
quadri di Magritte, il fuori sembrava entrare nel dentro e annullarlo’.687 However, as 
Tabucchi indicates in ‘Come in uno specchio’, the uncanny window does not erase the 
geometrical one: rather, they coexist, ‘l’una di fronte all’altra, come in uno specchio […] 
l’immagine ritorna invertita, è la stessa ma non lo è, dice la stessa cosa che però è diversa. 
O dice due cose diverse che però è la stessa’.688  
 
Pessoa’s heteronym Soares’ Livro do desassossego centres around a man staring at the 
window during his insomnias; similarly, Tabucchi’s ‘Le vacanze di Bernardo Soares’ is 
symbolically enclosed between the initial balcony from which the protagonist awaits his 
taxi and the twenty windows he counts on the façade of his holiday home and which 
epitomise ‘l’inquietudine che accompagna le mie notti’. 689  An analogous feeling of 
disquiet pervades ‘Una finestra sull’ignoto’, where the window, topologically extimate to 
the house, forms  
 
[U]n quadro naturale nella cui cornice accogli la natura, perché la natura devi lasciarla entrare dalle 
finestre [….]. L’ideale sarebbe lasciarla, questa finestra, aperta all’aria e ai venti, come se il suo 
interno senza soluzione di continuità arrivasse all’esterno e lo accogliesse. […] Pensò a com’era 
strano guardare la realtà che ci circonda come se fosse a portata di mano e pensò che niente è a 
portata di mano, soprattutto quello che vedi, e che a volte ciò che è accanto è più lontano di quello 
che pensi.690 
 
Uncanny windows epitomise, therefore, a non-propositional, non-reifying, but poietic 
vision, which, undoing the opposition between inside and outside, lay bare the topological 
articulation of Tabucchi’s signification. Claiming that ‘niente è a portata di mano’ has both 
                                                        
686 Si sta facendo, pp. 218-19. 
687 Ibid., p. 66. 
688 Racconti con figure, p. 220. 
689 Ibid., p. 43. As Tabucchi indicates, ‘la finestra di Bernardo Soares ha le imposte che si possono aprire nei 
due sensi, sul fuori e sul dentro’ and his gaze ‘costituisce la percezione e insieme l’alterazione dei dati 
dell’esperienza’ (Un baule, pp. 67-70). 
690 Racconti con figure, pp. 63-67. 
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metaphysical and linguistic bearings, for it refuses a view of the real as something at hand, 
at man’s disposal and thus appropriable for mastery, exploitation and consumption, and 





In Tabucchi’s opus, the oracular element embodies the possibility of seeing otherwise and 
on a different plane, a sort of negotiaton with (and negation of) the imperative of 
actualisation: it foregrounds the role of the unconscious as a semiotic reservoir of 
possibilia. The ocular therefore is most prominently oracular. 
Notably, Tabucchi defines his own poetics in terms of a ‘backwards poetics’ or divinatory 
blindness:  
 
La scrittura, a volte, è cieca. E nella sua cecità, oracolare. Solo che la sua previsione non riguarda il 
futuro, ma ciò che successe nel passato a noi o agli altri e che non avevamo capito che era successo 
e perché.691  
 
Tabucchi’s literature shares the seer’s vision, the capacity to uncover unfulfilled 
potentialities. As Dolfi comments,  
 
[Q]uella ‘correzione del definitivo’ che è negata alla vita, è per eccellenza il compito dell’arte 
narrativa, che, se da un lato ripercorre la storia, dall’altra può ipotizzare mondi possibili, luoghi 
alternativi, a quello unico, definitivo, che è il nostro. E questo non solo grazie a una qualche 
mescolanza tra accaduto e ciò che deve ancora avvenire; ma anche al trascorrere, con l’ausilio del 
sogno […] di passato, presente e futuro.692 
 
This is something that Tabucchi also explores on the diegetic level. Thus, in the 
eponymous novel, Tristano evokes the Pizia not to foresee his future but to redeem his 
past:  
 
[S]ei venuto affinché il tuo vero passato lo dica la mia voce, perché tu non hai il coraggio di farlo, e 
così affidi a me, che predico il futuro, di predire ciò che essendo già stato non si potrà più 
cambiare.693 
                                                        
691 Autobiografie altrui, p. 103. 
692 Tabucchi, la specularità, p. 20.  
693 Tristano muore, p. 154. 
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Similarly, I would also ascribe to the category of prophecies the letter ‘Il fiume’, included 
in Si sta facendo sempre più tardi, and which prefigures the posthumous novel Per Isabel 
in that it is narrated as a sort of mandala or temporal circling around a central vacuum. The 
protagonist, having reached a little church in ruins, whose door uncovers ‘[u]na targhetta 
insensata che diceva: “Scelta vita futura. Entrata Libera”’,694 decides to enter what might 
seem nothing more than a game: 
 
Niente ricerca dell’io più profondo, di quello più nascosto negli abissi della nostra coscienza, come 
vorrebbero certi palombari delle nostre anime. Solo una concentrazione sul ricordo più nascosto, 
quello che ci rese felici in passato e che vorremmo fosse la nostra vita futura […]. Perché in quel 
punto lì sogno e desiderio coincidono, essendo la stessa cosa […] un momento indistinto, che quelli 
della metempsicosi, nel loro codice chiamano anàstole, con il quale tutto ricomincia perché il 
cerchio si chiude e si riapre immediatamente.695 
 
However, his mandala, the backward gaze embracing his entire existence, does not contain 
its beginning except as a hole, since:  
 
[I]l segmento della chiesetta dove mi fermai […] non più percorribile per chi ha scelto di entrare nel 
cerchio, perché è quel momento speciale (loro lo chiamano “vacuo”) quando non sai esattamente chi 
sei, dove sei, e perché ci sei […] quel momento in cui […] vieni a patti con la mancanza di senso 
della vita.696  
 
Furthermore, if ‘la mescidazione dei tempi è l’‘arte’ degli indovini, delle cartomanti, che 
infatti ricorrono spesso nella narrativa di Tabucchi’,697 this is especially true of three 
figures: Zelmira, who appears in Piazza d’Italia, Miss Scriblerus, from the radio-drama 
Marconi, se ben mi ricordo and Mademoiselle Lenormand, Napoleon’s card reader, in 
‘Passato composto’. 
As a sort of popular witch and healer, ‘la Zelmira’ incarnates a sphinxian spokeswoman, 
formulating statements of truth that belong to a different order from that of official, 
rational accounts. When asked to cure the young Volturno, who ‘cresceva nell’immobilità 
e nel silenzio, come se conoscesse l’altra parte dei gesti […] rifiutando il mondo, 
                                                        
694 Si sta facendo, p. 28. 
695 Ibid., pp. 31-34. 
696 Ibid., p. 34. 
697 Tabucchi, la specularità, p. 20. 
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disegnando figure sulla cenere con un bastoncino’,698 she is the only one to understand his 
mutism as an experience of (Agamben’s) infancy, as a semiotic quest, thus diagnosing him 
as a ‘poeta’ afflicted by ‘il Mal del Tempo’.699 In effect, this correctly describes Volturno 
who, despite having become a man, in a gesture that prefigures, to some extent, Capitano 
Sesto’s small paper-boats in the subsequent novel Il piccolo naviglio, 
 
La sera tornava alla sua placenta di cenere, come a un vizio antico, per scrivere segreti […] piccoli 
scarabocchi fitti e illeggibili: pagine e pagine che prima di andare a letto lasciava cadere sul fuoco 
come farfalle.700  
 
As for Miss Scriblerus, she is George Orwell’s fortune-teller, who predicts both the 
disasters of World War II – ‘la mia sfera di cristallo mi parla di un destino collettivo […] 
morte e distruzione’701  – and some pages from the writer’s Homage to Catalonia, 
suggesting how history’s optical and collective unconscious already contains within itself a 
possible narrative: ‘Noi andiamo sempre alla cieca, perché il destino è cieco, anche se 
esiste, e noi brancoliamo nelle tenebre. Eppure…’702 Mademoiselle Lenormand sends a 
letter to Dolores Ibarurri, even though the Spanish revolutionary will come to life only a 
century after the prediction:  
 
Le mie carte […] mi chiedono di leggere la tua vita che ancora non è, e che i molti anni che la 
separano da questo mio tempo attuale mi lasciano discernere solo per larghi e forse ingannevoli 
squarci.703  
 
Yet, as the fortune-teller remarks, her cards ‘non possono cambiare ciò che, dovendo 
essere, è già stato’704: the impossibility of erasing what has actually taken place is, 
nonetheless, coupled with the potentiality to signify events in a different mode. In effect, 
Lenormand’s letter is included in ‘Passato composto. Tre lettere’, alongside Don 
Sebastiano de Aviz’ letter to Goya and Calypso’s letter to Ulysses; in the latter, in 
particular, the nymph is shown while despairing over her ‘invalicabile ora’ that denies the 
potentiality of change, wherein  
                                                        
698 Piazza d’Italia, pp. 22-23. 
699 Ibid., p. 26. 
700 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
701 Marconi, se ben mi ricordo (Rome: Rai-Eri, 1997), pp. 29-30. 
702 Ibid., p. 37. 
703 I volatili, p. 26.  
704 Ibid., p. 31. 
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[C]on un ramo traccio un segno sulla sabbia – come la misura di un vano conteggio; e poi lo 
cancello. E i segni che ho tracciato e cancellato sono migliaia, identico è il gesto e identica è la 
sabbia, e io sono identica. E tutto.705  
 
This episode is revealing of how the potentiality to be and signify otherwise, in synthesis 
Tabucchi’s narrative mode of the unconscious, disrupts the view of identity as self-
confirming sameness, positing the image of the void, of the blindspot – ‘La notte guardo 
gli spazi fra le stelle, vedo il vuoto senza misura; e ciò che voi umani travolge e porta via, 
qui è un fisso momento privo di inizio e di fine’,706 states Calypso – as what authentically 
grounds man’s ethical dwelling within a meaningful horizon and individuals’ need to find 
a measure, to articulate a possibility of sense. 
 
 
4.3.6 Insomnia and Dreams 
 
As Dolfi contends,  
 
Il sogno e l’insonnia […] sono quanto, nella vita cosiddetta reale, appare più libero dai freni inibitori 
dell’io, dalle leggi esterne della temporalità radicale; quanto può creare i luoghi del rimorso e della 
nostalgia, della riparazione e dei fantasmi.707  
 
The unconscious a-temporal logic structures Tabucchi’s dreams and insomnias. An 
example can be found in La testa perduta, where the lawyer Loton meditates about the 
oneiric disruption of chronological temporality: if ‘le insonnie portano fantasmi e fanno 
rinculare il tempo’, it is because the very possibility to think and experience time ‘è 
possibile solo nel sogno […], in quello spazio incontrollabile che secondo il dottor Freud è 
l’Inconscio allo stato libero’.708 Significantly, the attorney narrates a dream that explores 
the paradoxical, diplopic symmetry of the unconscious: ‘[a] volte sogno mia nonna […] 
quella donna spaventosa che fu il mio incubo da sveglio è entrata nei miei sogni, e c’è 
entrata bambina […]. Io so che lei è mia nonna, ma allo stesso tempo è bambina’.709 A 
similar scene appears in Requiem, where the protagonist dreams about his ‘Padre 
                                                        
705 Ibid., p. 32. 
706 Ibid., p. 33. 
707 Tabucchi, la specularità, pp. 21-22. 
708 La testa perduta, pp. 169-70. 
709 Ibid., pp. 170-71. 
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Giovane’, ‘vestito da marinaio, avrà avuto vent’anni o poco più ma era mio padre, non 
c’era possibilità d’equivoco’.710 The episode originates from the narrator’s own sense of 
guilt – ‘[m]eno male che mi consoli, padre, dissi, perché non sono soddisfatto di me 
stesso’711 – due to the way in which he reacted against the doctor who treated his father’s 
cancer in the wrong manner, causing him an esophageal perforation: ‘forse avrei fatto 
meglio a comportarmi in un altro modo, se lo avessi preso a schiaffi […] invece di 
prenderlo per il bavero ho scritto un racconto sulla conversazione che avevamo avuto e lui 
mi ha denunciato […]’.712  
As confirmed by Tabucchi’s reflection ‘Un universo in una sillaba. Vagabondaggio intorno 
a un romanzo’, included in his Autobiografie altrui, an (alleged) autobiographic tone 
informs and shapes the novel’s episode and its narrative modality. The writer’s self-
commentary includes three elements that seem to support an interpration of the novel’s 
episode in terms of the semiotic unconscious. Firstly, the author himself uncannily 
experienced what he calls ‘[u]n sogno perturbante. Avevo sognato mio padre. […] È 
probabile che il mio incosciente mi restituisse nel sogno la sofferenza che l’atroce degenza 
ospedaliera aveva inflitto a mio padre e alla quale avevo assistito’.713  
And secondly, the awareness of  
 
La difficoltà di formulare i sogni in termini narrativi […] per via di certi salti paralogici, o di certi 
passaggi brachilogici, o del problema di un tempo vissuto nell’inconscio e impossibile da trasferire 
in un tempo narrativo; ma soprattutto perché ogni sogno è un’emozione, una sensazione che trova il 
suo “senso” finché appartiene alla sua specifica “realtà”, e che lo perde quando si tenta di trasferirlo 
alla realtà dello stato di veglia.714  
 
How can a possibility of sense be negotiated, and how can the encounter with a traumatic 
real that has taken place in the oneiric unconscious be signified? The answer consists in 
moving the unconscious from the level of what has to be signified to that of signification 
itself. The unconscious is a semiotic experience, insofar as and to the extent to which it is 
the experience of a different semiosis. This leads to the third and final point: Tabucchi’s 
dream occurred in Portoguese, and, after several, failed attempts to transcribe it in Italian, 
the author realises that ‘se avevo attraversato inconsciamente il fiume per raggiungere 
                                                        
710 Requiem, p. 59. 
711 Ibid., p. 63. 
712 Ibid., p. 62. 
713 Autobiografie altrui, p. 29. 
714 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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l’altra riva linguistica, non potevo compiere in stato cosciente il percorso inverso’.715 
Tabucchi tries to explain this case of ‘alloglossia in letteratura’ by recalling a game he used 
to play with his father, which consisted in calling each other ‘pa’, bearing in mind that the 
Italian pa’ means ‘dad’, while the Portoguese pá means ‘boy’.716 However, indipendently 
of any presumed autobiographical confirmation, what is really at stake here is that the 
writer’s oneiric heteroglossia, in the novel, functions as and makes possible the experience 
of the unconscious as uncanny modus significandi, inasmuch as it strips language of its 
representational, propositional function and exposes the simple fact that language exists. 
This is what Agamben calls ‘glossolalia’, an experience in which the speaker is not 
consciously mastering his utterance and where ‘we encounter the pure materiality of 
language away from any possible meaning’.717 
 
Tabucchi’s nocturnal space articulates an attempt to ‘decifrare […] quanto, in ombra, 
costituisce delle cose la cifra più propria e essenziale. Che equivale poi a ricondurre tutto 
verso il sogno […] e l’insonnia’.718 Significantly, by inserting nightmares, hallucinations 
and insomnias throughout his writings, the author establishes an uncanny structure of 
awakening, for they all occur, either singularly or collectively, as instances of a nocturnal 
vigilance. The nightmare recounted in ‘Un curandeiro nella città sull’acqua’ creates an 
optical field at whose centre lies the narrator, split between being a detached observer of a 
symbolic reality and being called upon, by the gaze of the real, to participate in the scene: 
 
Di una cosa ero certo: che io potevo vederli, ma non potevo essere visto. C’era qualcosa che mi 
nascondeva al loro sguardo, una sorta di diaframma o di schermo […] che mi proteggeva dalla loro 
vista. Eppure avevo la sensazione di essere esposto in piena luce, seduto in prima fila, come a teatro. 
[…] Era uno spettacolo, di questo ero certo. Ma quello spettacolo era rappresentato in tutta la sua 
nuda verità, ed era vero perché era più vero del vero.719 
 
It could be possible to rationally explain the nightmare’s visual construction in relation to 
the fact that the protagonist has fallen asleep while watching television – ‘ho avuto un 
sobbalzo e mi sono svegliato. Era notte fonda, e dallo schermo del televisore giungeva solo 
                                                        
715 Ibid., p. 38. 
716 Ibid., pp. 38-39. As Francese observes, ‘writing in a second language helps bring to the fore aspects of 
[Tabucchi’s] own personality that are not part of the conscious ego’ (‘Fragments’, p. 393). 
717 Watkin, p. 29. 
718 Tabucchi, la specularità, pp. 30-31. 
719 Racconti con figure, pp. 197-98. 
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quella polverina elettrica di quando le trasmissioni sono finite’.720 Still, the coincidence 
between the television screen and the threshold that at once divides and conjoins the 
sleeping subject with the oneiric scene should be interpreted as the opposition between the 
reassuring slumbers of a familiar reality and the estranging awakening of the uncanny 
real.721 It is in the unconscious, in the optical rationale of the reverie, that Tabucchi locates 
the possibility to resist man’s reification or desubjectification: 
 
Mi sono detto: perché vogliono che io sogni questo sogno? Chi mi obbliga a sognare? Mi sono detto 
ancora: devi svegliarti, non puoi tollerare che ti si obblighi a sognare un sogno che non vuoi 
sognare, costoro si sono insinuati nella tua anima, vogliono impadronirsi di te.722 
 
Since, Gambazzi comments, ‘[i]l lavoro onirico è […] una posizione del soggetto nel 
‘mondo’[…]’, within dreams,‘il ‘vedere’ del soggetto si forma senza di lui, 
indipendentemente da lui e, anche, contro di lui’: the latter is precisely what happens with 
Tabucchi’s nightmare, where the scene not only looks at the subject but forces him to 
reciprocate its gaze.723 Wondering whether it is ‘la realtà che si trasforma in un incubo o 
l’incubo che si trasforma in realtà? L’onirico e il reale a volte si intrecciano’,724 Tabucchi 
suggests that insomnia is the only way to awaken inside and from a reality turned into 
phantasmagoria, an apparatus of optical illusions, which imposes upon individuals a 
forced, though reassuring, slumber, while offering a stock of predefined dreams. Reality 
wants us not to be able to dream or think, and to live ‘in a psychic state […] unable to 
differentiate waking from sleeping, dreaming from perceiving’.725 As Tristano phrases it, 
reality comes in the guise of  
 
                                                        
720 Ibid., p. 202. 
721 Commenting on another version of the same text published in l’Unità with the title ‘Ho paura di sognare’, 
Surdich observes that ‘[l]a drammatizzazione onirica […] esaspera un radicale divorzio dalla realtà, nel 
momento stesso in cui è proprio la realtà, quella più direttamente storica e politica, a costituire la ragione di 
impatto e di scontro da cui si sprigiona la violenza dell’incubo’ insofar as he identifies in Tabucchi ‘la 
funzione determinante dell’inconscio quale strumento di rivelazione della verità’ (‘Il principio della 
letteratura’, pp. 26-27). 
722 Racconti con figure, p. 198. 
723 Gambazzi, pp. 162-64.  
724 L’oca al passo, pp. 118-19. 
725 Thomas H. Ogden, ‘On not being able to dream’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 84 
(2003): 17–30 (17).  
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[I]ncubi notturni, ora la voce di pippopippi cominciò a visitargli perfino il rem […] e gli parlava con 
una voce flautata o in falsetto, gli pareva il bisbiglio di un confessore che dà consigli attraverso la 
grata di un confessionale, ricordati di non pensare, lascia che io pensi per te […].726  
 
What Tristano imagines is a quasi-dystopic scenario where:  
 
[P]ippopippi, nel solenne scopo di abolire ogni tipo di pensiero a lui nocivo […] comincerà 
gradualmente a espungere dalle sue scatole di vetro ogni immagine portatrice di pensiero, fino a una 
vostra disassuefazione completa e a una sparizione assoluta di ogni segno significante, perché 
l’immagine stessa [...] può indurre un pensiero, e il pensiero è pericoloso… e così guarderete 
unicamente la luce, certe rigature elettriche che tremolano […].727 
 
Tristano speaks of ‘intersogni’,728 explaining how: 
 
[M]i pensano loro, davvero, sono pensato, sono loro che mi pensano, e mi pungono […] Intersogni 
[…] quasi, ma non proprio, genere ricordi che galleggiano in una loro schiumetta, io sto sul ciglio 
delle mie nottate, alcuni mi raggiungono e mi pungono, altri mi basta far ciondolare il braccio dalla 
sponda del letto per pescarne qualcheduno a caso.729  
 
Observing his patient’s ‘spazio onirico’, ‘[i]l dottor Ziegler cominciava a sospettare un 
inconscio come un linguaggio, ma con riluttanza, perché non era di quella scuola’.730 
While Tristano adds that ‘è come se stessi sognando ma sono sveglio, e cominciano ad 
arrivare ricordi dimenticati da tempo […] e mi passano davanti agli occhi come se 
guardassi un film su una parete, e chi proietta quel film sono i miei occhi’,731 the doctor 
reaches the conclusion that they might ‘appartenere all’ordine del déjà vu […]. Freud […] 
ha indagato sul déjà vu nei suoi studi sull’Unheimliche, che voi italiani avete chiamato il 
                                                        
726 Tristano muore, p. 129. 
727 Ibid., p. 134. ‘Pippopippi’, like the nightmare in ‘Un curandeiro’, alludes to contemporary Italy and, 
specifically, to Silvio Berlusconi, then Italian prime minister and media tycoon, owner of the largest media 
empire in Italy, including Mediaset, the company that produces the three main national commercial channels. 
728 Like Pessoa’s Bernardo Soares, Tristano ‘non sogna, perché non dorme. Egli “sdorme” […] frequenta 
cioè quello spazio di iper-coscienza o coscienza libera che precede il sonno. Un sonno che tuttavia non arriva 
mai […] un’enorme insonnia’ (Un baule, p. 73). 
729 Ibid., p. 52. 
730 Ibid. Clear allusion to Lacan, for whom the unconscious is structured like a language. This irony reveals 
Tabucchi’s suspicion and criticism of psychoanalysis, when the latter appears too rigid and dogmatic, utterly 
unable to open up new spaces for meaning creation. 
731 Ibid., pp. 116-17. 
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perturbante, perché in effetti il perturbante accompagna spesso il déjà vu, ed è difficile dire 
se lo segue o lo precede…’.732  
In the end, Tristano realises, in relation to the difficulty of defining his oneiric experiences 
– ‘Devo aver fatto un sogno, ho sognato di Tristano… o forse era il ricordo di un sogno… 
o forse il sogno di un ricordo… o forse tutti e due’ – and their optical rationale – ‘ti lascio 
anche il punto di vista… facciamo così, il punto di vista è mio, anzi di Tristano, perché 
questa situazione la visse lui, io però l’ho sognata dal mio punto di vista e te la racconto’ –
,733 that this uneasiness is due to the fact that ‘il punto di vista appartiene al sogno, nel 
senso che il punto di vista è il suo, non è né mio né di Tristano, perché ai sogni non si 
comanda […] bisogna viverli come vogliono loro, e questo sogno voleva che io sognassi 





Used as the optical equivalent of metalepsis, the technique of trompe-l’oeil defines a 
narrative distortion of and confusion between different planes – spatial, temporal and 
ontological. It is employed, firstly, to confer depth and reliability upon something that does 
not actually exist, upon possibilia that are merely virtual, stalling the mastering eye. 
Tabucchi creates trompe-l’oeil effects and structures that stand on the verge between 
duplicity and deception, with the intent of questioning and exposing the inherently 
arbitrary and limited nature of every experience of sense making. 
In Notturno indiano  
 
[L]a stessa struttura dei capitoli ricorda gli effetti del trompe-l’oeil: molti episodi iniziano con il 
discorso diretto tra il protagonista e il deuteragonista […] e soltanto in seguito, distanziandosi dal 
dettaglio della scena e mettendo a fuoco all’infinito […] è ottenuta l’esatta misura della 
situazione.735  
 
The novel builds upon the idea of signifying otherwise by seeing differently: the narrator 
could be said to overlap with his estranged gaze, as when, staring at the customers of the 
                                                        
732 Ibid., pp. 121-22. 
733 Ibid., p. 122. 
734 Ibid., p. 123. 
735 Ernesto Livorni, ‘Trompe-l’oeil in ‘Notturno Indiano’ di Antonio Tabucchi’, in I tempi del rinnovamento. 
Atti del convegno internazionale: Rinnovamento del codice narrativo in Italia dal 1945 al 1992, ed. by Serge 
Vanvolsem and others (Rome: Bulzoni-Leuven UP, 1995), pp. 431-53 (pp. 449-51) 
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Taj Mahal, he reflects that ‘[n]on so chi ha detto che nella pura attività del guardare c’è 
sempre un po’ di sadismo […] e così guardai con maggiore voluttà, con la perfetta 
sensazione di essere solo due occhi che guardavano mentre io ero altrove, senza sapere 
dove’.736 The Jainist prophet that the protagonist encounters at a bus stop on his way to 
Goa, at first mistaken for a monkey, might be understood as an anamorphic image, which 
forces the narrator to accommodate his eyes for this vision, as ‘[d]i umano, in quel viso, 
restavano gli occhi: due occhi piccolissimi, acuti, intelligenti, che guizzavano inquieti da 
ogni parte’.737 Finally, during his stay in Goa, the narrator meets Christine, a photographer 
of Indian abjection, who is nonetheless driven by the belief that ‘bisogna vedere il meno 
possibile’. 738  The novel delineates a seemingly diplopic narration, intertwined with 
trompe-l’oeil, since it alludes to a parallelism between Christine’s work and the book the 
protagonist is currently writing – in which ‘tutte le cose sono fuori cornice’ as 
‘l’ingrandimento falsa il contesto, bisogna vedere le cose da lontano’:739 
 
«Qualche anno fa ho pubblicato un libro di fotografie», disse Christine. «Era la sequenza di una 
pellicola […]. Cominciava con una fotografia […] era un ingrandimento, la foto riproduceva un 
giovane negro, solo il busto; una canottiera con una scritta pubblicitaria, un corpo atletico, sul viso 
l’espressione di un grande sforzo, le mani alzate come in segno di vittoria: sta evidentemente 
tagliando il traguardo, per esempio i cento metri ». […] 
«Ebbene? », chiesi io, «dov’è il mistero?». 
«La seconda fotografia », disse lei. «Era la fotografia per intero. Sulla sinistra c’è un poliziotto 
vestito da marziano, ha un casco di plexiglas sul viso, gli stivaletti alti, un moschetto imbracciato, 
gli occhi feroci sotto la sua visiera feroce. Sta sparando al negro. E il negro sta scappando a braccia 
alzate, ma è già morto: un secondo dopo che io facessi clic era già morto ».740 
 
On the other hand, Tabucchi’s texts frequently incorporate a sort of cinematographic 
grammar, using interruption, repetition, slow and still motion to express the theatrical 
functioning of the unconscious modus significandi. For example, for the narrator of 
‘Piccoli equivoci’, a journalist attending a trial, the image of the court ‘si è dissolta sotto 
l’immagine di un vecchio passato che per me era il presente, proprio come in un vecchio 
film […] altrove abbandonato al ritroso dell’evocazione’. 741  An equivalent blurring 
between memory and imagination sustains trompe-l’oeil episodes in Tristano muore, 
                                                        
736 Notturno indiano, p. 37. 
737 Ibid., p. 66. 
738 Ibid., p. 99. 
739 Ibid., pp. 104-08. 
740 Ibid., pp. 101-02. 
741 Piccoli equivoci, p. 9.  
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where the schism between the dying man recounting his life and Tristano, the third-person 
protagonist of the episodes narrated, is enhanced by a cinematic mise-en-scene of history. 
The narration takes a film-like twist each time Tristano recalls and describes the two 
moments when he made decisions that would utterly change his life, deserting the Italian 
army in Greece and shooting a German squad to death during the Resistance. As for the 
former, the protagonist evokes how, having witnessed the brutal murder of a Greek child 
by the Nazis, he suddenly realised, in a sort of collective staging of an unconscious après-
coup, that he was nothing but a player in a historical tragedy, in the tragedy of history: 
 
[E] a quel punto dal fondo della piazza sbucò un ragazzo […] un Tedesco gli andò incontro e gli 
puntò il mitra […] tutti guardavano, tutti sapevano cosa stava per succedere, ma nessuno si mosse, 
nessuno fece un gesto, come se tutti fossero presi in un incantesimo […] e come per incanto Plaka si 
animò, e dal nulla sbucarono uomini, perché un inatteso servo di scena come Tristano aveva deciso 
che era il momento che entrassero in azione le furie vendicatrici della tragedia greca […] non c’era 
anima viva, come in certi momenti di sospensione, come un teatro vuoto.742 
 
He leaves an empty theatre, similarly to Piazza d’Italia, a rotten scenario where history has 
been robbed of its value. With the second episode, which is to turn him into a hero, the 
references to cinematographic signification become even more explicit; not only is 
Tristano identified with the actor Clark Gable, but, also, the story time pauses and narrative 
time is structured as a (photographic) freeze-frame: 
 
[E] anche Tristano lo vedi come se fosse un altro, quando lui era il comandante Clark […]. E lui, 
quel tale giorno, in quell’alba livida, sta aspettando nascosto dietro il masso, ha il fucile 
mitragliatore puntato, però ti sorride come se ti aspettasse per raccontarti una storiella… e gli sorridi 
anche tu, e lui è ancora lì, allo stesso posto, in quell’alba livida. Possibile che non si sia mosso? 
Possibile. Gli uomini non si muovono, restano incantati in tanti momenti fissi, solo che non lo 
sanno, noi crediamo che sia un fluire continuo che via via evapora, e invece no, da qualche parte 
dello spazio resta quel momento fisso col suo gesto e tutto, come in un incantesimo, una fotografia 
senza lastra.743 
 
[…] [E] tutti i tedeschi sono presi dall’incantesimo, prossimi al sonno e all’oblio, immobili l’uno 
accanto all’altro come in una foto di famiglia, come in un monumento ai caduti […]. Tristano, sta lì 
in piedi allo scoperto, fuori dalla roccia che lo nascondeva, il raggio del sole appena sorto lo investe 
come si addice alle scenografie dei film a colori per gli eroi’.744 
 
                                                        
742 Tristano muore, pp. 14-24. 
743 Ibid., p. 37. 
744 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
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Tristano’s life is significantly punctuated by episodes of vision, which define his peculiar 
approach to life: for example, his headaches are compared to a ‘caleidoscopio […] turbe 
della visione, della percezione degli oggetti e delle figure con effetti di distorsione o di 
ingigantimento dell’immagine, che so […] come si vede in certi documentari’. 745 
Likewise, Tristano recalls the afternoons spent with Daphne in his vineyard, when he 
‘spaziava con lo sguardo e se ne stava appoggiato su una seggiola di tela di quelle da 
regista cinematografico […] regista di un cinemascope amaro’.746 This optical free-motion 
sharply contrasts with the paralysis of his final days – ‘Ma dicevo degli occhi, per fortuna 
tutto si fa canzonetta quando arriva al punto di vista di uno che può guardare solo il 
soffitto…’.747 
 
That Tabucchi knows and purposely exploits the deceiving effect of trompe-l’oeil is 
linguistically evidenced by his consistent use of terms such as ‘incantesimo’ or ‘sortilegio’. 
Alongside the quoted occurrences in Tristano muore, where the introduction of the element 
of the spell additionally serves to emphasise the theatrical effect of memories narrated in 
still motion, one might mention ‘La trota che guizza fra le pietre’, wherein the poet 
explains that if ‘pensi a come è possibile che nella vita si possa vivere due volte lo stesso 
momento, ebbene, è un sortilegio’.748 Analogously, the term ‘incantesimo’ also appears in 
‘Notte, mare o distanza’, designating the protagonist’s attempt to recreate, through the 
imagination, an evening of violence in the Salazarian Lisbon: 
 
[L]ui che se ne stava dopo tanto tempo a immaginare quella notte, spingeva i quattro amici 
all’indietro, come un film proiettato a ritroso […] nel quale, come in un incantesimo che qualcosa 
avesse dovuto rompere, si sentivano prigioniere le persone che occupavano quella stanza. […] E 
tutto ricominciava, nell’immaginazione di chi immaginava quella notte, come una pantomima o una 








745 Ibid., p. 120. 
746 Ibid., p. 33. 
747 Ibid., p. 70. 
748 L’angelo nero, p. 99. 
749 Ibid., pp. 32-37. 
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4.3.8 Déjà Vu and Diplopia 
 
Exploring the bonds between the unheimliche and déjà vu, Royle notes that the latter ‘is 
the experience of the double par excellence: it is experience of experience as double’.750 
While the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as ‘a feeling of having previously 
experienced a present situation; a form of paramnesia’,751 and thus as a typology of 
mnemonic dysfunction, Chambers explains paramnesia either as ‘a memory disorder in 
which words are remembered but not their proper meaning’ or as ‘the condition of 
believing that one remembers events and circumstances which have not previously 
occurred’.752 Since an element of theatrical split and duplicity is inherent in the rationale of 
déjà vu, it might also be interpreted as ‘a kind of diplopia’, strengthening ‘the impression 
that the present reality has a double’.753 Not only does déjà vu perform a doubling in the 
chain of our experiences – figuratively, the signifiers of our existential sense making – but 
it also exposes an ontological duplicity, or, rather, the fact that to signify the real entails 
dealing with what is always other than itself. Therefore, one might wonder whether it 
signals ‘the invasion of a dream-state or of a different wakefulness’754 within one’s 
familiar reality. Like Tabucchi’s uncanny reversal, déjà vu instantiates the writer’s 
nocturnal writing, the idea that it is solely on the other(ing) night that authentic vigilance 
can be grounded, as an estranging blindness and clearing vision. As he writes in 
‘Controtempo’: 
 
Fu un lampo […] quella cosa strana che la medicina non sa spiegare […] lo chiamano déjà vu, un 
già visto, non mi era mai successo. […] Si sentì preso da una vertigine e temette di venirne 
risucchiato, ma fu un attimo, perché nel dilatarsi quella sensazione subiva una strana metamorfosi, 
come un guanto che rovesciandosi portasse con sé la mano che lo copriva. Tutto cambiò di 
prospettiva, in un lampo provò l’ebbrezza della scoperta, una sottile nausea e una mortale 
malinconia. Ma anche un senso di liberazione infinito, come quando finalmente capiamo qualcosa 
che sapevamo da sempre e non volevamo sapere: non era il già visto che lo inghiottiva in un passato 
mai vissuto, era lui che lo stava catturando in un futuro ancora tutto da vivere.755 
 
                                                        
750 Royle, p. 183. 
751 Ibid., p. 172. 
752 Ibid., p. 173 
753 Ibid., p. 183. 
754 Ibid., p. 182. 
755 Il tempo invecchia, pp. 170-71.  
  191 
However, Tabucchi mostly deploys déjà vu to (re)present nostalgia, remorse, and a sense 
of guilt. The letters ‘Della difficoltà di liberarsi del filo spinato’ and ‘Forbidden Games’ 
demonstrate how Tabucchi’s diplopia combines visual objects and optical narrative modes, 
producing a diegetic déjà vu which folds back on the narrative level. The first story – a 
love letter written ‘come se […] fosse una seduta psicanalitica’756 – prompts temporal, 
diplopic effects through the repetition of the diegetic element of the window. The first 
belongs to the present of the narration, 
 
Questa sera, qui dai miei amici, apro una finestra e mi sporgo. Da tanto tempo desideravo rivedere 
un temporale estivo, e mi domando se potrà ripetersi nello stesso modo e con le stesse sensazioni 
che provocò in me in un passato immemorabile.757 
 
The second window is part of the narrator’s memory of a summer storm, seen from ‘una 
grande finestra, che si affacciava su un paesaggio di macchia e di rocce bucate dalle 
interperie’. 758  Significantly, the narrator tries to relive the past precisely when, 
experiencing a sort of temporal and optical doubling, he finds himself ‘ancora a guardare 
attraverso una finestra che dà sul cielo di Parigi’, eventually realising that ‘l’ho rivissuto 
perché le cose si possono rivivere anche in un istante fuggitivo piccolo come una goccia 
che […] dilata l’universo della visione’.759  
Almost symmetrically, ‘Forbidden Games’ moves from temporal to narrative diplopia: 
unlike the previous text, here the narrator, again a middle-aged man wandering around 
Paris, denies the possibility of reliving a past experience – the romantic encounter with his 
addressee. Yet, asking whether ‘siamo noi che cerchiamo o siamo cercati?’ he accidentally 
finds someone else’s letter, written in French (and translated in a note), ‘questa lettera 
indirizzata al se stesso che scrive e con lui a me e a Voi’, which makes him understand 
how demanding, though pointless, his desire to express his feeling is.760 Significantly, the 
letter-within-the-letter device (metalepsis) creates a diplopic reading experience, which is 
enhanced by Tabucchi’s use of plural languages. 
 
Similarly, the story ‘Anywhere out of the world’ forms a dual diplopia which, endowed 
with a reverie-like tone, deals with the possibility of understanding the practice of déjà vu 
as narrative remorse. On the diegetic level, the protagonist happens to find in a newspaper 
                                                        
756 Si sta facendo, p. 89. 
757 Ibid., p. 91. 
758 Ibid., p. 92. 
759 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
760 Ibid., pp. 41-45. 
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a quotation from Baudelaire that used to function as a code message with his beloved and 
that now, left unexplained, gives rise to an overturning between the supposed rational 
mastery of his life – ‘sono un volto anonimo in questa moltitudine di volti anonimi, sono 
qui come potrei essere altrove […] e questo mi dà un gran struggimento e un senso di 
libertà bella e superflua’761 – and the surfacing of a sense of guilt: 
 
E poi, all’improvviso, il cuore comincia a batterti a precipizio […] il mondo perde i contorni, tutto 
entra in un’opacità sorda, si spenge tutto, luci, rumori, brusio, è come se un silenzio innaturale e 
immense avesse paralizzato l’universo, guardi meglio la frase, la rileggi, senti uno strano sapore in 
bocca, non è possibile, pensi, è un’orribile coincidenza; […] E per un momento insegui questa 
strana idea di una ripetizione, di un doppione della vita […].762 
 
The incorporation of passages from Baudelaire’s Le spleen de Paris into the narrative 
arguably turns intertextuality into a sort of uncanny misrecognition or ‘déjà lu’.763 
However, with hindsight, the text creates a deeper sense of narrative diplopia in Tabucchi’s 
writings, for, structured as a nocturnal wandering around Lisbon, it anticipates the story 
‘Voci portate da qualcosa’, and belongs to the same constellation of texts gravitating 






Anamorphosis defines an apparently unintelligible or distorted projection or drawing, 
which demands the observers to shift their perspectives in order to be properly seen and 
reconstructed: this brings it closer to the modes of diplopia and parallax, respectively. 
Tabucchi resorts to anamorphic narrative in order to obtain a threefold effect: the 
interruption, reversal and disruption of pre-existing perspectives and of the representational 
regime upon which the latter is founded. Anamorphosis is inherent in the unheimliche, 
since it exposes the unfamiliar always already inscribed inside the seemingly familiar; and 
                                                        
761 Piccoli equivoci, p. 72. 
762 Ibid., pp. 74-77. 
763  Similarly, Trentini explains Tabucchi’s inter-textuality in the visual terms of an apparent inner 
focalisation that eventually turns out to be an external one, insofar as it ‘funge da messa a fuoco del 
molteplice o del rovescio in un rapporto di star dentro o star fuori della cornice che è la dimensione di chi 
guarda/legge l’immagine’ (p. 79). 
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it is strictly intertwined with Tabucchi’s own poetics of the uncanny, presupposing and 
producing the othering of any experience of sense making. 
A clue to help comprehend the writer’s use of anamorphosis lies in ‘La battaglia di San 
Romano’, a story inspired by Paolo Uccello’s homonymous painting, which, as Tabucchi 
glosses in a note, ‘conterrebbe la dimostrazione di un gioco prospettico’ and ‘offrirebbe la 
rappresentazione non di esseri reali, ma di fantasmi’.764 In the text, this is evidenced by the 
narrator’s attempt to scientifically decipher ‘il quadro pezzetto per pezzetto dividendolo in 
un fitto reticolato’ and taking a picture of each square; an effort, however, that soon comes 
up against the estranging revelation that ‘la crosta della cornice dilatata dall’ingrandimento 
è un’epidermide piena di cicatrici, fa quasi senso’.765 This passage might be used as an 
archetypal exemplification of the writer’s anamorphic mode as what simultaneously 
estranges the texture of reality and elicits a potential articulation of sense – or, rather, a 
‘quasi senso’, which never saturates the holes of the real. 
 
More generally, Tabucchi’s anamorphic perspectivism deploys incongruous details to 
interrupt the flow of reality and trigger an almost epiphanic, de-realising and revealing 
experience for both the characters and the reader, uncovering the arbitrariness and 
artificiality of pre-established truths and interpretations. The use of anamorphosis 
demonstrates literature’s attempt to seize and signify what still remains an unfilfilled 
potentiality, to engage with the other(ing) of reality. An example can be found in Tristano 
muore where, blurring the line between memory and the imagination, the protagonist 
recounts the moment when, staring at a toad in his garden, he realised that he was the one 
being looked upon:  
 
[U]n rospo… e quel rospo diventò un cane […] il mondo cominciò a girare […] e provò 
l’ubriachezza di quando si capisce una cosa all’improvviso e ti viene la vertigine […] grazie 
Tristano, sei stato proprio un bravo cagnetto da guardia, e ora abbaia se ti riesce e se non ci riesci 
mordi il vento… Tristano guardava il rospo negli occhi e in quegli occhi c’era scritto tutto, e lui capì 
tutto.766 
 
Looking up at the starry sky immediately after and seeing a communication satellite, a 
symbol of the optical regime of a saturated (‘compatta’) reality, Tristano has a sort of 
uncanny epiphany: ‘sai quando la realtà, che è compatta come cemento, quasi per grazia 
                                                        
764 I volatili, p. 57. 
765 Ibid., p. 56.  
766 Tristano muore, pp. 131-32. 
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divina apre una fessura un’istante, tu puoi dare un’occhiata al suo interno […] è come un 
piccolo miracolo’.767 In L’oca al passo, published two years after the novel, Tabucchi uses 
the same image, affirming that ‘[s]e una volta vi vedeva l’occhio di dio, ora vi vede un 
occhio fatto di titanio’,768 in order to signify the scopic rationale of reality, which not only 
wants to be seen, forcing the subject into the position of a spectator of its show, but is also, 
at the same time, an eye that controls and subjugates the optical field. Spectacularisation 
and surveillance769 constitute the two main visual practices that inform the discourse of 
reality.  
Archetypically, in ‘Notte, mare o distanza’, the anamorphic detail of the fish elicits and 
makes room for ‘uno sguardo con cui non è possibile identificarsi, cui bisogna cedere il 
potere della visione […] in cui […] ciò che non può vedere guarda […], ci guarda perché 
guarda al nostro posto’770: 
 
E fu a quel punto che arrivò la cernia […]. Che cosa incongrua, una mano e un muso di cernia dal 
finestrino di un’automobile nera nella Rua Dom Pedro Quinto in una notte di novembre del 
millenovecentosessantanove. Ma questo dipendeva dall’immaginazione di chi pensava a come 
avrebbero potuto essersi svolti i fatti quella notte. Così, a quel punto, la sua immaginazione 
produceva una cernia.771 
 
The text combines several discursive strategies adopted by Tabucchi to articulate the 
optical unconscious: thus, archetypical of the trompe-l’-oeil effect is the confusion 
between memory and the imagination, which is pervaded by a sense of deception. The 
latter evolves, precisely, into the impossibility of looking into the eyes of the real, as 
witnessed by the fact that the protagonist keeps on imagining his role in the past as that of 
a spectator ideally situated in the blindspot of the scopic field of the narration: 
 
La sua immaginazione, a quel punto, soffriva di una specie di paralisi, o di sonno: una sospensione 
degli atti o degli eventi che era anche una sospensione e una immobilità di tutti i personaggi di 
quella scena. E i suoi occhi, che fino ad allora erano stati presenti e partecipi, si allontanavano come 
se qualcosa trascinasse via il suo corpo […] e lo trasportasse di peso su una panchina del giardino 
del Prìncipe Real […] e da quella distanza era impossibile capire chi si mosse e chi parlò […].772  
                                                        
767 Ibid., p. 128. 
768 L’oca al passo, p. 7. 
769 Similarly, in Sostiene Pereira the protagonist thinks of a possible coincidence between God and the eye: 
‘e forse qualcuno ci guarda da un osservatorio infinito’ (p. 29). 
770 Bellavita, p. 268. 
 771 L’angelo nero, p. 39. 
772 Ibid., p. 42. 
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The rationale of interruption and repetition – ‘così, chi stava immaginando i fatti di quella 
notte, dovette immaginare la scena di nuovo’773 – driving the story could be interpreted as 
an example of déjà vu, while it also accentuates the necessity to shift between different 
perspectives – parallax views – in order to try to engage with the gaze of the real. This 
scopic compulsion eventually reinforces the assumption that Tabucchi’s anamorphic 
perspectivism marks and belongs to the unconscious discourse of truth. 
 
 
4.4 The Reversal within Tabucchi’s Poetics of the Uncanny 
 
Illuminating how the reversal functions within Tabucchi’s poetics implies considering the 
abovementioned visual tropes and narrative modes in the light of his understanding of 
literature as a disquieting, interrogative practice. This section focuses on Tabucchi’s 
‘rovescio’ as a form of literary commitment, wherein addressing the unconscious means 
recognising, making sense of and giving voice to its signifying function. For, in Tabucchi, 
the unconscious is an experience of truth to the extent to which it moves towards the other, 
both inside and outside the subject. In effect, in Tabucchi, identity is always a matter of (an 
encounter with) alterity. This can be an internal or external other. In the former case, the 
focus will be on the individual unconscious, in the latter on the collective one. In both 
cases, however, this movement towards the other premises on the critical belief that ‘any 
state of sameness [i.e. identity formation] actually requires difference to structure itself’.774 
It is precisely for this reason that Tabucchi uses narrative and rethorical strategies based on 
visibility, which problematise and represent: how I see myself and the other and vice versa; 
how I see myself from the point of view of the other; how I see myself in the other; and, 
symmetrically, how I see the other in me.  
But, meaningfully, addressing the collective other, Tabucchi’s writing introduces a further 
level of enquiry: that is, how ‘identity politics’ theoretical success (the realization that 
difference grounds sameness) belies its inevitable social or political failure’.775 
For, on the one hand, identity formation, especially the collective one, implies a certain 
degree of conflictuality with who(m) is other, different: 
 
                                                        
773 Ibid., p. 44. 
774 Jeffrey T. Nealon, Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performative Subjectivity (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1998), p. 4. 
775 Ibid. 
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The construction of identity […] involves the construction of opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality 
is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their difference from 
‘us’.776 
 
And, on the other hand, every discourse about otherness runs the risk of silencing and 
‘appropriating the subaltern’s voice’.777 This is best illustrated by Tabucchi’s Gli Zingari e 
il Rinascimento: Vivere da Rom a Firenze. The latter is a non-fiction text originally 
published in the German edition of Lettre International and that was set to be included in 
the volume Dieci scrittori osservano una realtà di fine millennio. It denounces the poor 
conditions affecting the Roma living outside of Florence. However, the committed facet of 
the text lies more deeply in its narrative mode as well as in its underlying, epistemological 
approach. In an attempt to articulate a visual exploration of what methaporically 
constitutes an unconsciously split-off part of the city – the gypsies – Tabucchi decides to 
engage with the estranged awakening of an all-too-familiar reality. As a hybrid work, a 
sort of literary translation of an anthropological piece of fieldwork, it might be interpreted 
as an example of the parallax view, insofar as the narrator Tabucchi at once doubles, 
reverses and shifts the reader between his own and his anthropologist friend Liuba’s 
perspective. As he asserts in the preface: 
 
Più che ‘reportage’, questo testo avrebbe dovuto chiamarsi ‘reportage di un reportage’. Esso nasce 
infatti da un diario che ho tenuto accompagnando una persona che teneva un diario su ciò che era 
venuta a vedere a Firenze e alla quale ho fatto in qualche modo da guida durante il suo soggiorno. 
[… Esso è] il risultato di una serie di appunti nati osservando una persona che osservava una realtà 
che conoscevo già (o ritenevo di conoscere) ma che vedevo con occhi diversi perché per la prima 
volta la guardavo attraverso gli occhi di un altro.778 
 
What is more, recalling Tristano’s meditation on the relationship between the focal length 
of an optical instrument and its ability to really measure or signify the real, we read: 
 
[I]l progetto di reportage che presentai inizialmente era assai lontano, almeno nel soggetto, da 
questo scelto in seguito. Forse ricordando un sogno infantile, quando nelle notti d’estate, guardando 
con mio nonno il cielo stellato immaginavo che da grande sarei diventato astronomo, e allo stesso 
tempo consapevole che la vita mi aveva invece portato a guardare ad altezza d’uomo, avevo 
                                                        
776 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), pp. 331-32. 
777 Silvia Ross, ‘Roma Alterity in Florence: Tabucchi’s Gli Zingari e il Rinascimento (1999)’, in Identity and 
Conflict in Tuscany, ed. by Silvia Ross and Claire Honess (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2015), pp. 73-
83 (p. 76). 
778 Gli Zingari, p. 7, italicised. 
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presentato un progetto che si chiamava Osservare gli osservatori. Era una maniera, a me più 
consona, di guardare di sbieco il cielo osservando coloro che hanno dedicato la loro vita a osservare 
il cielo.779 
 
Nonetheless, the same rationale informs both the original and the actual reportage, which 
forms, albeit metaphorically, a descent ad Inferos, as it is the author himself that adopts 
Orpheus’ gaze:   
 
Quando a Firenze, dove vivo per alcuni mesi all’anno, venne a trovarmi una persona che per motivi 
professionali doveva studiare gli Zingari qui rifugiati, capii che senza andare sulle Ande o sul Monte 
Rosa, grazie al telescopio di un altro osservatore potevo osservare un microcosmo che in fondo va 
ben al di là dei suoi stessi confini. E che forse potevo capire meglio, attraverso una lente diversa, 
una realtà che credevo di conoscere già.780 
 
As Ferlito comments, the  
 
[C]rucial question Tabucchi's text implicitly raises: namely, how oppositions are made, sustained 
and represented […] weaves together seemingly unrelated worlds by shuttling his readers (and 
Liuba) between past and present, periphery and center, places and non-piaces until different places 
and spaces emerge as inseparably Iinked to and formative of each other.781  
 
The use of an estranged, almost anamorphic viewpoint explains the text’s hybridity: the 
textual oscillation ‘between a journalistic tone and the more intimate and spontaneous tone 
of a private journal and/or travel account’782 intentionally mirrors and performs a visual 
modality of signification based on field (and defamiliarised) observations both of the 
Roma inhabiting the outskirts of the city – the stated content of the story – and of how their 
identity as other is discursively structured, that is, which mechanisms of linguistic 
repression confine the gypsies to the city’s collective unconscious. The latter point – 
Tabucchi’s attention to the way in which the Roma’s otherness is textually constructed – 
not only constitutes the central issue tackled in the reportage, but also affects and gives 
shape to the narration itself. Juxtaposing in a montage-like structure newspapers articles, 
historical and academic sources alongside personal impressions, Tabucchi foregrounds the 
storytelling motif, in order to dislodge the stereotypical, symbolic narratives of Florence. 
                                                        
779 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
780 Ibid., p. 9. 
781 Susanna Ferlito, ‘Between Fiction and Ethnography: Tabucchi's Gli Zingari e il Rinascimento’, Forum 
Italicum, 39.2 (Autumn 2005), 461-80 (461). 
782 Ibid., 462. 
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On the one hand, he consistently alludes to a possible convergence between the uncanny 
and the town’s beauty, namely the de-realising effect it traditionally generates in the 
tourist, known as Stendhal’s syndrome – Florence offers an exemplary illustration of how 
‘lo stesso sentimento di Unheimlich può provenire da una eccessiva bellezza alla quale non 
siamo abituati’.783 
On the other hand, however, the writer points to the fact that such an uncanny feeling 
derives from and asks for a different semiotic experience: it is Florence itself that has to 
come to terms with its own identity. This is why, reversing the scopic field784 dictated by 
the media – ‘[i] giornali osservano ma c’è chi osserva i giornali’785 – Tabucchi attempts to 
expose and undo the rhetoric that still holds the city in a sort of collective, urban 
phantasmagoria. It is as if Liuba’s anthropological field had become, from the writer’s 
perspective, a theatrical scenario in which the city’s identity, its sense of the proper, is 
disturbed to the point that it is the very possibility of a conscious, official storytelling that 
is called into question.786 For, in Tabucchi, before and beyond addressing a ‘return of the 
repressed’, making sense of the unconscious means becoming aware of its signifying 
function. In Tabucchi’s reportage, Roma immigrants are not only characters but also, more 
importantly, narrators of the(ir) own story: 
 
‘Raccontatela voi la storia’, dico alla famiglia. Si consultano nella loro lingua. Il padre non parla 
italiano (o finge, questo non l’ho mai capito). L’italiano della madre è stentato. Tocca a Cerim. Ed 
ecco la storia. […] Ma te sai meglio di me, Tabucchi… Perché non racconti te? […] [I]o non ho più 
voglia di raccontare... E, insomma, mi sento anche un po’ triste’.787 
 
In the paragraph following the quote, entitled ‘Tabucchi continua’, despite being moved by 
Cerim’s emotional narration, the author assumes the role of the storyteller, both for Liuba 
                                                        
783 Gli zingari, p. 57. 
784 It is not by chance that Tabucchi initially reproduced the traditional representation of Florence and the 
scopic structure underlying it: ‘Liuba non è mai stata a Firenze. Ho pensato che uno sguardo panoramico 
sulla città fosse indispensabile. Mi è venuto in mente che la collina di Bellosguardo poteva essere il luogo 
adatto’ (ibid., p. 12). The familiar narration inherent in the panoramic view of Belloguardo is somehow 
reinforced by another visual trope that Tabucchi repeatedly and ironically mentions in his text, an exhibiting 
of Elton John’s glasses.  
785 Ibid., p. 50. 
786 ‘When one thinks of Florence, one thinks of images of monuments and cupolas as seen from an elevated 
view point - a view which leads to contemplation and serenity. […] Tabucchi […] doesn't undermine it by 
focusing only on the “other” reality: the conditions of absolute and abject poverty of the Roma living at the 
periphery of Florence, but by working to undermine the postcard image of Florence’ (Ferlito, 467). 
787 Gli Zingari, pp. 37-38. 
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and the other characters and for the reader alike, of the dramatic episodes experienced by 
the Krasnich family, glossing that ‘Liuba è venuta apposta per sapere e io sono qui apposta 
per raccontare’.788 Tabucchi’s uncanny writing begins when he encounters not a different 
meaning but a demand for and a diverse modality of creating meaning. In the light of 
Tabucchi’s topological realism, gypsies inhabit the ‘altrove’ that reverses the familiar 
‘dove’. Roma have been culturally – and socially and politically – repressed precisely 
because, extimate to the city, external and yet at its core, they lay bare the fallacy of its 
representational strategy – and the fact that it has one. They embody the other by asking to 
see differently. It is the form, not the content, that makes Tabucchi’s text disturbing.  
Yet uncanny experience is also, always, an experience that reveals the uncanniness of 
men’s status as producers of sense. In the story, this ‘statuto poetico’ is disguised as a 
question: ‘Perché non racconti te?’ the text asks the reader. Postulating a mutual 
interaction between observation and narration, between the gaze and the word, Tabucchi 
lends the young gypsy Cerim – a synechdochical character standing for the Roma as a 
whole – his authorial voice: it is at this point that the uncanny strategy of signyfying the 
other fades into the act of signifying for the other. And it is to the uncanny as a testimonial 













788 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
789 My interpretation of Tabucchi’s testimonial voice as what lets the other speak goes against Ross’ analysis 
that Tabucchi’s Gli Zingari ‘risks the complete erosion of the voice of the Other’ because a too large part of 
the text ‘is devoted to a (well-founded) condemnation of Florence’s local government’ rather than to the 
actual Roma community and since Tabucchi, ‘while feeling compelled to communicate Cerim’s story, uses 
his authority as writer to speak for the Roma Other’ (Ross, pp. 73-81). I believe Ross’ reading is too narrow 
and reductive as, focusing on a single text, it fails to assess Tabucchi’s relationship with the other within the 
wider perspective of the writer’s poetics. 
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To summarise: 
• Tabucchi addresses and adopts in his writings a semiotic view of the unconscious 
in opposition to a formulation of the latter as an obscure (improper) meaning to be 
decrypted or (solely) as a reservoir of repressed contents. 
• This implies that the unconscious is seen as ‘a specific form of semiotization of the 
experience’. 
• Within Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny, unconscious semiosis constitutes the 
other that reverses familiar processes of sense making. This is why it has to be read 
in relation to the writer’s idea of ‘rovescio’. 
• Accordingly Tabucchi’s attempt to signify the other (the unconscious) as an 
experience that reverses the familiar – both on individual and collective levels – is 
analysed by interrogating all those diegetic motifs and rhetorical strategies through 
which his narrative produces an uncanny gaze that questions and withdraws pre-
existing precepts and visual practices, seeking a different logic of sense making. 
• Eventually, the ethical dimension of Tabucchi’s exploration of unconscious 
semiosis is addressed by considering the role played by visibility in the process of 
































5.1 Signifying For the Other: Testimony, Literature, the Uncanny  
 
My thesis formulates the following main hypothesis: Tabucchi’s literary opus can be 
defined as a poetics of the uncanny, in relation to his view of literature as an interrogative 
and disquieting quest for sense. For Tabucchi, literature responds to human beings’ need 
for meaning – namely the need to assign meaning to every experience and existence, 
though in an unsaturated manner. This is cognate with Agamben’s semiotic understanding 
of the unheimliche. Tabucchi’s work therefore is uncanny since it explores and produces a 
specific, unfamiliar modality of signification. In the previous chapters I examined the way 
in which Tabucchi’s texts question, disturb and problematise familiar discursive practices 
(playing with rather than by their rules) while they make room for a different textual 
matrix, a different experience of semiotisation (the unconscious as other and as reversal).  
But, signifying otherwise and signifying the other lead Tabucchi to the final gesture of his 
poetics of the uncanny: signifying for the other. Accordingly the present chapter addresses 
the modes in which, by producing an uncanny experience of sense making, Tabucchi’s 
texts are committed to giving a voice to voiceless individuals, to their neglected and 
unspoken narratives.  
 
In particular, as, in his fictional texts and commentaries alike, this process occurs and is 
problematised essentially through the theme of testimony, its exploration requires a 
preliminary clarification as to what exactly witnessing is and how it relates to the uncanny, 
as well as an introductory description of what distinguishes its literary occurrences.  
My theoretical framework is based on an articulation of Agamben’s and Felman’s analyses 
of the reciprocity between testimony and (tentative) symbolisations of traumas. In 
particular, dealing with the first question, – what does it mean to bear witness and how 
does it work? –, I intend to adopt the main tenets of Agamben’s theory of witnessing. For, 
inasmuch as the latter are developed within the philosopher’s wider theorisation of post-
nihilistic language and semiosis already discussed in chapter 1, they illuminate its uncanny 
entailing. In his 1998 volume Quel che resta di Auschwitz, Agamben engages with 
‘l’aporia di Auschwitz’ that is ‘la stessa della conoscenza storica: la non coincidenza fra 
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fatti e verità, fra constatazione e comprensione’.790 If historical understanding requires 
testimony, how and to what extent does it become a modality of signification? In what 
ways and for what reasons can we make sense of Auschwitz by testifying to it? Aiming at 
isolating the rationale inherent in any act of witnessing, Agamben first traces the 
etymology of the word ‘testimone’:  
 
In latino ci sono due parole per dire il testimone. La prima, testis […] significa etimologicamente 
colui che si pone come terzo (*terstis) in un processo o in una lite tra due contendenti. La seconda, 
superstes, indica colui che ha vissuto qualcosa, ha attraversato fino alla fine un evento e può, 
dunque, renderne testimonianza.791  
 
While ‘testis’ implies a certain detachment and neutrality and is directed towards 
producing/obtaining a judgment, ‘superstes’ involves the radical, personal experience and 
narration of a different kind of truth (and not of a different truth).  For Agamben, every 
testimony about Auschwitz ‘contiene una lacuna […] un intestimoniabile, che destituisce 
l’autorità dei superstiti’.792 This is because, as written by Primo Levi, whom Agamben 
quotes:  
 
[N]on siamo noi, i superstiti, i testimoni veri. Noi sopravvissuti siamo una minoranza anomala oltre 
che esigua: siamo quelli che […] non hanno toccato il fondo. […] [S]ono loro, i ‘musulmani’, i 
sommersi, i testimoni integrali, coloro la cui deposizione avrebbe avuto significato generale. […] 
Parliamo noi in vece loro per delega.793  
 
As Agamben comments, ‘[c]hi si assume l’onere di testimoniare per loro, sa di dover 
testimoniare per l’impossibilità di testimoniare’; from this, it follows more generally that 
‘la testimonianza è l’incontro tra due impossibilità di testimoniare’, since ‘la lingua, per 
testimoniare, deve cedere il posto a una non-lingua, mostrare l’impossibilità di 
testimoniare’.794 Witnessing for the other pushes signification to its limits to the point to 
which it others or estranges itself: ‘nella testimonianza il posto vuoto del soggetto diventa 
la questione decisiva’.795 Thus, the philosopher situates such a paradoxical statement in the 
broader context of his post-metaphysical philosophy, as a non-coincidence between the 
                                                        
790 Giorgio Agamben, Quel che resta di Auschwitz: l'archivio e il testimone (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 
1998), p. 8. 
791 Ibid., p. 15. 
792 Ibid., p. 31. 
793 Primo Levi, I sommersi e i salvati (Turin: Einaudi, 1986), pp. 64-65, quoted in Agamben, p. 31. 
794 Quel che resta, pp. 32-36. 
795 Ibid., p. 135. 
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speaking and the living being, between he who survives and is able to bear testimony to the 
one who has died and will no longer enter language as subject: in the end, ‘la 
testimonianza ha luogo nel non-luogo dell’articolazione’, while ‘soggetto della 
testimonianza è quello che testimonia di una desoggettivazione’. 796  In the act of 
witnessing, the potentiality to speak finds its enabling condition and its limit in the 
(other’s) impossibility to testify. Witnessing implies speaking the discourse of the other, 
for the other and on his behalf. Inherent to testimony is, therefore, an experience of de-
subjectification,797 which, for Agamben, also explains the feeling of shame experienced by 
the witnesses.798   
Indeed, the logic of witnessing is inherently uncanny – ‘quite unfamiliar and estranging’799 
– to the extent to which and because it entails a disjunction within and between the 
subject(s), hence structuring a discourse that is always already inhabited by the mute voice 
of the other. As the Real is that which cannot be symbolised and yet, seemingly 
paradoxically, underpins any attempt at uncanny signification, likewise a ‘testimonial text 
[…] is the evidence of the impossibility of making experience speak’.800  Significantly, 
observing that witnessing constitutes ‘a crucial mode of our relation to events of our 
time’,801 Felman describes its functioning in terms of an unconscious realisation of truth, 
namely ‘not as a statement of but as a mode of access to that truth’802: the witnesses’ 
discourse does not produce ‘a completed statement, a totalizable account’ as ‘[i]n 
                                                        
796 Ibid., pp. 112-21. 
797 This is a dual de-subjectification, that of the one for whom (on behalf of whom) the speaking witness 
bears testimony and that of the witness himself. In the first case, the prefix ‘de-’ signals a deprivation and a 
negation of subjectivity due to the (actual or metaphoric) exclusion from language; in the second case, the 
prefix ‘de-‘, similarly to that which has been observed for the ‘un-’ of ‘uncanny’, alludes to a modification, a 
withdrawal which is also a grounding, an opening that literally means making room for the other within one’s 
subjectivity. 
798 As for shame, which Agamben links to the deprivation of self-sovereignty experienced with de-
subjectification, it is a key manifestation of the sense of guilt that affects Tabucchi’s witnesses; by way of 
example, the narrator in Piccoli equivoci suffers from ‘una grande stanchezza e una specie di vergogna’ (p. 
16). While Tabucchi’s characters are not guilty, their capacity to feel guilty is what produces shame. 
799 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and 
History (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 7. 
800 Shari Goldberg, Quiet Testimony: A Theory of Witnessing from Nineteenth-Century American Literature, 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 68. 
801 Testimony, p. 5. 
802 Ibid., p. 16. 
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testimony language is in process and in trial’, originating from and revealing a ‘crisis of 
truth’.803 
Furthermore, witnessing is a dialogic performance in a dual sense, since it presupposes an 
originary moment in which the witness sees and listens to the voice of the one(s) for which 
he testifies, as well as demanding a third auditor to which the testimony is then given. 
While listening might be grasped as a moment of world- and self-withdrawal, bearing 
witness marks a shift toward what I called the moment of uncanny decidability, a move 
from being responsive to towards being responsible for the other.  
 
Examining literary testimony implies asking how it is possible to signify for the other by 
expressing ‘an utterance that signifies although and because it has no possibility of 
statement’. 804  Felman, in her work The Juridical Unconscious, argues that literary 
witnessing constitutes a unique way to negotiate meaning in the face of traumas; in 
particular, she contends that what distinguishes legal from literary justice is precisely the 
different mode through which the two engage with the quest for and narration of a 
disturbing truth: 
 
Literature is a dimension of concrete embodiment and a language of infinitude that, in contrast to the 
language of the law, encapsulates not closure but precisely what in a given legal case refuses to be 
closed and cannot be closed. It is to this refusal of the trauma to be closed that literature does 
justice.805 
 
A trial and a literary text do not aim at the same kind of conclusion, nor do they strive toward 
the same kind of effect. A trial is presumed to be a search for truth, but, technically, it is a search for 
a decision and thus, in essence, it seeks not simply truth but a finality: a force of resolution. A 
literary text is, on the other hand, a search for meaning, for expression, for heightened significance, 
and for symbolic understanding.806  
 
 
5.2 Literature’s Sense of Guilt: Tabucchi Between Confession and Testimony  
 
Within Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny, the dual de-subjectification that Agamben 
identifies at the core of testimony, is structured in terms of a mutually shaping articulation 
                                                        
803 Ibid., p. 5. 
804 Ibid., p. 13. 
805 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 9. 
806 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
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of narrative silences and voices. It is solely in the hiatus between the taking place of 
language and its impossibility on the part of those who have been empirically dispossessed 
of their voice, that Tabucchi’s testimony comes forth. It is not a gesture of appropriating or 
imparting a voice onto theirs; rather, as suggested, it is a matter of embodying them. 
Tabucchi makes the other’s silence talk, out of and by virtue of its muteness. To him, a 
voice always implies a unique, irreplaceable body and the latter equals life.807  
Despite the gap ideally separating the two, every act of testimony in Tabucchi’s writings 
also occurs as and as a consequence of a moment of confession: this is due to the writer’s 
deep-rooted sense of guilt and shame, to his feeling ‘colpevol[e] per questa insufficienza 
della letteratura […]’,808 and the fact that ‘gli scrittori provano spesso il bisogno di 
giustificarsi, come se l’osservazione della vita desse un senso di colpa’.809 
Adopting Agamben’s distinction between the witness as ‘terstis’ and as ‘superstes’, it 
could be contended that Tabucchi feels the urgency to move from the former to the latter, 
from occupying the position of an external observer towards being the agent, the subject 
undergoing the experience that needs to be witnessed. This is strictly related to the 
abovementioned intermingling of voice and body, as, in moving from one form of 
testimony to the other and between the two, the writer tries to deal with the problem of 
how to make the case, how to clear the ground for a corporal, first-hand experience of the 
real within and through literary writing. This results in a topological interplay of 
confession and testimony, remoteness and proximity, as a consequence of which 
Tabucchi’s testimonial agency might seem to dwell in a somewhat ‘nearing distance’. 
Confession is Tabucchi’s mode of acknowledging and working through the limits of 
literature, its (im)possibility – Agamben’s ‘impossibilità di testimoniare’ – to make room 
for such a personal, direct involvement. Still, only when and precisely because he 
recognises literature’s fault – at once the reason and the object of his confession – can 
Tabucchi act as a witness: hence, his secularised confession marks a sort of inner divide 
for testimony, as aknowledging this sense of guilt, the author experiences that positive de-
                                                        
807 Thus, in Tabucchi, the body has a dual value: ontological, since it marks the irreducible presence of a 
human being; political, as the taking-place of a dialectic between dehumanising power (e.g. torture) and 
ethical resistance. 
808 Schwarz Lausten, p. 133. 
809 La gastrite, p. 59. Likewise, in Requiem Tabucchi writes that ‘siamo tutti colpevoli […] di essere nati, 
forse, e delle cose che sono successe in seguito, siamo tutti colpevoli’ (p. 122). A sense of guilt that, 
however, positively enables the writer to trasform his condition of detachment into an opening towards the 
others. 
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subjectification which can allow him to become, in turn, the subject witnessing for the 
other.   
Tabucchi dramatises this topological tension and interplay between confession and 
witnessing in the short story ‘Racconto dell’uomo di carta’, where, as the title suggests, the 
narrator can speak his testimony solely when he has seemingly retreated from his bodily 
identity: ‘Sono un uomo di carta. Per sfuggire al mondo sono diventato di carta ma ho 
imprigionato il mondo dentro la carta per raccontarlo’.810 Still, in Tabucchi, being in the 
flesh and being made of paper do not stand as opposite poles of an irreconcilable 
dichotomy; rather they mark the two terms of an on-going interaction, articulating a 
counter-turning motion which alone allows for the potentiality to testify:  
 
Cerco qualcuno che mi ascolta. C’è qualcuno che mi ascolta? Ehi, dico a tutti voi, volete ascoltarmi? 
Sono il Testimone, volete ascoltarmi? […] io sono il Testimone. Ma vi chiedo cos’è il testimone? 
[…] un ectoplasma che assomiglia all’aria, della sostanza d’aria è fatta la tempesta, il suono della 
voce svanisce nell’aria e nell’aria si trasforma in nube, in nebbia, in niente. Anch’io vorrei un 
testimone.811 
 
Why is the narrator-witness mute? Why is he demanding to be listened? To answer the first 
question, it is important to consider the setting of the short story, as the Argentine military 
regime and the tragedy of the desaparecidos situate the narrative in a specific historical 
context: ‘[L]ei non è un cittadino, lei è un anonimo, lei è folla, e nella folla lei sparirà’.812 
Nonetheless, the latter is subsumed by and trascended into a kind of archetypical 
demonstration of Tabucchi’s testimonial mode: ‘Ma io sono un uomo di carne. Di ferro 
sono gli eroi. Gli uomini di ferro schiacciano gli uomini di carne. […] E l’uomo di carne, 
schiacciato sotto la pressa di ferro, diventa un uomo di carta’.813 On this point, Zangrilli 
comments, the story might be read as a  
 
[M]etafora dello scrittore (-intellettuale) che vive nel mondo dei libri, ma senza mai smettere di 
osservare la realtà circostante […] un ‘testimone’ scomodo perché agita le acque, scuote lo status 
quo, crea problemi perché […] rappresenta l’imperativo di comunicare un messaggio, di risvegliare 
la coscienza.814  
 
                                                        
810 Racconti con figure, p. 74. 
811 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
812 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
813 Ibid., p. 74. 
814 Zangrilli, pp. 295-97. 
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This also responds to the second question, since the narrator’s request for attention denotes 
how, through confession, the writer becomes a witness to himself, to his possibility to 
testify for the other. Solely when he has lost his body – and significantly he maintains that 
‘[i]l mio corpo è la mia patria’–,815 can and does he embody an intention to signify. Losing 
his body and his name – the police calls him ‘anonymous’, literally without a proper name 
– the narrator undergoes an experience of de-subjectification, which, in turn, subjectifies 
him as the witness with a capital letter. He cannot but be the witness; this is his new body, 
where he can feel at home in being detached from himself. 
 
Significantly, the story recounts the protagonist’s attempt to phone ‘la signora Storia’ in 
order to tell her about those episodes of violence happening under the regime: 
symbolically, it is literature’s attempt to bear witness – ‘la mia piccola barchetta di carta si 
mise a navigare senza bottiglia’816 – despite and in the face of mute oblivion. The fact that 
the phone call is answered by a neutral voice working ‘alle Informazioni’ might suggest 
that, in order to testify in the court of history, and in order to engage with the traumatic 
real, the writer has to negotiate his narrative of truth with the other apparatuses and 
producers of discoursive practices, and that he needs to question any modality of 
signification upon which reality is funded. This might also explain the metaphorical 
presence of the elephant, as the narrator’s capacity to communicate with the animal and to 
share with it an experience of survival illustrates the rationale of literary testimony itself: 
being a ‘superstes’, bearing witness to and for whom has no voice:  
 
Poi trovai un elefante […] allorché arrivò un tipo travestito da vescovo, con un cappotto di cuoio 
nero come quello della Gestapo. Aprì il cappotto e mostrò la luger che teneva sotto l’ascella […] 
sono un parà privato, lavoro per la chiesa della diffamazione, trasformo l’oro in merda, so tutto di 
voi, so tutto di te, so tutto di tutti: mani in alto. Quel miserabile credeva di sapere tutto […] [m]a non 
conosceva la lingua degli elefanti. Cosa devo fare?, mi sussurrò l’elefante con la proboscide 
all’orecchio. Colpisci forte, dissi io, o lui o noi, è una questione di sopravvivenza.817 
                                                        
815 Racconti con figure, p. 70. 
816 Ibid., p. 75. 
817 Ibid., p. 73. The elephant, an archetypical symbol of vast and reliable memory, is a recurrent motif in 
Tabucchi’s testimonial writings; for instance, Tristano observes how, to narrate a life, ‘[c]i vorrebbe una 
memoria d’elefante, ma noi uomini non ce l'abbiamo, forse un giorno la inventeranno elettronica’ (Tristano 
muore, p. 10 ). Additionally, he compares his final witnessing to the elephants’ funeral rite: ‘Quando un 
elefante sente che è arrivata la sua ora si allontana dal branco, […] sceglie un compagno che vada con lui, e 
partono […] finché il moribondo non decide che quello è il posto per morire, e fa un paio di giri tracciando 
un cerchio, perché sa che è arrivato il momento di morire, la morte se la porta dentro ma ha bisogno di 
collocarla nello spazio, come se si trattasse di un appuntamento, come se desiderasse guardare la morte in 
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What makes the writer’s body, then? And how can it embody the voice of the other? On 
one level, it might be argued that, as Tabucchi’s literary corpus is composed of his texts, he 
purposively explores the role of his body by foregrounding his characters’ corporeity. In 
particular, as I will contend in my analysis of Sostiene Pereira and La testa perduta di 
Damasceno Monteiro, this perspective offers some original insight into the bond that joins 
testimony, body and repentance, which the writer thematises through the figures of Pereira 
and the lawyer Loton. However, Tabucchi embodies the other at a deeper level, when the 
text itself, through its narrative and linguistic structure, performs and incorporates the 
gesture of a speaking being: in the following section, by reading some of his fictions, I will 
argue that the use of features such as repetitions and ellipses, or the loose juxtaposition of 
irregular paragraphs, all serve to create the impression of a wounded body. In the end, it is 
the text itself that is metaphorically tortured.  
This is evident also in ‘Racconto dell’uomo di carta’: first, as introduced in the title, the 
body constitutes the main motif of the story, from the urgency of witnessing a case of 
brutal torture suffered by the narrator’s neighbour   
 
E che sarà del mio corpo?, chiese il vicino. Non ti preoccupare del tuo corpo, pensa alla tua anima, 
pensa alla tua patria, risposero quelli. Ma la mia anima è il mio corpo, la mia patria è il mio corpo, 
disse il mio vicino. […] L’ultimo ricordo […] è la sua voce che gridava, mentre la macchina si 
allontanava nella note: il mio corpo!818  
 
or the tentative description of what makes a body – ‘Come se un corpo fosse 
incomprensibile. […] Come spiegare un corpo?’819 – to the image of the hand holding a 
pen, a metonymy for the gesture of writing, which incarnates the sole possibility of 
salvation:  
 
[M]a io speravo nelle mani che mi avrebbero afferrato. Quali mani? […] L’ho trovato, ho trovato 
una mano, una mano umana, pollice, indice, medio che reggono un lapis o un pennello. […] Ci 
saranno due mani e un solo dito che di una folla sappiano fare un individuo? Un individuo che 
rappresenti la folla? Tutta la folla, ciò che siamo, noi, l’umanità intera?820 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
faccia, fuori da lui [...] il suo è un circolo immaginario, naturalmente, ma gli serve per geografizzare la morte, 
se posso dire così […] E questo in qualche modo c'entra con quello che ti ho chiamato a fare’ (pp. 10-11). 
818 Racconti con figure, p. 71. 
819 Ibid., p. 72. 
820 Ibid., pp. 74-77. 
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Second, focusing on the narrative texture, what comes to the fore is the story’s peculiar 
structure, as, unlike the other texts included in the collection, it is divided into eleven 
paragraphs of different length, and each part is numbered and introduced by a citation in 
italics,821 separated from the body of the text. Graphically, the use of disjointed and 
interrupted textual fragments might be said to compose an irregular, narrative tempo, as if 
the text itself were struck by the same blows suffered by the bodies in the story and, like 
them, brutally dis-articulated, as well as pointing, through the element of asyndeton, to 
literature’s urgent need and im-possibility to testify. Yet, this is an im-possibility that, as 
previously discussed, defines a positive grounding: arguably, this is why Tabucchi inserts 
intertextual quotations to enhance the writer’s de-subjectification, visualising his making 
room for the testimony of the other. Intertextual references create an echo-effect in the 
writer’s voice that reinforces the ethical and collective dimension of his gesture, disrupting 
any binary opposition between the I and the other. Furthermore, this accentuates the meta-
historical value of literary witnessing, namely the fact that, rather than occurring solely as 
the account of a subjective experience, it forms an attempt to expose the limits of existing 
narrations and symbolic appropriations of such historical episodes, to engage with the 
discursive construction and dissemination of traumas.822 
 
 
5.2.1 Witnessing (as) Tabucchi’s Uncanny Commitment 
 
Functioning in accordance with the counter-turning motion between semiotic 
defamiliarisation and ethical commitment upon which Tabucchi’s uncanny is founded, and 
by virtue of its being enmeshed with the writer’s confession of his own sense of guilt, 
witnessing may be credited as being the only possible form of agency that is coherent and 
consistent with Tabucchi’s view of ‘impegno’. To stay with the legal framework, in fact, 
                                                        
821 Significantly, three citations are from Wislawa Szymborska’s 1986 poem Tortures. 
822 As Meel argues, it is not solely a matter ‘of bearing witness to specific events and experiences, but also as 
an ongoing struggle over representations of the past. […] Historical trauma is not grounded in memory traces 
but in the interpretation of what may be “forgotten” in the texts of mass media, academic criticism, 
psychoanalysis and critical theory itself ’. Allen Meek, Trauma and Media: Theories, Histories and Images 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 1. Similarly, Zangrilli suggests that, in Tabucchi’s case, ‘la missione del 
mondo mediatico […] deve consistere nella ricerca della notizia concreta e giusta, della verità più scomoda, 
nell’altruismo inteso come una sorta di voce potente che grida e denuncia per coloro che non hanno voce. 
Schierarsi a favore degli inermi del presente e del passato […] per l’autore vuol dire testimoniare, 
rappresentare come nella storia e nei suoi tempi i valori umani e civili vengono soppressi, annullati’ (pp. 243-
71). 
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one could notice that, no longer occupying the role of legislator, the writer can and intends 
to be an accuser and a member of the (popular) jury.823  
On the one hand, this is due to Tabucchi’s concerns with the present situation and to what 
he considers (his) literature’s specific mode of signification; as he declared in an interview: 
 
 [T]he Italian and the European reality has always captured my attention. I have spoken of fascism, 
of terrorism, of the ‘pentiti’ […], of the judicial inquiries. But I have done this in my own way, that 
is, as a writer, one who interprets. In this respect literature distinguishes itself from journalism: it 
doesn’t limit itself to reporting the facts; it lives them.824    
 
On the other hand, the judicial metaphor aptly describes the intellectuals’ role in the 
passage from modernity to postmodernity. Adopting the distinction between legislator and 
interpreter theorised by Bauman, I follow Ceserani in assigning Tabucchi to the second 
category.825 For, while the term legislator defines the modern intellectual who used to act 
as a spokesperson for an ideological view of history, society and, in broader terms, of 
reality itself, the interpreter is the intellectual ‘condannato al confronto e al conflitto delle 
interpretazioni’,826 who engages with and comes to terms with the void of the real, 
articulating unsaturated possibilities of sense.  
Truly, Tabucchi is aware that, from Pirandello’s ‘la vita, o si vive o si scrive’ onwards,827 
‘[l]a società italiana non ha mai del tutto accettato gli scrittori e ha cercato in tutti i modi di 
suscitare in loro un sentimento di colpevolezza […] vivere o scrivere, come se fossero due 
                                                        
823 Hence, admitting his own guilt through confession, Tabucchi accepts to speak – and become, at that very 
moment, the speaker of – a discourse of truth irreducible to any reassuring and practical resolution, which 
disrupts the dichotomy between truth and lies, articulating, in its place, the grey zone of fictional truth. This 
is a zone that he frequently theorises also in his texts, from ‘Un confessore, pensò, ci sarà in quella chiesa un 
confessore? […] Sono io, avrebbe detto, sono un poeta, la poesia è menzogna, ho mentito per tutta la vita, 
tutta la scrittura è menzogna, anche le cose più vere, mi assolva, per favore, non ho fatto altro che mentire’ 
(L’angelo nero, p. 103) to the claim, advanced in Requiem, that ‘la verità suprema è fingere’(p. 124).  
824 Botta, ‘An interview with Antonio Tabucchi’, 439, italicised. 
825 The opposition between the intellectual role in modernity and in postmodernity defined in terms of the 
difference between legislator and interpreter comes from Bauman. Zygmunt Bauman and K. Tester, 
Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman  (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).  
826 Ceserani, ‘Intellettuali liquidi o in liquidazione?’, p. 39. As Pocci observes, ‘[w]hile an entire culture of 
amnesia and désengagement was on the rise, Tabucchi used fiction to address the most difficult and 
intractable kind of past, the past which exists and resists in the form of ghosts, nightmares, traumas, regret 
and guilt’: therefore his form of ethical commitment can be understood as a form of response and resistance 
to the 1980s dominant ‘individualistic hedonism’ and to the latter’s view of literary commitment as 
‘playfully archival’, which uses history solely as a ‘cultural playground’ (406-18). 
827 Luigi Pirandello, Carteggi inediti, ed. by Sarah Zappulla Muscarà (Rome: Bulzoni, 1980), p. 82. 
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cose molto diverse. […]’.828 Yet, as previously discussed, he works through and eventually 
rejects this opposition, turning literature’s apparent helplessness into its greatest possibility 
of sense making: ‘Perché mettere una “o” tra queste due parole? […] Non esiste una 
dicotomia tra entrambe come si voleva che fosse, proteggendosi dietro criteri di aberrante 
pragmatismo’.829  
 
What literary commitment is possible in the current Italian scenario? And to what extent is 
the gesture of bearing witness intelligible in terms of an ethically committed practice?  
In answering the first interrogation, I make reference to La gastrite di Platone,830 wherein 
Tabucchi explicitly deals with the issue and identifies a peculiar model of literary 
commitment. Not only does he disentangle the notion of intellectual function from that of 
the intellectual figure, reconfiguring the former in terms of a possible tool at the disposal 
of writers, artists and even citizens831: ‘è a suo modo un intellettuale […chi] usa l’intelletto 
                                                        
828 ‘La letteratura come inquietudine’, p. 24. Similarly, Magris writes of a sense of guilt that ‘non riguarda 
moralisticamente il singolo individuo […] bensì la condizione storica generale […]. L’individuo prova il 
sentimento di vivere in un mondo caduto e avverte questo suo stesso sentimento come colpevole’ (p. 7). 
829 ‘La letteratura come inquietudine’, pp. 24-25. As Burns observes, for Tabucchi literature ‘has the potential 
to mediate powerfully in this relationship between hegemonic discourses and the individual subject […] he 
seems to see writing and reading literature as modes of seeking meanings in, and thereby improving, the 
human condition’ (Fragments of Impegno, p. 61). In a similar vein, Francese argues that ‘Tabucchi’s 
commitment is defined by his opinion that literature must ask precisely those questions that society is not yet 
prepared to answer. Literature does not exist for the present but as witness to the present’ (Socially Symbolic 
Acts, p. 6, italics in the text). Thus, Tabucchi overcomes both modernist ineptitude (writing about living 
instead of living) and its postmodern radicalised version (writing about writing). 
830 La gastrite di Platone originates as Tabucchi’s reaction to Eco’s article ‘Il primo dovere degli intellettuali: 
Stare zitti quando non servono a niente’, which appeared in L’Espresso on 24 April 1997: as Tabucchi 
explains, ‘Eco, affidando all’intellettuale esclusivamente la gestione della cultura […] e fondandosi su due 
imperiose asserzioni (la prima, che quando la casa va a fuoco l’unica cosa sensata che l’intellettuale possa 
fare è chiamare i pompieri; la seconda, che sia vano fare opera di convincimento su sindaci impermeabili a 
maniere di civile educazione e dunque più utile per l’intellettuale scrivere dei manuali ad uso dei nipotini di 
tali sindaci […]) tracciasse dell’intellettuale un profilo eccessivamente malinconico […] Solo che non è 
compito del capitano dei pompieri […] individuare chi collocò l’ordigno […] nell’eventualità che il risultato 
dell’inchiesta lasci ragionevoli dubbi […] che facciamo: archiviamo?’ (Ibid., pp. 15-17 and p. 40).  
831 Tellingly, Tabucchi’s detectives are never professional ones: they are writers, journalists, or even a doctor 
in the case of Spino, who improvise their quests. This element reinforces the idea that his detections are 
ontological rather than epistemological and that their methodology is based on a sort of ‘literary intuition and 
a-logical insight’, namely on the possibility to make constellations of sense based on a-causal 
correspondences rather than on consequential ties. It is not fortuitous that Tabucchi dedicates La gastrite to 
Sciascia and Pasolini, for he sees in them the perfect actualization of literature’s practice of truth. 
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a sua metodologia. E costui naturalmente si inquieta’.832 In addition, Tabucchi explains 
what he means by ‘intellectual function’ and, recounting Eco’s opinion that ‘gli 
intellettuali, per mestiere, le crisi le creano ma non le risolvono’, he reverses it through his 
own assertion that ‘l’ipotetica funzione dell’intellettuale non sia tanto creare delle crisi, ma 
mettere in crisi’.833 The etymological meaning of crisis – a judgement resulting from a trial 
– reinforces the understanding of Tabucchi’s commitment as the act of putting dominant 
and familiar narratives on trial, retaining the whole judicial resonance of the term: ‘se è 
vero che una giusta condanna dei giudici è necessaria, è anche vero che essa non spiega 
nulla’.834 In effect, the focus on law and justice also shapes the structure of the text, which 
is explicitly defined as a ‘testimonianza’.835 Three features should be considered in this 
regard. First, there is the epistolary form – the volume is made up of two letters sent by 
Tabucchi to Adriano Sofri, the latter’s reply, and, in the central part, a conversation 
between the author and his French editor Bernard Comment, to whom Tabucchi also 
directs the concluding epistle, deciding to ‘incrostare in questa lettera due brani di lettere 
(qui l’epistolarità del tutto sale di esponente) che estraggo dal Corriere della Sera,836 and, 
finally, a hypothesised letter that, Tabucchi suggests, someone in the future may send to 
the widow of the anarchist Pinelli, in order to tell her the truth about her husband’s 
death.837 Secondly, the choice of the recipient (Sofri) gives Tabucchi the opportunity to 
proceed along the dual tracks of historical contingency and the meta-historical exemplum: 
what Sofri’s unfair condemnation – ‘un errore giudiziario o una devianza giuridica’ –838 
incarnates is the blind functioning of law, ‘persino il Diritto soffre di stomaco’,839 which 
                                                        
832 La gastrite di Platone, p. 25. 
833 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
834 Ibid., p. 34. 
835 Ibid., p. 18. Tabucchi ascribes to the intellectual a ‘funzione conoscitiva […] percorrere il discorso al 
rovescio con una logica che non ubbidisce a una sequenza conformista della realtà, e che ha uno statuto 
agnitivo’ (p. 28). 
836 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
837 Significantly, however, this last letter would be merely a fictional creation by a writer who may decide to 
investigate the story: ‘E può darsi, chissà, che uno scrittore un giorno abbia voglia di scriverla. Una vicenda 
come questa offre una vasta gamma narrativa […] Prova a immaginare […] La donna sta aspettando da 
trent’anni una lettera che le rechi la spiegazione della morte di suo marito, che nessuno ha mai saputo o 
voluto spiegare. […] Ma: cosa dice quella lettera? E soprattutto: chi la sta scrivendo?’ (Ibid., pp. 83-84, 
italics in the text). That Tabucchi ends this volume with a question(ing) of identity perfectly suits his 
theoretical meditation upon the intellectual function as a disturbing approach that anyone, especially the 
reader, can and should adopt. 
838 Ibid., p. 83. 
839 Ibid., p. 41. 
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‘assume una dimensione più vasta: è davvero il perturbante di freudiana memoria, un 
Unheimlich non più desunto da un racconto di Hoffmann, ma dalla Storia’.840 And finally, 
Tabucchi purposively appropriates the language of the court in this book – thus, in the 
prologue ‘si giustifica questa Gastrite’, 841  while in the third part he writes that 
‘l’interpellato rispose, venendo doverosamente verbalizzato agli atti della presente 
Gastrite’.842 Arguably, this is a text about the function of literary witnessing as a disturbing 
modality of knowledge and sense making that is articulated in the form of a testimony. 
This convergence between form and content is revealing of the communicative urgency of 
the writer in the act of bearing witness – recalling ‘l’uomo di carta’ when he exclaims, ‘C’è 
qualcuno che mi ascolta? […] Sono il Testimone, volete ascoltarmi?’ 
 
Tabucchi responds to the second question concerning the connection between witnessing 
and commitment most effectively in L’oca al passo, where he introduces and reflects upon 
the element of testimony in several key places. Already the subtitle, ‘notizie dal buio che 
stiamo attraversando’, alludes to the role of the writer as witness and, recalling Agamben’s 
classification, as superstes, since Tabucchi can witness the darkness of the present only 
because he is experiencing it and struggling to survive it. Likewise, in the prologue 
Tabucchi quotes Pasolini’s ‘Io so’, but turns it into ‘io non so se so’843: this accentuates his 
distance from a ‘culto dell’evidenza […] della testimonianza oculare’,844 in favour of ‘un 
modello interpretativo molto più attrezzato, proprio in virtù della sua indeterminazione, a 
decifrare la complessità del reale di quanto non si dimostrino le garanzie di veridicità 
ostentate dal paradigma della testimonianza oculare’. 845  Mis-appropriating Pasolini’s 
claim, consequently to his inhabiting a radically changed historical context, Tabucchi 
embarks upon a different pathway to testimony. As Antonello comments: 
 
Ripartire da quel ‘io so’, significa con enfasi diverse affrontare il problema del rapporto tra verità 
storica e il suo carattere testimoniale e probatorio. […] Quello che va allora ricercato è una forma di 
                                                        
840 Ibid., p. 26. 
841 Ibid., p. 15. 
842 Ibid., p. 63. 
843 Ibid. Here, Tabucchi ironically dismisses any certain possession of knowledge in favour of a generative 
doubt.  
844 Arturo Mazzarella, Politiche dell’irrealtà. Scritture e visioni tra Gomorra e Abu Ghraib (Turin: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 2011), Amazon Kindle e-book (Preface, para. 2, location 27). 
845 Ibid., (Chapter 1, para. 27, location 190). 
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giustizia etica e memoriale, […] un tentativo di trovare un rapporto di comprensione de-
ideologizzato con la realtà, aggiornato da un supplemento etico.846 
 
Tabucchi examines the mutual relationship between literary writing and the present 
scenario in the article ‘Il silenzio è d’oro’, which is included in the collection. In particular, 
he denounces how ‘[i]n Italia è in atto una dittatura della parola. […] Perché la parola è 
d’oro. E la possiede una sola persona, un uomo politico che è contemporaneamente il capo 
di un governo e il padrone di quasi tutti i media che trasportano la parola’.847 To 
(Berlusconi’s) linguistic regime, he counters the belief that ‘[l]a fonazione, cioè la favella, 
è la facoltà di cui la natura ha dotato gli uomini affinché si distinguano dagli animali’, from 
which he derives his own mode of commitment: ‘[i]o parlo perché sono uno scrittore. La 
scrittura è la mia voce. Uno scrittore che non parla non è uno scrittore. Non è niente’.848 
Lastly, Tabucchi explains how the volume itself is structured in such a way as to embody 
his voice. Hence, inasmuch as they presuppose a reciprocity, or a dialogical responsibility, 
his appeals to Ciampi scattered throughout the text follow the same logic of testimony – 
‘La democrazia significa anche reciprocità: Lei è il garante della mia Costituzione, io ne 
chiedo conto. E dunque a mio modo divento garante di ciò che Lei deve garantire. 
Altrimenti, come diceva Paul Celan, chi testimonia per il testimone?’ –.849 This also 
distinguishes literature from mass media:  
 
[l]a parola invece è alata […] non è imprigionata in un tubo catodico, sfugge ai palinsesti, ai talk-
show imbalsamati, alle conferenze stampa di ministri e generali. La parola è voce. E la voce è 
imprendibile, clandestina. Si sparge e si diffonde. […] La parola si oppone alla lingua corrente.850 
 
In the end, although it is important to discriminate whether it is the author Tabucchi, as in 
the case of articles, interviews and non-fictional books, or the fictional figure of the 
narrator that acts as a witness and confessor, thus separating his view of literature as 
testimony from the judicial episodes included within his literature, what will emerge, 
looking more closely at his texts in the following section, is a strong correspondence 




846 Antonello, pp. 120-21.  
847 L’oca al passo, p. 29. Clearly, Tabucchi’s polemical target is Berlusconi. 
848 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
849 Ibid., p. 55. 
850 Ibid., pp. 119-21. 
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5.3  Tabucchi’s Testimonial Fictions 
 
In this section, I intend to analyse a number of texts that all explore the nexus between 
testimony, literature and trauma. The novels Il piccolo naviglio, Sostiene Pereira, La testa 
perduta di Damasceno Monteiro and Tristano muore, and the short story ‘Piccoli equivoci 
senza importanza’ have in common a series of recurrent elements and modes that clearly 
illuminate Tabucchi’s use of the uncanny as a form of testimony.  
In particular, I advance a dual hypothesis: first, that characters in Tabucchi’s fictions 
follow a somewhat chronological progression from passivity to activity, from being 
Agambenian ‘terstis’ to being ‘superstes’. This might be said to mirror the writer’s 
redefinition of literary commitment as a sort of ‘ethical disquiet’, resulting from his shift 
from the initial confession of a guilty externality to the testimony of an engaged 
outwardness.851 And second, that, in accordance with Tabucchi’s view of literature as a 
form of depoliticised commitment, the character’s testimonial agency departs from – and, 
with Tristano, regrets852 – institutionalised actions or ‘political militancy’853 in favour of 
turning into producers and narrators of (unsaturated) meaning themselves. 
                                                        
851 This biographical movement from being an observer to being a direct witness of present reality is evident, 
from the late 90s, in the publication of non-fictional texts such as La gastrite di Platone (1998), Gli Zingari e 
il Rinascimento (1999) and L’oca al passo (2001). However, the interplay of confession and testimony finds 
no definitive resolution or arrangement in Tabucchi’s poetics. As he writes in the preface to the posthumous 
Per Isabel, ‘[p]otrà sembrare curioso che uno scrittore, passati i cinquant’anni e dopo aver pubblicato tanti 
libri, senta ancora il bisogno di giustificare le avventure della sua scrittura. […] Probabilmente non ho ancora 
risolto il dilemma se si tratti di un senso di colpa nei confronti del mondo o di una più semplice mancata 
elaborazione del lutto’ (pp. 11-12 ). Tabucchi’s preface is meaningfully entitled ‘Giustificazione’, which, 
Ceserani suggests, is a ‘termine che di solito si usa per spiegare una colpa, che qui sarebbe quella di essersi 
abbandonato all’avventura della scrittura […in] un tempo storico che [ha] perso i punti di riferimento’. Remo 
Ceserani, ‘Qualche altra riflessione su Isabel’, in Tabucchi postumo. Da Per Isabel all’archivio Tabucchi 
della Bibliothèque nationale de France, ed. by Thea Rimini (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2017), pp. 59-67 (pp. 60-
66). This biographical and narrative tension towards active agency might be read, significantly, through the 
gradual de-centring of the narrating I taking place in Tabucchi’s fictions. As Francese observes, while his 
texts from the 80s are characterised by an ‘acquisition of self-understanding through empathy for the other’ 
(Socially Symbolic Acts, p. 178), in the following decade Tabucchi’s protagonists begin to explore their 
subjectivity and social dimension by looking at themselves from the perspective of the other – which might 
also be another, posterior myself, as in the case of memorial writing. For Francese, this entails a shift towards 
a future-oriented or posthumous practice of literature, wherein the latter becomes ‘a tool for looking at our 
present from the perspective of the future’ that ‘offers a testimony of the present for posterity’ (ibid., p. 6 and 
p. 190).  
852 Undergoing an experience of world-withdrawal and revelation, an uncanny clearing and de-saturation, 
Tristano realises how his political commitment during the Italian Resistance has led to the affirmation of an 
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Addressing my twofold hypothesis, I will discuss the intertwining of witnessing and 
confessing, the separation of justice from law, the nexus between torture and the bodily 
dimension, and the centrality of the voice and of the unconscious. At the narratological 
level, moreover, I will focus on the reduction of the narrator to a mere recorder of the 
other’s voice in the light of a more general blurring of mimesis and diegesis, together with 
the use of repetitions, ellipses and disjointed tenses.  
 
 
5.3.1 Testimony and Confession in Il piccolo naviglio and ‘Piccoli equivoci’  
 
The court episode in Il piccolo naviglio almost constitutes a narrative hapax in Tabucchi, 
as it is a peculiar case in which the protagonist is also the accused.854 Capitano Sesto is 
deemed responsible for distributing ‘materiale offensivo’855 and arraigned for having 
accused, in turn, a group of policemen of Ivana’s murder; eventually, he will be 
condemned to a criminal asylum. 
Reading the narration of the trial, through Sesto’s memory of it, what immediately emerges 
is the character’s detachment from the events actually taking place;856 as the narrator 
                                                                                                                                                                       
illusory freedom granted by the apparatus of the media: ‘Scrittore, lo sai per chi combatté Tristano? […] un 
giorno Tristano se ne accorse, così, ebbe un lampo di intuizione […] sai, quando la realtà che è compatta 
come cemento, quasi per grazia divina apre una fessura un istante, tu puoi dare un’occhiata al suo interno 
[…] Tristano capì per chi aveva lottato, per chi aveva combattuto, per chi aveva ucciso, per chi aveva 
rischiato di essere ucciso… […] Per pippopippi’ (Tristano muore, p. 128). Repentance is prefigured in what 
Tristano initially tells the writer he has called to his bedside to narrate his life, ‘[t]i devo confessare una cosa 
… dopo che ti avevo chiamato mi sono pentito di averti chiamato’ (ibid., p. 11), and which casts a somewhat 
judicial as well as religious (though secularised) undertone upon the protagonist’s testimony. 
853 Socially Symbolic Acts, p. 160. For both the characters and Tabucchi, being an active witness means being 
Agambenian contemporaneous, that is, being separated from and yet ultimately leaning towards the historical 
situation they inhabit. As Francese comments, Tabucchi and his characters find themselves in a sort of 
‘proximity at a distance’ (ibid.), an uncannily structured, topological negotiation of sense with reality. 
Similarly, Tabucchi affirms that the committed writer ‘[r]itraendosi dal politico, non se ne distacca, ma cerca 
di conservare questo spazio di ritirata e questo sforzo di ritiro per profittare di questa prossimità che lo 
allontana al fine di installarvisi (installazione precaria) come una sentinella’ (La gastrite, p. 39). 
854 Another accused, the lover and murderer of the woman from Porto Pim appears in the eponymous story. 
The trial is briefly alluded to in the closing of the text, which nonetheless brings to the fore the centrality of 
the voice. He is a singer and, in a way, his songs bear witness to the other that he has both silenced and now 
remembers. 
855 Il piccolo naviglio, p. 192. 
856 Thus, recalling that which was analysed in chapter 4, the episode assigns a positive value to the oneiric 
dimension – comprising daydreams, hallucinations or actual dreaming – in that it constitutes a potential 
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clarifies, the protagonist’s memory turns the hearing into a sort of reverie, for: ‘È curioso 
come la memoria riesca a deformare la realtà […] quando fu una realtà impietosa e 
tagliente, che ci aggredì e ci fece vivere con crudele completezza, senza lasciarci 
tregua’.857  
However, it is not just the mnemonic filter that superimposes a dreamlike quality onto the 
episode; it is the way in which Capitato Sesto lived the trial. For instance, it is stated that 
‘ne aveva approfittato per schiacciare un pisolino’858 conferring fantasmatic qualities upon 
the episode, as if he had experienced the trial unconsciously, closing it off to the recording 
and integrating activity of consciousness. Sesto’s removal from reality should be 
understood according to Tabucchi’s modality of oneiric awakening: for the protagonist, 
falling asleep constitutes the only way he has to detach himself from a ‘stupido spettacolo 
allestito nell’aula’,859 hence something that demands to be watched and which forces him 
into the position of a passive spectator (which the writer tries to overcome in his gesture of 
confession). Yet actual slumber is not the only defence adopted by the protagonist: even 
when awake, during the trial, Capitano Sesto experiences a dreamlike, almost hallucinating 
state. Still, this is not only intended to denaturalise the discourse of law. On the contrary, it 
also signals, and more radically, his attempt to cope with the trauma of Ivana’s murder. 
Thus, seeing ‘uno spettacolo minuscolo […] una famiglia di tarli’860 surfacing from the 
wooden bench where he is sitting, Sesto hallucinates about a group of worms moving 
around on Ivana’s corpse: ‘Sesto non poteva sopportarlo, non poteva tollerare ancora, 
doveva intervenire, doveva gridare! […] volle gridare qualcosa, ma non riuscì a liberare il 
più piccolo suono’.861 However, it is precisely such an impossible scream that will become 
his final accusation. 
Indeed, silence and ellipses characterise his role as witness: noticeably, Tabucchi 
articulates a sharp contrast between the absence, from the narration, of Sesto’s testimony, 
which is said to develop ‘per rigore filologico’,862 and, on the other hand, the ‘Deposizione 
di Mastrangelo dottor Salvatore, commissario di Pubblica Sicurezza’, which is reported in 
its entirety to expose the redundancy and obtrusiveness of burocratic language. When 
                                                                                                                                                                       
awakening from the anesthetic slumber of familiar reality. Being able to dream means being able to estrange 
and expose pre-existing networks of significance and clearing a space for free agency – i.e. thinking.  
857 Ibid., p. 189. 
858 Ibid., p. 190. 
859 Ibid., p. 193. 
860 Ibid. 
861 Ibid., p. 196. 
862 Ibid., p. 191. 
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Capitano Sesto acknowledges them to be ‘dichiarazioni […] per quanto espresse in 
maniera ridicola, erano fedeli ai fatti accaduti’,863 it is the problem of truth that is 
foregrounded. Is (judicial) truth simply a matter of factual accuracy? And, more 
importantly, is it enough to consider only raw facts? Is this the (only) truth? Clearly, 
Tabucchi’s answer is negative. 
On the other hand, the oneiric dimension also serves to introduce another crucial element: 
that of corporeity and, specifically, animality, for the trial is compared to ‘un incubo 
popolato di bestie, come la rappresentazione di uno zoo macabro e grottesco’. 864 
Peculiarly, here Tabucchi reverses the positive value he confers upon the bodily dimension 
elsewhere, since Sesto uses animal metaphors to expose at once the brutal violence of law 
and of the process as a complacent farce: if, looking at the judge, it was ‘impossibile dire 
se fosse un gorilla travestito da giudice oppure un giudice travestito da gorilla’,865 he 
certainly asserts that ‘[l]’ avvocato di parte civile aveva una testa equina’, recognising that 
he was surrounded by ‘due cani mastini vestiti da carabinieri’.866 This use of zoological 
images reaches its climax in Sesto’s final deposition:  
 
Io qui presente Sesto Degli Angeli, […] dichiaro pubblicamente, in questo sudicio tribunale, di 
essere stato offeso e avvilito da una legge subdola e asinina che non riconosco, ma che disprezzo e 
derido. Dichiaro inoltre di essere stato giudicato da un gorilla e da un equino travestiti da giudici, o 
da due giudici travestiti rispettivamente da gorilla e da equino; il che è un doppio travestimento 
essendo costoro in realtà due vermi.867  
 
However, animality is also realistically alluded to by the narrator, at the moment when the 
commissar denies that Capitano Sesto ‘durante il tragitto sia stato fatto segno di percosse 
da parte degli agenti’,868  and which sounds like a reversed, silenced confession or 
excusatio non petita. Metaphorically, it is as if the commissar were refusing to take 
responsibility for the testimony he is making, thus collapsing it from the inside. 
Conversely, for Tabucchi torture constitutes the most prominent uncovering of the bodily 
dimension that underpins the functioning of justice, testimony and any ethical gesture: 
reduced to a body to be wounded – and this might also explain the insistent image of 
Ivana’s corpse, which haunts Capitano Sesto’s thoughts – the protagonist completes his 
                                                        
863 Ibid., p. 192. 
864 Ibid., p. 189. 
865 Ibid. 
866 Ibid., pp. 190-91. 
867 Ibid., p. 197. 
868 Ibid., p. 192. 
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process of de-subjectification, which is essential to testimony, and enters a bodily 
dimension. In the end, Sesto’s body constitutes his real voice, and the act of falling asleep 
is his real act of witnessing, for the body inscribes a space of alterity that is internal to and 
disrupting of existing practices of meaning. Being able to dream, Sesto articulates a 
different kind of truth, issuing from the unconscious. 
 
I have already discussed the short story ‘Piccoli equivoci senza importanza’, pointing out 
the intertwining of ludic elements and the theme of alienation and a sense of guilt. The 
latter, having introduced Agamben’s and Tabucchi’s conceptualisation of witnessing, 
could now be interpreted as a sort of secular confession, wherein the narrator, a journalist, 
struggles to overcome his role as a mere observer – as a witness qua ‘terstis’:   
 
[E] anch’io, che ero venuto col mio blocchetto per gli appunti, anche il mio semplice guardare loro 
che recitavano la loro parte, anche questa era una parte, e in questo consisteva la mia colpa […] 
perché non ci si sottrae a niente e si ha colpa di tutto, ognuno a suo modo.869 
 
The protagonist seems to have always been the third party – and detached spectator – in 
relation to his longtime friends Federico (now the judge) and Leo (the accused): for 
instance, this is evident in how he remembers Maddalena, the girl they were all in love 
with, and who, however, was interested only in the narrator’s friends:  
 
[C]osì io gli ho rimesso il disco, se lo meritava il Leo di ballare con Maddalena […]. E così è 
cominciato il processo, con il Leo e Federico che ballavano a turno con la Grande Tragica 
guardandola perdutamente negli occhi, entrambi facendo finta che non erano affatto rivali, […] io 
compreso, naturalmente, che mettevo il disco come se niente fosse.870 
 
What the speaking I aims at is becoming a ‘superstes’, and it is exactly in this light that one 
may read his remembrance of their youth spent together. However, he is – and has always 
been – stuck in the external role of the observer: in the tragedy they all performed at 
school, unlike the others, he was not part of diegesis, occuping the role of the narrator. 
Then, when Maddalena undergoes surgery for breast cancer, he is able only to stare at her 
breast; yet, unable to confort her, he blames Federico for not being at her side. And finally, 
he now hallucinates about seeing his friends on a raft – ‘ma tutti e tre avevano una fissità 
immobile, e ho capito che erano immagini di gesso […]. E non ho detto niente, 
                                                        
869 Piccoli equivoci, p. 16. Tabucchi’s sense of guilt follows from passivity, an incapacity to choose and act.  
870 Ibid., p. 9-10. 
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naturalmente’ –.871 The fact that he is an external ‘terstis’ is expressed also on the 
linguistic level, through the repetitions of terms and metaphors such as ‘immagine’, ‘film’, 
‘il tempo ha barcollato e […] galleggiando in una pozza di anni è affiorato il viso di 
Maddalena’, ‘fingere […] la parte’, ‘commedia che ci stavano giocando’, ‘le parti erano 
assegnate ed era impossibile non recitarle’, all alluding to an experience of visual 
estrangement. 
 
Comparing this short story to Capitano Sesto’s trial, the two texts share, significantly, the 
dual focus on oneiric detchment from reality and on animality (or the body, more in 
general): 
on the one hand, law is depicted as a dispositif – capable of turning, in the case of Leo, 
who completely makes up the episodes for which he is accused, the act of confession into 
mere fiction too – in relation to which the oneiric state represents a possibility of 
profanation and awakening:  
 
Li ho guardati sedersi, come assistendo a un rituale incomprensibile e lontano ma proiettato nel 
futuro, e l’immagine di quegli uomini gravi si è dissolta sotto l’immagine di un passato che per me 
era il presente, proprio come in un vecchio film […] ero ormai altrove, abbandonato al ritroso 
dell’evocazione.872  
 
On the other hand, the focus on animality once again accentuates the brutality and 
violence, both physical and symbolic, intrinsic to the functioning of law: ‘il Leo, seduto 
dentro quella grande gabbia come un animale pericoloso’.873 Yet, similarly to Capitano 
Sesto, the image of the body – in particular of Maddalena’s breast, as ‘anche se dentro 
erano malati, non me ne importava niente, perché tanto c’è sempre una malattia dentro tutti 
noi’874 – introduces a more authentic, if not innocent, dimension of life, which tries to 
simplify and eschew the imprisoning webs of reality: ‘ci ho immaginati tutti quanti seduti 
su una foglia […] perché i nostri organismi erano diventati microscopici e mononucleari, 





871 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
872 Ibid., p. 9. 
873 Ibid. 
874 Ibid., p. 12. 
875 Ibid., p. 17. 
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5.3.2 From ‘Terstis to ‘Superstes’: Pereira, Loton, Tristano  
 
The passage from ‘terstis’ to ‘superstes’, so longed for in ‘Piccoli equivoci’, finds its 
accomplishment in the novel Sostiene Pereira, which is both the recounting and the 
performance of such a gesture of witnessing: the novel is a prolonged speech act, for which 
one reads Pereira’s actions before and inside his words. Indeed, Pereira’s pathway to 
testimony does not occur as an external, factual change,876 for the protagonist is already a 
survivor, albeit unknowingly. On the one hand, this element can be linked to the central 
theme of death:  
 
Da quando era scomparsa sua moglie lui viveva come se fosse morto. O meglio: non faceva altro 
che pensare alla morte, alla resurrezione della carne nella quale non credeva e a sciocchezze di 
questo genere, la sua era solo una sopravvivenza, una finzione di vita.877  
 
The protagonist’s obsession with death engenders and defines a process of mournful de-
subjectification, which, as seen, is inherent to testimony; in order to testify, to speak for the 
others, Pereira has to uncannily become other, a ‘stranger to himself’. On the other hand, 
however, Pereira’s posthumous condition, namely the fact that he has to survive himself to 
bear witness, reflects that of the intellectuals during Salazar’s regime:  
 
La signora Delgado […] disse: e allora faccia qualcosa. Qualcosa come?, rispose Pereira. Beh, disse 
la signora Delgado, lei è un intellettuale, dica quello che sta succedendo in Europa, esprima il suo 
libero pensiero, insomma faccia qualcosa.878 
 
The encounter with the young Monteiro Rossi and Marta, opponents of the regime, triggers 
and speeds up the protagonist’s movement of de-subjectification and the consequent 
shaping of his identity as a witness: as Pereira observes, if Monteiro and Marta were right 
in calling for a direct engagement against Salazar’s fascism,  
 
[L]a mia vita non avrebbe senso, non avrebbe senso aver studiato lettere a Coimbra e avere sempre 
creduto che la letteratura fosse la cosa più importante del mondo, non avrebbe senso che io diriga la 
pagina culturale di questo giornale del pomeriggio dove non posso esprimere la mia opinione e devo 
                                                        
876 This does not diminish the role and the importance of the novel’s conclusion, with Pereira’s denunciation 
of Monteiro Rossi’s murder and his clandestine departure to Paris; on the contrary, the latter constitutes the 
external realisation of a movement which is initially and necessarily inner to the character himself. 
877 Sostiene Pereira, p. 15. 
878 Ibid., p. 72. 
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pubblicare racconti dell’Ottocento francese, non avrebbe senso più niente, ed è di questo che sento il 
bisogno di pentirmi, come se io fossi un’altra persona e non il Pereira che ha sempre fatto il 
giornalista, come se io dovessi rinnegare qualcosa.879 
 
Hence, Pereira’s preoccupation with death, his inhabiting a paradoxical place beyond 
death, performs and embodies what Ferroni has termed the ‘condizione postuma della 
letteratura’,880 which designates the literary functioning in terms of temporal belatedness. 
This is an idea Tabucchi acknowledges and shares, since he perceives in it the suggestion 
of a critical approach towards the real that only an (apparent) detachment allows:  
 
Sono d’accordo con Giulio Ferroni, la letteratura è sempre postuma […]. Il sentirsi contemporanei 
all’unisono rispetto a ciò che viene detto in un’opera d’arte rischia di ridursi a una sorta di 
falsamento della realtà, mentre la postumità richiede un ripensamento.881   
 
Meaningfully, for Ferroni, in Tabucchi’s novel: 
 
La voce narrante è sempre voce di un altro ed è sempre postuma, si accanisce da dopo a ritrovare le 
ragioni di una dissolvenza, interroga le altre voci, le immagini e i fantasmi che sorgono nella 
tensione del ‘dopo’, la passione per la vita e il rimorso che si svolge dal perdersi stesso della vita 
[…] entro una scrittura che continua a cercare, come a voler ritrovare un centro perduto, e 
incessantemente ritrova quel residuo, quel poco che resta.882  
 
In a way, therefore, it could be argued that Tabucchi lends the character his own theoretical 
concerns and vocabulary, for Pereira describes the movement of becoming aware of his 
condition as a survivor-superstes in terms of a sense of guilt and repentance: 
 
[F]orse farei meglio a parlarne con il mio amico padre Antonio, che è un sacerdote, però forse lui 
non capirebbe, perché ai sacerdoti bisogna confessare le proprie colpe e io non mi sento colpevole di 
niente di speciale, eppure ho desiderio di pentirmi, sento nostalgia del pentimento.883  
 
                                                        
879 Ibid., p. 122. 
880 For Ferroni, ‘postumo’ means ‘un di più, un oltre, una dimensione estrema, in cui nello stesso tempo 
qualcosa sopravvive, in cui, nel segno della fine, si dà come una continuazione, un’eredità’. Giulio Ferroni, 
Dopo la fine: una letteratura possibile (Rome: Donzelli, 2010), p. 15. Posthumous literature is inherently 
testimonial for it is oriented by ‘un principio di sopravvivenza oltre la fine […] sopravvivenza delle 
possibilità che il passato stesso non ha realizzato […]’ (ibid., pp. 135-36).  
881 Tabucchi, ‘Catullo e il cardellino’, Micromega, 2 (May-June 1996), 121-125.  
882 Giulio Ferroni, ‘Isabel e la passione postuma della scrittura’, in Tabucchi postumo, pp. 37-46 (p. 39). 
883 Sostiene Pereira, p. 121. 
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Padre Antonio is an essential figure for understanding Pereira’s testimony, as he is already 
conscious of the fact that the protagonist inadvertently occupies the role of witness, for 
which no confession is either possible or required: ‘la prossima volta mi verrò a 
confessare. Non ne hai bisogno, replicò padre Antonio, prima vedi di commettere qualche 
peccato e poi vieni’.884 This is reinforced by the priest’s comment, about the French 
catholic writer Bernanos, that ‘il Vaticano non lo può sopportare perché lui è un vero 
testimone’.885 Thus, it is religion itself that secularises Pereira’s confession, showing how 
his personal need for repentance hides a civil dimension.886  
Alongside religion, the psychological perspective seems pertinent in analysing Pereira’s 
act of bearing witness. Exemplarily, dottor Cardoso explains Pereira’s existential crisis in 
terms of the emergence of a new hegemonic-I within his personality:  
 
[L]ei è in conflitto con se stesso in questa battaglia che si sta agitando nella sua anima, lei dovrebbe 
abbandonare il suo superego […]. E di me cosa resterebbe?, chiese Pereira, io sono quello che sono, 
con i miei ricordi […] . [L]ei ha bisogno di elaborare un lutto, ha bisogno di dire addio alla sua vita 
passata, ha bisogno di vivere nel presente […] la smetta di frequentare il passato, cerchi di 
frequentare il futuro.887 
 
Also in this case the protagonist is diagnosed with a mournful estrangement from the 
present, and, at the end of his talk with the doctor, Pereira is left feeling ‘una grande 
nostalgia di una vita passata e di una vita futura’.888 Nonetheless, saudade, which Tabucchi 
defines as a blending of remorse and nostalgic longing for the possible, describes both 
Pereira’s illness and his unique possibility of finding a cure (an existential and ontological 
sense). During an interview, Tabucchi explicitly established a comparison between 
saudade and Pereira’s interplay between passivity and activity as well as his final 
orientation towards the latter: ‘La saudade può essere nostalgia del futuro, un desiderio del 
                                                        
884 Ibid., p. 147. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Significantly, Klopp observes how many characters in Tabucchi’s work, which is informed by a ‘Western, 
post-Christian imagination’, although ‘reluctant to acknowledge that they are sinners in a traditional sense 
[…] are frequently driven to make confession in an attempt to obtain some sort of, if not absolution, then at 
least peace of mind’; however, Klopp adds that in Tabucchi’s fictions ‘old-time religious categories such as 
‘‘sin’’, ‘‘confession’’, ‘‘Hell’’, ‘‘angels’’, and ‘‘the soul’’ have become such cliches that they cannot help 
but be regarded with suspicion and within quotation marks that point up their hypothetical or fictional 
nature’. Charles Klopp, ‘Antonio Tabucchi: Postmodern Catholic Writer’, World Literature Today, 71. 2 
(Spring 1997), 331-34. 
887 Ibid., pp. 157-58. 
888 Ibid., p. 159. 
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futuro, e inoltre nostalgia per le cose che avrebbero potuto essere e non sono state. È un 
po’ come il desiderio di pentimento di Pereira’. 889  
Melancholic saudade moves Pereira to action exactly at the moment when it shifts from 
being a nostalgia for the past to a future-oriented desire to give (different) forms to the 
present and the future. As Francese comments, saudade ‘sparks Pereira’s desire to rectify 
his inactivity in the past and to inhabit the future by engaging posterity in dialogue’ and 
this ‘enables Tabucchi’s reader to imagine a new social and moral order’ given that what 
‘we visit through his prose, provoke a desire for what never was, but still might be: for 
feasible, attainable utopias, a new social and moral order to be realized in the future’.890 
For, what Pereira ‘sostiene’ is,891 first of all, his capacity to process mourning, to cope with 
actual loss (the deaths of his wife and Monteiro), to sustain a factual void – and this is what 
makes it unsustainable to his adversaries, who are, in turn, uncapable of tolerating or 
dwelling within unsaturated forms of sense. Violence, both physical and psychological, in 
fact denotes an inability to think, to signify raw emotions, an impossibility to draw limits 
and sustain gaps, and hence to accomplish an authentic process of subjectification. 
Violence affects the victim as much as the perpetrators, who are petrified in a role lacking 
any subjective identity. However, recalling Agamben’s peculiar definition of melancholia, 
Pereira’s mourning is also melancholic (saudade) to the extent to which at the moment he 
questions and withdraws familiar narratives of meaning – of his life, of the historical 
context, of human beings – the protagonist opens up a gap that underpins a different 
modality of signification. His testimony, similarly to Tabucchi’s Requiem, is a 
countermourning gesture, which appropriates and bears a semantic vacuum. What Pereira 
calls into question and repents is not the letting go of a sense that was not there in the first 
place and therefore cannot be properly lost. Rather, starting to enquire about what is (or 
could be) the sense of his life, the character asks the question that is central to Tabucchi’s 
poetics of the uncanny, i.e. in what ways it is possible to make sense of one’s life, hence 
shifting from the plane of substantive meanings to that of their production. 
 
Comparing Sostiene Pereira to the court narrations of Il piccolo naviglio and ‘Piccoli 
equivoci’, some recurring elements emerge. The theoretical couple of sleep/awakening 
also appears in the novel: significantly, Pereira’s publisher affirms that ‘siamo noi che 
dobbiamo essere vigili, […] noi giornalisti che abbiamo esperienza storica e culturale, noi 
                                                        
889 Petri, 72. Significantly, Pereira lives at ‘Rua da Saudade 22’.  
890  Memory and Nostalgia, 919-30. 
891 The verb ‘sostenere’ also carries the judicial value of a deposition, although it remains unclear whether 
Pereira is witnessing in front of the fascist police. 
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dobbiamo sorvegliare noi stessi’ adding that ‘la polizia ci protegge, vigila sui nostri 
sonni’.892 Interestingly, the image is reversed by the executor of Monteriro Rossi, who 
contends that ‘anche la nostra polizia la notte dorme, sa, la nostra è una polizia che ci 
protegge tutto il santo giorno, ma la sera va a dormire perché è esausta’.893 In both cases, 
sleeping figuratively stands for passivity, while both Pereira’s publisher and Monteiro’s 
murderer encourage a somewhat faulty form of vigilance, since it aims to reinforce 
reality’s slumber rather than awaken to a different possibility of sense making. 
Likewise, the physical dimension permeates the narration throughout, in relation both to 
Pereira’s body – already on the first page it is said that ‘era grasso, soffriva di cuore e 
aveva la pressione alta’, and this is intended to emphasise the bodily facet of testimony – 
and to Monteiro Rossi’s deadly torture, what reduces him to bare life. Once again, torture 
signals the violence underpinning the functioning of law, as well as the vulnerability of 
those who oppose and bear witness against it. From this point of view, Marta’s physical 
transformation is archetypical – ‘doveva essere dimagrita di almeno dieci chili. Le sue 
spalle, che Pereira ricordava dolci e tonde, mostravano due scapole ossute, come due ali di 
pollo’894 – since it clearly denounces the political context inside and in opposition to which 
Pereira’s testimony arises.  
 
Finally, there are two other elements to consider in the novel’s patterns of testimony. First, 
the centrality of the paedagogical metaphor: while Tabucchi, in La gastrite, denies any 
pedagogical interest for the writer’s disturbing function, in Sostiene Pereira education is 
referred to as an essential element, albeit in a distorted form, of the totalitarian reality, as 
well, more plainly, as a potential space for profanation. On the one hand, Monteiro’s 
killers declare that they have come to Pereira’s house in order to ‘dare una piccola lezione 
a un giovanotto che sta in casa sua, una persona che ha bisogno di una piccola lezione 
perché non conosce quali sono i valori della patria’.895 On the other hand, Pereira manages 
to avoid censorship by publishing in his journal the translation of Daudet’s ‘La dernière 
classe’, which tells the story of a teacher who, right before being exiled from his country, 
occupied by the German army, writes on the blackboard, during his final class, ‘vive la 
France’, to the applause of all the inhabitants of the village. As dottor Cardoso observes,  
 
                                                        
892 Sostiene Pereira, pp. 168-69. 
893 Ibid., p. 196. 
894 Ibid., p. 138. 
895 Sostiene Pereira, p. 194. 
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[T]utti i giorni, prima di uscire, le bozze del suo giornale passano attraverso l’imprimatur della 
censura preventiva, e se c’è qualcosa che non va stia pur tranquillo che non viene pubblicato, magari 
lasciano uno spazio bianco, mi è già capitato di vedere i giornali portoghesi con degli ampi spazi 
bianchi, fanno una grande rabbia e una gran malinconia [… eppure] lei ha potuto scrivere viva la 
Francia […] anche se per interposta persona.896 
 
In the end, one may contend that the whole of Pereira’s testimony is articulated ‘per 
interposta persona’. Although reduced to a mere ear, there is, in effect, a narrator. As will 
be the case with Tristano muore, in Sostiene Pereira, too, Tabucchi recurs to a ‘minimal 
nature of the diegetic voices, which are either reduced to the verba dicendi or sentiendi, or 
more often omitted’.897 The narrator here is the listener – like padre Antonio and dottor 
Cardoso, but also the doorkeeper Celeste, who works as a delator for the regime, on the 
diegetic level –, the primal recipient of Pereira’s testimony, which makes the latter 
possible. Arguably, he functions as a sort of ideal or first reader, creating and occupying a 
space of mutual participation and co-creation of meaning. For, as Felman points out, 
‘trauma cannot be simply remembered, it cannot simply be “confessed”; it must 
be testified to, in a struggle shared between a speaker and a listener’.898 This explains 
Tabucchi’s title, as Pereira’s cannot be (solely) a confession, in that it merges individual 
and collective planes. In a way, the novel is nothing but the acoustic recording of a voice. 
And this is evident in the linguistic texture, in the body of the text itself. The repetition of 
the phrase ‘sostiene Pereira’ performs a sort of linguistic belatedness, the working through 
of his posthumous condition. It is a novel in the present tense – as Tristano muore will be – 
since it is entirely based on the counter-turning motion of approaching and moving away 
from the real. 
Yet, this is the uncanny present: I believe that linguistic repetition is intended to express 
the fact that Pereira’s testimony is taking place at the very moment the story is narrated, 
aiming to create and perfom the effect of an experience in fieri, and thus turning the simple 
present into the present participle. This is precisely the disjointed temporality of the 
uncanny, for, Weber observes,  
 
The linguistic tense in which this convergence of being and unbeing tends to articulate itself is that 
of the present participle […] is in the uncannines of the present participle, in which the part is 
                                                        
896 Ibid., p. 129 and p. 155. 
897 Marina Spunta, Voicing the World: Writing Orality in Contemporary Italian Fiction (Bern: Peter Lang, 
2004), p. 140. 
898 Shoshana Felman, What Does a Woman Want? Reading and Sexual Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), p. 16. 
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brought before our eyes and ears as a reiteration that is forever incomplete, never coming full circle, 
always open to change.899  
 
This could also be read in terms of a sort of self-quotation without quotation marks, which 
does not produce a return of the same, but rather predicates on the open potentialities of 
iterability; for, Agamben notices, ‘la ripetizione restituisce la possibilità a ciò che è stato, 
lo rende nuovamente possibile […] La memoria restituisce al passato la sua possibilità’.900 
Similarly, narrative silence and omissions occur as a void within communication that is 
nonetheless capable of producing sense. Recalling Felman’s explanation, a ‘testimonial 
text […] is the evidence of the impossibility of making experience speak’,901 and so the 
witnesses’ discourse does not produce ‘a completed statement, a totalizable account’.902 
This is why I do not agree with Spunta’s interpretation that ‘[w]ith his reticent attitude 
Pereira is the epitome of non-commitment, which is used by the author to portray political 
silence’.903 On the contrary, verbal and non-verbal silence describes Pereira’s negotiation 
of and coming to terms with the urgency of speaking for the others.904 
 
In the subsequent novel La testa perduta di Damasceno Monteiro the tension between 
possibility and impossibility which lies at the core of witnessing is introduced already in 
the epigraph: ‘Il marziano mi ha incontrato per strada/ e ha avuto paura della mia 
impossibilità umana./ Come può esistere, ha pensato tra sé, un essere/ che nell’esistere 
mette un così grande annullamento dell’esistenza’.905 Tabucchi’s quote from Drummond 
de Andrade’s 1962 poem Science Fiction906 clearly anticipates the main theme of the story: 
                                                        
899 The Legend, pp. 24-29.  
900 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Il Cinema di Guy Debord’, in Guy Debord (contro) il cinema, ed. by Enrico Ghezzi 
and Roberto Turigliatto (Milan: Il castoro/ La biennale di Venezia, 2001), pp. 103-07 (p. 105). 
901 Goldberg, p. 68. 
902 Testimony, p. 5.  
903 Spunta, p. 158. 
904  Goldberg, in her Quiet Testimony, distinguishes between taciturn and stone-silence. The former 
‘withholds and refrains […] but it always retains the right to enter the realm of speech again’, while the latter 
‘is total’, and defines ‘the silence of the voiceless’. Pereira’s reticences and omissions belong to both types, 
as on the one hand he never loses his capacity to speak, but, on the other hand, his voice tries to bring to 
signification those who have been dispossesed of their voice – Monteiro, and, more generally, all the 
intellectuals and opponents to Fascism (pp. 93-94).  
905 La testa perduta, p. 7. 
906 Significantly the protagonist of the poem follows the martian as he needs him to be his witness: ‘Il 
marziano si è allontanato, l'ho seguito./ Lo volevo come testimone./ Ma, rifiutando il colloquio,/ si è 
disintegrato nell’aria costellata di problemi./ Sono rimasto solo in me, da me assente’. Carlos Drummond de 
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that of torture, or, more generally, of the violence, either physical or verbal,907 that men 
impose upon themselves. On the one hand, the protagonist is a journalist, and when 
recounting Monteiro’s murder he struggles with the principles of news values and with the 
spectacularisation and voyeurism inherent to the media, which constitute a form of verbal 
‘violence’. However, perhaps as a consequence of his also being a literary scholar, Firmino 
shows himself to be caring when it comes to the other’s vulnerability. This is due to the 
ethical, committed function Tabucchi assigns to literature that, unlike the ‘informazione 
indifferenziata’ provided by mass media, entails an attentiviness and opening up to and for 
what and who is other.908 
This is evident when, during his interview with Manolo, the man who discovered the 
severed head at the beginning of the novel, Firmino decides not to record the gypsy’s voice 
– ‘[f]orse perché […] [g]li piaceva quell’espressione dura e insieme sperduta, a suo modo 
disperata, e la voce di quel vecchio gitano non meritava di essere rubata da un aggeggio 
elettronico giapponese’.909  Significantly, this encounter is characterised by a serious 
linguistic gap between the two characters, as Manolo speaks only the Romani language; 
yet, this hiatus does not compromise the effectiveness of Manolo’s testimony: ‘Il Manolo 
[…] si spiegava abbastanza bene, e per le parole in geringonça pazienza, Firmino non le 
decifrava ma dal filo del discorso riusciva a intuirne il significato’.910 Rather, the title 
Firmino subsequently chooses for his article explicitly acknowledges the linguistic agency 
or role of the gypsy’s voice: ‘Vedeva già il titolo: Parla l’uomo che ha trovato il cadavere 
decapitato’.911 This situation is then reversed, as it is Firmino that experiences, in turn, an 
(im)possibility to speak and to be understood: when he has to inform Damasceno’s mother 
about her son’s murder, Firmino only manages to ‘balbettare che era un giornalista’.912 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Andrade, Sentimento del mondo. Trentasette poesie scelte e tradotte da Antonio Tabucchi (Turin: Einaudi, 
1987), p. 109. 
907 The two converge in Tabucchi’s representation of the policemen responsible for Damasceno’s murder for, 
alongside the physical humiliation and annihilation of Monteiro, they show linguistic aggressiveness in their 
attempt to exclusively shape and appropriate judicial truth: for example, the commissar states that ‘[i]o sono 
un poliziotto, una autorità dello stato, vuole mettere in dubbio le mie parole?’ (Ibid., p. 192). 
908 ‘Con l’informazione indifferenziata si è persa una scala di valori etici che costituisce l’anima della 
letteratura […]. La letteratura […] deve configurarsi proprio come informazione differenziata, non deve 
dunque competere con i mass media ma deve proporre delle questioni, deve porre delle domande (‘Il mio 
tram‘, p. 59). 
909 La testa perduta, p. 43. 
910 Ibid. 
911 Ibid., p. 48. 
912 Ibid., p. 91. 
  229 
Furthermore, the novel itself seems to enhance the protagonist’s act of bearing witness to 
Manolo’s voice, as the Gypsy issue is frequently brought to the fore: for instance, during 
the encounter with the journalist, Manolo recounts the episodes of discrimination suffered 
by the Roma in Portugal – ‘Manolo lo guardava con gli occhi interrogativi, come se 
aspettasse da lui una soluzione […] Firmino abbassò lo sguardo, quasi come se fosse 
responsabile di quello che stava succedendo al popolo del Manolo’.913 Similarly, while 
having lunch in a restaurant, Firmino meets a young waiter who overtly condemns racist 
violence and asks him to sign a petition promoted by the association ‘Diritti del 
cittadino’.914 And still, the Roma issue constitutes merely a contingent example of a wider 
ethical concern permeating the narrative: to some extent, there is a circularity that connects 
Drummond de Andrade’s quote with the novel’s conclusion, namely with the introduction 
of the character of Wanda. The latter is ‘[u]n travestito […] ospedale psichiatrico, schedato 
per prostituzione’915 who was an eyewitness to the torture suffered by Damasceno at the 
police station. (S)he embodies the subaltern, a silenced voice who uncannily inhabits and 
problematises the threshold between humanity and dis-humanity; yet, as the lawyer Loton 
reminds Firmino, Wanda ‘[è] una persona […] prima di tutto è una persona’,916 an 
observation that resonates with Tabucchi’s exploration of creaturality within testimony. 
The bodily dimension is essential to uncanny testimony because it is first and foremost in 
the body that each individual is ‘written’ and seized by familiar discourses and pre-given 
meanings; it is in and through the body that men are saturated, removed from their intrinsic 
potentiality for (subjectifying) sense making. 
  
Loton is probably the closer character to Tabucchi’s civic and ethical concern – ‘quando 
credevo che scrivere servisse a qualcosa, mi ero messo in testa di scrivere qualcosa sulla 
tortura’ –, 917  considering that he works for ‘una specie di correzione tardiva della 
Storia’,918 which corresponds exactly to literature’s function for Tabucchi. Still, while the 
author places the exploration of legal procedures at the core of his diegesis, Loton goes the 
other way around, bringing literarure within law, for, he comments quoting Jouhandeau,  
 
                                                        
913 Ibid., p. 45. 
914 Ibid., p. 84. 
915 Ibid., p. 238. 
916 Ibid. 
917 La testa perduta, p. 176. 
918 Ibid., p. 111. 
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[P]oiché l’oggetto intrinseco della letteratura è la conoscenza dell’essere umano, e poiché non c’è 
luogo al mondo in cui la si possa studiare meglio che nelle aule di tribunale, non sarebbe auspicabile 
che fra i giurati ci fosse sempre, a norma di legge, uno scrittore?919  
 
Applying literary approaches to the analysis of legal justice, Loton exposes the latter’s 
fictional and discursive nature. In particular, he demonstrates how law, for instance in 
distinguishing between truth and falsity, guilt and innocence, is informed by a precise 
metaphysical stance: ‘Non so se si è reso conto che il mondo è binario, la natura corre su 
strutture binarie, o almeno la nostra civiltà occidentale […] da cui discende verità o 
menzogna, per esempio […]’.920 This reaches its climax when Loton explains how legal 
justice itself is nothing but a nihilistic, metaphysical model and modus significandi: this is 
what is called the Grundnorm, ‘norma base […] situata al vertice della piramide, è una 
norma base rovesciata […] una proposizione normativa […]. Se vuole è un’ipotesi 
metafisica […] è veramente una cosa kafkiana, è la Norma che ci invischia tutti quanti’.921 
 
Similarly to the other texts examined in this chapter, the body constitutes a central element 
also in La testa perduta. First, the title itself acknowledges such a centrality through the 
image of the severed head. Interestingly, Tabucchi has declared that the original title he 
had in mind was ‘La testa tagliata’,922 and the fact that it later became a missing head 
foregrounds the detection pattern inside the plot, while it shifts the novel from being a 
pulp-noir story towards being a legal narrative. This entails that the question asked by the 
novel moves from the epistemological ‘who did it?’ to the ethically based ‘who lost it?’ 
Or, to put it otherwise, the focus shifts from murder to torture.923 In effect, and this is the 
                                                        
919 Ibid., p. 122. 
920 Ibid., p. 147. 
921 Ibid., pp. 114-15. 
922 As Surdich observes, ‘[c]hi possegga la prima edizione del romanzo, quella uscita da Feltrinelli nel marzo 
del 1997, noterà che nel bollino SIAE […] il titolo del libro è: La testa tagliata di Damasceno Monteiro. 
Insomma, sembra che fino all’ultimo Tabucchi sia stato indeciso e solo alla fine, col bollino SIAE ormai 
pronto, abbia mutato il titolo del testo, sostituendo il termine più concreto e orrido ‘tagliata’ col più 
esistenziale ‘perduta’’. Luigi Surdich, ‘Tabucchi, io ricordo…’, in I ‘notturni’, pp. 405-22 (p. 410). 
923 Significantly, from a psychoanalytical perspective, the severed head symbolises an impossibility to think, 
to produce and articulate meaning. See: Giuseppe Civitarese, Perdere la testa. Abiezione, conflitto estetico e 
critica psicoanalitica (Florence: Clinamen, 2012). In Tristano muore Tabucchi outlines a similar image, as 
the protagonist uncannily realises how reality subjugates and alienates individuals, detaching them from their 
capacity to think: ‘[g]li pareva il bisbiglio di un confessore che dà consigli attraverso la grata di un 
confessionale, non pensare, ricordati di non pensare, lascia che io pensi per te, Tristano, hai combattuto per la 
libertà e ora essa è arrivata, è essere affrancati dal pensiero, è il non pensare più… la vera libertà è essere 
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second element related to the body, torture forms the basis of Loton’s principal argument 
in his accusation of the policemen. In particular, he brilliantly confutes their defensive 
strategy – Damasceno killed himself when left alone in a room at the police station – 
arguing that if they did not kill him, he must have decided to commit suicide because of 
the torture he had suffered. In the face of the authorities’ denial, Loton finally contends 
that, even when admitting Monteiro’s suicide, the severing of the head and the traces of 
cigarette burns on his corpse prove that he was tortured post-mortem. More broadly, 
torture is identified as the threshold between individual and collective responsibility, 
between humanity and de-humanisation within law: 
 
[H]o la mania di fissare i nomi dei torturatori, chissà perché ho l’impressione che fissare i nomi dei 
torturatori abbia un senso, e sa perché?, perché la tortura è una responsabilità individuale, 
l’obbedienza a un ordine superiore non è tollerabile, troppa gente si è nascosta dietro questa 
miserabile giustificazione […] si nascondono dietro la Grundnorm.924 
 
And, in his final summation, Loton mentions, among others, Kafka’s Penal Colony and 
Améry’s testimony on the Holocaust, eventually asking himself and the jury ‘ma cosa vuol 
dire sopravvivenza’,925 and thus also questioning and problematising the role of and reason 
behind the witness. In a way, discarding his literary interest to become a lawyer, Loton has 
experienced and accomplished the passage from being an external observer – ‘terstis’ – to 
being an internal witness – ‘superstes’. Arguably, the desire and the urgency to be within 
the law in order to estrange and deconstruct it, they are alluded to and enhanced by Loton’s 
physical appearance. He is – as the third element related to the bodily dimension in the text 
– obese, like Pereira. In the lawyer’s case, this has a positive value inasmuch as, Mauri 
observes, it relates to his ethical and judicial commitment, as Loton ‘con il suo grande 
corpo fa da scudo ai corpi disarmati dei poveri che assiste gratis, perché è benestante e si 
sente un po’ missionario’; but his body might also stand for the judicial principle of habeas 
corpus, ‘formula giuridica medioevale che riguarda appunto la garanzia di libertà 
individuale, di ‘possesso’ del proprio corpo’.926 
                                                                                                                                                                       
pensati’ (pp. 129-30). That Tabucchi’s characters testify (against) a physical and symbolic violence whose 
aim is the abolition of the act of thinking may also derive from Arendt’s concept of the ‘banality of evil’, 
which she defines as ‘a curious, quite authentic inability to think’. Hanna Arendt, ‘Thinking and moral 
considerations: a lecture’, Social Research, 38 (Fall 1971), 417-46 (417). 
924 La testa perduta, p. 176. 
925 Ibid., p. 221. 
926 Paolo Mauri, ‘La testa tagliata di Tabucchi’, La Repubblica, 12 March 1997, p. 34. 
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On the contrary, Pereira’s obesity is negatively connoted; thus, the way he tries to deal 
with his bulk is revealing of an inner shift from binge eating as an incapacity to draw limits 
and to avoid saturation towards being on a diet as a metaphorical attempt to sustain and 
metabolise a void.927  
Fourth, alongside Loton’s bulk and Monteiro’s corpse, the reader also encounters another 
body, that of the text. Why is Loton’s final accusation full of ellipses, visually marked by 
long sequences of suspension points? It is not that what he says is ineffable. Rather, these 
are visual wounds, a visual silence. They are disturbing, an authorial aposiopesis or 
recitence. Significantly, not only is the transmission of the text disturbed – Firmino’s 
recorder was too far from Loton to clearly register his speech – but the journalist himself 
experiences an oneiric detachment from the trial:  
 
Di quella giornata Firmino avrebbe poi ricordato soprattutto le sensazioni fisiche, precise e insieme 
quasi estranee, come se non lo riguardassero, come se una pellicola protettiva lo isolasse in una 
specie di dormiveglia […].928 
 
This twofold interruption, both a diegetic and verbal silence, confers  
 
[A]lla scrittura, proprio in virtú della vaghezza documentaria, il carattere di testimonianza e, dunque, 
di verità. […] La conoscenza è provocata dai vuoti, ovvero dall’interpretazione del lettore, che 
connette quel che non appare immediatamente connesso. Lo stile lacunoso è una dimostrazione 
esemplare di quello che la letteratura fa e deve fare: avvenire, non semplicemente parlare di 
avvenimenti.929  
 
Ellipses and suspension points do not attest to a difficulty in verbalising on the part of 
either the lawyer or Firmino; instead, they express a literary failing, or, better, a 
withdrawal, which is, nonetheless, revealing. And this is what eventually changes the text 
from being the narrative of a trauma to being traumatic narrative itself.930  
                                                        
927 As for Pereira, obesity negatively alludes to his inability to cope with and sustain the void left by his 
wife’s death. However, after meeting Dottor Cardoso he goes on a diet and actually manages to lose some 
weight: ‘quando abbandonò la clinica, per prendere il treno per Lisbona, si sentiva tonificato e in forma, e era 
dimagrito quattro chili’ (Sostiene Pereira, p. 131). 
928 La testa perduta, p. 207. 
929 Gardini, (Part 1, chapter 6, para. 7, location 1045; Part 2, chapter 2, para. 5, location 1703). 
930 I believe that it is only because it moves from being the account of a traumatic episode to incorporating 
the traumatic dimension within the text itself that Tabucchi’s novel mostly develops its performative 
component. And this is exactly what allowed Tabucchi to narrate the evolution of the story before it was 
factually confirmed: as he explains in the concluding note, ‘[d]i reale c’è un episodio ben concreto che ha 
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The novel Tristano muore, similarly to Sostiene Pereira, is developed entirely in the form 
of a confession and testimony, for Tristano has to come to terms with the fact that his sense 
of guilt and responsibility, and individual and collective memory are strictly intertwined. 
Also in this case the narrator is nothing more than a mute recorder who nonetheless makes 
it possible to trigger and realise the communicational logic inherent to testimony.931 Yet, 
more explicitly than in Sostiene Pereira, the protagonist himself is first a listener: indeed, 
throughout his soliloquy Tristano is haunted by and speaks for several inner voices: 
 
Ma quella voce esiste davvero? Tristano l’ascolta, ricorda quello che ha letto nei padri della chiesa, 
è una voce interna, non può venire da fuori, la sente solo lui, i padri della chiesa le chiamavano voci 
degli angeli, le possono sentire solo coloro che le possono sentire o che vogliono sentire quello che 
desiderano sentire […].932 
 
Dicevo che cominciarono ad arrivargli lettere. O meglio, erano voci, arrivavano sotto forma di voce, 
anche se lui le vedeva scritte, poteva leggere la calligrafia di ciascheduna nell’aria […].933  
 
In this respect, Ceserani observes how ‘Tristano parla in prima persona e lo scrittore 
riferisce le sue parole, ma continuamente lo trasforma in personaggio, passando alla terza 
persona’.934 In a text that Tabucchi calls ‘il ritratto di una voce’,935 the silent scrivener 
echoes and doubles Tristano’s own lacunae and reticence and this aspect acquires a 
twofold value: it warns the reader about the character’s reliability, while aiming at 
representing writing and the literary discourse in terms of a process of interrogation and a 
self-estranging modus significandi. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
mosso la fantasia romanzesca: la notte del 7 maggio 1996, Carlo Rosa, cittadino portoghese, di anni 25 è 
stato ucciso in un commissariato […] e il suo corpo è stato ritrovato in un parco pubblico, decapitato e con 
segni di sevizie’. (La testa perduta, p. 239.) Yet, the plot of the novel prefigures and anticipates the actual 
solution of Rosa’s murder, fostering the impression that, as Mauri puts it, ‘[l]a verità, già scritta in un libro, è 
diventata realtà’ (quoted in Brizio-Skov, p. 169).  
931 Francesce aptly talks of ‘dialogo mancato […for] [t]he writer never speaks nor is his presence ever 
corroborated in any way’ (Socially Symbolic Acts, p. 209). 
932 Tristano muore, p. 48. 
933 Ibid., p. 135. 
934 Remo Ceserani, ‘Tabucchi all’ombra di un eroe tradito’, Il Manifesto, 24 February 2004. 
935 Tabucchi, ‘Una conversazione intorno a Tristano muore’, in Parole per Antonio Tabucchi, pp. 77-88  
(p. 87).  
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Moreover, unlike Pereira’s initial intellectual detachment, Tristano has always been – at 
least in the story recounted – an active protagonist of Italian history.936 How, therefore, can 
his sense of guilt be explained? On the one hand, there is the character’s resentment 
towards some attempts to re-frame Italian Resistance as a war of liberation rather than as a 
civil one: hence, Tristano feels (is) guilty to the extent to which he cannot articulate a 
proper narration of the past.937 On the other hand, more deeply, Tristano feels guilty 
because he no longer holds the meaning of such past: hence, not only does he struggle with 
the necessity to formulate a proper and adequate testimony of history – more of an 
epistemological concern – but he also engages with the (ontological) questioning of such 
historical reality, asking not how to bear witness but whether this makes sense at all. 
Francese argues that Tristano’s is ‘a falsified historical testimony’938: surely it is so in 
terms of historical accuracy, yet the protagonist’s narration cannot be reduced to it, as it is 
a search for a different kind and order or truth, which is not factual. As Tabucchi explains, 
the real question driving Tristano is ‘ma valse la pena?’939 This is why the character might 
be considered as a sort of fetishist or melancholic of truth, where the latter approach, 
stemmed from his being torn by a dichotomy between ‘contemporaneous disavowal and 
acknowledgement of the reality of the death’ of his parents,940  is mirrored in and 
eventually affects and shapes his attempt to come to terms with and to signify personal and 
collective trauma. Tristano oscillates between a somewhat mythical attachment to the 
memory of his killing of the Germans’ squad, which made him a hero of the Italian 
Resistance, and the disillusioned, disenchanted awareness of the political scenario that this 
episode has led to. Like Pereira, his testimony is melancholic to the extent to which it does 
not account nor mourn for a lost sense (of his life and of his country); rather, asking if it 
was worth it all along, Tristano’s testimony questions the ways in which his life can be 
made meaningful: through political action, remembrance or writing it down. Indeed, it is 
this the third option that turns him into an uncanny ‘superstes’. 
Accordingly, in the novel, Tristano experiences both depersonalisation and derealisation, 
through physical suffering and psychological hallucination in his final month of agony 
                                                        
936 This is why he reproaches the writer, claiming that ‘voi scrittori vi vedete sempre in una luce futura, come 
postumi, e pensavo al meccanismo che hai messo in moto quando mi hai raccontato in prima persona, come 
se Tristano fossi tu … mi avevi già affidato al futuro’ (Tristano muore, p. 55). 
937 On Italian Resistance as a ‘civil war’ see: Claudio Pavone, Una guerra civile: saggio storico sulla 
moralità nella Resistenza (Turin, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991). 
938 Socially Symbolic Acts, p. 209. 
939 ‘Una conversazione intorno a Tristano muore’, p. 81. 
940 Socially Symbolic Acts, p. 214. 
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before death. However, these episodes of self- and world-withdrawal do occasion, in turn, 
a moment of revelation, for the protagonist comes to realise that every decision he makes 
would have an after-effect that still lives on in history,941 and that, in the end, history itself 
is nothing but a form of survival. ‘Chi testimonia per il testimone?’ reads the quote from 
Celan that Tabucchi includes in the epigraph,942 and which, with Agamben, might be 
rephrased as ‘cosa significa essere soggetto di una desoggettivazione? Come può un 
soggetto dare conto del proprio dissesto?’.943 Tristano’s reflection on testimony and his 
emerging as a subject thereof touches upon three main threads of thought: the value of 
literature as a mode to bear ethical and ontological witness; the role of the voice, as that 
which guarantees the nexus between human life and testimony; 944  and, finally, the 
nonlinear temporality of trauma, which defines history in terms of survival.945 
Concerning the first element, it is important to observe that the frequent apostrophes to the 
writer expose a certain uneasiness towards literature: on the one hand, Tristano fears 
literary mediation as a sort of opaque distancing from the truth of life: 
  
Tu intanto ascolta e scrivi […] [t]i devo confessare una cosa… dopo che ti avevo chiamato mi sono 
pentito di averti chiamato […] forse perché non credo nella scrittura, la scrittura falsa tutto, voi 
scrittori siete dei falsari. […] E invece ho voglia di scrivere, cioé… parlare… scrivere per interposta 
persona, chi scrive sei tu, però sono io’. ‘[M]i stai scrivendo […] [l]e cose appartengono a chi le 
dice o a chi le scrive?946  
 
This is a filter that adds to his own lack of sincerity and trasparency at some points in the 
story: ‘come vedi sono onesto, ti confesso che me lo sto inventando’.947 Significantly, 
however, Tristano acknowledges that he decided to offer his final confession to the writer 
                                                        
941 ‘Vorrei cercare di cominciare dal principio, ammesso che il principio esista, perché… dove comincia la 
storia di una vita […] uno fa una cosa, e quella cosa che fa determina il corso della sua vita, ma quell’azione 
che compie è difficile che nasca per miracolo, era già dentro di lui, e chissà come era cominciata…’ 
(Tristano muore, p. 12). 
942 Ibid. p. 7. 
943 Quel che resta, p. 135.  
944 ‘Forse, sintetizzando molto, è il ritratto di una voce. […] La voce è il respiro, come dicono appunto i 
fonologi e i linguisti: la frase pronunciata oralmente è un sistema biologico che, come qualsiasi altra creatura, 
ha una nascita, una crescita, una stabilizzazione, una decrescita e una morte. […] Quindi, il parlare è, se tu 
vuoi, simbolicamente la vita’  (‘Una conversazione’, p. 87). 
945 For, Tristano contends, ‘ti sto insegnando che il tempo dell’orologio non va di pari passo con quello della 
vita’ (Tristano muore, p. 81). 
946 Ibid., pp. 11 and 82. 
947 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
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because of the latter’s ability to testify, to make sense of and render justice to the Italian 
post-war Resistance:  
 
[I]l tuo libro mi è piaciuto, davvero, è la più bella testimonianza su quel periodo eroico […] 
Testimonianza per modo di dire, perché tu non potevi esserci, ma è come se ci fossi stato, testimone 
di un clima, di una scelta, di una posizione etica. […] 
Che curioso, tu, in poche pagine, sei riuscito a essere ciò che una persona vera non fu mai in tutta la 
vita […] la verità si scrive e si sottoscrive.948 
 
In a way, Tristano eventually recognises that literature works on a different plane from 
official historical accounts in its search for truth; and still, it is precisely this belonging to 
the domain of potentiality rather than of actuality that prevents writing from being caught 
in a sterile, superficial ritual, which has also affected the functioning of justice:  
 
[E] processi tutti uguali a imputati tutti uguali, nel senso che non c’erano, gli imputati, c’erano i 
processi ma mancavano gli imputati, è curioso, no? ma in una democrazia è importante il fuori, mica 
il dentro, quello che conta è il rituale, poi se non ci sono gli imputati che ti frega?949  
 
This reinforces the assumption that, for Tabucchi, the ethical value of literary testimony 
differs from and denaturalises the form of legal truth. 
Secondly, the novel brings to its climax the reflection and dramatisation of the mutuality 
between voice and creaturality, which, for Tabucchi, forms the basis of every act of 
testimony. Interestingly, Tristano’s grandfather used to tell him, when he was just a child, 
that ‘la vita è fiato, ragazzino, in principio era il verbo, e i preti chissà cosa si son creduti, 
ma il verbo è fiato, ragazzino, nient’altro che respirazione’.950 
The presence of the voice is the only trace, for the reader, that Tristano is still alive and 
bearing witness to his life precisely in the moment when he is preparing to abandon it:  
 
Sei venuto qui a raccogliere una vita. Ma sai cosa raccogli? Parole. Aria, aria, amico mio, le parole 
sono suoni fatti d’aria. […] 
E invece il mondo è fatto di atti, azioni … cose concrete che però poi passano, perché l’azione, 
scrittore, si verifica, succede […] E per restare ci vogliono le parole che continuino a farla essere, 
che la testimonino. […] Il verbo non è al principio, è alla fine, scrittore. Ma chi testimonia per il 
testimone? Il punto è questo, nessuno testimonia per il testimone. […] … Ma nonostante quello che 
dicevo prima, su di te ho un vantaggio, amico, io sono voce, e la tua è solo scrittura, la mia è voce 
                                                        
948 Ibid., pp. 12 and 91. 
949 Ibid., p. 32. 
950 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
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… la scrittura è sorda… questi suoni che ora senti nell’aria sulla tua pagina moriranno, la scrittura li 
fissa e li uccide […] la scrittura è una voce fossile […] il simulacro di una voce… e invece quello 
che ti sto dicendo […] queste parole sono vive, perché sono il mio respiro, finché c’è… la voce è 
respire, scrittore, mettiti in ascolto.951 
 
On the discourse level, Tabucchi uses ellipses and blank spaces between irregular 
paragraphs as if his writing were capturing and moving alongside the waveforms of 
Tristano’s voice. After all, he is (also) a dying body slowly being devoured by gangrene, 
who is administered morphine, and this slow process of physical de-subjectification – 
matched by his becoming a subject of testimony – is mirrored in the body of the texts, in 
its losing and loosening of syntactical and thematic connections.  
The element of the voice (or lack thereof) also embodies and epitomises the dichotomy 
between the discursive, familiar screen of reality and the wound of a traumatic real; in 
particular, the former is peculiarly compared to ‘il bisbiglio di un confessore che dà 
consigli attraverso la grata di un confessionale, non pensare, ricordati di non pensare 
[…]’,952 thus stressing the nexus between the slumber anesthetising individuals and their 
sense of guilt and proclivity to admit their faults. Trauma is alluded to through ‘la 
sofferenza delle creature che non hanno voce, che poi siamo tutti noi, o quasi’.953 Hence, 
the protagonist tells the writer, 
 
Dunque, se un giorno una di quelle creature che guardi alla tivù del tuo salotto, una di quelle 
creature ridotte pelle e ossa, con la pancia come un tamburo e gli occhi pieni di mosche uscisse dal 
televisore e si materializzasse davanti a te, sai cosa dovresti dirle […] Gli devi dire, parla, amico, 
parla, tu sei un uomo libero, la tua parola è sacra e nessuno può distruggere la tua parola, e questa è 
la vera libertà. […] [P]arla, la mia civiltà te lo permette, tu sei qui per parlare, devi parlare, apri la 
bocca, scaccia le mosche dalla bocca e parla.954 
 
As for the third element, namely the temporal functioning of history as such as a sort of 
uncanny survival, similarly to Sostiene Pereira, as the title suggests, Tristano muore is a 
novel entirely developed in the present tense. Yet it is, once again, an uncanny one, in that 
it entails a non-coincidence with the historical phase that the protagonist inhabits, which 
makes it possible for him to topologically renegotiate his position as subject: like Pereira, 
Tristano is posthumous to himself. This is why his actual death lies outside the plot; in a 
                                                        
951 Ibid., p. 118 and pp. 155-56. 
952 Ibid., p. 129. 
953 Ibid., p. 72. 
954 Ibid., p. 92. 
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way, it is as if he had begun to die the moment he decided to rebel, in Greece, against 
Fascism, and which marks the chronological starting point of his entire story. One should 
also consider, from this perspective, the (apparent) oxymoron of the title and the subtitle 
Tristano muore. Una vita, as Tristano dies in life, i.e. he becomes a witness only because 
he survives, and he moves after and beyond life in the approaching of death. As a 
superstes, he outlives himself and can now become a witness.  
 
 
5.4 From Testimony to Testament  
 
During his final months, Tabucchi was working on a new text that, as the widow Maria 
José de Lancastre explains in the introduction to the posthumous publication of the 
incomplete draft,955 was based on the memory of a writer’s friend who, during Salazar’s 
regime, was a student in linguistics. One day, her professor decided to organise a trip to do 
some fieldwork in order to study a number of almost forgotten properties of the Portuguese 
language; yet,  
 
[M]entre interrogavano un’anziana donna […] si cominciarono a sentire delle grida terribili nel 
villaggio – grida di donne disperate, acutissime e quasi inumane, in un coro da tragedia greca, che 
penetravano negli animi come ferro rovente. Si seppe subito che la causa era stata l’arrivo di un 
telegramma che comunicava la morte in guerra (la guerra coloniale in Africa) di un giovane del 
villaggio, forse l’ennesima morte. […] La vecchia era la nonna del ragazzo morto e, nonostante 
tutto, continuò a sillabare vocaboli dentro il registratore.956 
 
There is an uncanny coincidence between the old lady that keeps pronouncing obsolete 
sounds on the recorder machine, and this writing that survives Tabucchi’s own voice, 
functioning as a sort of final witnessing or testament. And, in effect, the text, which stops 
before the diegetic recording process begins, is entirely developed around the relationship 
between body and language. Thus the narrator establishes a difference between the two, for 
‘la lingua galleggia su queste miserie umane, la lingua è leggera, è fatta di parole, sono 
aria, l’aria non ha niente a che vedere con le sofferenze del corpo, le piaghe e il sangue. 
[…] La lingua no, non la puoi torturare’.957 Nonetheless, he then observes how, to become 
individual experience, to practically enter language and constitute himself as a subject, 
                                                        
955 Clearly, it is essential to stress that posthumous works are published without the author’s imprimatur. 
956 E finalmente arrivò il settembre (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2015), Amazon Kindle e-book (Preface, para 3, 
location 9). 
957 Ibid., (Chapter 1, para 3, location 48). 
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man needs to physically articulate his own voice, thus crossing the threshold between the 
two:  
 
Bisogna che delle persone, uomini e donne, e bambini, le parlino con delle corde vocali che sono gli 
strumenti della fonazione, e che le formulino con la glottide, che è fatta di mortale cartilagine, 
creature come te e come me, che oggi siamo e domani non siamo più, perescibili, mortali e 
vulnerabili.958  
 
Yet Tabucchi’s text, exploring an attempted experimentum linguae, also contains an 
oblique reflection on the role of testimony as historical survival. First, the fieldwork takes 
place in what is defined as ‘un villaggio di sopravvissuti’,959 people who are disconnected 
from and have outlived history and their own existence, who have collapsed and exited 
chronological time, inhabiting the fissure opened up between their lives and the historical 
context to which they should belong. Furthermore, if, as Firmino in La testa perduta 
demonstrates, even language can be an instrument of subjugation, this text describes – but 
fails at – an almost violent appropriation of the other’s voice: ‘noi raccoglievamo le voci 
per studiarle’.960 This ultimately confirms the value of these voices as, perhaps, a final 
space of resistance, of difference and uncanny semiotic opening within the taking place of 
language – and of literature – itself.  
Remaining incomplete, the text cannot capture and objectify the other’s voice, which is 
brought to its linguistic, literary verge only in the form of a nonsaturated potentiality. 
Tabucchi’s writing, once again following in Orpheus’s footsteps, can testify to and for the 
other, to the extent to which it produces and signifies the other’s withdrawal. Death opens 
up his and the other’s voice to the space of a potential intention to signify that survives its 










958 Ibid., (Chapter 1, para 3, location 58). 
959 Ibid., (Chapter 3, para 4, location 130). 
960 Ibid., (Chapter 3, para 4, location 135). 
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To summarise: 
• Testimony is the way in which Tabucchi and his characters try to signify for the 
other, i.e. to give voice to who has been denied the possibility to speak. 
• Testimony is also, always, a moment of confession, as Tabucchi and his characters 
try to move from being detached observes toward being actively involved 
witnesses. Thus, testimony takes place in a sort of critical distance from and 
defamiliarisation of reality. 
• As such, testimony is the only form of ethical commitment available to postmodern 
literature. 
• Central to Tabucchi’s testimony is the motif of the body, either positively (as what 
stands for the unique voice and presence of the other, the author or the text) or 




























This research project forms an interrogative journey that departs from familiar 
theorisations of the uncanny and proceeds to delve into Agamben’s philosophy in order to 
present a reading of Tabucchi intended to describe and circumscribe, topologically rather 
than chronologically, how and why certain narrative modes and motifs appear in his texts. 
However it cannot reach a definitive conclusion. How, then, can we balance the opening 
force inherent in the uncanny with the opposite movement of a conclusion that, by 
definition, encloses precisely by leaving something out? If, as Royle contends, every text 
about the uncanny has always already started, so to speak, and a preface is therefore both 
‘part of and separated from […] what follows’, 961 one might also ‘conclude’that every 
discourse about the unheimliche has always already ended. For, having already moved 
somewhere else, it never reaches its conclusion; it has no proper end, at most it can be said 
to have an end-ing.962 The unheimliche is extimate to its own conclusion. 
 
Although the question of the uncanny in Tabucchi has no closure – one can never really 
pin down exactly what the uncanny is in and for the writer, but solely follow and trace how 
it is produced and articulated in, through and by his texts – it somehow fulfils itself, as 
unveiling ‘the unanswerability of the question of the uncanny is the answer to that 
question’.963 That is, investigating the enabling conditions, limits and extent to which it is 
possible to talk about a poetics of the uncanny in Tabucchi’s works, tracking its 
movements and configurations, rather than providing an ultimate, neat definition of the 
concept or a catalogue of its manifestations, is the kind of critical response the unheimliche 
itself demands. The uncanny is, topologically speaking, a field of tensions, an interplay-ing 
of different lines of force, and not a gradual, but linear saturation of sense.  
Withy observes, however, that 
 
                                                        
961 Royle, p. vii. 
962 There is thus a quest(ion) of sense in Tabucchi as well as another, parallel one – this research project – 
surrounding the writer’s poetics. It is no coincidence that the terms ‘quest’ and ‘question’ have the same 
etymological root: the Latin verb ‘quaero’ meaning to ask, to search for information. For, both in Tabucchi’s 
work and in my journey around and through his texts, moving takes the form of an interrogation and going 
forward signifies opening up further critical perspectives.  
963 Withy, p. 240. 
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[C]laiming that a question cannot be answered is not sufficient; we have yet to pose the question of 
the uncanny and to get clear on precisely what is question-worthy in it. In pursuing the question 
worthiness of uncanniness we seek not an answer but a better understanding of the question and its 
force as a question. The goal is to make uncanniness intelligible as unintelligible. […] The closure 
of the investigation of uncanniness must thus be the openness of a question.964 
 
This is why, to end this enquiry into Tabucchi’s poetics, I will try to explain why an 
investigation into the author’s uncanny is worthwhile, as well as illuminating some 
possible directions its further questioning might take. In effect, existing literature, despite 
having detected a presence of the Freudian unheimliche in the writer – even an ‘assedio del 
perturbante’ –, 965  has not developed this observation into a wider reading and 
problematisation of Tabucchi’s poetics.966 It has been my aim in this thesis to fill this gap, 
through a comprehensive analysis of Tabucchi’s works and a descriptive interpretation of 
                                                        
964 Ibid., pp. 204-05. 
965 Giorgio Bertone, ‘Antonio Tabucchi: Il viaggio, il tempo. Ipotesi costruttive (appunti provvisori e non 
rivisti)’, in Antonio Tabucchi narrateur. Actes de la journée d'études (Paris, 17 novembre 2006). Nouvelle 
édition revue et augmentée du texte inédit de la première leçon du cours donné par Antonio Tabucchi au 
Collège de France en 2003 (Paris: Cahiers de l'Hôtel de Galliffet, 2012), pp. 73-97 (p. 90). 
966 Dolfi sees in Tabucchi, ‘sulle copertine dei suoi romanzi, l’apparizione di quella che con un termine 
freudiano si potrebbe chiamare Das Unheimliche, l’inquiétante étrangeté […] inquietante estraneità [… 
distinguishing] [i] luoghi, i personaggi, gli oggetti’ in his texts (Tabucchi, la specularità, pp. 211-14). For the 
scholar, this points to Tabucchi’s ability to reveal ‘il senso nascosto delle cose mettendo in azione quella che 
con Freud vorrei chiamare l’unheimliche, l’inquiétante étrangeté, quella sensazione perturbante e irrisolta 
che porta alle soglie di una possibile verità senza mai rivelarla’ (Gli oggetti, p. 59). Burns retrieves in 
Tabucchi’s stories about childhood traumas, such as ‘I pomeriggi del sabato’, ‘something precisely 
unheimlich [… wherein] domestic security was ruptured by the intrusion of behaviour which was unfamiliar’ 
(Fragments of Impegno, p. 64). Analogously, Palmieri ascribes to ‘I pomeriggi del sabato’ a ‘connotazione 
[…] inquietante e perturbante […] nel senso del perturbante freudiano’ (Piccole finzioni, p. 157). Both 
Amigoni and Lazzarin associate the presence of the Freudian uncanny in Tabucchi’s work with the genre of 
the fantastic: if Ferdinando Amigoni, in Fantasmi del novecento (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2004, pp. 141-
45), considers the uncanny solely as a thematic repertoire, Lazzarin describes it as the principle underpinning 
the practice of ‘rovescio’, which constitutes Tabucchi’s ‘legame fra il narratore fantastico e lo scrittore 
impegnato’ (14). In La quête de la vérité dans ‘Il se fait de plus en plus tard’ d’Antonio Tabucchi (Paris: Le 
Manuscrit, 2005), Margaux Kobialka compares the tension in Tabucchi’s writing between realism and the 
emergence of a disquieting, unreal dimension to the Freudian unheimliche (p. 10). Significantly, while 
Burigana reads Tabucchi’s opus as ‘un’immersione rapida nell’inquietante’, recognising, although very 
briefly, that ‘essere inquieti vuol dire ricercare. E la poetica dell’Inquietudine è l’unica poetica che si può 
avere oggi’ (Piccole finzioni, p. 156), Pocci highlights the presence, specifically in Tabucchi’s 1980s fictions, 
of an ‘uncanny and haunting past’ (409) through which the writer refuses and resists the cultural ‘anything 
goes’ characterising the decade. 
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his poetics. The main risk inherent in this critical study might seem to be that of imposing 
a strong interpretative hypothesis upon the physiognomy of the writer’s works. However, 
keeping with the spirit of the uncanny, the analysis is intended to be unsaturated and open-
ended. To this end, I have tried, on the one hand, to combine a theoretical reflection with 
close reading, attempting to isolate the dominating pathways, recurrent features and 
structuring modes in Tabucchi, with an investigation of major and lesser-known fictional, 
hybrid and theoretical texts. On the other hand, however, there is more to be investigated 
and pursued still, and the present journey around and into Tabucchi’s poetics of the 
uncanny elicits and paves the way for further research.  
 
 
Answers to Be Questioned 
 
The introduction argued that exploring Tabucchi’s uncanny poetics was a legitimate and 
necessary task. In hindsight, I would add that the mode in which this thesis engages with 
the topic is also intended to be original, comprehensive and consistent: it is original 
because it is largely based on a theoretical tool, Agamben’s conceptualisation of the 
uncanny, which finds its first systematic elaboration and discussion here; and it is 
comprehensive and consistent since Tabucchi’s uncanny is addressed as (a matter of) 
poetics, thus in an attempt to encompass all its manifold occurrences within and through 
the writer’s fiction and non-fiction writings. 
The present research project takes its cue from the observation of two undisputable, 
interrelated facts. First, the uncanny is present; there is a presence of the uncanny in the 
works of Tabucchi. Second, this is not necessarily and solely equivalent to Freud’s 
unheimliche – and this is where/why Agamben comes in. To begin with, there are three 
different levels or dimensions in which the uncanny comes to be present in Tabucchi’s 
opus. The first is of a diegetic nature (the uncanny in Tabucchi), as characters undergo 
experiences of sense-withdrawal and revelation. One might think, for example, of Capitano 
Sesto and Tristano, to whom the uncanny generates an estranging possibility of unsaturated 
signification, fracturing the thick density of familiar reality and orienting them towards 
narrative activity. Next we have the textual or narrative level (the uncanny through 
Tabucchi), on which the unheimliche functions as the movement that each time structures 
his texts as a play, reversal or testimony. Lastly, one finds a theoretical reflection on the 
concept in the writer (the uncanny and Tabucchi), where ‘Inquietudine’ emerges as an 
idiosyncratic, ineluctable figure and (literary) style of the past century. 
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A discussion of poetics, therefore, explains the manner in which I have tried to gather and 
bring these three dimensions into correlation and mutual dialogue, illuminating how one 
resonates with(in) the other, and showing how the uncanny constitutes at the same time the 
content, form and function of Tabucchi’s writing. For, what forms the basis of and binds 
this threefold articulation of the unheimliche is a communal view of literature as an 
interrogative mechanism of sense making. 
This re-thinking of literature as a distinctive practice for producing meaning is implicit in 
the question (which he calls ‘interrogazione metafisica’ or ‘desiderio metafisico’ or 
‘necessità religiose’) Tabucchi asks throughout his opus, and which he posits to the reader. 
This is a quest(ion) of sense: in what ways is it possible to live authentically, to live a 
meaningful life? Or, to put it otherwise, what is the sense of one’s existence? 
From Spino’s interrogation ‘Piangi? Chi era Ecuba?’,967 to the narrator of ‘Il gioco del 
rovescio’ asking Maria do Carmo ‘tu vedi il rovescio del quadro, che cosa si vede da 
codesta parte?’,968 and Tristano wondering doubtfully whether if it was worth it, from the 
ash circles traced by Volturno in Tabucchi’s debut novel Piazza d’Italia969 to those drawn 
in the sand in the posthumous Per Isabel, his characters experience episodes of world- and 
self-withdrawal. Such experiences nonetheless function as ontological epiphanies within 
diegesis and as clues to Tabucchi’s poetics, reminding us that he explicitly describes his 
own writing as disquieting and interrogative. Characters see how the sense of life lies in 
how one makes sense of it, and, consequently, their – and the text’s – playing, dreaming, 
and witnessing come to the fore as gestures, forms and formulations of the unheimliche, 
mechanisms of meaning creation rather than meanings in themselves. Yet this is precisely 
what the uncanny is about: it disturbs signs and signification, albeit in order to articulate a 
diverse semiosis. 
                                                        
967 Il filo, p. 97. 
968 Il gioco, p. 24. 
969 ‘Volturno continuò a crescere acquattato nel buio della sua prigione, rifiutando il mondo, disegnando 
figure sulla cenere con un bastoncino’ (Piazza d’Italia, p. 23). Similarly, in Per Isabel ‘il Violinista Matto 
[…] prese il suo archetto e disegnò sulla sabbia un piccolo cerchio’ (p. 114). What is the sense and 
significance of this gesture? A possible answer might be found in the following passage from Tristano 
muore: ‘La vita non è in ordine alfabetico come credete voi […] è un mucchietto di sabbia, e qual è il 
granello che sostiene l’altro? […] [P]erché quel mucchietto non ubbidisce alle leggi della fisica, togli il 
granello che credevi non sorreggesse niente e crolla tutto, la sabbia scivola, si appiattisce e non ti resta altro 
che farci ghirigori col dito […] e poi un giorno il dito si ferma da sé, non ce la fa più a fare ghirigori, sulla 
sabbia c’è un tracciato strano, un disegno senza logica e senza costrutto, e ti viene un sospetto, che il senso di 
tutta quella roba lì erano i ghirigori’ (p. 139, italicised). 
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Wondering what is the sense of one’s existence, for Tabucchi, signifies questioning the 
manners in which it can be made meaningful, exploring the mode in which human beings 
can become creators of meaning. This question is twice uncanny: first because it is about 
man’s uncanniness, in that it reveals how the essence of human beings is that of producing 
sense, although poetically, that is in a non-consequential, interrogative, unsaturated mode; 
and second since it is uncannily formulated: its answerability coincides with the 
interrogative gesture. In a way, Tabucchi answers it by paraphrasing it: he gives no 
solution, because it is a question that cannot and does not aim to have one. One can live 
authentically, experience a life full of sense, solely when and to the extent to which one 
questions the way in which it can be signified. Clearly, one way to do so is through 
literature. For, literature, questioning pre-given meanings and familiar practices of 
signification, at the same time posits itself as a unique sense making discourse.  
 
As for the second element from which this research issues, the fact that Tabucchi’s 
uncanny is not reducible to the Freudian one is pivotal to understanding the reasons and 
consequent significance of reading the writer’s poetics alongside and through Agamben’s 
thinking on the uncanny. Using Agamben to examine Tabucchi has an inner justification in 
the latter’s work as well as an outer one.  
First, both in his fictional and more speculative texts, Tabucchi tries to focus, isolate, 
observe and describe this ‘Inquietudine’, the pervasive presence of which he perceives in 
his writing as well as in the literary style, moods and reflections of the past century. 
However, both his narrative and his theoretical analyses reveal how the writer’s efforts to 
pursue clarity and exactitude ultimately result in a movement that enlarges, multiplies and 
connects, in a sort of critical constellation, terms, motifs and intuitions as distinctive as 
those of the reverse, the saudade, the sense of guilt, play, and so forth. In his attempt to 
domesticate his uncanny (and that of others), Tabucchi comes to realise that this cannot be 
done, let alone straightaway and linearly. This is why, although he explicitly recognises in 
(his reading of) Freud an essential source for every discourse about the uncanny, Tabucchi 
feels compelled to expand the space and magnify the angle of his perspective on the 
subject. Pessoa, nocturne, absurdist literature and all those other images and figures 
Tabucchi introduces into his reflection, are revealing of how, for him, the unheimliche is 
not reducible to a catalogue of themes or forms. Tabucchi demands and incessantly seeks a 
different (non)conceptualisation of the uncanny, whose effects and manifestations he 
detects and produces in his own literary experience. 
Second, although Agamben moves from and inside a philosophical concern and dimension, 
he reaches an understanding of the uncanny, and of the literary uncanny, which noticeably 
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converges with Tabucchi’s thought and helps to illuminate the complexity of the latter, in 
particular the worldview underpinning Tabucchi’s poetics.  Using Agamben in reading 
Tabucchi lets emerge a philosophical enquiry within his works that would remain 
otherwise overlooked. Tabucchi’s philosophical enquiry is precisely the uncanny 
emergence of signification itself in literature (the uncanny as poetics), in relation to the 
ontological (or metaphysical) view of men as creators of sense. 
As already stated, at present, it is possible to prove neither a direct influence of Agamben’s 
texts – especially of Stanze – on Tabucchi nor the fact that the writer knew or directly read 
the philosopher. Nonetheless, it is no small coincidence that, working on a short story 
about Walter Benjamin in his final months, provisionally entitled ‘Il piccolo gobbo’, 
Tabucchi kept on his workstation, as a daily presence, the latest version of Benjamin’s 
Berlin Childhood around 1900, which was based on the manuscripts Agamben himself had 
discovered at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (‘BNF’), and which, therefore, 
evidences a somewhat cultural and theoretical proximity.970  
It is possible to read solely the initial page of Tabucchi’s draft, which stages the encounter, 
taking place at the BNF, between Benjamin and the fictional character Archibold, who 
introduces himself as the ‘Direttore della Biblioteca Universale […] Vengo da Auschwitz. 
È un luogo in cui mi hanno fluidificato. Per questo ho assunto il compito di Direttore della 
Biblioteca dell’Universo’.971 The reference to Auschwitz might suggest a further, ethical 
development of the story, perhaps in the form of a testimony, in which literature becomes a 
sort of meta-archive – a ‘Registro dei Registri’,972 as Archibold calls it – for what cannot 
be finally archived, an unlimited clearing for signification. However, what is most relevant 
is that, in the draft, Tabucchi sketches two of his most effective, idiosyncratic uncanny 
figures: Archibold is described as ‘un ometto dall’aspetto buffo, vestito in maniera 
stravagante, con […] una bombetta foderata di tela cerata che aveva posato sul tavolo e 
sulla quale faceva [sic] disegnava con l’indice dei ghirigori’,973 thus repeating the same 
gesture made by Volturno, the fiddler or Tristano, and which, as aforementioned, 
epitomises the occurrence of uncanny sense making; as for Benjamin, facing his 
unexpected guest, he undergoes an experience of sense- and self-withdrawal:  
 
                                                        
970 ‘Dossier Antonio Tabucchi’, ed. by Sandra Teroni, Genesis, 37 (2013), pp. 189-99. Agamben is, in effect, 
one of the most important scholars of Benjamin and his Italian editor. 




L’aria di curiosità di Ben si era trasformata in una stupefazione infantile. Raramente, nei momenti 
più forti di estraneità da se stesso, le sue labbra carnose si allontanavano [sic] distaccavano l’una 
dall’altra creando sul suo volto quell’espressione di bambino che sta sognando da sveglio; ma ora 
quell’espressione congenita era emersa tutta, era uno sbigottimento.974 
 
Interestingly, the quote includes a semantic cluster of expressions – ‘stupefazione 
infantile’, ‘estraneità’, ‘sognando da sveglio’, ‘sbigottimento’ – which may all be ascribed 
to Tabucchi’s poetics of the uncanny. This is revealing of two things: a pivotal, proven 
commonality of interests, sources and readings between Tabucchi and Agamben; and a 
concern with the unheimliche that was far from over in the latest, still unpublished writings 
by Tabucchi.  
 
 
Questions to Be Answered 
 
As suggested above, exploring Tabucchi’s uncanny poetics is a journey in fieri with no end 
in sight. In particular, I think this study opens up two main possible routes for further 
research and analysis: one is internal to the writer, and is linked to the number of his still 
unpublished works, which would shed innovative light on his poetics and literary figure; 
the other is somewhat external, as it might call into question all the authors, concepts and 
motifs Tabucchi discusses and touches upon in his theoretical problematisation and 
fictional articulation of the uncanny.  
 
This thesis opened with the following questions: what does it mean to talk about a poetics 
of the uncanny within Tabucchi’s oeuvre? To what extent, on what conditions and in what 
ways is it possible to do so? In the end, what I have tried to demonstrate is that, far from 
being two disjointed interrogations, these questions answer each other. For, talking about a 
poetics of the uncanny in Tabucchi means recognising, within his writing, a question, a 
search for and an interrogation of sense; yet this act of recognition, or critical response, can 
take place solely as a quest(ion) of sense itself. Inquiring into the meaning of Tabucchi’s 
literary experience ultimately implies and demands a reflection on the ways in which it can 
be signified. Tabucchi’s literature is uncannily interrogative and disquieting because it 
intends and wants its question to become ours.  
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